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INTRODUCTION 
Set out in the following pages is th~complete collection of 
the executive summaries of the basic reports conducted for the 
research programme on the "costs of non-Europe" which was 
launched in 1986 and completed early 1988. 
The programme's reports, funded by the European Commission, 
sought to establish the present costs of the European 
Community's market fragmentation- and thus the potential 
benefits from their removal - by analysing the impact of market 
barriers, and by comparing with the North American experience. 
The costs inherent in these barriers were examined both in 
reports dealing with the principal horizontal barriers impeding 
market integration, and in those studying the impact of 
specifie examples of barriers in representative sectors of the 
Community's service and manufacturing economy. 
The reports, while supervised by Commission officiais, were 
conducted by independent consultants, who are thus responsible 
for the findings set out in them. 
Common to all reports was the unprecedented nature of the 
research task. This created novel methodological challenges 
encountered in assessing non-Europe's present costs, and thus 
the potential gains to be had from market integration. Two 
symposia held between the consultants and the Commission in May 
and October, 1987, were essential to the project's 
methodological and indeed overall coherence. 
To these challenges was added another : the project's 
geographical scope. In view of material constraints, studies 
could not embrace all twelve Community countries. However, data 
on the four largest EEC economies provided a common empirical 
core for systematic analysis. Despite the fragilities, the 
stories told by these various reports are complementary and 
convergent, and their message to the politicians unmistakeable. 
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SUMMARY OF OVERALL FINDINGS 
There are widely quoted estimates of the costs of customs barriers applying to trade in 
goods between Members of the European Community which have tended to have either little clear 
empirical basis or they have been extrapolated from evidence which relates to American experience 
severa! years ago in very different circumstances. 
The present study, initiated by the Directorate General for the Internai Market and Industrial 
Affairs, is intended to provide estimates of: 
• the costs to fmns of compliance with customs formalities; 
• the costs to govemment of administering the procedures; 
• an estima te of the opportunity cost to the Community; 
• the economie significance of services in the customs related sector. 
The fmdings discussed below are ali subject to a range of assumptions, limitations imposed 
by the size and coverage of the sample, and the extent of available official data, as indicated in each 
of the earlier sections of this report. While therefore the results need to be interpreted with caution 
they do represent the frrst attempt to obtain comprehensive empirical evidence on the customs costs 
of 'non Europe', which they confrrm to be of considerable significance. 
With these caveats in mind, the estimates presented below suggest that: 
• the costs to frrms of customs procedures might be in the area of: 
7 112 billion ECU for administrative costs, and a further 415-830 million ECU 
for delay related costs; 
• costs to govemment might amount to 500-1000 million ECU; 
• the economie significance of the customs sector in terms of its turnover might be of the 
order of 11!2 billion ECU; 
• turning to lost trade, where the estimates need to be treated with particular caution, firms' 
opinions imply that trade could rise by in the region of3/4- 3%, or 3 3/4- 15 billion ECU. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Non-Europe: Customs 
The 1985 Commission White Paper 'Completing The Internai Market' recalled that the 
Treaty of Rome envisaged the creation of a single integrated Community market within which there 
would be the free movement of goods. 
Although a common extemal customs tariff had been adopted, the White Paper emphasised 
that severa! physical, technical and fiscal barriers remain. Physical barriers, in the form of 
Customs posts, are the most visible example of continued division in the Community. Frontier 
controls contribute to the costs and disadvantages of a divided market and the White Paper argued 
that their removal is essential for the completion of the internai market. 
The White Paper recognised that frontier controls exist to ensure the enforcement of 
national policies on such matters as immigration control, health and safety regulation, the taxation 
of goods, the collection of trade statistics, the control of drugs and terrorism, and of the Common 
Agricultural Policy with respect to monetary compensation amounts. The White Paper said the 
"objective is not merely to simplify existing procedures, but to do away with internai controls in 
their entirety". 
Completing the internai market: The 1992 Target 
The Single European Act, which came into effect on 1 July 1987, states: 
"The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the 
internai market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992 ... The internai market shall 
comprise an area without internai frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons 
and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty". 
By 1992 the Commission intends that Member States will agree on the abolition of barriers 
of ali kinds, harmonisation of rules, approximation of legislation and tax structures, strengthening 
of monetary co-operation and the necessary measures to encourage European firms to work 
together. 
It was against this background that the present study of the costs of customs controls was 
initiated by the Commission of the European Communities. 
The costs may be divided into: 
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• the financial costs to fmns of the administrative procedures and of the dela ys associated 
with compliance with customs fonnalities; 
• the opportunity costs of lost trade; and 
• the costs of administering customs con trois borne by national government agencies. 
Previous Estimates of costs 
Previous attempts to quantify the costs of customs formalities have had to be made without 
the benefit of direct evidence from the frrms and national administrations concerned. It is also a 
feature of severa! previously published estimates that their precise source is difficult to establish. 
The 1981 report from the Commission to the Council on "The State of the Internai Market" (COM 
(81) 313) simply states " ... these procedures increase the costs of goods by around 5-10%". ln 
1983 Commissioner Narjes on behalf of the Commission said of customs formalities that "they are 
calculated in business circles to account for 5 to 7 per cent of the priee of the goods traded 
"(Kangaroo News, February 1983). The Patterson Report to the Economie and Monetary 
Committee of the European Parliament (31 May 1985, Document A 2-50/85/B) quotes the 
estimates in the Albert and Bali Report ("Towards European Economie Recovery" European 
Parliament Working Document, 1983), which estimates the total costs of Non-Europe at 50 billion 
ECU or 2% of GNP, of which 12 billion ECU is attributed to the costs of crossing frontiers; 
Albert and Bali quote as their source Commission document to Council (COM (83) 80) which 
quotes the Economie and Monetary Affairs Committee of the Parliament as a source and states that 
preliminary c~culations by the Commission suggest that the cost of these formalities could be 
equal to between 5% and 10% of the actual value of goods traded. 
In short the source for each official estimate quoted above is either another official 
document or "business circ les" or not stated, rather th an a primary source su ch as a survey of 
frrms. 
In fact the basic source of ali these estimates appears to be a 1971 study by the US National 
Committee on International Trade Documentation. That study suggested that the costs of exporting 
and importi.ng could each amount to 7 percent of the value of goods traded, or 14 per cent in total. 
Estimates of comparable EC costs of up to 10 per cent have been derived from the US figures after 
making certain adjustments: assuming that costs of about 4 per cent arise anyway for domestic 
trade. This is sometimes further reduced to 5-7 per cent in view of the greater simplification of 
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procedures which traders in the Community face than existed in 1971 for US frrms, and because 
the US estimates included fmancing and insurance charges as well as customs compliance costs. 
A recent report to the UN Economie Commission for Europe ("Methodology for Estimating 
Costs and Benefits of Trade Facilitation", 31 December 1986) argued that the US figures are 
quoted out of context, that they are out of date, and that they were grossed up from data of variable 
quality supplied by a possibly unrepresentative sample of frrms, by an unclear methodology. They 
included all documentation costs (for instance, fmance and shipping as well as customs) relating to 
US trade with the rest of the World, with which US trading relationships can be subject to much 
more complex control than exist currently within the EC. In particular, EC customs authorities are 
more co-operative than hitherto, their inspections are more selective; techniques for document 
preparation and processing have improved; comprehensive, competitively priced services by agents 
have helped to eut costs. 
The degree of seriousness of the effect of administrative formalities on trade has therefore 
been a matter of conjecture. 
The study for the British Overseas Trade Board stated that "successful exporters- almost 
without exception, dismissed such matters as customs procedures and export documentation as 
nothing more than an administrative nuisance". However other firms fmd either the prospect of 
complying with customs formalities, or their initial attempts to comply with such formalities, off-
putting. 
A study carried out among a sample of frrms in Germany (by DIHT) suggested, on the 
basis of "fragmentary and inconsistent" information there is little relationship between compliance 
costs and the value of goods traded. The suggestion that the compliance costs facing frrms is 
unrelated to the value of goods traded implies that exports of small value consignments, and by 
smaller frrms, will bear a disproportionately high cost burden. It follows that, if the above 
impression is correct that the deterrent effect of frontier barri ers will be greater for smaller than for 
very large frrms. But it also implies that customs costs will tend to be a small proportion of the 
value of large consignments and of exports by larger firms. A recent study for the British 
Overseas Trade Board ("Into active Exporting" 1987) says "In terms of aggregate value, exports 
are dominated by a small number of large frrms." 
It would seem to follow from the German and British studies quoted above that if customs 
compliance costs are a low proportion of the value of exports by large frrms, then because large 
firms dominate trade, compliance costs will be a low proportion of the actual value of trade. 
Nevertheless: 
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• the burden on smaller fmns may be such that the opportunity for potential trade by small 
fmns is lost; 
• the impact on marginal decisions by larger fmns on whether or not to export will be 
important if customs costs are a significant proportion of profit margins; 
• although customs barriers are not insurmountable they are only overcome at a cost. 
It is clear from the discussion above that accurate, relevant information above the costs of 
'Non Europe' customs barriers need to be established. To the extent that the costs of 'Non 
Europe' are passed on to consumers in the form of higher priees, the costs of consumption are 
raised. Furthermore, the value of trade, output and employment will be reduced both because 
costs of trading within the EC are higher than they need be and because at least sorne fmns are 
inhibited from trading because of their perception of the barriers imposed by customs formalities. 
The loss of trade, output and employment does not arise solely because trade within the 
Community is lower than it otherwise would be; the cost-raising effect on customs formalities 
reduces Europe's competitiveness vis a vis the rest of the world. 
Initiation of the E& W Study: The Issues 
The present study was initiated by the Directorate General for the Internai Market and 
Industrial Affairs to estimate, with the co-operation of firms and national administrations, the costs 
of 'Non Europe' created by customs formalities. 
The purposes of the study are to identify the barriers to intra-community code resulting 
from customs formalities and to measure: 
• the costs borne by firms including: 
the administrative costs of complying with customs formalities; 
costs associated with the delays caused by customs procedures; 
• the opportunity costs, that is the foregone exports and imports for firms 
including the costs on entry to another Community market; 
• the budgetary cost to public authorities of customs formalities; 
• the economie importance of the customs-related sector. 
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The Approach 
The information to be obtained needed to cover: 
• a range of countries; 
• a sample of finns, by interview; 
• a range of commodities; 
• imports and exports. 
The countries chosen (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom) 
together account for 90 per cent by value of the internai trade of the EEC. 
In view of the Commission's particular interest in the problems of small and medium sized 
fmns (SMEs) the sample was to be constructed to give particular emphasis to industries in which 
they are important. But to the extent that trade is dominated by large fmns it needs to be borne in 
mind that the costs to SMEs might not be typical of trade as a whole. 
Three detailed questionnaires were devised following pilot testing requesting information 
on: 
• costs of customs procedures to finns; 
• road haulage dela ys and restrictions on competition; 
• freight forwarders/customs agents. 
The sample 
Over 2,500 fmns were approached by Ernst & Whinney offices in the six countries 
concerned, over 2,000 questionnaires were sent out and our staff interviewed 467. Details of 
internai costings and trade values were obtained from 267 for imports and 224 for exports. The 
sample accounts 0.8 percent of intra-EEC trade. Summary data on the sample are shown at 
Annex 1. 
Ernst & Whinney decided to telephone the offices of the chief executives of fmns before 
sending them the questionnaires, to exp lain the importance of the survey, in order to improve the 
response rate. 
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Limitations on the response rate are attributable to the considerable degree of detail sought, 
which was time-consuming for the fmns to provide, the fact that a number of other surveys of the 
same subject had already been undertak:en in Ital y (where response from small fmns was low). 
Within the rime and resources available for this study we have been unable to establish how 
representative the sample is in terms of its size structure of fmns in each sort of commodity trade in 
each country. 
Small and medium sized fmns are proportionately numerous in our sample (because of the 
Commission's interest in them), and probably to a greater extent than in intra-Community trade as 
a whole. 
Weighting the Sample Data 
The sample results needed to be 'grossed up' to obtain estima tes of total costs in the sample 
countries and the EC as a who le. In order to do this the sample results were 'weighted', to take 
into account the share of each industry in each country's trade, each country's share in total EC 
trade in that industry, each country's share in ali EC trade, each industry's share in total trade in the 
sample countries. 
Adding lmport and Export Costs 
In order to arrive at the total costs to fi s of compliance with customs controls the separate 
costs for importing and exporting in each fi in each country need to be established and then 
added. An international trading transaction inv Ives the preparation of customs documentation in 
the exporting country and in the importing co ntry, so the total cost of customs documentation 
compliance is the sum of these costs. For ex pie, if someone in one country buys a car from 
someone in another contry they each have to co plete customs documents. This point needs to be 
stressed to avoid misunderstanding. 
Gross Costs 
Finally is should be noted that our re · t was to establish the total costs of con trois and 
procedures administered by customs on the ass mption that they are ali avoidable. To the extent 
that any controls remain after 1992 the actual c t saving will be lower than those estimated below, 
but it was not our task to analyse this (largely p litical) issue. 
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COST TO FIRMS 
Introduction 
The intention was to obtain as much information as possible about: 
• the nature of the costs borne by fmns (internai administration costs, including staff, 
computers, overheads, agents' fees, delay related costs, excessive inventories and any 
other costs regarded as significant); 
• the way in which these costs varied according to: 
fums' size; 
connnoditiestrade~ 
the value of consignments; 
the means of transport used; 
countries concerne~ 
• the use of simplified customs procedures; 
• the expected impact on costs of the new Single Administrative Document; 
• the impact on trade expected if ail customs fonnalities were abolished within the EC; 
• fmn's views on the main source of difficulty posed by official procedures. 
Overall results of Ernst & Whinney Survey 
The average cost per consignment (including internai costs and agents fees) to firms in the 
sample was found to be in the region of approximately 65-85 ECU, or 0.7-0.8 percent of value, 
for imports and exports respectively. In round terms the combined costs for both imports and 
exports could amount to 11!2 percent of the value of internai Connnunity trade, or in the region of 
1112 billion ECU (but see below). 
To this delay related costs need to be added (see below), these might amount to 415-830 
million ECU for road haulage. 
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As a proportion of the value of tra e and as a contribution to costs and priees, the 
administrative costs of customs formalities lower than those previously quoted in sorne other 
sources. This is not surprising as procedures ave been streamlined, particularly through the co-
operation of customers authorities and the in ased use of computers. Notwithstanding this, their 
economie significance lies in the extent to wh ch they reduce the incentive of fmns to trade across 
frontiers thereby inhibiting the development fa single market. Customs related costs of 1-2 per 
cent may be a major consideration if expected profit margins are low. 
However we are not in a position to es ablish the elasticity of exports with respect to profits 
or the extent to which customs costs are bo e out of reduced profits rather than passed on to 
purchases in the form of higher priees (w ich will depend on market structures in specifie 
industries and countries), nor were we asked model such macro-economie effects. But without 
such estimates it is difficult to establish the ul ·mate economie significance of the results presented 
here. 
Grossing up: alternatives 
Weighting the results by industry and ountry we arrive at a combined cost for imports and 
exports of 1 1/2 percent of the value of the i tra-EC trade, implying a total cost of around 7 1!2 
billion ECU. 
An alternative method of grossing up om the sample data would be to multiply the costs 
per consignment (for each industry in each co ntry) by the number of consignments. 
However no data for the number of c signments is available for each category of good in 
each country. 
Data on the number of entries (which an include more than one consignment) is available 
by type of good in Belgium and the UK; total number of entries for ali trade, but not by 
commodity, is available for other countries x e t Italy. Applying weighted national average costs 
per consignment to the total number of consi 
number of consignments and the grossing up 
of 4 1/3 Billion ECU emerges from this broad 
ments for the five countries for which we know the 
o the level of ali EEC countries a total cost to fmns 
sh approach . 
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Costs by Country 
Analysis of costs per consignment after allowing for differences in the relative importance 
in EC trade of the commodities included, show that costs are: 
• below average in Benelux; 
• particularly high in Italy . 
Costs 12er Consignment~ ECU 
Im12orts EXROrtS 
Belgium 26 34 
France 92 87 
German y 42 79 
Ital y 130 205 
Netherlands 46 50 
United Kingdom 75 49 
The existence of simplified documentation within the Benelux customs union appears to 
have contributed to lower customs clearance costs. In particular, the 'Benelux 50' document 
effectively facilitates trade within the member countries providing ali the necessary information for 
V AT and customs statistics purposes. 
More generally, differences in costs between countries reflect differences in the industrial 
composition of sample firms' trade, variations in agents charges across countries, and the presence 
of 'outliers' in the sample. 
Likewise differences between costs for imports and exports largely reflect differences in the 
industrial composition in the sample and the presence of 'outliers'. 
Agents Costs: Benelux and Italy 
An analysis of agents costs per consignment, for which the basic data is probably more 
accurate than that for fmn's internai costs and which is available by trading partner shows that: 
• costs of trade between Benelux partners are lower than for trade between Benelux countries 
and other EC countries; 
• costs of trade between EEC members are lower than for trade with Non-Members; 
- 25 -
11 
• that trade between ltaly and other countries is more costly than between any other country 
and the rest of the EC. 
Costs and firms' sizes 
Our sample data suggests that costs per consignment are 30-45 per cent higher for fmns 
with fewer than 250 employees than for larger fmns. But larger fmns account for over 65 per cent 
of trade (in our sample) so that their lower costs will be the more important influence on the 
average for firms as a whole. 
Costs by industry 
An analysis of costs by industry exhibits variations between industries and between 
imports and exports. There are a number of factors which can cause these differences: 
• the sample size for petroleum products is too small to make inferences and 
is influenced by a French company with extremely high costs; 
• cost per consignment is positively related to value per consignment although not in direct 
proportion; 
• sorne industries require additional documentation for strategie reasons or 
because they are covered by trade agreements; 
• outliers have an impact in sorne industries such as iron and steel where 
sorne Italian importers report very high costs; 
• countries with high (or low) costs in a particular industry can distort the 
differences between import and export costs if their share of EEC exports 
and imports are significantly different 
Existing simplified procedures 
A number of procedures have been developed by customs authorities to simplify 
fonnalities. They include pre-authenticated documents, local import or export control (as opposed 
to border control) and period entry (whereby a trader can have perhaps a month's imports/exports 
processed together). 
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Such procedures can reduce the time between the presentation of documentation to customs 
control offices and the release of the goods at the border transit point to a few minutes. At sorne 
stage the necessary documentation needs to be prepared and subsequent! y processed. 
Where fmns do not use simplified procedures this is mainly because either the minimum 
necessary loads required to qualify are not available, or the finn uses agents to complete all the 
fonnalities; in only a minority of cases we did find that fmns were not sufficiently aware of the 
available simplified procedures. 
The sample data suggests that costs per consignment are in the region of 50 per cent lower 
where simplified procedures are al ways used than where they are never used. 
The Single Administrative Document 
From January 1988 a new customs document, the Single Administrative Document (SAD) 
is to be introduced. It represents document simplification, not a simplified procedure. It will 
enable export, transit and certain import information to be entered on a single form, rather than on 
separate forms. 
However, serious misunderstandings about the purpose and effects of SAD emerged from 
our discussions with several fmns in certain countries, where the customs authorities will need to 
help finns to understand the changes. 
Virtuany an finns which commented on the anticipated impact of SAD believe it will neither 
accelerate nor simplify customs procedures. 
Companies which do not have computerised systems are afraid that without a computer 
they will not be able to complete the form; those with computers need to change their programs and 
most do not expect a significant reduction in costs subsequently. Sorne fear that the replacement of 
text by code numbers will make documentation more difficult to complete and read. Sorne fmns 
are worried that SAD will not be the only document if different documents will be needed for 
exporting, transit and importing, in each language of the countries concerned. Sorne said they still 
await official explanations of the changes. Sorne fmns which have thought about 1992 see SAD as 
an unnecessary step, given the target of abolishing an intra-EEC formalities. 
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The principal conclusion to emerge from the above opinions is that SAD is not regarded as 
reducing the benefits to be achieved in 1992 by comparison with the current situation and that a 
major information and training effort is needed in certain countries to explain the nature, purposes 
and procedures of SAD. 
Banking, Insurance and Inventory Costs 
Abolition of customs barriers are not seen as reducing financial costs or inventories, which 
are not usually regarded as being sensitive to changes in procedures which may save minutes or 
hours rather than da ys in terms of reduced dela ys. In could be argued that severa! hours delay can 
effectively amount to a whole working day, but most frrms interviewed have not adopted 'just-in-
time' inventory control techniques this could reflect the structure of our sample which contains 
severa! small frrms. 
Banks and insurance companies were interviewed to establish whether the removal of 
customs formalities would bring any benefits to firms through the impact of swifter, more 
predictable transactions. Neither banks nor insurance companies saw any significant benefit 
arising, whether through the reduction of premiums for European traffic, through lessened 
possibility of consequentialloss or through lower bank charges. 
Cost of delay 
In our survey "Cost of Non Europe: lllustrations in the road haulage sector" we include 
details of the work carried out to assess the cost of delay borne by road vehicles across the 
Community. The results of our survey were then used to estimate a cost for delay for ali road 
haulage. The cost of delay for road traffic amounts to sorne 830 Million ECU. This represents a 
gross figure that cannot ali be saved as it assumes that ali delay rime can be utilised. This is not 
necessarily the case as drivers tend to coïncide rest breaks with frontiers wherever possible and 
cargo is not necessarily available to occupy the available capacity. To take this into account, we 
have assumed that a 50% saving could be achieved, th us giving a range of ECU 415-830 million 
ECU for the Community as a whole. 
Although significant tonnage is also carried by Inland Waterway (41% of 1986 tonnage 
total) and rail (13%), an insufficient proportion of our sample utilised these services to provide any 
reliable data from which to calculate delay-related costs. This should be borne in mind when 
considering the cost of delay for the Community as a whole. 
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Costs and Means of Transport 
No significant difference in customs compliance costs appear to be associated with 
differences in the means of transport used, although as the sample was heavily biased in favour of 
road traffic the reliability of data relating to the use of other modes is suspect. 
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OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
Introduction 
The second key part of the study is to examine the opportunity costs for fmns, especially 
lost trading opportunities. 
In our assessment of this cost we have concentrated on four key issues: 
• the.extent to which importers and exporters claim they would increase their trade within the 
community if customs fonnalities were abolished; 
• the extent to which fmns contend that the presence of customs regulations has prevented 
them from trading with partners in the European Community; 
• differences in perceptions among fmns of different sizes; 
• particular activities likely to be hit by delays and indefmite transit times, namely: 
express; 
mail order. 
It is important to emphasise that the data presented below, as in -several other studies, is 
based on what fmns perçeive or claim to be the problems associated with customs barriers and the 
benefits they claim to expect from the removal of those barriers. As such they do not represent 
objective data about costs and benefits which can be independently tested. But as perceptions they 
have a reality of their own which needs to be recognised. 
Other studies 
The paper on "implementation of ECEIF AL recommendations methodology for estimating 
costs and benefits oftrade facilitation" (31/12/86) for the United Nations Economie Commission 
for Europe Committee on the Development of Trade sees opportunity costs arising in the import 
and re-export of goods and consequent compliance with two sets of formalities and procedures. 
The rime delays and consequent unpredictability of both the import and export cycle mean that 
"costs and so priees rise, profits tumble and customers are lost and alienated". The same study 
identifies "deterrent costs", (classified in this study as an opportunity cost) as the barrier to trade 
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represented by "a general impression of complication and difficulty" associated with "complicated 
procedures and documents". 
A survey is currently being carried out by the Banque Nationale de Belgique involving 500 
Belgian companies. We understand that initial feedback from this study has not identified customs 
formalities as a major barrier to trade. 
The Joint Textile Committee's report, "Lifting the Barriers to Trade" (June 1986) analysed 
the trade barriers to UK exports of textiles and clothing, and categorised the type and severity of 
barrier according to the country concerned. The Western European countries are categorised 
together as "relatively accessible" with reasonably low import duties and generous quotas. 
The real barriers in EEC are seen as "administrative inconveniences rather than real obstacles". 
The exceptions are Greece, Portugal and Spain, ali new members of the EEC whose barriers are 
now being dismantled. The view of the Joint Textile Committee then, is that the EEC 
administrative formalities do not represent a major barrier to trade. 
The BOTB research paper "lnto Active Exporting" (April1987) analysed the presence of 
uptapped export potential in smaller and medium sized manufacturing companies, identifying: 
• the barriers to export and their relative importance; 
• how export can be encouraged. 
The BOTB questionnaire based survey the problem associated with customs procedures and export 
documentation was seen "as nothing more than an administrative nuisance" by successful 
exporters, although with inevitable teething problems. Of the fmns not exporting, 10 percent 
mentioned lack of experience and confidence in exporting but documentation was not seen as a 
prime barrier to trade. The report concluded that export documentation and procedures represent 
no problem to professionals either internally or externally. The ten least successful frrms had tried 
to eut corners in this area 
A Small Business Research Trust study (ail firms including non manufacturing) concluded 
that the following were the most significant factors: 
• finance/delays in payment 26.2% 
• export paperwork 14.4% 
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• market information 14.4% 
• product suitability 14.3% 
This shows that the smaller fmns believed export paperwork (of which about half is customs 
related) was a more serious problem than the larger fmns but again indicates that it is one of many 
contributory factors. 
Findings 
In our discussions with trade associations and traders, we have found little empirical 
evidence to suggest that customs formalities represent a major barrier to trade for newcomers. 
Rather, these procedures are seen as an irritation or an inconvenience to be overcome by successful 
fmns. Smaller fmns which do successfully export have found customs formalities particularly 
worrying but have leamed to cope with them, often with the advice of trade associations and quasi-
official agencies intended to promote trade. As for those fmns which do not export it is difficult to 
establish the significance of customs barriers al one, a part from ali the other (languages etc) 
problems involved. For this reason advisory bodies who have been approached for advice by 
small firms from which they subsequently beard no more, are very doubtful of being able to 
derive valid estimates of the effect of customs formalities, even if a large sample of such firms 
were to be contacted; in any event a large sample of non exporters was beyond the scope of the 
present study. 
One of the largest Chambers of Commerce in Germany emphasised to us that the reasons 
why SMEs do not trade across frontiers include: 
different industrial standards; 
limited knowledge of foreign markets; 
different procedures for registering and testing the design of certain goods apart 
from customs barriers. 
Nonetheless the results of our survey shown in the table below are not insignificant. 
A number of smaller companies reported to us that they are reluctant to attempt to break into 
new markets because small unmarketable samples and brochures may be subject to duty by 
Customs authorities; the duty on the despatch of severa! such consignments is regarded as a 
significant deterrent by such finns. 
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Mail Order and Express Companies 
Most mail order fmns conduct their operations within national boundaries, partly because 
of the cost of translating and distributing catalogues in other countries. There were mixed 
responses from the small sample of companies which do mail order business in other countries: 
sorne found customs regulations burdensome, others said they were not a major consideration. 
Little thought has been given by sorne to their post 1992 strate gy, but in any event customs 
formalities are just one element of the changes they need to consider. 
Express companies find customs procedures the cause of delay (up to about 1 hours per 
consignment). One fmn reported that 8 out of 25 staff at a central European despatching point in 
Brussels are involved in customs procedures, (but this includes non-EEC business). 
Survey Findings 
The table below shows those companies indicating that the removal of customs formalities 
willlead to an increase in existing trading activities. It clearly shows that the smaller fmns see 
themselves in particular benefitting from the completion of the internai market 
IMPORTS 
% of sample stating 
increase 
Average % increase 
stated 
EXPORT 
% of sample stating 
increase 
Average % increase 
stated 
Number of Employees 
Morethan 
0 - 50 51 - 250 251 - 500 500 
12 8 3 11 
22 13 7 8 
24 22 14 22 
26 20 8 10 
* Including firms not expecting increase. 
Average Over 
AU Firms* 
9 
1.0* 
22 
3.2** 
** Weighted according to share of total imports/exports accounted for by firms in each size 
category in the sample. 
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The results suggest that exporters are more optimistic about increased opportunities than 
importers. In practice increased exports and imports within the EC must equal one another, but it 
is not logically required that this balance must apply to this particular sample. 
These results take no account of possible increases in trade by frrms which do not trade 
across frontiers at present, a large sample survey of such frrms being beyond the scope of this 
study. 
Even if finns do perceive customs formalities as being due for abolition in 1992 it does not 
follow that they envisage greater export activity unless the other barriers are expected to vanish, 
and even then the other inhibitions on trade (such as limited awareness of foreign markets) need to 
be overcome. 
An increase in trade of the order of 1 - 3 per cent implied by the table above is by no means 
insignificant and, if true of the EC as a whole, could amount to 4 112- 15 Billion ECU. These 
results need to be compared to those which can be obtained from a simulation using an econometrie 
model of trade in Europe, on the assumption that the costs to finns fall to the extent reported in the 
previous part of th~? report, that these costs are passed on in lower priees, and taking into account 
the elasticity of demand for, and supply of, traded goods. 
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COST TO GOVERNMENT 
Introduction 
The third part of the study involves the calculation of the budgetary cost to the public 
authorities in terms of the material and human resources employed to carry out inspections. The 
initial assessment of this cost was to be based on publicly available data which was then to be 
discussed with the officiais in the agencies concerned. 
Approach 
In each country involved in the survey responsibility for customs formalities is combined 
with additional duties. In order to obtain a consistent and representative cost of administration we 
have adopted the following approach to the assessment: 
• ali figures relate to the calendar year, 1986; 
• trade with all member states is included (including Portugal and Spain); 
• where possible, the cost associated with non-customs tasks have been deducted, for 
example: 
administration and collection of domestic value-added tax (V AT); 
compilation of trade statistics; 
excise administration; 
• the number of consignments rather than the value trade has been used as a basis for 
splitting the cost of customs between EEC and non-EEC trade wherever possible or at 
least between export and import: where this is not available we have used trade values; 
• if customs officiais have indicated that import consignments take more time than exports 
we have weighted the costs accordingly: however, where the ratio of EEC trade to non-
EEC (trade in terms of consignments or alternatively value) for imports and export is 
similar we have not weighted the results; 
• equally, if officiais indicate that EEC traffic requires generally less attention than non-
EEC, an adjustment has been made. 
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• compilation of trade statistics has been deducted wherever separate figures are available 
as in most countries this is not a task for customs authorities. 
Findings 
The table below shows estimates of the costs to government and of the staff involved. The 
figures for 'Total' staff and budget refer to ali the operations of customs administrations as shown 
in official sources. The 'adjusted' figure frrst removes the costs of activities which are not related 
to customs con trois for international trade, such as domestic V AT administration and car taxation 
which customs administrators undertake - to varying extents - in the countries concerned. The 
remaining costs are then adjusted according to a statistical estimate based on the percentage of 
international trade undertaken with panner EC countries. 
It takes no account of the likelihood that costs of dealing with EEC trade are in general 
lower than those for a similar amount of non-EEC trade. Assuming that costs are indeed lower for 
EEC trade it follows that the potential savings which should arise from the abolition of customs 
barriers will be lower than those shown in 'adjusted' columns. 
It is also the case that certain customs officiais believe that feasible reductions in their 
function after 1992 are for discussion and do not automatically imply that they will have no role as 
far as EC trade is concerned. Taking these matters into account it may be that the savings to be 
achieved may lie in the range of 500 to 1,000 million ECU, or 15,000- 30,000 staff, that is to say 
between a half and ali the expenditure and staff implied by the 'adjusted' figures. 
COSTS TO GOVERNMENTS 
Total Adjusted 
Staff Costs Staff Costs 
ECU ECU 
~ millions ~ millions 
Belgium 6.4 160 4.7 75 
France 21.1 470 12.3 275 
German y 8.0 487 4.0 245 
Ital y 6.8 240 3.3 115 
Netherlands 7.0 220 2.3 67 
llK 2hl 660 ~ ill 
Total 75.4 2,237 31.1 902 
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CUSTOMS RELATED SECTOR 
Introduction 
As part of our study we were asked to calculate the economie importance of the acùviùes 
directly associated with customs inspecùons. Such economie activity includes: 
• customs clearance by agents; 
• providers of customs and tax advice; 
• support services at fronùer points, eg. restaurants, hotels and other services catering for 
the drivers arriving and waiting at frontiers. 
The scale of this activity is very difficult to assess as formai statistics are not kept of any of 
these functions. 
Customs agents 
There are no reliable statistics on the customs-related sectors. Customs clearance is 
increasingly provided as one of the services from diversified forwarding agents and is therefore 
difficult to analyse as it forms only part of the firm's turnover. There is no single body 
representing all customs agents in any country and the organisations representing freight 
forwarders are not subscribed to by ail relevant organisations. 
At the beginning of this year the European Federation of National Federations of Freight 
forwarders (Clecat) carried out a survey of its Members' views on the expected loss of jobs arising 
from the abolition of customs barriers for intra-EEC trade and estimated that 85,000 jobs could be 
lost. However, because of differences in the manner in which the questions appear to have been 
interpreted and ambiguity over the split between EEC and non-EEC work we have not felt able to 
rely on these figures as a means of assessing the scale of economie activity. 
In order to assess the scale of agent activity in Member States we have taken the fees paid 
to customs and forwarded agents from the main study and have grossed these figures up to provide 
an indicative assessment of the scale of this activity and we have: 
• 
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• calculated the number of consignments moving between member states, using either 
publicly available figures or extrapolating from total consignments for ali trade and using 
the value of trade for EEC countries; 
• calculated the % and number of entries prepared by agents, either using estimates from 
official customs statistics (United Kingdom and Belgium) or the% found in our survey; 
• taken the average cost per consignment charged by agents in our survey and used this 
to compute total charges for the survey countries. 
The resulting figures show total revenues of ECU 1,500m. The following points should 
be considered: 
• the agent percentages, whilst drawn from a random, small sample have been found accurate 
when comparing our survey percentage with customs estimates in Belgium and UK; 
• it is not straightforward matter to derive a related manpower figure for this activity: 
charges for customs clearance are often based on a standard tariff that may be influenced 
more by competitive pressures than by the actual cost of preparation; 
• the manpower impact will vary depending on the level of diversification and the size of 
the organisation. 
Organisations engaging in tax advice may have separate departments specialising in the 
provision of customs-related advice, but again, no breakdown of these revenues is available. 
Whilst there are sorne small specialised fmns providing this advice there is no means of 
aggregating their revenues short of a detailed search. 
Customs and tax advice 
It is very difficult to quantify this activity, as the fmn providing the services tend not to 
publish their turnover in a sufficiently detailed fashion and together do not form a recognisable, 
measurable economie sector. 
Whilst we found customs tax specialists active in sorne countries, for instance, United 
Kingdom, in other countries, for example Belgium, much of this work is carried out by the agents 
themselves as a means of diversifying activities and providing clients with a more complete 
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service. When advice is provided it tends to be "one off' rather than continuons and we do not 
regard it as a major activity area in the context of customs related services as a whole. 
Support services 
Many frontier points have support services established not only to provide facilities for the 
passing haulier or tourist but also for the customs-related fonctions that have given up at these 
points. Without a detailed examination of this phenomenon it is difficult to assess the total scale of 
activity involved and the extent to which it would be effected by the abolition of customs 
formalities. We do not believe this is likely to be a major cost, compared to the cost of Customs 
agents. 
• 
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ANNEX 1 
STRUCTURE OF SAMPLE 
Questionnaires* Useful 
sent out Replies Imp Exp 
Ital y 379 73 38 41 
Belgium 211 73 59 46 
Netherlands 281 49 35 33 
WGennany 310 93 62 63 
France 514 101 25 26 
UK 316 78 48 39 
* After deducting companies approached by telephone who did not want to receive the 
questionnaire. 
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SUMMARY OF OVERALL FINDINGS 
Our study was initiated to provide: 
• an estimate of the costs borne by road hauliers as a result of customs formalities at 
border and inland clearance sites; 
• an indication of the cost of empty road joumeys and the reported views of a small sample 
of road hauliers re garding the impact on these costs arising from: 
lifting restrictions on cabotage; 
removing quantitative limitations on permit availability. 
The findings discussed below are subject to a range of assumptions and limitations 
imposed by the size of the sample. Our findings indicate that the total cost of delay is between 
415-830 million ECU. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The completion of the internai market will have a profound impact on the road haulage 
industry which represents the prime means of transporting goods between Member States. 
Indeed, in sorne quarters this impact is already being felt. 
In the current regime road vehicles are subject to delays either at frontiers or at inland 
clearance sites brought about by the presence of import and export formalities. Whilst the extent of 
these delays differs between Member States and indeed between frontier points, the existence of 
the delay imposes an additional cost on the haulage operator and thereby on the priee of these 
services to importers and exporters. 
The Cockfield White Paper foresees a market in which the passage of vehicles and thereby 
goods is unhindered by the need to comply with documentary and physical control obligations, 
resulting in the faster and more predictable movement of cargoes. 
The free movement and operation of road vehicles throughout the Community is restricted 
by a variety of measures, which include: 
• the quota system, which requires hauliers to apply for quantitatively restricted permits in 
order to move goods to, from and across Member States; 
• the restrictions over non-resident hautiers carrying out a collection and delivery within the 
boundaries of a Member State ("cabotage"). 
The presence of these regulations bas created an environment in which free competition 
does not exist, and again, although the extent of these restrictions varies greatly between Member 
States, this bas inevitably influenced the operating efficiency of international road hauliers within 
the Community. 
As a consequence of the Treaty of Rome, a common transport policy and an internai market 
are envisaged, in which: 
• limitations on the number of permits are replaced by qualitative criteria relating to the 
credentials of the haulier concerned; 
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• cabotage is allowed, thereby enabling non resident hauliers to collect and deliver loads 
within the boundaries of a Member State, in order to supplement the revenue 
earned for the vehicle round-trip. 
Terms of reference 
Our study was initiated to provide an indication of the impact of these restrictions on road 
haulage operators, in conjunction with our survey, "Costs of Non Europe: Customs Barriers". 
The work undertaken for the Commission is split into two distinct although related parts as 
follows: 
• an assessment of the cost of delay experienced by hauliers in the movement of goods 
between Member States as a result of customs formalities; 
• a preliminary evaluation of the cost of empty movements borne by the hauliers in the 
sample and of their views on the impact that the Commission's proposais will have. 
Approach 
The study was to comprise "own account" operators from the sample of fmns surveyed in 
the customs study and additional "hire and reward" hauliers from the following Member States: 
• France; 
• Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands (Benelux); 
• West Germany; 
• Italy; 
• United Kingdom. 
Our sample was to include small haulage businesses as well as the major international 
operators and was aimed at hautiers involved in Community trade. Contact was also made with the 
appropriate trade associations in each Member State. The data received is described in subsequent 
sections of this report. 
Following completion of the questionnaire, participants were interviewed in order to 
validate the data received. Following our analysis of the data we held discussions with certain 
experts in the road haulage industry. 
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Severa! difficulties were encountered in obtaining the desired leve! of support from road 
hauliers. These included the following: 
• many of the fmns we approached did not keep statistics in the form required to complete 
our questionnaire: this was particularly true of the smaller enterprises; 
• the amount of information required to satisfy our needs for both dela ys and empty moves 
was felt by sorne fmns to be excessive, particularly if additional analysis was needed to 
extract data from existing reports and files; 
• sorne fmns were unwilling to provide data concerning empty loadings as this was deemed 
to be extremely sensitive, in spite of our assurances regarding confidentiality: this was 
particularly the case in West Germany where it was felt that releasing such data could put 
hauliers at a competitive disadvantage. 
Additional problems were also caused by lack of publicly available data in standard, 
consistent formats. This situation was referred to in the International Road Union report of late 
1985, in which is described, "the considerable difficulties encountered whenever comparisons are 
drawn in the sphere of statistics, and more especially in that relating to the transportation of goods 
and passengers by road". 
The sample size of this outline study is small when considered in the context of the size of 
the road haulage community in each Member State. Our sample of 68 hire and reward operators is 
drawn from over 283,000 hauliers in the six Member States surveyed. Care has been exercised in 
drawing global conclusions from our results without frrst considering the appropriateness of the 
sample and we have therefore adopted a policy of explicitly presenting our assumptions and the 
influences that may affect the figures shown. 
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Size and structure of sample: Number of fmns in sample classified by number of vehicles 
Hir~ & Reward Own Account 
Number of Vehicles 1-5 6-10 11+ 1-5 6-10 11+ Total 
Belgium 1 10 4 2 1 18 
France 3 6 10 19 
West Germany 1 3 4 
Ital y 1 3 3 2 9 
Netherlands 2 2 5 3 2 14 
UK _.1 _.1 16 - - - 21 
- - -
9 10 49 10 2 5 85 
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COST OF DELAYS 
Data and analysis 
Data required 
In order to assess the cost of delay hau1iers were asked to provide details of: 
• time spent on typical transactions in export, transit and importing countries: hauliers 
were asked to include in their estimates all the formalities that are completed inland and at 
frontiers; 
• vehicle and driver costs; 
• the causes of delay; 
• the extent to which hauliers estimate that charges would be reduced if customs formalities 
were abolished. 
Delay costs have been combined for both hire and reward and own account traffic. 
Cost of delays 
In order to assess the cost of delays it is necessary to reflect the two major types of cost 
arising namely, driver costs and opportunity costs relating to the vehicle utilisation, and to then 
derive a basis upon which an hourly rate for these costs can be calculated. We describe our 
approach to these below. 
Having calculated the average delay time on each route, irrespective of haulier nationality, 
an average annual driver cost was established (26,500 ECU) and an hourly rate was computed 
based on 214 working days per year (allowing for holidays and sickness) and a maximum nine 
hour working day. 
To provide a global figure for all road transport between the countries surveyed, the total 
number of journeys was needed. In order to assess the total number of journeys made and thereby 
calcu1ate the total cost of empty movements between Member States, we have assumed a typical 
load of 12.5 tonnes of cargo per road vehicle. A major Europe-wide haulier uses this figure as 
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supplied by Customs statistics for Community trade in its management information and it has been 
used here in the absence of any other verifiable figures. 
It was decided to include the opportunity cost associated with the under-utilisation of the 
vehicle, for although the dela ys were only measured in hours, the wasted rime nevertheless relates 
to an unused asset which over time could be better used. However, the data collected in our 
survey relates to vehicle running cost rather than the fixed annual costs, from which opportunity 
costs can be calculated. These costs are: 
• depreciation; 
• financing cost; 
• insurance; 
• vehicle tax • 
A recent study entitled, "Freight Transport in the European Community" showed that, 
coincidentally, annual driver costs and fixed vehicle costs represent very similar percentages of the 
total annual operating cost, namely 22-34% and 23-30% respective! y. As the total operating costs 
from our survey were similar to those in this study, we have used the driver-related cost from our 
sample as a substitute for the annual vehicle operating cost. To derive an houri y vehicle delay cost 
rate, we have assumed that the vehicle will be 95% available, 24 hours a day for 365 days a year. 
This figure has been verified by an international haulier. The resultant hourly rate is theo applied to 
the custom delay. 
1 nterpretation of findings 
Using this approach the total delay-related cost is calculated as ECU 780 million for the six 
countries surveyed. If similar delays and costs are found in the remaining Member States, which 
represent 6% of the total road haulage tonnage, then a globalised figure would be ECU 830m. 
This figure is however subject to certain distortions, as follows: 
• the computation of hourly cost saved is based on an effective nine-hour working day; 
this is a regulatory maximum and the actual working day is likely to be lower, thus 
increasing the hourly rate and cost; 
• the computation assumes that the time spent in delay could otherwise be effective! y used; 
this may not al ways be the case, as legitimate rest periods may be timed to coïncide with 
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known customs delay points: this in itself is not al ways possible to achieve, due to the 
regulations on driving and rest hours; 
• the dela ys include those incurred by unaccompanied trailers for which the driver-related 
costs do not apply; 
• the assumption is made that work can be found for the driver and the vehicle: this will not 
al ways be the case. 
Given that there are a number of influences that will tend to reduce the overall potential 
savings the cost estimate above must be treated with caution and therefore as an upper limit. We 
suggest that a lower limit should be established at 50% of this figure, providing a globalised range 
of 415-830 million ECU. 
P erceived ejfect of abolition 
ln our survey we asked hauliers to estimate the effect that the abolition of customs 
formalities would have on their costs and the extent to which clients would benefit from this. It 
should be noted here that in many cases the hauliers will be operating for forwarding agents and 
therefore the net benefit will not automatically be passed onto the importers and exporters. 
The majority of hauliers stated that although their costs would be reduced, they did not 
believe that this would result in a similar reduction in their charges to clients. Most hauliers we 
spoke to regard rating structures as highly competitive at present and will take opportunities 
wherever possible to boost short-term profitability. Traders with own account operations will 
benefit more directly from the reductions in operating costs. In overall terms, the net effect for 
users of road haulage services will be largely influenced by the more competitive market envisaged 
by the Commission which should ensure that in the long-term these users will benefit. 
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COST OF EMPTY MOVEMENTS 
Introduction 
The countries included in this survey were those chosen for the customs formaliùes study, 
and whilst these countries generate over 90% of the cargo tonnage moving by road within the 
Community, it cannot be assumed that the data collected and views reported from the surveyed 
countries are idenùcal to those in the other Member States, namely Greece, Eire, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal. Indeed, the excluded States include a number of the poorer 
naùons with lower operaùng costs as weil as those on the geographie periphery of the Community. 
As a result, there are likely to be specifie issues and problems relating to these countries that differ 
markedly from the pattern established in our survey countries. This should be borne in mind when 
our survey results are viewed in global context. 
Data and analysis 
Data required 
In order to assess the cost of empty joumeys hauliers were asked to provide details of: 
• the number of loaded and empty journeys to and from Member States and the distances 
and times involved; 
• vehicles and driver costs; 
• causes of empty movements. 
Cost of empty journeys 
Our sample was small, and as a result, unlikely to be representaùve of road haulage across 
the Community as a whole and it was therefore decided that the data collected should not be used 
for global analysis, but should rather be viewed in the context of the sample itself. In order to do 
this, the following approach was used: 
• establishing an average annual cost for both driver and vehicle based on the average ùme 
and length of the empty joumeys: these were esùmated averages for each country as 
data was not available from each individual firm; 
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• estimating the net operating cost for each haulier as 90% of the stated turnover assuming 
a 10% gross margin; 
• assessing the percentage that the average cost of empty journeys represents of the total net 
operating cost for each haulier: the results are presented for each country by vehicle fleet 
size, separating hire and reward and own account operations. 
The results are summarised below. 
Cost of empties as % of net operating cost Cali countries) 
No of vehicles 
Hire & Reward OwnAccount 
Cost% 1-5 6-10 11+ 1-5 6-10 11+ 
Incomplete data 
(Turnover or empty 
moves) 3 4 11 8 1 5 
No empty moves 3 3 19 1 
Below 1 1 5 1 
1-5 1 2 7 
5- 10 
Over 10 2 7 1 
The picture presented in the table above is broadly similar for each of the countries 
concerned. The majority of positive observations occur in the 1 - 5% range which, although small 
as a share of costs, may be significant in relation to profits and could result in a sizeable profit 
increase if the revenue earning potential can be realised. Of the 32 firms whose responses could 
not be used in this analysis over half did not provide turnover data. Just under half of the 
companies with no empty journeys were from the UK for whom the round trip was only profitable 
if loads could be found in each direction. This is due to the downward pressure on rates on the 
outward leg arising from substantial competition from other Community hautiers. Although the 
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main beneficiaries appear to be the larger organisations this simply reflects the structure of our 
sample. From our analysis hauliers of ali sizes will benefit, as our survey sample shows that the 
smaller operators do not have a materially different loaded to empty ratio than the larger hauliers. 
Reported causes of empty journeys 
Hauliers were asked to rank the possible reasons for empty moves as: 
• most important; 
• significant; 
• not important 
The options provided were: 
• awareness of loads; 
• cabotage; 
• permit availability; 
• unprofitability; 
• incompatibility; 
• customer creditworthiness; 
• other. 
In analysing. the responses to the questionnaire, we have identified the number of 
incidences of each reason specified as "most important" and "significant". The table below 
summarises these results. 
Incidence of "mQSt im12ortant" and "significant" reason~ for hire and reward hauliers 
Incidences as Incidences as 
"mQst important" % Position "Significant" % Position 
Awareness 72 49 1 19 16 4 
U nprofitable 33 23 2 27 19 3 
Cabotage 19 13 3 11 8 6 
Incompatible 13 9 4 31 22 2 
Permits 8 5 5 13 9 5 
Other 1 1 6 10 7 7 
Customer 
creditworthiness 0 0 7 32 22 1 
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For most countries observed and for all haulier nationalities operating to and from these 
countries, awareness of cargo and unprofitability are the most commonly mentioned "most 
important" reasons. Permit shortages were most often reported in Italy where this reason was placed 
third. Cabotage was in third place for every country except Ital y. 
The main findings in respect of the causes of empty moves stated by fmns in this sample 
can be summarised as follows: 
• the key concern of the majority of hauliers was the awareness and availability of loads, 
although most used automated means to locate cargo, usually telex; 
• the lack of multi-lateral permits is not seen as a cause of empty movements and although 
the lack of permits restricts cross-trade opportunities, cross-trading itself is still not 
regarded by most of the sample hauliers as a weil developed opportunity area; 
• cabotage was viewed as a potentially significant means of reducing empty trips. 
It was not within the remit of the study to calculate the net benefits that would accrue from 
liberalisation, but rather to identify the cost of empty moves that liberalisation is intended to reduce. 
It is clear that, whilst there is a potential cost saving there are also factors which could reduce this 
potential. 
Interpretation of findings 
Introduction 
It is important to distinguish between the findings arising from the views expressed to us 
by our survey sample and our interpretation of these views in relation to liberalisation. In order to 
form a basis for the views expressed in this section we have used input from: 
• industry experts; 
• previous reports; 
• studies from the USA relating to the impact of de-regulation. 
In our survey the focus has been on assessing the number of empty journeys as a means of 
providing a measure of "wasted capacity". However, this measure needs to be interpreted with 
caution because of the following factors: 
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the imbalance of each country's imports and exports compatible for carriage by road; 
the natural imbalances of import and export road traffic arising from the use of 
specialised equipment to carry particular cargoes for example, refrigerated and liquid loads; 
the under-utilised capacity represented by part-loaded lorries; 
the extent of oversupply of vehicle capacity in the international road haulage market: this 
is evidenced by the presence of empty loads and the differentiai that exists between inter-
national haulage rates and those for domestic journeys of equivalent distance. 
In addition, any assessment of the effects of liberalisation should take into account the tendency of 
operators to improve productivity as rates become more competitive. 
Permit availability 
The questionnaire was designed to assess the extent to which the shortage of multi-lateral 
permits causes empty moves, as without such permits the option of cross-trading is precluded. 
The availability of bilateral permits is not an issue here as these cover a return journey and cannot 
therefore be said to cause empty movements. It could be argued however, that this does reduce the 
effective utilisation of capacity if equipment is unused because of a bilateral permit shortage. 
Whilst our study did not fmd that permit restrictions were believed to be a significant cause 
of empty moves, there was sorne suggestion that sorne permits are in short supply, particularly 
those for multi-lateral purposes. The "Freight Transport" report to which we referred earlier found 
evidence of a "black market" in permits in the United Kingdom leading to "a Joss of priee 
competitiveness for the UK operator compared with foreign hauliers who can secure permits 
through official channels". The study concludes however that "the problem of permit shortage is a 
diminishing one", and that "80 percent of UK international hauliers considered the problem to be 
Jess severe than it was 3 years ago". Given that the number of permits available is planned to 
increase annually this seems a reasonable conclusion. 
ln assessing the importance placed upon the lack of mutli-lateral permits it is instructive to 
consider the extent to which cross-trading is currently undertaken, using statistics from a recent 
Commission report. 
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Haulier nationality 
West Nether-
1984 figures German y France Ital y lands Belgium UK 
Prevalence of 
cross trade as % 
of hire and reward 
movements 0.4 1.2 0.1 4.8 6.0 1.9 
The table indicates a great range of usage and different degrees of familiarity with the cross 
trade option which could help explain the relative lack of interest expressed in cross-trading as a 
means of reducing empty loads. The main users of cross-trading, that is, Netherlands and 
Belgium, have an adequate supply of multi-lateral permits and are already therefore taking 
advantage of this opportunity. In 1984, only 1.9% of journeys undertaken by UK hire and 
reward hauliers were used for cross-trade purposes due largely to shortages of bilateral permits for 
which purpose multi-lateral permits are often used. The relatively low importance attributed to 
multi-lateral permits may therefore be the result of lack of familiarity due to the predominant bi-
lateral focus adopted by these hautiers rather than a lack of opportunities. 
The significance of the opportunities presented by cross-trading is clearly a matter of sorne 
debate and inevitably in view of our small sample size we have simply reflected the news of a small 
part of the haulage community. 
Cabotage 
The introduction of cabotage is seen by the Commission as another means of improving the 
capacity utilisation of road haulage. The impact of removing the restrictions of cabotage in each 
Member State cannot be easily assessed, as it will depend on the interaction of severa! factors, 
including: 
• the degree of control and regulation in the domestic market; 
• the commodity mix and level of domestic trade and the use of specialised equipment 
relative to the patterns for international trade; 
• the size of the country and the physical disperson of cargoes; 
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• the prevalence of freight forwarders who are reported to be less nationalistic is selecting 
road haulage services. 
Large countries with tightly regulated domestic haulage market and high domestic rates, for 
example, France and German y see themselves as being particularly vulnerable. However, in each 
country diverse views have been expressed, emphasising the subjectivity of the topic. The 
"Freight Transport" report (quoted above) estimated that, under liberalised cabotage, 1% of the UK 
domestic market was under threat. At the same rime a press report declared that the UK would be 
"swamped" with European operators. 
In our survey we found that whilst the operators in Northern Europe are worried about the 
influx of low cost operators from Southern Europe, the Southern European operators are 
concerned about the inroads that the highly efficient Northern European hauliers will make. 
Clearly this is a complex and emotive issue and one that is beyond the scope of this study to 
address comprehensively. 
Comparison with USA 
One of the difficulties in quantifying the effects of a liberalised road haulage market is the 
absence of precedent, as, for example, ali Member States restrict cabotage. For this reason we 
have made comparisons with the road haulage market and industry in the USA which until 1980 
was characterised by high transport rates and state-based restrictive practices. 
In 1980 the Motor Carrier Reform Act enabled: 
• trucking companies to raise or lower rates by ten per cent without lnterstate Commerce 
Commission approval; 
• easing of entry barriers; 
• reduction of the level of operating restrictions; 
• abolition of collective rate fixing. 
There are severa! key differences between the operating frameworks in USA and the 
Community, which must be borne in mind. For example, in the USA: 
• no authority is required for interstate bilateral or cross-trade movements, whereas there is a 
permit system in the Community; 
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• there are differences between states in the levels of taxation and vehicle weights, but these 
do not distort the relative operating costs of hauliers from different states to the same 
extent as in the Community; 
• there are no currency differences between states. 
Given that the USA does not reflect the same level of complexity and competitive distortion 
as that which exists in the Community, it nevertheless represents a market in which competition 
has been increased. Intrastate barriers to entry still exist in 43 states, the equivalent of cabotage 
restrictions, and this provides the opportunity to observe the relative performance of operations in 
both regulated and de-regulated environments. 
There have been a number of studies undertaken in recent years, including sorne by Ernst 
& Whinney, to quantify the effect of de-regulation in the USA. These studies have sought to 
establish the extent to which operational efficiency has been increased and to identify the potential 
benefit yet to be derived. Sorne statistics are instructive: 
• during 1960-80 expenditures of manufacturers and distributors on freight transportation 
averaged 8% of GNP, whereas in 1986 this had fallen to 6.8%; 
• between 1960-80 truck ton miles had an annual compound growth rate of 10.7%: since 
1980 truck ton miles have grown at the same rate as GNP, that is 3.2% per annum, thereby 
indicating an increase in carriage effciency. 
Several important trends are emerging, and although they cannet all be ascribed to 
deregulation because of the parallel effects of the depression, it appears that there are sorne positive 
indicators of relevance to the Community. These include the following: 
• competition has reduced freight rates and brought an improved level and choice of service 
in most cases; 
• whilst there have been a large number of bankruptcies spread across ail sizes of company, 
the total number of carriers has increased; 
• small hauliers have survived by occupying niche markets and concentraùng on low invest-
ment strategies; 
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• successful haulage frrms have shifted their emphasis from pure operations to marketing, 
planning and the need for innovation; 
• there is evidence that frrms operating in regulated environments are not necessarily more 
profitable than those in more competitive markets because of the higher operating costs that 
can prevail in regulated markets; 
• a recent study found that the high level of regulation in Texas has lead to: 
higher distribution costs; 
increased prevalence of own account haulage; 
lower carrier productivity; 
business lost to other de-regulated states. 
Implications for the European Community 
Although the USA is not an exact parallel with the European Community there is sufficient 
similarity to make the comparison worthwhile. Indeed, sorne of the trends emerging in the USA 
can already be seen in the Member States, for example: 
• the growth in the importance of multi-modal, multi-service operators providing additional 
facilities in the form of warehousing and customs clearance; 
• the movement of the large operators into high value-added, capital intensive and specialised 
products and services and away from general haulage, typically dominated by the small 
owner-operator with low operating costs and a high degree of operational flexibility; 
• the increased focus on productivity and efficiency, for example, on the highly competitive 
link to and from the UK, unaccompanied trailers account for 50% of the cargo moved: m 
this way, driver and tractor utilisation are improved on both sides of the channel; 
• the increased demand for computerised freight-broking services, particularly in Northern 
Europe. 
The market in the Community has already begun to change and there are indications which 
suggest that the benefits enjoyed by traders in the USA may begin to accrue here. Further work is 
required to confrrm the validity of this comparison and to provide evidence that can assist the 
Commission in assessing the impact of the proposed liberalisation measures. 
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1 • 1 NTRODUCTI ON 
1.1 Background 
Si nee the i nee pt ion of the European Economi c Commun i ty in 1957, 
private sector trade between member states has risen substantially. 
However, despite the existence of directives designed ta promote 
open tendering and competition, the public sector has not enjoyed 
the same level of benefit. Indeed, direct imports represent a very 
small proportion of public purchasing. 
Today, the world is a highly competitive commercial environment. 
With the contraction and disappearance of old industries such as 
coal, steel, shipbuilding and textiles and the rapid growth of new 
industries, such as electronics and biotechnology, European 
producers have ta face the joint threats from 1 ar ge sc a 1 e hi gh 
technology companies in the USA and Japan and law labour cast 
manufacturers/assemb lers in the newly i ndustri a 1 ising nations such 
as Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan. 
In certain key industries, for example, telecommunications 
equipment, the public sector1 is a major - often dominant -
purchaser. Therefore, by not encouraging intra-Community 
competition, it is implicitly supporting sub-optimal enterprises, 
which is reflected in European industry being less competitive in 
world markets. In addition, public expenditure is higher than 
necessary. 
Against this background, WS Atkins Management Consultants have 
carried out a global assessment of the potential savings in public 
expenditure from removing all barriers ta trade in public 
purchasing, including: national purchasing practices and 
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procedures, standards, border formalities etc. The Consultant•s 
brief was to quantify the measurable effects: the important dynamic 
effects are discussed at the end of the report. 
1.2 The Public Sector 
In this study, the pub 1 i c sec tor i s defi ned to i ne 1 ude centra 1 and 
local government and its agencies, and also the •non-competitive 
sector•, that is, those enterprises, whether privately or publicly 
owned, which are granted a monopoly or concession to provide a 
public service. Gas distribution, power generation and 
distribution, railways, airport authorities and the like are 
therefore included in the estimates of expenditure and savings. On 
the other hand, publicly owned manufacturing firms, for example, 
Regie Renault, are excluded. 
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2. KEY CONCLUSIONS 
2.1 Barriers to Trade in Public Purchasing 
Public purchasing is sometimes used by EC member states as a policy 
instrument to support national or regional firms or industries, 
either: 
* for strategie reasons (e.g. defence goods, telecommunications 
aerospace, etc) 
* to support employment in declining industries (e.g. 
shipbuilding) 
* to compensate local communities near environmentally damaging 
public industries (e.g. coal mining, nuclear fuels) 
* to support emerging high technology industries (e.g. new 
telecommunications systems, lasers) 
* for more general political reasons (e.g. highly visible goods 
like cars, tableware). 
Public purchasing authorities generally deny that overt 
nationalistic purchasing policies exist. However, in certain key 
sectors there i s vi rtua lly no trade between produci ng countries of 
the Community even though they have extensive trade with other 
countries, as described in the case studies in Section 8. Sample 
contract data collected during the study (see Table 1) support the 
view that the degree of import penetration in public purchases is 
much lower than for the economy as a whole. This may be an 
underestimate since purchasers do not always know whether contracts 
let with national suppliers include the supply of imported goods. 
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TABLE 1 - PUBLIC SECTOR IMPORT PENETRATION FROM EC AND NON-EC SOURCES 
(percent) 
Belgium France Germany Ital y UK 
4 
National import 1 
penetration (1) 1 43 20 22 19 22 
1 
Apparent public 1 
sector import 1 
penetration (2) 1 21 16 12 1 4 
1 
Public purchases froml 
foreign suppliers (3)1 2.6 1.6 3.8 0.3 0.4 
1 
Sources: (1) ESA National accounts 1985, ( 2) and (3) At ki ns sample 
contract database 
Definitions: (1) Imports/(national production+ imports) 
(2) Purchases reported to be of foreign origin/total 
pure hases (tot a 1 purchases i ne 1 ude tho se of unreported 
origin) 
(3) Value of contracts with foreign suppliers/total value of 
contracts (includes contracts with unreported suppliers) 
2.2 The Completion of the Internal Market 
The consequence of closed and protective public purchasing is that 
in certain key high technology supplying sectors - notably capital 
equipment for defence, power generation, telecommunications and 
railways - a symbiotic relationship builds up between suppliers and 
purchasers. This has enabled a situation to persist in which: 
* there are widely differing national design standards, for 
example in railways and power generation. This also creates a 
barrier to the trade in the goods and services supplied by the 
public sector, with widespread repercussions on transport and 
communications, and hence on the efficiency of European 
business 
* Governments attempt to enforce competition between alternative 
national suppliers (e.g. GEC and Plessey, or the three German 
locomotive manufacturers) which di rectly leads to suboptima 1 
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size of plants, and to Government support for inefficient 
firms which would otherwise have to improve performance or go 
out of business 
* markets are distorted by Government subsidies, R&D support and 
artificially high priees 
* R&D effort is duplicated, dispersed and suboptimal 
* there is little incentive to invest in new technology to 
confront the competition from non-EC firms 
* firms have shortsighted marketing and production strategies. 
In key sectors such as computers, aerospace, 
telecommunications and vehicles, US and Japanese firms, as 
well as non-EC firms, are making increasing inroads into the 
EC market by adopting European marketing strategies while EC 
firms shelter behind their national public sector customers 
and look outward only towards declining third world markets 
* there is a lack of product specialisation, so that even large 
EC firms have uneconomically wide product ranges and short 
production runs. 
Unless the restrictions on public purchasing are swept away, it is 
the Consultants' view that, far from strategie industries being 
protected, whole areas of industry which have high multiplier 
effects on other sectors of manufacturing could cease to be viable. 
In most of the key industrial sectors the largest world firms are 
generally US or Japanese. Yet the EC's larger number of firms adds 
nothing to the degree of competition in EC states, because of the 
protectiveness of European national markets. 
Completion of the internal market, as far as public purchasing is 
concerned, means: 
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* making public purchasing procedures transparent, and open ta 
all qualified suppliers 
* doing away with unnecessary differences in engineering 
standards and design specifications which confuse third 
country customers as well as making intra EC trade difficult 
* viewing competition policy on an EC wide basis, permitting 
bath national and transnational mergers sa that world-league 
EC firms can be built. 
Although the completion of the internal market will lead ta 
increased intra-Conmunity trade and a reduction in priees of sorne 
products, the bulk of producers in a given country will experience 
no significant direct impact, because: 
* in most sectors public purchasing only represents a small 
proportion of gross output 
* the restructuring effects will be limited ta certain key 
industries, for example, telecommunications equipment 
* local purchasing will still continue for a wide range of 
products 
* as in the private sector, not all priee competitive producers 
will take advantage of the export opportunities in the public 
sectors of ether Community countries. 
2.3 Savings in Public Expenditure 
The analysis and estimates described in Section 9 indicate potential 
savings in annual public expenditure of sorne 8 ta 19 billion ecus, 
made up of: 
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* 3 to 8 billion ecus (1 to 2 percent of 1984 public purchasing) 
for the five study countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy 
and the UK, from new trade at the priees of the lowest cost 
country, arising directly from opening up public procurement 
(This includes a potential 2 billion ecus saving in coal 
_purchases by imparti ng from out si de the EC, which in the 
context of an ove ra 11 energy po 1 i cy may not be con si dered a 
cost of non-Europe) 
* a further l to 3 billion ecus (around half a percent of 1984 
public purchasing) as a result of competitive pressure on 
priees in sectors not previously open to international 
competition. It is assumed this will be matched in time by 
improvements in efficiency of firms by reorganisation or 
adoption of new technology 
* a further 4 to 8 billion ecus (1 to 2 percent of 1984 public 
purchasing), with sorne time lag, in economies of scale arising 
from the restructuring of industry in the previously protected 
sectors supplying equipment for defence, power generation, 
railways and telecommunications. 
In addition to these potential public expenditure savings there are 
likely to be: 
* benefits for private sector purchasers of similar goods 
* an important impact on the rate of innovation, investment and 
growth in the sectors enjoying the benefits of restructuring, 
with positive effects on their international competitiveness. 
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3. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY METHOD 
The study has been carried out in two parts: 
* Part I, a study of the present public purchasing environment, 
which included three main streams of research: 
institutional aspects of the purchasing entities and their 
purchasing procedures, in the EC and USA 
- data on tot a 1 vo 1 urnes of pure has i ng and its breakdown by 
purchasing entity and product group 
compilation and analysis of an extensive database covering 
detailed information on a sample of over 4,000 contracts in 
the five study countries. 
The results of this research were presented in the Part I 
report. 
The compilation of data was made difficult by the reluctance 
of sorne purchasing authorities to participate, and by the lack 
of detailed records or data on purchasing in most authorities. 
In one country the current legislation precluded the provision 
of all the information requested on contracts, particularly 
priee information and data on suppliers 
* Part II, an evaluation of the cast of non-Europe in public 
procurement. This part investigated existing priee 
differences and the potential for future cast savings through 
industrial restructuring, in a representative sample of 
products purchased by the public sector. The products 
include: 
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- a • priee effect 1 i st •, of products for which the re were 
thought to be possible restrictions on trade and priee 
differences between countries 
- a •case study list•, of products predominantly purchased by 
or for the public sector, for which there was thought to be 
strongly nationalistic purchasing, and potential for 
significant economies from industry restructuring. 
From this analysis, the potential savings in public expenditure have 
been estimated in terms of: 
* the static trade effect - by buying from the cheapest 
supplying country at present priees 
* the competition effect - reduction in priees from national 
producers who are faced with foreign competition for the first 
time. It is assumed that these priee reductions can be met by 
• 
reduction in real production costs, by investment in new 
technology or by eliminating •x-inefficiency• 
* the restructuring effect - the long run saving ar1s1ng from 
economies of scale, including shared R&D and distribution 
costs, following industry restructuring in certain key sectors 
dominated by public sector purchasing. 
The following sections describe the analysis, assumptions and 
findings in more depth. They caver: 
* the institutional constraints and opportunities for saving 
(Section 4) 
* the derivation of da~a on the size and breakdown of total 
public purchasing (Section 5) 
* the selection of products for detailed study of priee 
differences and economies of scale (Section 6) 
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* the methodology and findings on static priee savings 
(Section 7) 
* the case studies on economies of scale (Section 8) 
* the aggregation of findings and analysis of total potential 
savings (Section 9). 
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4. THE POTENTIAL FOR SAVINGS 
4.1 The Institutional Framework of the Public Sector 
The five countries studied have quite different institutional and 
legal frameworks for public purchasing. 
Firstly, there are important differences between the study countries 
in the extent and legal form of public ownership, and hence in the 
degree of public control over purchasing in key sectors like 
transport, telecommunications, and energy. 
Secondly, there are also differences in the level of 
decentralisation of purchasing decisions. Where purchasing is 
highly decentralised, contracts are generally small and of little 
interest to foreign suppliers except in border areas. Decentralised 
purchasers also have few resources to handle international tendering 
(if this involves evaluation of complex bids or quality assurance of 
foreign firms}. In all countries, defence, railways and posts and 
telecommunications, which together make up 20 to 35 percent of 
public purchasing, depending on the country, are fairly centralised, 
whereas local government purchasing (15 to 40 percent of the total} 
is highly decentralised. For the rest, which includes electricity, 
gas, water, health, roads and other transport, purchasing is highly 
decentralised in Germany and Italy, and much less so in the other 
countries, particularly the UK. 
Thirdly, there are differences in the traditional regulatory 
framework for public purchasing into which the current and proposed 
EC legislation is inserted. In France, there is a rigid legal code 
and central control over a widely defined concept of 'marches 
publics•. Less rigid systems apply in Belgium, Italy and Germany, 
while the UK traditionally has no central system of regulations. 
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4.2 Procurement Procedures 
The EC Directives on public purchasing have been in force since 1971 
(for works contracts) and 1977 (for su pp 1 i es). The se enforce 
transparency in tendering procedures by, amongst other provisions, 
requiring publication of calls for tender to a standard format in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC); limiting 
the use of negotiated (i.e. non-competitive) tendering procedures 
and of brand names or restrictive specifications. 
Des pite the existe nee of the se procedures, the re has so far been 
very little effective opening up of public procurement. This is 
true for all sectors, and particularly so for the purchasing sectors 
where there is really nationalistic purchasing for strategie 
reasons, and where there are large specialist contracts of interest 
to foreign suppliers. These have up to now been excluded from 
coverage by the directives. They are: 
* energy 
* transport 
* telecommunications 
* drinking water supply. 
In addition, certain categories of defence contracts, particularly 
those involving special security measures or state security, are 
also excluded. This study has shawn that in these excluded sectors 
there are very large potential gains from opening up the markets. 
The purchasing authorities which do comply at present (including 
ministries, local authorities and health authorities) tend to have a 
lot of small contracts, and purchases of relatively common supplies 
and works which could be purchased from local importers or locally 
established representatives or subsidiaries of foreign firms. Such 
authorities have not seen much benefit in terms of direct bids from 
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foreign suppliers. Sorne purchasing officers view the directives as 
an irritant and waste resource trying to evade them. It is likely, 
however, that implementation of the directives has improved national 
firms' awareness of public sector opportunities, by increasing the 
extent of open tendering, and so led to saving in public purchasing 
even where trade has not increased. As new legislation takes 
effect, the benefits must increase. 
In the past, legislation on procurement has not had much direct 
effect on trade because: 
* the re are too many ways to ev ade the ru 1 es or i nf 1 uence the 
choice of supplier during bid evaluation 
* the other barriers to trade which permit priee differences 
sti 11 exi st 
* purchasers perceive that th~ir resources do not permit costly 
active sourcing and evaluation of international bids for low 
value contracts (although the thresholds set by the Directives 
are such that if foreign suppliers respond, the potential 
benefits ought to justify the additional cost) 
* suppliers sometimes either do not want to export, are limited 
by marketing agreements or exclusive dealerships, do not want 
to enter into competitive bidding, or do not believe the call 
for tender is serious, so international tendering is 
unproductive. 
It is hoped that by 1992 this situation will have changed. 
4.3 Areas of Potential Savings 
Although central purchasing agencies and large public enterprises 
which practi ce competitive tenderi ng are sometimes very effective, 
resources for public procurement in many authorities are often 
insufficient. Purchasing is sometimes inefficient, complacent and 
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open to corruption, particularly at the local level. The re i s 
clearly an argument for improving control and transparency in public 
purchasi ng in the i nterest of consumers and taxpayers. Benefits 
would come from improved purchasing within a country or region, not 
just by increased trade, and in many cases local suppliers would be 
forced to meet import priees. 
The study has shawn that for most of the products considered there 
are large potential savings for sorne countries by buying from 
foreign suppliers. The fact that priee differences exist, indicates 
either that there are other barriers to trade (including lack of 
knowledge), or the products concerned are not really comparable. If 
it is the latter then sorne of the potential gains from trade would 
be overestimated. It should also be noted that except for 
centralised purchasing agencies which have enormous market power and 
act commercially, public purchasers are unlikely to be better 
traders than commercial trading companies; there would not be many 
significant savings from cross-border trade on products which are 
a 1 ready free ly t raded by the priva te sector. The 1 ar ge pri ce 
differences identified in the study suggest, however, that many 
products are not freely traded and there are very significant 
restrictions on private sector trade, so a few large cross-border 
public contracts could have a powerful knock-on effect on bath 
purchasers and suppliers by, in particular, breaking restrictive 
trade practices. 
A special situation exists in the case studies and similar products 
where the public sector is the main purchaser, contracts are large 
and there are few suppliers. Public purchasing in these sectors has 
in the past been used to maintain an indigenous capabi 1 ity for 
strategie reasons, and also at the same time to be an organ of 
anti-trust policy, to maintain more than one supplier. This had led 
to a si tu at ion in many sec tors where the re i s vi rtua lly no trade 
between EC producers. Railway, power generation and 
telecommunications equipment are prime examples. Consequently there 
is overcapacity, too many firms, duplication of R&D and marketing 
efforts, and suboptimal scale of production. In sorne of these 
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sectors (power generation equipment, railway locomotives, 
telecommunications equipment) technology changes and the threat from 
new 1 ow cast producers have now made fi rms· want to merge, 
rationalise and invest in new technology. Wider public procurement 
is essential to permit this; without it, protectionist countries 
will be left with no viable producer. 
Where potenti a 1 benefits from trade and restructuri ng have been 
identified, these may be a result of a combination of: 
* changes in public procurement procedures 
* changes in Member States• protection and competition policy 
* other changes in the Internal Market (e.g. freedom to create 
pan-European companies and harmonisation of standards) 
* changes in technology (e.g. the development of TGVs in France) 
which give one firm an advantage and help to break up cartel 
arrangements. 
There is possibly a danger of double counting the benefits. What 
this study has measured is the total benefit of the internal market, 
in terms of savings in public expenditure (but without taking 
account of the benefits to private sector purchasers caused by more 
competition in the public sector). Public purchasing legislation 
alone may not achieve these benefits without other elements of the 
internal market programme being implemented, and without changes in 
suppliers• attitudes and strategies. 
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5. THE VOLUME OF PUBLIC PURCHASING 
In arder ta estimate the potential benefits of the internal market 
on public purchasing, data have been collected on the volume and 
pattern of purchases. 
Three different concepts, which can be applied ta any entity or 
group of entities, need ta be distinguished: 
* total expenditure, which includes wages and salaries, other 
employment costs, financial charges, and transfers ta other 
individuals or authorities (e.g. grants, subsidies, etc) as 
well as purchasing 
* total purchasing, which includes all payments for goods and 
services from third parties. For government (excluding public 
enterprises) this is typically 10 ta 20 percent of government 
expenditure 
* contract procurement, defined for this study as that portion 
of total purchasing which is made after tendering or 
negotiating a formal written contract with a limited term of 
validity and which theoretically could have been open ta 
competition. This excludes a substantial portion of total 
purchases which are either: 
non-competitive or non-tradable services or products such 
as gas and electricity, rents of buildings, post and 
teleconmunications and administrative expenses. The data 
suggest that this is around 15-25 percent of total 
purchasing 
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- sma 11 pure hases or other pure hases not subject to forma 1 
contract procedures. From limited evidence in France and 
the UK these appear to make up around 20-30 percent of 
total purchasing (but this may be partly due to under-
reporting of contracts). 
Table 2 shows the macroeconomie importance of public purchasing. In 
1984, it totalled 384 billion ecus in the five study countries, 
which indicates a total of about 440 billion ecus for the 12 member 
states. This is equivalent to 15 percent of GDP. 
Total contract procurement (total purchasing less the above 
elements) is estimated at between 170 and 250 billion ecus in 1984 
(200 to 280 billion ecus for the 12 member states), equal to between 
6 and 10 percent of GDP. 
The figures in Table 2 need to be treated with caution. The data 
have been compiled from a variety of sources, including Eurostat ESA 
National Accounts, Member States' national accounts, contract data 
compiled by Ministries and local government representative bodies, 
company accounts and the Consultants' own estimates. The values for 
contract procurement are approximate, 
a centra 1 record of pub 1 i c contracts 
high degree of under-reporting. 
because only France maintains 
let, and this suffers from a 
Belgium has a more limited 
database, which does not include local government. 
Data on the breakdown of total purchases by product group have been 
obtained from manipulation of the input-output tables for 1980, 
adjusted to 1984 levels of purchasing. At the one digit level the 
breakdown is shawn in Figure 1. 
- 88 -
18 
TABLE 2 - MACROECONOMie IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC SECTOR PURCHASING 
(Billion units national currency, 1984) 
Belgium 1 France German y Italy UK Total 
BF 1 FF DM Lit UKL ecu 
1 
GDP 1 4,402 4,282 1 '754 720,682 319 2,566 
1 
Total expenditure: 1 
Government 1 2,599 2,048 788 336,515 137 1 '183 
1 
Total public 1 
purchasing: 1 
Government 1 288 369 131 60,215 38 227 
Public enterprises 1 480 235 77 34,226 32 157 
Total PP 1 768 604 208 94,441 70 384 
1 
Government purchasing/1 
expenditure 1 11.0% 18.0% 17.0% 18.0% 28.0% 19.0% 
1 
Total PP as % GDP 1 17.5% 14.1% 11.8% 13.1% 21.8% 15.0% 
1 
Estimated total 1 
contract procurement 1 350-500 270-400 95-140 43,000- 32-45 170-250 (45-65% PP) 1 60,000 
1 
Sources: ESA National Accounts; Atkins• estimates for public enterprises and 
contract procurement 
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Figures in billion ecus 
Agriculture,Fish, F orestry .•.•••••.• 2 
Energy & water •.•••••••.••.•.•••••..• 64 
of whtch coal •••••••••••• 14 
petroleum products •••• 36 
lntermediate goods ...••.•••.•...••. 16 
Equipment goods ....•..•.•.•......•. 85 
Consumer goods ..••.••••.••.•..•..•• 28 
Building & Construction ••.•.•.. 1 02 
Transport & Communication ... 22 
~E!,ÏC:E!fi •••••••••••.•••.•••••..••..••.••••• ES~ 
FIGURE 1. BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC PURCHASES BY 
SUPPLYING SECTOR (5 Countries 1984) 
A002SR01 
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6. SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE PRODUCTS 
The quantitative estimation of gains from trade and restructuring 
started from specifie cases. For priee comparisons, very specifie 
products were selected and closely defined. Within the limitations 
of the present study the re i s a trade-off between the number of 
different products that can be studied and the level of detail at 
which each can be analysed. 
agreed: 
Two 1 i sts of se 1 ected products were 
* a 'priee effect' list of products which show a potential 
saving from new trade due to static priee differences 
* a 'restructuring effect' list of products for which there is a 
potential dynamic benefit from restructuring and economies of 
sc a le. 
To evaluate the static trade effect of gains from new trade arising 
from openi ng up pub 1 ic procurement, it was necessary to 1 ook at 
products which: 
* have a large share in public purchasing, so that priee 
differences lead to significant savings 
* are tradable 
* are not at present freely traded, so that there is a 
possibility of priee differences existing {after allowing for 
trading and transport costs) 
* benefit from nationalistic purchasing policies, the removal of 
which might lead to increased trade by the public sector. 
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Using the NACE classification of economie activities at the three 
digit level, all products were reviewed against these criteria, 
using data on the breakdown of public purchasing. The products for 
which savings were considered possible are shawn in the "Priee 
Effect List", Table 3. 
In arder that opening up public procurement should have an effect on 
the effici ency of the industry through restructuri ng and economies 
of scale it is necessary in addition that the supplying industry 
should: 
* depend heavily on public sector purchasers 
* have a few dominant producers in each country, because 
economies of scale are important. 
These products are shawn in the 11 Restructuring Effect List", 
Table 3. 
A further selection of these products was made to arrive at a list 
of products for analysis of priees, costs and industry structure and 
behaviour. Products of little importance in total purchasing, 
products not researchable for security reasons, and defence 
industries were eliminated from further study (but the conclusions 
of the analysis of selected products have been applied to all 
products). This left 14 product groups (42 specifie products) for 
which an analysis of priees has been carried out and 8 products for 
which case studies have been prepared covering industry structure, 
markets, competitiveness, cast structure and economies of scale, and 
the industries• likely response to opening up public procurement. 
Most of the products are from the manufacturi ng sectors. Raw 
materials and commodities can generally be excluded since near 
perfect international markets exist in most cases, and public sector 
purchases are law. The main exception is coal, for which 
restrictive purchasing agreements exist, and has been treated as a 
special case in the analysis. 
TABLE 3 - PRODUCTS/SECTORS AFFECTED BY OPENING UP PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
Estimated share of Priee effect list Restructuring effect 1 i st 
PP affected 
6.8% * Aerospace equipment/arms 1 * Aerospace/arms 4.6% * Business services 1 -3.7% Coal for power stations 1 Coal 
3.0% * Specialised civil engineering & building 1. 7% Motor vehicles 
1. 6% Pharmaceuticals 
1.3% * All other mechanical engineering 1.2% Heavy steel fabrications Heavy fabrications 
0.9% * Shipbuilding * Shipbuilding 0.9% Power generation equipment Power generation equipment 
0.9% Telecommunication equipment Telecom equipment 
0.9% Computer equipment Mainframe computers 
0.9% Railway rolling stock Raliway rolling stock 
0.7% School/office desks/furniture 
0.7% Uniforms/clothing 
0.5% Power cables 
0.5% Lighting (office/street) 
0.4% Paper 
0.3% * Nuclear fuels * Nuclear fuels 0.3% * Explosives o. 1% * HVAC equipment o. 1% * Mining e~uipment o. 1% * Military police boots o. 1% * Steel tubes/special steels o. 1% Lasers and optoelectronics 
less than O. 1% Cement 
less than 0.1% * Steel plant less than 0.1% * Pit props less than 0.1% * Railway track 
Source: WS Atkins: Shares of public purchasing from analysis of input-output data 
* not included in detailed studies 
-.() 
N 
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There are also a large number of categories of utilities and 
services for which the potential for trade is very weak 
distribution of water and electricity, personal services, transport 
and communications - because proximity of the final supplier and the 
eus tomer i s of the essence. (This does not prevent the servi ce 
being provided by a local establishment with foreign ownership, or 
imported materials being used in providing the service). 
The re are, however, undoubtedly a reas wi thin the servi ces sector 
where there is potential for sorne expansion of trade - examples are 
engineering design, management consultancy, computer services, or 
architectural services, within the business services sector. This 
sector also includes insurance and finance brokers, estate agents, 
legal services, accountants, advertising, and technical services. 
In most of these sectors, language and knowledge of local laws, 
eus toms and ci rcumstances are the main barri ers to cross border 
trade, and nationalistic purchasing is likely to be of little 
importance. Most business is done by or through local 
representative offices. Nevertheless in this, and in sorne other 
service sectors, there is opportunity for trade in border areas and 
in specialist services. Completion of the internal market will 
facilitate this trade, for which international tendering is a 
prerequi site. It is not susceptible to detai led compari son of 
priees, but an estimate has been made of the potential impact in the 
calculation described in Section 9. 
Building and civil engineering is a far larger supplying sector, 
representi ng about 30 percent of pub 1 ic purchasi ng. A lthough the 
potential for increased trade is in general limited by distance, the 
volume of purchases makes any savings potentially important. Trade 
i s restricted by the on-si te nature of most of the work, and the 
limited mobility of labour and the cast of transporting building 
materials, which also limit potential savings which could be offered 
by foreign contractors. 
potential savings: 
Nevertheless, there are likely to be 
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* in border areas 
* in specialist activities such as tunnelling, airports, and 
innovative building methods 
* when there are local areas of high construction activity and 
law construction activity, leading to differential profit 
margins, so that firms with law orders have an incentive to 
bid in the high demand areas. 
Although there are highly innovative contractors, designers and 
building product manufacturers, the construction industry tends, 
rightly in view of the long term risks of new methods, to be 
cautious. The building materials trade is also prone to restrictive 
practices. The entry of foreign contractors with proven methods and 
experience which are new to national markets is likely to accelerate 
useful innovation, stimulate competition and by-pass materials 
cartels. The Commission•s own experience in building 120 rue de la 
Loi is an example of potential savings: 
The Commission issued a call for tender in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities for the contract to 
construct a Commission office building at 120 rue de la Loi, 
Brus se 1 s. Res panses were recei ved from a wi de range of 
construction companies bath from within and outside the 
Community. They provided interested firms with a 
specification of works in English and French. There were few 
foreign tenders, which were generally more expensive than 
local bids. The selection was made from tenders received -
not all firms submitted a tender subject to the tenderer being 
financially sound and complying with the works specification. 
The contract was awarded to a consortium of four companies, 
including Dumez of France, which collectively took on the role 
of the prime contractor. Tenders were also invited for 
sub-contract parcels of work and nominated sub-contractors 
were appointed. Although there was foreign involvement in the 
contract and it was not always evident as to the origin of 
certain materials and equipment - other than specialist 
equipment such as the air conditioning system, all purchases 
were made locally - according to the responsible Commission 
official: 
* an estimated 90% of the cast of works remained in 
Belgium 
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* the project was completed on time and to budget 
* the value of the contract was sorne 15 - 25% below the 
initial estimate provided by the Belgian Ministry of 
Works in 1981 prior to the issue of the call for tender. 
As with services, these potential areas of saving are specifie to 
particular locations, contracts and times and are not easily 
quantifiable. An estimate of the potential has been made in the 
calculations of the static priee effect. 
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7. PRICE COMPARISONS 
For analysis of the static trade effect, inter-country comparisons 
of priees have been obtained from four sources: 
* direct market research for 17 closely specifie standard 
products. In each country enquiries were made to obtain 
quotations from three suppliers (where three exist and were 
willing to quote), and the priee actually paid by one 
purchasing authority 
* data he 1 d by Eurostat. Of the se data, 17 products had 
comparable priees for at least four of the five study 
countries (this includes data on 18 models of car, averaged to 
represent one composite product) 
* data on the cast of a basket of pharmaceutical products from a 
study by the Bureau Europeen des Unions de Consommateurs ( • A 
Common Market in Medicines• BEUC 1987) 
* data from case study interviews. 
The compari son of pri ces rai ses a number of prob 1 ems, the most 
critical of which are: 
* identical products are not available in all countries, because 
of differing national standards, and product differentiation. 
In sorne cases the nearest available product has a quite 
different specification (e.g. diameter of power cable, rating 
of transformer) for which it has been possible in the direct 
priee enquiries to make a correction. It is understood that 
similar analyses and corrections have been carried out on the 
Eurostat data. In other cases, however, quality and design 
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differences have not been able to be analysed, and may account 
for a part or all of the priee differences observed. In the 
case of street lamps, for example, comparable specifications 
could not be found in all countries; and products like desks, 
however c 1 ose ly defi ned, are subject to design and qua 1 ity 
differences 
* there is a considerable variation in priees within each 
country. For example, a study of local authority purchasing 
in the UK found priee differences of typically 2:1 and 
sometimes more, even for identical product speci fi cati ons. 
This effect has been minimised by taking the mean of four 
observations where possible, but the fact that the priee 
differentials within a country are as great as the differences 
between countries indicates that expenditure savings could 
often be made by improved purchasing without increased trade. 
To calculate the potential savings, the Consultants estimated a 
savings threshold for typical contracts for each product and each 
pair of trading countries. The savings threshold is the cast of 
transport, trading, procurement and bidding, and a risk premium, as 
a percentage of the domestic priee. The potential savings factor is 
then estimated by subtracting this savings threshold from the priee 
differential for each pair of trading countries. Sensitivity 
analyses have been carried out to test the effect of different 
assumptions, and in particular the effect of assuming negligible 
trading and procurement costs and zero risk in the future internal 
market. 
The potential savings factors calculated by this method are shawn in 
Table 4. For several products there are no apparent potential 
savings at all (for example fluorescent tubes, school desks, cement, 
cardiac monitors). For sorne there are apparent potential savings of 
30 to 50 percent for the high priee countries (for example uniforms, 
filing cabinets, X-ray machines, telephones). These data are 
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carried forward to the calculations of the trade effect, where 
aggregate sa vi ngs are ca leu 1 ated for each product group and a pp 1 i ed 
. 
to product groups not covered by detailed analyses. 
-a 
-a 
TABLE 4 - POTENTIAL STATIC PRICE SAVINGS BY PRODUCT 
(percent of 1987 home priee - base case hypothesis) 
R59 Product sector % of total Belgium France Germ any Italy UK Data source 
pure hases 
31 Coal 3.69 0 0 50 0 25 a 
151 Cement etc 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 a 
170 Chemicals 3.22 
Pharmaceuticals 9 0 52 0 40 c 
190 Metal products 2.27 
Boi lers 0 0 0 0 0 d 
Fi1ing cabinets 20 15 28 0 0 a 
Fixed armchair 0 2 23 0 5 b 
Storage cabinet 0 0 0 0 0 b 
File cabinet 4 19 0 11 0 b 
Shelf 30 0 0 0 0 b 
Swive1 chair 16 0 5 0 0 b 
Weighted average 6 3 5 1 0 
210 Agriculture/industry etc 2.62 11 8 10 7 4 e 
230 Office machine & instrumentation l. 76 
Mainframe 0 0 0 0 0 a 
Typewriter I 0 10 0 28 27 b 
Calculator 1 4 25 17 43 0 b 
Paper shredder 0 0 0 31 0 b 
Calculator II 0 22 0 33 0 b 
Weighted average 1 12 3 27 5 
~ 
0 
TABLE 4 - POTENTIAl STATIC PRICE SAVINGS BY PRODUCT - CONTINUED 0 
(percent of 1987 home priee - base case hypothesis) 
R59 Product sector % of total Belgium France German y Ital y UK Data source 
pure hases 
250 Electrical equipment 4.69 
Turbine generators 20 5 0 10 0 d 
Cab les 28 0 0 0 0 a 
Transformers 12 16 0 0 19 a 
Transformer 1 0 6 6 0 29 b 
Telephone switching 60 40 70 50 50 a 
Telephones 20 43 39 0 0 a 
Te 1 ephone II 47 63 68 34 0 b 
laser 0 0 0 0 0 a 
Cardiac mon. 0 0 0 0 0 a 
Electrocardiograph 0 0 0 0 0 b 
X-ray machine 18 30 29 49 0 a 
Street 1amp 0 0 0 0 0 a 
Fluorescent tube 0 0 0 9 0 a 
Weighted average 17 14 15 14 7 
270 Motor vehic1es l. 70 
Ope1 0 11 9 9 7 a 
Average car 0 4 0 8 12 b 
Fiat 0 12 4 5 0 a 
vw 0 15 4 17 0 a 
Van 86 0 0 11 13 t 14 b 
Van 87 0 21 5 12 1 13 b 
Bus 08 0 8 0 19 1 0 b 
Bus 014 0 30 4 0 1 21 b 
1 
Weighted average 0 13 4 10 1 9 
1 
~ 
0 
~ 
TABLE 4 - POTENTIAL STATIC PRICE SAVINGS BY PRODUCT - CONTINUED 
(percent of 1987 home priee - base case hypothesis) 
1 
1 R59 Product sector % of total Belgium France Germany Italy UK Data source 
1 pure hases 
1 
1 
1 290 Other transport 9.01 
1 Electric locos 10 0 10 20 0 d 
1 Goods wagon 13 0 23 5 10 a 
1 
1 Weighted average 11 0 13 16 3 
1 
1 410 Textiles and clothing 0.69 
1 Uniforms 55 25 0 36 1 a 
1 
~ 450 Wooden furniture 0.70 
School desk 20 7 25 0 0 a 
Office desk 0 0 15 0 0 a 
Weighted average 10 4 20 0 0 
471 Paper and board 0.44 
Copier paper 0 8 18 0 0 a 
430 Leathers, leather & skin goods, footwear o. 13 11 6 11 14 4 e 
490 Rubber & plastic products o. 71 11 6 11 14 4 e 
510 Other manufacturing products 0.46 11 6 11 14 4 e 
530 Building & civil engineering works 26.65 10 10 10 10 10 f 
TABLE 4 - POTENTIAL STATIC PRICE SAVINGS BY PRODUCT - CONTINUED 
(percent of 1987 home priee - base case hypothesis) 
..... 
0 
N 
R59 Product sector % of total Belgium 
pure hases 
France Germany Italy UK Data source 
710 Business services provided to enterprises 4.63 10 10 10 10 10 f 
Sources: a 
b 
c 
Notes: 1 
2 
3 
Atkins direct enqu1r1es 1987 
Eurostat priee survey 1986 
BEUC 'A Common Market in Medicines' 1987 
63.41 
d 
e 
f 
Atkins case study interviews 
Weighted average of other manufacturing sectors 
Atkins hypothesis 
To estimate potential savings for leather goods and footwear, rubber and plastics, and other manufacturing 
products, a weighted average was used of the potential savings in other manufacturing sectors. 
A straight estimate of 10% potential savings was made for building and civil works, and business services, for each 
country 
The potential savings for coal are taken from the case study 
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8. CASE STUDIES 
8.1 Selection of the Case Studies 
The objective of the case studies was to examine, for specifie 
supplying industries, the potential impact of the internal market on 
industry structure and economies of scale. The analysis included a 
comparison of the structure and competitiveness the EC and US 
industries. The case studies were selected from the range of 
special 'public sector goods', which was shown in the restructuring 
list in Table 3. These are principally capital equipment for the 
defence, transport, energy, telecomunications and water sectors. 
They were chosen to cover different industry sectors, traditional 
and hi-tech industries and different industry structures, as 
illustrated in Table 5. 
8.2 Case Study Method 
Interviews were held with senior executives and directors concerned 
with European marketing and development strategy in the principal 
firms in the five study countries, a total of sorne 60 companies, 
supplemented by desk research in Europe and USA. Many of these 
companies supply several of the case study products. The 
outstanding example is that three subsidiaries of CGE (Framatome, 
A 1 sthom and A 1 ca te 1 ) are vi rtua lly monopoly su pp 1 i ers in France and 
also dominant EC suppliers of equipment to the rail, power 
generation and telecommunications sectors. 
The interview programme and case study desk work covered: 
* the industry structure: size of firms, market shares, 
ownership patterns 
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TABLE 5 - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
Product sector 
Coal 
Boilers (heavy 
fabrications) 
Turbine 
generators 
Locomotives 
Mainframe 
computers 
Public 
switching 
Telephones 
Lasers 
Purchasing sector 
Power generation 
Power generation 
Power generation 
Transport 
Central & local gov•t 
& public enterprises 
Telecommunications 
Telecommunications 
Defence and telecoms 
Characteristics 
Declining industry 
Strategie resource 
Traditional industry, facing 
technical change. Few 
producers 
Similar to boilers 
Oligopolistic industry, hi-
tech with traditional base 
High technology; with 
external threat 
High R&D costs, rapid 
technology change, government 
involvement in R&D 
Small unit value, high volume, 
medium scale industry 
New product, highly innovative 
with strategie importance 
* market size, trends and existing trade patterns 
* technology and technology trends 
* cost structure and capacity utilisation 
* relative priees 
* perceived barriers to intra-EC trade 
* the firms• European marketing strategies 
* the firms• views of future industry scenarios and 
restructuring. 
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8.3 Characteristics of the Case Study Industries 
Table 6 summarises the key market characteristics of the case study 
products. There is generally excess capacity (except telephones and 
computers) and negligible trade between EC producers (except in 
computers - mainly due to IBM - and public switching equipment 
between local subsidiaries of EC and non EC firms). 
TABLE 6 - CASE STUDIES : MARKET CHARACTERISTICS, 1986 
Product 
Coal 
Boil ers 
Turbine generators 
Locomotives 
Mainframe computers 
Public switching 
Telephones 
Lasers 
Approx. 
EC market 
rn Ecus 
20,000 
2,000 
2,000 
100 
10,000 
7,000 
5,000 
500 
Estimated 
capacity 
utilisation 
20% 
60% 
50% to 80% 
80% 
approx 70% 
90% 
50% 
Source: WS Atkins interviews and estimates 
Intra-EC 
trade 
negl 
negl 
negl 
negl 
30 to 100% 
15% to 45% 
negl 
high 
Table 7 compares the number of major firms in the EC and USA. In 
several of the products (boilers, turbine generators, locomotives, 
public switching) there are more firms in the EC than the USA, and 
economies of scale are important in each of these products. It is 
not, however, universally true that the EC has too many firms, and 
there are only sorne sectors which would be likely to undergo major 
restructuring in the internal market. Mainframe computer 
manufacturing, however, illustrates the point that although the US 
has more firms than the EC, in the US the biggest (like IBM) may be 
very big and achieve economies of scale and the smaller firms may 
speci a 1 ise ( 1 i ke Cray). In Europe, product ranges and R&D are 
duplicated, without effective competition to improve efficiency. 
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TABLE 7 - CASE STUDIES : EC v USA IN 1987 
Product No. of EC firms 
Coal 
Boil ers 
Turbine generators 
Locomotives 
Mainframe computers 
Public switching 
Telephones 
Lasers 
Source: WS Atkins interviews 
10 majors 
12 
10 
16 
5 
11 
12 
over 1,000 
No. of US firms 
3,000 
6 
2 
2 
9 
4 
17 
over 1,000 
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8.4 Priees and Economies of Scale 
Table 8 summaries, in rounded terms, the concensus of industry views 
on typical priee differences for the case study products, relative 
to ei ther the lowest priee EC su pp 1 i er or the 1 i ke ly future open 
market priee. These differences are included in Table 4. 
In each of the sectors a quantitative analysis of potential 
economies of scale was made, using data on cast structures, capacity 
utilisation and technology. Likely scenarios, based on firms• 
reported strategies and their views of likely changes in industry 
structure, were considered. This enabled hypotheses to be developed 
on potential changes in the output of typical plants and potential 
economies in R&D and overheads. 
Economies of scale can be defined in terms of: 
* Short Run Economies of Scale (SREOS} - economies achievable 
with existing fixed capital (or with 
de-bottlenecking} as a result of 
utilisation and overall capacity 
restructuring, with markets unchanged. 
plants are also unchanged 
minor investment in 
increased capacity 
reduction due to 
The size of firms and 
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* Long Run Economies of Scale (LREOS) - result from increases in 
the si ze of p 1 a nt (new i nvestment) or in the si ze of fi rms 
(mergers and acquisitions, or market growth). In the selected 
case studies, increase in the size of plant and major 
investment in new facilities is not part of any of the 
scenarios. Mergers of firms leading to rationalisation of 
production, and elimination of duplicated R&D and marketing 
effort, is a common feature. 
8oth 'short run' and 'long run' economies of scale may take many 
years to be achieved, since bath require industry restructuring. 
TABLE 8 - CASE STUDIES : POTENTIAL PRICE SAVING 
Product 
Coal 
Boil ers 
Turbine generators 
Locomotives 
Mainframe computers 
Public switching 
Telephones 
Lasers 
Potenti al 
priee saving 
50% FRG 
25% UK 
negl 
5 to 20% 
8, F, I 
10 to 20% 
8, FRG, I 
negl 
40% F 
45% 8 
50% UK, I 
70% FRG 
40% F, FRG 
20% B 
negl 
Source: WS Atkins interviews and priee enquiries 
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8.5 Scenarios 
Co al 
A brief sunmary of the assumed scenarios for each of the case 
studies is given below. The estimated priee change due to economies 
of scale - assuming all cost savings are passed on to customers (as 
they should in the new competitive environment) - is shawn in 
Table 9. 
TABLE 9 - CASE STUDIES : RESTRUCTURING EFFECTS 
Pro du ct SREOS LREOS Restructuring required 
Pit closures 
Boil ers 20% Mergers and plant closures 
Mergers and rationalisation 
Mergers and technical 
collaboration, sorne closures 
Turbine generators 10% 2% 
Locomotives 13% 7% 
Mainframe computers negl 5% Rationalisation of product 
ranges and manufacturing 
Public switching 10% 10% Further acquisitions and 
rationalisation 
Telephones negl negl Sorne closures, sorne 
rationalisation 
Lasers large, not due to Natural growth and 
internal market consolidation 
1 
Source: WS Atkins 
* Coal: Germany and UK have purchasing agreements between power 
authorities and the coal industry. (France and Belgium have 
high production subsidies but smaller, declining industries 
and do not prevent imports). Removal of purchasing 
restrictions would lead to sorne accelerated closures in UK and 
massive closures in Germany. Germany would save around 50 
percent and UK about 25 percent of coal priees by imports from 
outside the EC. It is assumed that imports would capture most 
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of the German market and about 10-20 percent of the UK market. 
This is only the effect of removal of purchasing restrictions, 
not the removal of all subsidies. In the absence of 
purchasing restrictions, the same protection could be afforded 
to coal industries by increasing production subsidies to lower 
home production priees, or by external tariffs. Since this is 
a matter of energy policy the potential savings estimated here 
may not be considered a 'cast of non-Europe' in the context of 
this study 
* Boilers: there is no trade between EC producing countries, and 
the re i s massive overcapacity. Pri ce differences gi ve no 
evident static priee advantage, but increased competition in 
the internal market would lead to sorne reduction in 
boilermaking capacity, and in the number of firms from 15 (in 
five countries) to around four. Unit priees and costs would 
fall by around 20 percent. The industry is vulnerable to low 
cast third world competition, and sorne manufacturing would 
probably shift offshore. These developments will require 
changes in na ti on al competition po licy as we 11 as openi ng up 
public procurement 
* Turbine generators: As in boi 1 ers, the re i s 1 itt 1 e trade 
between the main EC producing countries, and sorne 
overcapacity. There are sorne priee differences, so there are 
potential static priee gains. Italy and the UK are beginning 
new power station building programmes, so French and German 
firms would be able to enter these markets. This is likely to 
lead to mergers and acquisitions and rationalisation of 
production, reducing unit costs by an estimated 12 percent, 
without major closures 
* Electric locomotives: There is no significant trade yet 
between EC producing countries, but mergers and collaboration 
agreements are beginning to occur. Purchasing is opening up. 
Trade will be slow to develop because present locomotive 
designs were developed jointly between railway authorities and 
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national suppliers, and different rail systems are perceived 
as a barrier. Over a period of decades, the number of main 
manufacturers is likely to reduce from 16 (counting bath 
mechanical and electrical subsystem manufacturers) to 3 or 4, 
with rationalised product ranges. Unit costs would fall by 
around 13 percent. Pressure for these changes already exists 
because of changing technology, but they cannat occur without 
changes in public purchasing policy 
* Mainframe computers: Unlike the previous case studies, this is 
a highly competitive industry, but in a bilateral fashion, 
with indigenous producers competing against IBM in each 
country. IBM has bec orne a pan-European fi rm, and other 
manufacturers are following, particularly Groupe Bull. There 
is no static priee effect likely as a result of opening up 
public procurement. 
industry is likely, 
Sorne continued rationalisation of the 
leading to minor savings in R&D and 
marketing, estimated at around 5 percent of costs, but Europe 
now has fewer manufacturers (5 including IBM) than the USA (9 
fi rms). Japan a 1 rea dy has a strong presence in Europe ( ICL, 
Comparex and Olivetti sell Japanese machines) and this is 
likely to increase, with direct sales and possibly local 
manufacture 
* Public exchange switching equipment: There are seven different 
digital switching systems being installed in EC countries, 
five of which were developed by EC firms with the protection 
of national purchasing policies and R&D funding. According to 
interviewees and press reports, the 1987 priee per line ranges 
from $225 to $500, because of varying levels of amortisation 
of development costs, compared to around $100 in the USA. 
With open tendering the European priee would probably fall to 
around $150 (there are still R&D costs for adaptation to 
different nation al networks). The i ndustry has been 
restructuring rapidly recently to compete for national market 
shares, notably by the emergence of Alcatel as a major 
pan-European fi rm and a seri es of other mergers and 
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cooperation agreements. With completely open markets there 
would probably be only two firms in the EC. This would give 
economies of sc a 1 e in production, a 1 though the re wou 1 d st i 11 
be distributed manufacturing, and would give sorne economies in 
the next round of development costs for future systems 
* Telephones: There are many manufacturers of telephones and 
significant imports into deregul ated markets. There are 
substantial priee differences, mainly because there are high 
specifications for telephones into regulated markets (ie. 
first telephones in all but UK) and lower quality products in 
free markets. There are also differences in technology 
between manufacturers. Free competition would drive out 
expensive products and high cast producers, bringing priees 
dawn by 30 to 40 percent in Belgium, France and Germany, but 
there ~re no additional economies of scale to be achieved bJ; 
major restructuring 
* Lasers: The laser industry is very competitive, with many 
small firms, at the beginning of the product cycle curve. 
Only France is reported to have nationalistic public 
purchasing policies, although for telecommunications 
a pp 1 i cati ons 1 a sers are produced by sorne of the 
teleconmunications equipment firms which are themselves 
protected by public purchasing. Otherwise the market is open. 
Costs will continue to fall as the industry matures and 
economies of scale will be achieved through market growth and 
mergers, but this will not be a result of internal market 
effects. 
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9. THE COST OF NON-EUROPE IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
The priee analyses and case studies described in preceding sections 
give estimates of the potential changes in priees of products 
entering into public purchasing. The priee changes were applied to 
give a weighted average priee change for each 2-digit NACE product 
category (sorne of which, for perfectly traded commodities and for 
non-tradables, are zero). To estimate the potential savings in 
public expenditure, these priee changes were input into a madel, 
developed by the Consultants, of the total volume of public 
purchasing and potential changes in trade flows. 
It is assumed throughout that there is no change in the total volume 
of public purchasing, nor of the volumes of private consumption. It 
is also assumed that all priee changes result from a change in the 
cast of production, so that profit levels remain unchanged. Welfare 
gains are therefore measured directly by the change in public 
expenditure. This is essentially a comparative static approach. 
The longer term dynamic macroeconomie effects of the change in 
public expenditure and resource use on financial constraints, 
balance of payments, employment and economie growth are to be 
estimated by Commission staff using macroeconomie models. 
The measurable effects of the internal market on priees and hence on 
public expenditure have been analysed in three components, the 
formulae for which are summarised in the technical appendix. The 
additional very important effects which cannat be quantified are 
listed at the end of the section. 
* a static trade effect: this arises from increased imports 
from law cast producers. It i s assumed that the products 
concerned are differentiated goods with monopolistically 
competitive markets (apart from coal, which is treated 
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differently in the analysis, traded commodities are excluded) 
so that the lower priced imports wi 11 take a share of the 
market without initially affecting the priee of existing 
products. A range of hypotheses have been made about the 
potential change in import penetration. The base case assumes 
that public sector import penetration reaches the same level 
as the private sector for each product. The change in import 
penetration has been calculated using data from the contract 
database, trade statistics, and the analysis of public and 
private sector purchases from ESA input-output tables, for 
each country and each product. 
For each product, the static trade effect equals: 
(initial expenditure) x (% priee saving) x (change in import 
penetration proportion) 
* a competition effect: as imports increase due to the trade / 
effect, domestic suppliers will be under pressure to eut 
priees to maintain market share. To the extent that there is 
x-inefficiency (that is, wasteful use of resources) they can 
do this by improving efficiency (e.g. reorganising or adopting 
new technology) and maintaining profit levels. If there is no 
x-inefficiency then either firms must merge or restructure to 
achieve economies of scale or any priee eut is matched by loss 
of profits and there is no welfare gain. The existence of 
x-inefficiency implies an absence of profit maximising 
behaviour, which can only occur in non-competitive markets. 
The assumption is therefore made that a competition effect 
applies to all output in the case study sectors and similar 
products (where there is negligible public sector trade at 
present and few private sector buyers) but not at all to other 
products where there is a substantial private sector market. 
In the previously •non-competitive• markets therefore the 
competition effect equals for each product: 
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(initial expenditure) x (% priee saving) x (1 - change in 
import penetration proportion) 
The competition effect on priees of domestic suppliers is 
1 i ke ly to be seen as saon as the re i s new trade or threat of 
trade. The effect on costs will take longer, since firms have 
to reorganise, improve procedures and possibly invest in new 
technology. In the intervening period there will be a loss of 
profits for firms, and it is this which will stimulate the 
efficiency improvements required. 
* a restructuring effect: the development scenarios for the 
case study industries outlined in the previous section lead to 
the reduction in average costs, and hence in priees, due to 
the economies of scale which were shawn in Table 8. Such 
effects would probably take 5 to 10 years to be realised. 
These priee reductions are estimates for a •typical• firm and 
are assumed to apply equally to all countries. 
The restructuring effect is estimated by: 
(initial expenditure) x (restructuring factor) 
The results of a series of sensitivity analyses on the import 
penetration factors, savings thresholds, and priee differentials is 
shawn in Table 10. These also include the effect of an assumed + 30 
percent variation in the economies of scale factors in the 
restructuring effect. 
The total potential savings are estimated in the range 8 to 19 
billion ecus. The static trade effect, which can be assumed to be 
achieved by or saon after the completion of the internal market in 
1992, amounts to 4 to 9 billion ecus. The competition effects on 
domestic suppliers, which will follow very saon after, gives an 
additional 1 to 3 billion ecus saving. The longer term 
restructuring effect is estimated to be similar in magnitude to the 
potential trade effect. 
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TABLE 10 - SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS IN TOTAL PUBLIC PURCHASING 
(Billion Ecus 1984 - 5 countries) 
Component Value % GDP % of total (billion ecus) public purchasing 
Static trade effect * 3 - 8 0.1 - 0.3 1 - 2 
Competition effect 1 - 3 0.04- 0.1 0.3 - 1 
Restructuring effect 4 - 8 0.15- 0.3 1 - 2 
8 - 19 0.3 - 0.7 2 - 5 
* Note: Savings are calculated on total purchasing (not just contract 
procurement). The base case estimate of the static trade effect 
includes: 
Coal 
Pharmaceuticals 
Other manufactured goods 
Construction 
Services 
bi 11 ion ecus 
2.0 
1.2 
2.2 
1.0 
0.2 
o.6' 
The savings in public purchasing which have been quantified exclude 
sorne very important elements, which are outside the scope of the 
present study: 
* savings for the private sector purchasers of goods whose priee 
has been reduced by increased competition. In the case study 
sectors, where the greatest savings apply, private sector 
pure hases are sma 11 - the re are few 1 priva te 1 purchasers of 
power station equipment, railway equipment, and network 
telecommunications equipment, since all enterprises providing 
these services are included in this study 1 s definition of the 
public sector. Nevertheless, the leverage wielded by public 
sector purchasers may break up restrictive trade practices 
(such as sole concessions and discriminatory pricing) and 
generate new gains from trade in products, su ch as of fi ce 
equipment, pharmaceuticals or construction, which are 
purchased by bath pub 1 i c and priva te sec tors. Su ch sa vi hgs 
would, however, under the assumptions of this madel, be partly 
offset by reductions in profit margins 
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* dynamic effects on innovation and growth. The 1 on ger term 
restructuring effect includes an estimate of the reduction in 
R&D and marketing expenditure possible as a result of company 
mergers and collaboration eliminating duplication. On the 
ether hand, a more effective use of the same R&D and marketing 
expenditure could have a far-reaching impact on innovation, 
investment and growth, which has not been quantified 
* external effects: the more effective use of R&D and marketing 
effort may have a profound effect, not just on innovation and 
growth, but on the survival of sorne sectors of European 
industry. In key high technology sectors such as computers, 
telecommunications, aerospace, transport equipment and defence 
goods the historical fragmentation of European industry into 
national preserves has made it increasingly uncompetitive, 
bath at home and in world markets. Even though imports from 
outside the EC are likely to increase in the short term, major 
restructuring and increased competition can bring costs dawn 
and enable European industry to remain viable, compete and 
possibly gain new export markets in the long term. 
The total estimated savings in public expenditure represent around 
half a percent of GDP, and this is equivalent to 2 to 5 percent of 
public purchasing, a very considerable saving. The dynamic effects 
outlined above would not only add to t~se savings in the long term 
but act as a powerful stimulant to European economie growth. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX - METHOD OF CALCULATION OF TOTAL POTENTIAL SAVINGS 
1. Formulae used in the Madel 
Initial public purchasing = pQ 
where Q = tot a 1 vo 1 ume of purchases from bath 1 oc a 1 producers and 
importers 
p = initial home priee of bath local producers and importers. 
After opening up markets, expected public purchasing 
where M = new imports 
Pm =priee (delivered) of new imports from foreign supplies 
immediately after opening up 
dpc = change in priee of local suppliers due to new competition 
dpr = change in priee of all products due to restructuring 
effects 
Savings = initial purchasing - expected purchasing 
= pM - dp Q + dp M - dp Q - p M c c r rn 
........ trade effect 
+ (-2.Ec) (1 - !:!) pQ ........ competition effect 
( p ) ( Q) 
.....•.. restructuring effect 
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define ~ = static priee saving = p-pm 
p 
so { 1-Â) = .P.m 
p 
e = change in import penetration = ~ 
pQ 
so !:! = R e 
Q Pm 
R = -dp ~ 
p 
also, by hypothesis: 
= e 
-{ 1-â) 
-dpc =~for previously protected public sector suppliers 
= 0 for other supply sectors 
Then: 
Trade effect = 1 ~A · 8· (-pQ) 
Competition effect = ~ A[r- 1~A}pQ 
{ 0 
Restructuring effect = R{pQ) 
for protected 
sectors 
otherwise 
2. Data Used 
These formulae are used for calculation of the savings for each 
product at 2 digit NACE {R59) level. The data sources are 
ll = the priee savings shown in table 4 
{pQ) = the initial {1984) public purchasing expenditure 
breakdown based on input-output tables 
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R = the economies of scale factors from the case studies, 
extrapolated to 2 digit NACE level 
9 = change in import penetration estimated as described 
below. 
3. Estimation of the change in import penetration 
For the calculations of the 11 Cost of Non-Europe.. in public 
procurement, a hypothesis has to be made about the change in public 
sector import penetration for each product group at the 2 digit NACE 
level. Since no reliable data exists on the current level of public 
sector import penetration, and since the 1992 public sector import 
penetration is pure hypothesis, an assumption was made of the 
maximum likely change in import penetration as follows: 
* For coal: 
* For construction: 
* For services: 
as assumed in the case study 
10% increase, representing border 
areas and sorne specialist construction 
10% of business services, zero for 
other services (eg. maintenance, 
rents, health, travel) 
* For manufactured goods: After 1992 the pub 1 ic sector import 
penetration will be similar to the 
private sector at present. The latter 
is not known, but data for total 
import penetration of each 2 digit 
sector (public and private purchases) 
is known. 
Estimates of the present level of 
import penetration in the public 
sector have been made on the basis of 
av ail ab le evidence from the Contract 
data base. The implied private sector 
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import penetration is then calculated, 
us i ng data from the ana 1 ys i s of ESA 
input-output tables for the ratio of 
private and public sector purchasing 
(using intermediate consumption as a 
proxy), as follows: 
Taking for each 2-digit NACE category 
9AV = total import penetration, from the DGII 
data base (1986 or latest year available) 
9PRIV = present private sector import penetration 
9PUB = present public sector import penetration 
EPUB = public purchases of the sector output 
EPRIV = private sector purchases 
ETOT = total purchases 
ETOT x 9AV = EPUB x 9PUB + EPRIV x 9PRIV 
whence: 
PUB = 
and hence: 
Change in import penetration 9 = SPRIV - 9PUB 
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1. INTRODUCTION : Context, objectives and methodology of this study. 
This study was motivated by the following questions : what are technical 
trade barriers? What are their origins? Why do they persist? Who wins and 
loses from their existence? If the reader's first reaction to these questions is 
"wh y does it matter?", he is duly forgiven. The subject of technical trade 
barriers has heretofore been the domain of lawyers, bureaucrats, 
technicians, politicians, and has rarely been in the public eye. Until now. 
Technical barriers are important. ln fact, technical trade barriers are one of 
the greatest obstacles to the completion of the internai market in 1992. 
That is the true reason why this study was undertaken; to cali attention to 
the nature and persistence of technical trade barriers in a theoretically 
barrier-free European Community. 
To cite one piece of evidence, in a widely distributed business survey, the 
existence of technical trade barriers was ranked as one of the most 
important obstacles preventing the completion of the internai market. 
COUNTRY IMPORTANCE OF TECHNICAL TRADE BARRIERS {RANK) 
GER MANY 1 
UK 1 
FRANCE 1 
BELGIUM 2 
Source : CEC : "Research on the Cost of Non-Europe"; The complet1on of the internai 
market: a survey of European industry's perception of the likely effects, forthcoming. 
Such results illustrate that from the standpoint of completing the internai 
market herein lies a problem to be reckoned with. 
This study is part of the European Commission's ove rail research program on 
the "Cast of Non-Europe." Other studies have identified and analyzed 
technical trade barriers, but they have done so while focusing on a single 
industry. ln requesting this study, the Commission wished a horizontal view 
of this problem covering a variety of sectors in arder to cali attention to the 
problem, and to piece together sorne general conclusions. 
The objectives of this study therefore are three-fold : 
identify, on a sectorial basis, technical barri ers to trade; 
examine the similarities and differences of these barriers and evaluate 
their consequences for trade and other indirect effects; 
develop general conclusions asto the current importance of national 
technical disparities as an obstacle to intra-EC trade and to EC company 
competitiveness on world markets. 
ParAgro3727188 
GROUPBMAC 
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The sectors covered in the study were chosen based on the importance and 
frequency of technical trade barriers as weil as the availability of data. The 
sectors are : 
Foodstuffs 
Pharmaceuticals 
Automobiles 
Building Materials 
Electrical Products and Machines 
Telecommunications Equipment. 
Given the time constraints, the MAC Group conducted this study based on 
data previously collected du ring the relevant sectorial studies developed on 
the cost of Non-Europe, supplemented with 25 individual interviews within 
the Commission and with industry experts, observers and participants. The 
author also reviewed existing lite rature on the subject. 
ParA:jr03727188 
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Il. TECHNICAL TRADE BARRIERS IN THE EC 
A. What are technical trade barriers and what are the benefits of their 
removal ?(1l: 
If an EC producer must alter his product to comply with industrial standards 
or legal regulations for commercialization in another EC country, and/or, if 
a producer must have his product tested and certified by the importing 
country, he faces a technical trade barrier. lt is th at simple. 
There are three types of technical trade barriers. The first two concern the 
specifications of a given product and the third relates to the procedure by 
which product specifications are verified. 
Differences between countries in industry standafds, when imposed as a 
condition of entry, sale or use, create the first 'type of technical trade 
barrier. Here standards refer to voluntary specifications regarding product 
form, functioning, quality, compatibility and/or interchangeability. 
Standards are not legally binding and are defined by private individuals and 
organizations (ie. standardization bodies such as AFNOR in France,) in the ir 
own interest. The DIN system of standards used for building materials in 
Germany provides a good example of an industry standard. That these 
standards differ from the AFNOR standards in France prevents certain goods 
from freely moving between the two countries. 
The precise way trade is hindered can be quite subtle in the case of technical 
standards. For certain building materials, French insurance companies will 
only pay for damages caused by the product in question if it meets the 
industry standard and has been approved as such. Architects, who can be 
held liable for damages, are therefore reluctant to use (foreign) products 
produced according to a different standard, even if their level of safety is 
the same. 
The second type of technical trade barrier is caused by differences in legal 
regulations, where regulations are specifications similar to standards but 
differ in that they are legally binding often with the purpose of serving the 
public interest, in particular the objectives of health, safety, and 
environmental protection. The legal basis and the public interest of 
regulations distinguish them from standards. An example of a regulation is 
the pasta purity law in France, Ital y and Gree ce which specifies th at "pasta" 
must be composed of duram wheat only. A British-made pasta composed of 
both duram and soft wheat is prohibited from being sold in these countries 
under the na me "pasta" --creating a formidable marketing obstacle. 
By contrast to standards, the way in which a country's regulations prevent a 
good from being imported is unambiguous; they make importation illegal 
if the good does not comply with them. 
(1) Based on CEC, "Research on the Cost of Non-Europe"; The economies of 1992 : an 
assessment of the potential economie effects of completing the internai market of the 
European Community, "European Economy", forthcoming. 
ParAgro3727188 
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The third type of technical trade barrier are testing and certification 
procedures that are designed to ensure conformity to existing regulations 
or standards. Technical trade barriers are created when an importing 
country requires an additional certification procedure to that required in 
the country of origin. Pharmaceutical certification procedures and the type 
approvals necessary for automobiles are examples of this technical trade 
barrier. The trade hampering effects include the cost, time, and effort 
producers must expend to comply with these procedures. 
ln addition to the obvious restrictions on trade, the existence of technical 
trade barriers deprives the Community--both producers and consumers--of 
important economie benefits, both direct and indirect. Economies of scale in 
production gained by the acceptability of a single product throughout the 
Community is one important direct benefit. A second benefit is linked to the 
reduction in raw materials and finished goods inventory storage costs that 
could be realized by companies who heretofore build and distribute 
heterogeneous products within the EC. Manufacturing companies serving 
different Community markets could be significantly and positively a.ffected 
by a single, barrier-free market, and competitive pressures would ensure 
that a portion of these benefits are passed onto customers in the form of 
lower priees. Sorne of these direct benefits are quantified in the final 
chapter of this paper for the specifie case studies. 
Indirect economie effects of removing technical trade barriers include the 
increase in consumer choice, and a further gain in scale economies resulting 
from increased foreign sales. lndustry restructuring is a third important 
indirect benefit as more efficient European producers displace higher cost 
locally orientated manufacturers; which in turn would have a positive effect 
on the competitiveness of selected EC industries in world markets. 
ParAgro3727, 88 
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B Why do technical trade barri ers exist ? 
As described above, technical trade barriers exist when differing national 
regulations and/or standards prevent the free movement of goods, or wh en 
countries impose duplicative testing and certification procedures for 
imported goods. The more compelling question is why do they exist? And 
additionally, what interests are being served in their continued existence? 
Two fundamental reasons account for the existence of technical trade 
barriers within the EC. The reasons are themselves artifacts of the historical 
evolution of regulations and industrial standards and practices of the 
Community's twelve members: 
Historical and philosophical differences among countries on the 
essential requirements necessary to protect public safety, health and 
the environ ment 
Historical differences in standards and testing and certification 
procedures. 
Differences in values between countries on the essential requirements. This 
is the most fundamental cause of technical trade barriers. lncreasingly, 
member countries have similar if not identical views on how to protect 
public health, safety and the environment. Where differences do exist, 
however, barriers can be difficult to remove. Often, the only resolution of 
these differences is through direct political negotiation among the member 
countries. 
An example of this type of trade barrier are safety requirements on 
electrical cutting machines used in industrial environments. German 
requirements differ from French requirements because of differing 
philosophies on how to protect the machine user. Dangerous moving parts 
on French machines are completely isolated from the machine worker, so he 
would be protected even in the case of gross negligence. ln Germany, the 
philosophy underlying machine design delegates more responsibility to the 
machine worker. Moving parts are designed to minimize their danger and 
are properly indicated with signing, but they are not always completely 
isolated from the worker. 
Historical differences in standards and testing and certification procedures. 
The second cause of trade barri ers is wh en technical standards, defined and 
respected by manufacturers, trade organizations, insurance companies, and 
the like, differ between two countries. Users and prescriptors of the good in 
question then are reluctant to use a foreign product that complies to a 
different set of standards. Differences in standards--often the result of 
historical differences in the degree of industrialization among member 
states at the ti me of admission to the Community--therefore creates its own 
class technical trade barri ers, albeit on es which are not based in law. 
ParAgro3727188 
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A good example of the second fundamental cause of technical barriers, 
which also makes obvious the difficulty or impossibility of their removal, is 
the custom of right-hand drive in the British Isles and the Republic of 
lreland. lt is not illegal to own and operate a vehicle designed for left-hand 
drive, but a hundred years of road design and consumer habits combine to 
make it impossible to penetrate the automobile market with left-hand drive 
cars. ln this case, of course, it is unlikely the difference will ever be resolved. 
Another example of this type of technical barrier are the DIN versus AFNOR 
versus BPI systems of standards for building materials in Germany, France 
and the UK, respectively. 
The removal of technical barriers has been and will be accomplished easily 
for sorne and with much more difficulty for others. ln examining the various 
sectors covered in this study, two reasons appeared th at explain wh y certain 
technical trade barri ers are difficult to remove : 
- Protection of special interests 
- Protection of a strategie industry 
ln each of these cases, the "official" explanation or justification of barri ers is 
based on differences in values between two countries. However, looking 
behind the official explanations, one or both of these reasons can be 
identified. 
"Protection" of special interests. This is perhaps the most common reason 
why technical trade barriers are erected and or why they are difficult to 
remove. Examples of this class of barriers abound. ln ltaly, duram wheat 
used in the production of pasta is produced by a relatively small but 
powerful group of farmers in the southern part of the country. Pressure 
exerted by this group has led to the continued enforcement of the pasta 
purity legislation in ltaly. The "official" explanation of this legislation is to 
protect the consumer from poor quality pasta--something, it must be 
added, the consumer may do for himself by not purchasing it. Other 
examples in elude the restriction against the use of the sweetener aspartame 
in soft drinks in France--thereby protecting the sugar industry--and the 
individual approval required by European PTTs for telecommunications 
equipment--to protect domestic manufacturers. 
""Protection" of strategie industries is the second common reason why 
barriers are difficult to remove. Many European governments use selective 
procurement and certification policy as weil as incompatible standards to 
protect industries deemed of strategie importance. The pharmaceutical, 
automobile, and telecommunications equipment industries are ali 
prot~cted by member states, in part, through the erection of technical trade 
ba mers. 
As a case in point, the automobile industry Community Directives exist for 
41 out of 44 essential requirements of an automobile. The three that remain 
are relatively unimportant in themselves: weight and sizes, tyres, and wind 
screens. However, certain member states are resisting the completion of 
these directives for fear of losing complete control on the inflow of extra-
community imports. 
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C. How has the European Community approached this problem? 
Before going further, it will be useful to review the Commission's approach 
to the probrem of technical trade barriers and clarify sorne of the jargon 
that has arisen on this subject. The reader may find that a basic 
understandin~ of the often misunderstood concepts such as "the new 
approach", 'mutual recognition", and "reference to standards" will 
advance significantly his appreciation of technical trade barri ers. 
The principle of mutual recognition derives from the "cassis de dijon" ru ling 
which is based on Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome(2l. lt sim ply means that a 
good lawfully produced and commercialized in one countrY. of the EEC 
should be aole to be freely transported and sold in another member 
country, without being modified, tested, certified, or renamed. Mutual 
recognition1 therefore1 is the first tool the Commission has at its disposai to ensure the rree flow or goods. 
The principle of mutual recognition breaks down legally and practically 
concerning each member country's obligation to protect pubric health, 
safety ana the environment. Specificany, if one country maintains a 
different philosophy on how to protect healthhsafety and the environ ment, 
from another country, then it may prevent t e free circulation of goods. 
This right is guaranteed by Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome(3), and is a 
genesis of technical trade barri ers. 
ln those instances where two countries differ concerning how to protect 
safety, health and the environ ment, the oniY. solution to ensuring free trade 
is for the member countries to agree to a harmonized set of regulations. 
Harmonization takes the form of directives which are legal, Community 
wide proclamations that state the measures with which a product must 
comply to be commercialized in any country of the Community. If a good is 
produced according to these measures no national legislation can prevent 
1ts commercialization in a given country (4l. 
(2) Article 30 : "Quantitative restrictions on imports and ali measures having equivalent 
effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between 
member states". 
(3) Article 36 : "The provision of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public 
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, 
animais or plants, the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historie or 
archaeological value, or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such 
prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States". 
(4) More recently, Article 1 OOA recognizes the right of member states to adopt yet stricter 
regulations than those contained in Community directives when justified by Article 36 
{ie., for protecting health, safety and the environment,) and thereby prevent entry of 
goods which comply to the Directive but not their own regulations. However, as no 
actions on this basis have been undertaken, the procedure and impact of Article 100A 
cannot be clearly evaluated. 
Article 100A, paragraph 4: "If, after the adoption of a harmonization measure by the 
Council actin~ by a qualified majority, a Member State deems it necessary to apply 
national prov1sions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 36, or relating to 
protection of the environment or the working environment, it shall notify the 
Commission of these provisions. The Commission shall confirm the provisions involved 
after having verified that they are not a means of arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade between member states ... " 
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From the 1960's to the early 1980's, the European Commission went about 
the process of developing "harmonization directives" in ali areas where the 
principle of mutual recognition proved ineffectual. However despite the 
considerable efforts of the Commission, this proved to be a failure(s). 
Basically, directives got bogged down in defining technical product 
specifications, which, given the need for unanimous approval by the 
member states, delayed the approval process. As a case in point, the 
harmonization program for foodstuffs drawn up in 1973 listed far in excess 
of 50 directives to be put in place. By 1985 only 14 directives had been 
adopted. 
Enter the new approach. ln the often cited "white paper", simply entitled 
"Completing the Internai Market" the Commission described a new 
approach to the intractable problem of technical trade barriers. The new 
approach simply argues for a different orientation of directives--away from 
a detailed specification of technical standards, toward a simple outline of 
the principal features that products must have. These features were called 
the essential requirements, because they contain only what is essential for 
the protection of health, safety and the environment and exclude 
peripheral technical matters. ln place of the detailed technical 
specifications, "new approach" directives include a reference to European 
standards, which are standards drawn up outside the Commission by 
European standardization bodies (eg CEN, CENELEC, CEPT, etc) and based 
on mandates included in the directives. Compliance with these standards 
ensures that the "harmonized essential requirements" are met, thus 
guaranteeing access to ali EC markets. 
ln simple terms, Commission directives are no longer to include detailed 
specifications of how a product should meet an essential requirement, but 
simply state what that requirement is, and then refer to a European 
standard as a favored means of proving conformity. ln theory, this 
reorientation should increase the speed and flexibility of the Commission 
and th us contribute to the reduction of technical trade barri ers, which is the 
ultimate objective. 
The new approach provides a number of benefits. lt allows the Commission 
to delegate to standards institutes what the Commission is illequiped to do 
and wh at the institutes presumably do weil: specify technical standards. 
Likewise, it limits the content of directives to a specification of the minimum 
essential requirements for protecting health, safety and the environment, 
that if met, guarantee a product commercial access to any country in the 
Community (though see (4) above). Such a narrower scope for directives 
should speed up the process by which they are written and approved. 
(5) See Pelkmans, Jacques, "The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standardization", Journal of Common Market Studies, March 1987. 
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ln parai lei with the new approach, two developments of this decade should 
considerably improve the Commission's ability to speed up the approval of 
directives and to slow down the creation of technical trade barriers. ln 
reverse chronological order, the Single European Act of 1987 permits the 
Council to adopt Commission directives with a simple majority vote, rather 
than the previously required unanimity. 
Second, the Mutuallnformation Directive of 1983 obliges member states to 
notify the Commission in advance of draft technical regulations and 
standards. lt also gives the Commission the power to delay the 
implementation of national legislation by one year in order to prepare a 
directive to combat the trade restricting nature of the legislation. 
Having now an appreciation of what technical barriers are, their origins, 
and how the Commission is trying to remove them, it is appropriate to 
examine next sorne of these barri ers in more detail. 
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Ill. THE EXISTENCE OF TECHNICAL BARRI ERS IN SIX INDUSTRIES 
A. The incidence oftechnical trade barriers in six industries 
Although the purpose of this exercise was not to develop an exhaustive 
picture of the existence of technical trade barriers in each of the six 
industries, discussions with industry participants and Commission officiais 
allow the author to present a partial view as to the relative existence and 
incidence of barriers in each industry (see exhibit 1). 
EXHIBIT 1 
TYPES AND INCIDENCES OF TECHNICAL BARRI ERS 
lndustry 
Standards Regulations Authorization & 
' Certification 
Foodstuffs 0 xxx 0 
Pharmaceuticals 0 0 xxx 
Automobiles 0 xx xxx 
Building Materials xxx xx xxx 
Electricical Products and 
Machines 
Hi voltage xxx xx xxx 
Lowvoltage 0 0 . 0 
Telecommunications xxx 0 xxx 
Legend: XXX high incidence/impact on trade 
XX intermediate incidence/impact on trade 
0 law/non-existence. 
For each sector, the table shows the type of trade barrier (see chapter 2 
above) and the relative incidence or impact on trade. While highly 
subjective, a few features of the table are of interest. Notably, the existence 
of regulations is more important in the sectors which directly affect hu man 
health and safety (eg, foodstuffs) compared to those where it is less of an 
issues, (eg, telecommunications and building materials.) Additionally, 
duplicative testing and certification procedures creates technical barriers in 
ali sectors save low voltage electrical products, the latter benefiting from a 
directive on low voltage appliances (76-23-EEC.) 
On a sector by sector basis, the types of barriers are quite different. ln 
foodstuffs because of the extreme sensitivity of public opinion in this field 
standards are almost non-existent and regulations abound. This, combined 
with the diversity of the Community's culinary traditions, creates an 
environment favorable for the existence of trade barriers caused by 
differences in regulations. ln a recent study on foodstuffs, the MAC Group 
identified over 200 technical trade barri ers of the regulation type in just ten 
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product sectors, and this was not an exhaustive list (6). lnterestingly, in 
foodstuffs, few barriers are cr:eated from certification and testing 
procedures. 
Technical trade barriers caused by regulations fall into three general 
categories: 
product composition laws relating to use of a generic product 
na me 
- specifie ingredient restrictions 
packaging and labeling laws. 
Technical trade barriers in the first category are created when a member 
state restricts the use of a generic product name, such as pasta or beer, to 
products produced according to a specifie recipe. If products do not comply 
to the recipe, they may not be commercialized under the given product 
name, which presents obvious marketing obstacles to the 
producer/importer. Though these barri ers are flagrant, they are a Iso 
increasingly subject to direct and indirect legislative action. The Cassis de 
Dijon and Reinheitsgebot court rulings have set powerful precedents in this 
a rea. 
The second and third categories of barriers are the most troublesome from 
the standpoint of their removal because of the recourse member 
governments have to Article 36. Specifie ingredient restrictions, as the term 
implies, are those laws that prohibit the use of additives in certain products. 
The prohibition of aspartame in soft-drinks in France is a good example. 
Aspartame is a sugar substitute used in diet soft drinks in many European 
countries and the US (where it received approval from the often stringent 
FDA). The use of aspartame in soft-drinks in France was illegal, ostensibly for 
reasons of protecting consumer health. lndustry insiders admit,however, 
that this restriction was in fact the result of successful lobbying efforts by 
sugar producers and distributors. 
Like specifie ingredient restrictions, packaging and labeling laws a Iso specify 
requirements, which if not met, prohibit the sales of a product in a given 
country. These laws are often justified as means to protect consumers and 
the environment. Restrictions against the use of plastic botties for mineral 
water in over 150 ltalian municipalities is justified, argue the local 
authorities, for air pollution reasons. However, substitute measures could 
achieve the same end (eg, a depositlrecycling program) and the restriction 
places foreign mineral water producers (mainly French) at a severe cost 
disadvantage compared to local producers. The infamous Danish returnable 
bottle law imposes a similar transportation cost disadvantage on foreign 
beverage companies. Partially as a result of this barrier beer imports into 
Den mark account for less th at 0.1% of total consumption. 
{6) The MAC Group, "Research on the Cost of Non-Europe in the Foodstuffs lndustry", 
1987. 
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Due to the inherent critical nature of health and safety in pharmaceuticals, 
standards are non-existent (like in foodstuffs) and required technical 
specifications are upheld through national legislation. Twenty years of 
harmonization efforts by the Commission have fortunately given rise to 
eleven basic directives and two Council Recommendations, which have 
harmonized the criteria of drug quality, safety and efficacy. However, 
severe technical barriers remain in the testing and certification of drugs. 
Each EC country requires a separate marketing authorization for 
pharmaceuticals. If a product is to be admitted to a particular national 
market is must first receive approval by the national registration authority. 
Therefore, in spite of the harmonization of approval criteria, differences 
exist in the authorization decisions made by national authorities. Priee 
regulation and the placing of drugs on reimbursement lists are two other 
significant features in the Community's pharmaceutical industry, 
which,though not technical trade barriers in themselves, are used by 
member states to regulate the pharmaceutical industry. 
Differences in standards play a small role too in the genesis of technical 
trade barriers in the automobile industry. Regulations play only a moderate 
role, given that 41 out of 44 "essential requirements" have been 
harmonized across the community. The most notable sticking point on 
regulatory differences are exhaust emissions, where Denmark remains 
steadfast on imposing stricter requirements than other Community 
members. lt is, however, in the area of testing and type approval where the 
most important technical trade barriers exist in the automobile industry. 
More will be sa id about this below. 
A recent study fou nd that 70% of a sample of 50 building material products 
faced differences in norms--both standards and regulations--across the 
principal five countries in the Community{7) (8). These differences cou pied 
with different certification and testing methods in each country plague the 
construction products industry with a seemingly disproportionate number 
of technical trade barriers. Northern European countries such as Germany, 
France and Great Britain suffer the greatest differences in standards and 
regulations. 
Perhaps more than the other sectors considered in this study, the barriers 
against the use of foreign products are deeply entrenched and diffused 
among many participants in the building products industry. Because of the 
local nature of building materials and methods, craftsmen in one region 
may simply be unfamiliar or unsatisfied with products coming from another 
region, much less country. ln France, Spanish roofing shingles are about 
50% cheaper th an domestic ones, owing to the geologie depth at which the 
slate is found in Spain compared to France. However, roofers in France are 
not familiar with using Spanish shingles because they have slightly different 
qualities which change how they are attached to the roof. 
(7) BIPE, "Le coût de la Non-Europe des produits de construction", 1987. 
(8) The Commission is scheduled to submit to the Council later this year a draft "new 
approach" directive for buildings which should reduce technical trade barriers in the 
building materials industry. The directive seeks to harmonize seven essential 
requirements for buildings: stability, fire resistance, durability, energy economy, 
health/hygiene/ environment, user safety, resistance to noise. 
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lnsurance companies also play a subtle role in creating technical barriers in 
this industry. Often, insurers will only insu re various aspects of buildings if 
the building and the materials used in its construction comply with certain 
national standards. Architects and contractors, who could be held liable for 
accidents caused by faulty construction, resist using foreign products that 
do not correspond to the national standards, even though they may be 
otherwise suitable for the job. 
Electrical products and machines must at a minimum be divided into two 
categories: low voltage products which are typically home appliances and 
high voltage products which are often industrial tools. Because of the law-
voltage directive, technical trade barriers have been ali but eliminated in 
this sector, which in itself is quite promising. Severe trade barriers remain 
however in the second product sector. These latter barriers, like building 
materials, are created by ali three barrier types: differences in technical 
standards, regulations and certification and testing procedures. The case of 
wood cutting machinery will be discussed below. 
Because Telecommunications equipment does not per se affect public 
health, safety or the environment,industry specifications are maintained 
through the respect of technical standards rather than legally based 
regulations. Moreover, these standards differ substantially from one 
country to another. However, due to the strategie nature of the 
telecommunications industry, and the fact that the state-controlled PTT is 
often the main buyer of equipment and thus can impose standards on the 
domestic industry, differences in standards and certification processes are 
only slowly being aligned. A recent paper developed for the Commission 
cites four main technical trade barriers in the telecommunications 
equipment industry(9>: 
differences in standards 
over-specification of technical requirements 
excessively costly, complex duplicative testing procedure 
lack of clear administrative processes. 
Apparently, both consumer premise equipment {eg PABX, telephones, etc.} 
and central office computers (eg public switching systems) are equally 
affected. The example of PABX will be discussed in sorne detail below. 
(9) Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, "The Economie Benefits of a Common 
Concept for Telecommunications within the European Community" 1986. 
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B. Description of illustrative cases 
This section examines technical trade barri ers in more detail through six case 
studies,one for each industry considered. For each case study, we describe 
the technical trade barrier, evaluate it with respect to its origin and 
"justification", and present the potential economie impact of its removal. 
Contained in the six examples are two cases of technical standards, two 
cases of regulations and two pure cases of testing and certification. Each 
case offers the reader a deeper insight into the causes and impact of 
technical trade barriers. Exhibit 2 presents the six barrier cases studies and 
their classification by barrier type. 
EXHIBIT2 
TYPE 
TECH NI CAL AUTHORIZA TION 
BARRIER STANDARDS REGULATIONS & CERTIFICATION 
Foodstuffs 
Pasta purity law x xxx 
Pharmaceuticals 
Registration process x xxx 
Automobiles 
Type Approval xxx x 
Building Materials 
Building til es x xxx x xxx 
Electricical Products and 
Machines x xxx xxx x 
Wood cutting tools 
Telecommunications 
PABX standards xxx x x xxx 
Before describing these in more detail, it will be useful to briefly review a 
simple three criteria test used by the Commission to evaluate the 
justification--as guaranteed by Article 36-- of technical trade barriers 
imposed by member states to protect safety, health and the environment(10l. 
(10) A. Mattera, "les barrières frontalières à l'intérieur de la CEE et l'action menée par la 
Commission pour leur démantelement", Revue du Marché Commun, n°307, May-June 
1987. 
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Towit: 
Criteria of causality : there must exista direct cause and effect relation 
between the trade restrictive measure and the objective or "essential 
requirement" being pursued. 
Criteria of proportionality : the trade restrictive effects of the measure 
should not be disproportionate with respect to the objective being 
sought. 
Criteria of substitution : if a noth er means exists to attain the objective 
that does not hamper trade, then this criteria is not met. The 
substitution criteria is perhaps the most important of the three. 
Though these criteria were designed for evaluating adherence to Article 36, 
which necessarily concerns only legally imposed barriers to trade {i.e. 
technical regulations), they can be usefully applied to any technical trade 
barrier, including those caused by differences in standards. How then do 
each of these case studies stand up to the three criteria test? 
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1. Foodstuffs 
Composition ru les are common in the European foodstuffs industry. Among 
the most significant from an economie standpoint are the so called pasta 
purity laws in ltaly, France and Greece. This case study concerns the ltalian 
version which was adopted as law in 1967. 
Very simply, the law states that in arder to use the generic product name 
"pasta", the product must be composed exclusively of duram wheat, as 
opposed to the less expensive soft wheat. Historically, the law was erected 
to help ltalian duram wheat farmers (essentially in the South) secure a 
market for the ir product. The only other commercial use of duram wheat is 
for couscous, a market of considerably smaller size. lnterestingly, before the 
law was erected, "mixed pasta" made with a combination of soft and 
duram wheat accounted for up to 50 % of ltalian pasta consumption. After 
the law was introduced, this proportion feil to close to zero. This barrier falls 
under the category of a technical regulation (see exhibit 2) and like most 
foodstuffs it is not associated with a testing procedure. 
With respect to the three criteria test, the case of the pasta purity law is 
quite clear from the author's perspective. First, causality ; it is not apparent 
that the consumer is "protected" by the pasta purity law. The consumption 
of mixed pasta does not pose a health risk and there is no reason to assume 
mixed pasta, which is typically associated with lower quality at lower priees, 
would "drive out" pasta made from duram wheat. ln fact, industry experts 
believe a substitution of 10-20% is the most likely scenario. 
Second, proportionality ; the law effectively prohibits ali imports of mixed 
pasta from other European countries where this form of pasta is consumed 
and produced (e.g. England, Holland, Germany.) lmports of pasta into ltaly 
account for less th an 0.05% of total consumption. 
Fi nally, substitution ; to the extent th at con su mers need to be "protected" 
from mixed pasta, this can be accomplished through labeling without the 
adverse trade hampering effects. 
Th us the pasta purity law satisfies none of the criteria that could justify its 
existence from the perspective of article 36 of the Treaty of Rome. Wh at are 
the "costs" therefore of this technical trade barrier. 
Without repeating the analysis, the MAC Group has demonstrated the 
direct cost savings that could accrue to consumers from the removal of this 
law are the arder of 20-60 million Ecu per year. These costs result from the 
savings that could be realized from the substitution of a lower cost 
ingredient, in this case, soft for duram wheat, in the production of pasta. 
Indirect effects are likewise significant. ln the short term, imports into ltaly 
cou Id increase dramatically, accounting for up to 5 % of consumption. This 
would then decrease as local pasta producers geared up their production 
facilities to serve the newly created product segment. ln addition, the 
re moval of the law could speed up the eurre nt industry consolidation ta king 
place, ultimately helping extra-community trade in the process as larger 
more powerful pasta concerns are formed with an increased capacity to 
export. 
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2. Pharmaceuticals 
From a technical barrier stand point, testing and certification procedures are 
the most significant trade obstacles in the pharmaceuticals industry. 
If a pharmaceutical product is to be admitted to a particular national 
market within the EEC it must first be approved by the national registration 
authority. Each authority is free to make its own decision. Closely linked to 
this are the pricing and reimbursement decisions th at local authorities make 
on an individual drug basis. Drug registration, combined with 
pricing/reimbursement decisions, forms a potential barrier to the 
unification of the community pharmaceutical market. How does this barrier 
stand up to the three criteria test? 
From a causation stand point, it can be arg ued th at the testing and 
certification procedures do protect public health and thus pass the first 
criteria. However, testing and certification procedures fail the 
proportionality and substitution tests. Namely, the trade distorting effects 
cou pied with the feasibility of either centralized testing {similar to the FDA) 
or a mutual recognition approach lead to a rejection of this barrier based on 
the criteria test. 
The largest direct effects of the individual testing and certification processes 
are increased delays and administrative costs. At the present time no 
country can meet the official 120-day limit. The European average is in the 
18-24 month range, but delays up to three years have been reported. The 
cost of delays and duplication for a company wishing to introduce a product 
across the community as a who le can be significant. One estimate has placed 
these costs on the order of 0.5-0.8 % of total industry costs within the 
community(11l. Other industry observers have suggested that this could be 
an underestimate. 
An indirect effect of this technical barrier is the continued fragmentation of 
pharmaceutical manufacturing throughout the Community. The high value 
per weight of the product lends itself to a strategy featuring centralized 
production and exports. However, currently sorne 250 pharmaceutical 
plants are scattered about the Community. Companies pol led on this subject 
revealed that their direct investment in individual countries was practically a 
sin qua non of doing business. "If we were to close down our plant in--, 
we'd never get another priee increase there." (11) 
If however the industry could consolidate, the gains could be large. Benefits 
in terms of both labor and capital saved could amou nt to 0.3-0.8% of total 
industry costs.(11l 
The overall implication is significant for the pharmaceuticals industry. 
Between 0.8-1.6% of total industry costs cou Id potentially be economized if 
ali technical barriers were removed. 
(11) See a study for the European Commission by Economists Advisory Group, "Research 
on the Cost of Non-Europe, The Costs of Fragmentation in the European Community's 
Pharmaceutical lndustry and Market", November 1987 (forthcoming} 
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3. Automobiles 
Like pharmaceuticals, the principal technical trade barrier within the 
automobile industry is in the area of testing and authorization procedures. 
Since the 1970's, the Commission identified and then went about the 
process of harmonizing 44 "essential requirements" that an automobile 
must meet in order to guarantee free shipment from one country in the 
Community to another. Today, EC directives exist for 41 of these 
requirements. The requirements which remain to be harmonized are tires, 
weight and sizes, and windshields. 
The implication of this is that type approval from an EC standpoint is not 
feasible. Because directives do not exist for the whole gambit of essential 
requirements, type approval must take place on an individual country basis. 
ln addition, neither the majority of industry members nor certain EC 
governments are in favor of trying to harmonize the remaining directives. 
Why would this be the case? 
Certain national governments, notably France, are concerned about 
control ling imports originating outside the Community. If local approval did 
not exist and if border customs checkpoints were eliminated, France would 
have more difficulty in stopping, say, Japanese imports from entering the 
country via a neighboring country. For this reason, sorne member 
governments are not supporting efforts to harmonize the remaining three 
directives. National manufacturers and their distributors are also concerned 
about extra-community imports. They have th us joined their governments 
in slowing down the harmonization process. 
Examining the criteria test this author finds that none of the criteria is met. 
Given 41 requirements are already harmonized, type approval is not 
necessary for protecting health, safety of the environment (causality). lt 
thwarts the free movement of goods across community borders 
(proportionality) ; and public health, safety and environmental 
requirements could be equally weil upheld through finishing the 
harmonization task coupled with mutual recognition of testing and 
certification procedures (substitution). 
If automobiles could be approved in just one country and then be freely 
exported to other countries, the direct cost savings could range from 14-22 
million Ecus(12l. Indirect benefits include increased consumer choice, namely 
the freedom to purchase cars anywhere in the Community for domestic 
consumption. 
(12) Based on a study for the EC Commission by Ludvigsen Associates Limited "Research on 
the Cost of non-Europe- The EC92 Automobile Sector: Executive Summary", 1987. 
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4. Building Materials 
Not unlike different recipes in foodstuffs, the fragmented nature of 
building materials used throughout Europe have contributed to a large, 
though predictable, body of technical trade barriers in this sector. Many 
examples exist where building material manufactures of one country, often 
working with standardization organizations, erect ali three types of barri ers 
to prevent competition from abroad. Building tiles provides a good 
example. 
The market for glazed and unglazed building tiles is large, approximately 
3.2 billion Ecus per year, owing to the common use of these products in both 
public and private buildings. The European market is dominated by ltaly 
and Spain, who between them posses a 79 % share of the total volume of 
production (see exhibit 3). 
EXHIBIT 3 
PRINCIPAL PRODUCERS OF 1985 PRODUCTION SHARE OF EC 
BUILDING TILES (MILLION SQ. M) PRODUCTION 
Ital y 300 58% 
Spain 110 21% 
German y 40 8% 
France 25 5% 
Other EC 45 9% 
Total 520 100% 
Source: BIPE 
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ln addition, the Spanish and ltalian products are less expensive than their 
European competitors (see exhibit 4). 
EXHIBIT 4 
PRICE INDICES (SPAIN •100)* 
PRODUCING COUNTRY 
GLAZED UNGLAZED 
German y 193 249 
Den mark 142 268 
France 127 172 
Holland 115 183 
Ital y 126 163 
UK 98 116 
Spain 100 100 
Source : BIPE 
Note: Priee index based on 1980 export priees 
ln France, domestic tile manufacturers feeling pressure from ltalian and 
Spanish competitors worked through AFNOR to create an especially 
stringent standard for ti les (UPEC). Any building material expert will admit 
this standard is overly restrictive with respect to the essential requirements 
it should be designed to protect. 
Given this is a standard and not a regulation, non-standard til es may still be 
sold in France but they may not be used in public works (about 40% of the 
market) and architects and building engineers are reluctant to use them. If 
an accident occurs as a result of the non-standard ti les, insu rance companies 
could refuse damages daims. 
The standard is coupled with a certification process, which reportedly can 
take from severa! months to a year's delay. Moreover, the product must be 
tested and certified on an annual basis. Together these technical barriers 
have effectively reduced the flow of tiles into France from its southern 
neighbors. Reportedly, similar standards and testing procedures are being 
developed in Germany, Holland, and the UK(13l. 
Like type approval for automobiles, the technical trade barrier for ti les fa ils 
ali criterià and therefore is difficult to justify on legal grounds. While this 
particular example is a candidate for mutual recognition, other building 
material products, due to their safety and public health implications, cou Id 
require a harmonization of standards. 
(13) A draft directive on construction materials should help to eliminate this trade barrier. 
See "Proposai for a Council Directive on the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the member states relating to construction products 
(Com (86) 756 final/3) 
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The direct costs of the trade barri ers for building til es are important. If these 
restrictions prevent Spanish producers from doubling their marketshare in 
France, (the ir current share is about 10% ), they are casting French 
consumers about 3% of the value of the ir domestic expenditures on til es, or 
$15 million. 
Indirect effects cou Id a Iso be pronounced. Ti le manufacturing lends itself to 
significant scale economies. ln a barrier free EC, it could be expected that 
significant consolidation in the tile industry would take place. Centralized 
production units would serve distant markets through experts programs. 
Overall, this should exert downward pressure on priees, further benefiting 
consumers. 
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5. Electrical Products and Machines 
Given the low voltage directive has ali but eliminated technical trade 
barriers in household appliances, it is more revealing to draw a case from 
the high voltage sector. The case of wood working machines has been 
chosen, based on a recent paper submitted to the Commission(14l. 
Regulations for the commercialization of wood working machines, differ 
significantly in France as compared to Germany, ltaly and the UK. ln France, 
additional safety deviees (protective hoods) are required and machines must 
be tested and approved through the Minister of Labor. ln addition a 
separate testing and certification process is required. The testing procedure 
must be repeated for each type of machine to be imported and takes from 
six months to a year to complete. By comparison, similar tests in ltaly, 
Germany and the UK take two to three months. 
ln this case, the three criteria test is less clear. lt could be argued that 
protective hoods are necessary for the safety of the French workers. The fa ct 
that other countries do not require the same measures is a philosophical 
difference in the needed level of protection. One implication is that the 
simple policy of mutual recognition would not resolve the problem, and a 
harmonization would be necessary. However, the cumbersome testing 
procedure and delay cannat be readily justified by the criteria test. 
EC suppliers of wood working machinery have reacted in different ways to 
this trade barrier : 
Many, notable UK suppliers, do not attempt to export to France, 
ltalian manufacturers have modified their products and export only a 
standard model to France, thereby economizing on testing costs, 
German suppliers export only machines with an automatic feed 
mechanism, which circumvents the worker safety requirement. 
lt has been estimated that the direct impact of the French regulations and 
testing procedures increases the cost of imported machines by 20-30% of 
the machine's value. If technical regulations were harmonized at a "non-
French" level, scale economy (indirect) effects on the order of 3-5 % of 
production costs cou Id a Iso be realized<14l. 
(14) Gewiplan, "The Realization of a Joint Domestic Market" 
ParAgro3727 188 
GROUPE MAC 
- 151 - /25/ 
6. Telecommunications Eguipment 
A recent paper by the DIW(15l presents convincing evidence on the existence 
of technical barriers in the PABX (private automatic branch exchange) 
market and it is to this topic that we now turn for the sixth and last case 
study. 
The principal thesis is that the EC market for PABX is fragmented as a result 
of differing national technical and regulatory standards. This arises from 
two sources which correspond, once again, to differences in technical 
standards and a costly testing and certification program : 
differences in standards and over-specification of requirements, 
excessively costly, complex and duplicative testing procedure without 
clear administrative processes. 
Despite efforts to harmonize standards, differences still exist across major 
EC members. ln addition, standards are imposed " ... weil beyond th ose 
needed to avoid network damage"(15l. 
Besides differing standards, delays surrounding the approval process and 
the lack of a formai appeal procedure compounds the technical trade 
barrier ; foreign companies may not have enough confidence in the 
integrity of the approval process to even attempt to obtain approval for 
their products. Below is a table comparing the various delays and appeal 
procedures a cross major EC countries with th ose of the US(15l. 
FOR MAL 
COUNTRY DELAY APPROVAL APPEALS 
PROCEDURE 
Belgium 3-6 months PIT No 
France 12 months PIT No 
Germany 6-12 months PIT No 
Ital y 6-12 months PIT No 
UK 3 months (min) British Approval Y es 
Board 
us less than 10 weeks FCC Y es 
(15) Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, "The Economie Benefits of a Common 
Concept for Telecommunications within the European Community" 1986. 
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The three criteria test could be met, if indeed the network could be 
damaged by use of certain PABXs and thus jeopardize the public interest. 
Mutual recognition, for similar reasons, cannat be the solution, so a 
harmonization of standards appears too be the answer for removing 
technical barriers in this sector. As for testing and certification, a number of 
measures should be taken, among them, disassociating the PTT's from the 
direct approval decision, reducing the delays, and instituting a formai 
appeals process. 
One direct impact of removing the technical barriers will be the reduction in 
costs incurred for PABX approval. However, the most important direct 
benefit of harmonizing PABX standards and eliminating the type approval 
procedure are the cost savings certain countries may enjoy as a result of 
importing lower cost equipment. The case of Germany provides a good 
example. 
PABX manufactured priees are over twice as high in Germany as those in 
France. Y et, because a French manufacturer wou Id have enormous difficulty 
in obtaining approval in the Bundespost, PABX exports from France to 
Germany are almost non-existent. The following table shows priee 
differences for small to medium PABXs, and the direct cost savings that 
could accrue to German consumers if the German market were open to 
lower-priced French products. 
VOLUME IN PRICE/LINE (DM) POTENTIAL COST AS%0F 
PABX GERMAN Y SAVINGS(*) MARKET 
(000 Li nes) GERMAN Y FRANCE (000 DM) VALUE 
2-291ines 54.1 875 323 1493 3.2% 
30-50 lines 133.2 826 302 3489 3.2% 
51-100 lin es 106.1 777 268 2700 3.3% 
Total PABX 293.4 7682 3.2% 
Source: lndustry statistics, 1985; furnished in confidential interview. 
* Assumptions: French manufacturers obtain 10% share of market ; one half of the 
priee difference remains after the export market opens. 
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The table suggests that a direct cost reduction of over 3 % of total 
expenditures on PABXs (equipment only) could be realized if French 
manufacturers could capture a 10% market share in Germany. 
Indirect benefits are equally compelling and include: 
reducing the current fragmentation of the PABX industry allowing it to 
enjoy the significant scale economies in production and r&d, 
increasing the incentive to experiment, which will a id the inovativeness 
of the European industry, 
reducing entry barriers to encourage start-ups of small firms wishing to 
attack selected market niches. 
Ali these features should increase specialization among current producers, 
encourage trade, and strengthen the EC industry with respect to global 
competitors. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
• The elimination of technical trade barriers is a sin qua non condition for 
creating a single EC market in 1992. Businesses polled on the subject 
view technical trade barri ers as one of the two most severe obstacles to 
trade within the Community. 
• Significant technical trade barriers exists in each of the six sectors 
considered in this study. Of the six specifie technical trade barriers 
examined, none indisputably met, in the author's view, ali three criteria 
which "justifies" a technical trade barrier. 
• Ali member countries have similar goals for protecting health, safety 
and the environment. Differences on how these goals should be 
reached accounts for a large reason why the technical trade barriers 
exist. Two additional reasons explain why certain technical trade 
barriers are especially difficult to remove: 
protection of special interests, 
protection of a "strategie industry". 
• ln theory, the principle of mutual recognition and the (ongoing) 
harmonization of essential health, safety and environmental 
requirements should eliminate technical trade barriers. ln practice, this 
has not yet been the case. Because of the manoeuvres of member 
countries, the inherently slow process of adopting EC directives, and 
uncertainties businesses have about legal recourse, technical trade 
barriers have proved extremely difficult to overcome. 
• The new approach to removing technical trade barriers, and the 
harmonization of standards that it promotes, should speed up the 
process of removing technical trade barriers. 
• Removing barriers will generate economie benefits to both producers 
and consumers throughout the Community. ln the six sectors studied, 
the existence of technical trade barriers reduces consumer choice, 
delays the introduction of new products, and causes higher relative 
priees for similar products. 
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Introduction 
In the course of the "Cost of Non-Europe" study, GE~VIPLAN 
was commissioned to analyze the problems surrounding 
"Technical Barriers". 
The work entailed: 
identification of existing technical barriers 
description of possible differences in technical 
specifications between the relevant countries, 
Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain 
determination of the possible impacts of a 
harmonization of technical specifications 
From the numerous products available for which technical 
barriers exist, the following products were selected. 
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product group: 
relevant products: 
product group: 
relevant product: 
product group: 
relevant product 
product group: 
relevant products: 
product group: 
relevant products: 
- 2 -
wood working machines 
planing machines 
single-spindle type 
multi-spindle type 
testing and measuring 
equipment 
weighing machine, 
especially mechanical 
weighing machines for 
consumer purposé (household 
and kitchen balances) 
low tension product 
household dishwashers 
fire protection 
doors (inhouse) 
plates (inhouse) 
electrically driven lifts 
electrically driven 
passenger lifts 
electrically driven 
material lifts 
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The criteria applied in selecting the products were: 
already executed harrnonization of technical 
specification 
non-executed harrnonization 
In order to ascertain the impact of already executed or 
future harrnonization, case-studies were carried out with 
rnanufacturers. The Executive Surnrnary presented is 
cornposed of three chapters: 
PART A: 
PART B: 
PART C: 
contains a short description of the 
justification for the existence of 
technical specifications; a definition 
of technical barriers; and the efforts 
by the EC for harrnonization. 
This section contains the results of 
the case-studies. 
concluding cornrnents 
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PART A: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
1. Technical Specifications 
Technical Standards are basically designed by 
manufacturers themselves. 
The classical form of technical standards arising 
from industrialization served to rationalize 
production. The objectives were: 
simpler production 
reduction of types 
increase of lotsize 
cheaper products 
The fact that technical standards are formulated for 
increasingly more areas, which even the judiciary 
now refers to, means an extension of the aspects 
involving technical specifications. 
We must distinguish: 
technical standards 
technical regulations 
technical certification 
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Technical standards are voluntarily agreed codifica-
tions of the form, functioning, quality, compatibil-
ity and/or exchangeability of methods, products, 
processes and services. 
Technical regulations are specifications as to form, 
construction, performance (etc.) of products, 
service and sometimes even of processes and methods, 
included or referred to in public law, e.g. for 
health, safety, environmental and consumer protection. 
Technical certification comprises arrangements such 
as technical inspection, testing and comparisons, 
for identifying conformity to given standards or 
regulations. The evidence is usually found in testing 
reports. For simplicity, products may carry and 
marketing may employ approval signs and comformity 
of certification marks. 
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2. Harmonization of Technical Specifications 
Harmonization implies the existence of varying 
technical specifications. Technical standards are 
indeed voluntary agreements between firms, however, 
inter-firm and branch-specific aspects are 
frequently devised with the possible consequences 
that foreign suppliers are confronted with competi-
tive disadvantages. In arder to realize supra-
national interests, the national organizations, 
such as DIN, AFNOR, BSI etc., cooperate under the 
framework of CEN and CENELEC. 
At the end of 1983, only 147 European standards had 
been adopted by CEN and CENELEC together; draft 
standards in total numbered 290; CENELEC harmoniza-
tion documents amounted to 320 and draft CEN/CENELEC 
harmonization documents added up to 147. On the 
ether hand, in 1983 DIN was said to have adopted 
23,000 standards, AFNOR approximately 18,000 and 
BSI sorne 13,000. 1) 
If an internal market is to be realized, any 
divergences in national technical specifications 
must be harmonized. 
1) see: Pelkmans & Vanheukelen, Coming togrips 
with the internal market, EIPA, 1986 
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Increasingly Mutual Recognition is replacing old 
style harmonization. 
The mutual recognition principle was already referred 
to in the Treaty of Rome in the context of professional 
qualifications, and introduced relatively early in 
the financial sector. It began to be used widely in 
the technical standards field in the early nineteen 
eighties. However, the 1985 White Paper generalised 
the principle and spelt out the philosophy behind it. 
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3. Removing Technical Barriers 
Removing technical barriers refers to activities 
with respect to technical standards, technical 
regulations and technical certification. 
The actual problem regarding technical barriers is 
not so much the possibly different technical 
standards but more the technical regulations and 
technical certification (a well-known exception is 
e.g. the field of telecommunications). 
As stressed previously, technical standards are of 
a voluntary nature; technical regulations have a 
predominantly legal character primarily involving 
the implementation of national environmental and 
safety measures. Internationally-active companies 
themselves are interested in orientating the national 
technical standards to international practice. The 
expert discussions conducted made it clear that the 
companies consider technical standards as unproblem-
atical with regard to an international exchange of 
goods. Technical regulations and technical certifica-
tion are based on national considerations, whereby 
safety aspects, consumer protection and environmental 
aspects dominate. Due to the influence of these 
interests, technical regulations are created which 
differ between states, i.e. the creation of trade 
barriers is a possible side-effect. 
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Such technical barriers are of a partially pro-
hibitive nature in the case of wood-working 
machines and, to a certain extent for fire 
protection products and weighing equipment. 
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PART B: CASE-STUDIES 
1. Remarks 
The work of GEWIPLAN is not so much to analyse and 
quantify the costs and benefits of technical specifica-
tions as such, but to scrutinize the effects of removing 
technical barriers among EC-Mernber States' markets 
in the five product groups, electrical lifts, 
wood working machines, consumer orientated mechanical 
and electro-mechanical weighing machines, dishwashers 
and specifie products of the fire-protection sectors 
(doors and panels). 
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2. Methodology 
The evaluation of public statistics in the study-
relevant countries, Germany, Great Britain, Italy 
and France was accompanied by conducting expert 
discussions with individual manufacturers from 
each country (84 expert discussions altogether). 
This producted firm-specific estimations of a 
largely qualitative nature. 
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3. Results of Fact-Finding 
The effects of removing technical barriers depend 
on, amongst other things, the market situation, 
competition, the product and the divergence of 
regulations. 
3.1 Technical Specifications 
The level of harmonization of technical specifica-
tions involving the products analyzed can be 
devided into two groups: 
Product group 1: harmonization already conducted 
dishwashers (low voltage 
directive) 
lifts (EN-81 standard) 
mechanical weighing equipment 
(directive) 
Product group 2: lack of harmonization measures 
woodworking machines 
fire protection products 
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3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Lifts 
As a result of the EN-81 standard published in 1984 
techncial barriers no longer exist in this sector. 
A concentration process began in the sixties and 
was completed in the middle of the seventies. A 
number of companies were bought out/stopped produc-
tion. Today there are five important suppliers 
within the four countries. Production volume fell 
from 25,900 units to 21,900 units, which represents 
a decrease of approximately 16 % between 1974 and 
1985. This was caused on the one hand by the very 
close correlation between construction activity and 
the demand for lifts and the substitution of 
electrically driven lifts by hydraulic driven lifts 
on the ether. (The EN-81 refers only to electrically 
driven lifts.) 1985, the share of hydraulically 
driven fifts amounted to 35-40 %; in 1975 this share 
amounted to 10-15 %. Manufacturers also do main-
tenance work. 
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3.2.2 Dishwashers 
The low voltage directive has applied to this 
sector since 1976. Remaining technical differences 
(e.g. the UK's 240 volt system) create no serious 
problems for trade. 
In the case of dishwashers, concentration also set 
in in the sixties. Today there are approximately 
6-8 firms active in this market, whereby there are 
none in the UK and only one manufacturer in France. 
Italian production primarily involves contract 
production for foreign suppliers who still partially 
exploit the comparative cost advantages. Production 
of dishwashers rose in the period 1975/1980 by 
approximately 38 % (from 1.4 mio. units to approx-
imately 1.9 mio. units). 
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3.2.3 Weighing Equipment 
The EC guideline of 1/7/1982 has led to a harmoniza-
tion of the technical specifications being 
conducted. De facto, however, considerable differ-
ences still exist particularly those caused by 
testing and certification requirements. 
Mechanical weighing machines are being increasingly 
replaced by electronic scales, particularly in the 
case of industrial and shop scales. The demand for 
mechanical household scales is stagnating. Manufac-
turers of scales who did not switch into electronic 
scales have had to move into up-market niches. To 
survive they have had either to rely on low wages 
or to introduce rationalization investment. 
As a result we observe: 
few important suppliers in the mechanical 
scales market (1-2 manufacturers per country) 
substantially identical manufacturing costs 
with divergent costs structure 
The average manufacturing costs for personal scales 
amounts to approximately 7-8 ECU. The structure 
of the costs are comprised of the following: 
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10-20 % plant costs, 30-40 % personnel costs and 
approximately 40-50 % material costs. The size 
of the material costs is influenced by the 
existing model variety 
divergent national technical regulations. 
The divergent national regulations primarily concern 
the calibration and scaling. Therefore, in France 
e.g. - as opposed to the ether countries - there 
exists a calibration obligation for scales with a 
load exceeding 350 g. In Great Britain the units of 
weight must correspond to the imperial system. There 
are also differences regarding the limits of 
calibration errer. In Italy and Great Britain this 
amounts to +/- 1 d from zero to maximum load, where-
as the errer limit in France and the FRG amounts to 
+/-1 0.5/1/1.5 d. These divergent regulations lead 
to an increase in the number of components so that 
a manufacturer supplying all countries requires 
8,000 components. Harmonization could result in 
reducing this number to approximately 800-1,200, 
which would represent a material costs saving of 
approximately 15-20 %. With average material costs 
of approximately 40-50 % - related to manufacturing 
costs - this would represent a savings per balance 
of approximately 0.2-0.8 ECU. 
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Possible harmonization of technical certification 
and technical regulations has only slight impacts 
because: 
manufacturer concentration has not yet taken 
place 
adaption investment has been carried out 
demand is stagnating. 
The direct effect of harmonization will be in the 
arder of magnitude of less than one percent. 1 ) 
Indirect effects will result from possible 
reduction of components as well as a more 
efficient utilization of production capacity. 
Due to the type variety (= small lot sizes) as 
well as the relatively large share of manual work 
in the manufacturer of scales (calibration), cast 
reduction with a rise in output is very slight. 
Related to manufacturing costs, costs reduction 
would amount to less than 3 %. With a stagnating 
output of approximately 10 mio. scales in Europe 
(approximately 50 % thereof in the relevant 
countries), costs savings would amount to an 
approximately maximum of 2 mio. ECU. 
1) test costs per type: 2,000 ECU, related to an 
output of at least 200,000 units at 7-8 ECU, 
this represents a cast share of less than 1 % 
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3.2.4 Wood-working Machines 
Harrnonized technical standards do not exist. 
However, different regulations only exist in France. 
Sirnilar norrns apply in Gerrnany, the UK and Italy. 
In July 1980, various decrees concerning the general 
safety of machines and deviees were issued by the 
French governrnent. Regulations for the forrnal 
implementation of these regulations were published 
in 1981 and 1982, and also carne into force in 1982. 
The new rules tighened both safety standards and 
testing procedures. Under decrees 81-170, 171, 172, 
173, 408, 409, 410, and 411, there are new rules 
for self-certification, for a "visa d'examen 
procedure", and for homologation. 
According to the type of machine, the costs for 
additional protective facilities arnount to approx-
irnately 1,200-1,400 ECU per machine. These 
additional regulations apply to all suppliers, even 
the French, i.e. they are cornpetitively neutral 
(upwards trend of econorny of scale curve). 
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The consequences of the French regulations are as 
follows: 
Tests are frequently duplicated and repeated, which 
imposes heavy travel and transport costs, as well 
as requiring complex and duplicated French-language 
documentation for each separate test. Test fees are 
300-800 ECU per test. Making suitable assumptions 
about adaptation costs, production and export 
volumes, we estimated that compliance with no French 
norms would raise priees by 6.6-20 % per machine. 
Firms interviewed reported figures of 7-10 % extra 
costs. 
The testing duration itself is between six months 
and a year. In the other countries, Italy, UK, 
FRG, the test duration extends to 2-3 months only. 
The firms react to the French decrees in varying 
manners: 
sorne foreign suppliers did not carry out 
adaption investment with the consequence that 
no machines are exported to France 
in so far as it was accepted, manufacturers of 
special machines passed on the full cost of 
the priee rise to the customer 
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Italian manufacturers carried out product 
improvement and concentrated on exporting 
smaller, standardised machines to France 
German manufacturers primarily supply CNC 
controlled machines with automatic feeding of 
the workpiece, i.e. this new technique takes 
the safety aspect into account 
there are no noteworthy British experts to 
the French market 
Taking the described state of affairs into account, 
the following direct costs of a non-realised 
internal market will arise: 
Planing, milling or moulding machines (1986) in mio. ECU 
Production 
Imports 
Imports share 
Exports 
Exports share in % 
share of 
single-spindle type 
multi-spindle type 
(production 1985) 
France 
17.5 
9.5 
54 % 
6.9 
39 % 
60-70 % 
30-40 % 
Ital y 
48.7 
5.6 
11.5 % 
31.6 
64.9 % 
98 % 
2 % 
UK 
9.4 
8.0 
85 % 
5.3 
56.4 % 
80 % 
20 % 
German y 
1 01 • 5 
1 3. 3 
1 3. 2 % 
100.0 
98.5 % 
6 % 
94 % 
...... 
00 
...... 
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Based on the French foreign trade data - imports -
and the focal points of production in each country 
the following results: 
French imports of planing, milling or moulding 
machines (in 1,000 ECU) 
Total 
EC 
German y 
Ital y 
UK 
other 
countries 
1) estimations 
1983 1984 1985 
share of 
1986 conv~nti?~al 
mach1.nes J 
in % in 
1 '000 
ECU 
7,256 6,770 7,872 9,528 
6,907 6,587 7,442 9,030 
4,508 
1 1967 
257 
350 
4,165 
2,143 
1 98 
183 
5,624 
1 '7 31 
26 
430 
5,716 
2,920 
212 
498 
6 
98 
80 
343 
2,860 
170 
3,373 
In 1986, French imports of (conventional planing, 
milling or moulding machines amounted to approxi-
mately 3,3 mio. ECU. The direct effect of 
harmonization at the French level would accordingly 
amount to approximately 0,2-0.33 mio. ECU. From 
the longer term viewpoint the complete market 
situation must be considered. The demand for 
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conventional planing, milling or moulding machines 
is tendentially stagnating/declining. 
Consumption of planing, milling or moulding 
machines (in mio. ECU) 
France Ital y FRG UK 
1983 1 9. 2 28.9 32.6 11.9 
1984 16.7 20.8 1 0. 7 10.2 
1985 1 9. 0 34.0 31 . 2 1 2. 7 
1986 2 0. 1 22.8 14. 7 8.3 
Source: estimations 
Total 
92.6 
58.4 
96.9 
65.9 
Harmonization of the technical regulations at a 
"non-French level" could lead to an expansion of 
production, particularly for the Italian manufac-
turers. The expense of French manufacturers, 
i.e. the number of French manufacturers 
(currently approximately 6 firms) would be 
reduced. The initial basis for further observa-
tion is the French production volume, which 
amounted to 17.5 mio. ECU in 1986. Taking into 
account the well-known economies of scale in 
mechanical engineering of approximat@ly 3.5 % in 
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the case of a rise in average lot size to approx-
imately 30-40 units, this results in cost reduction 
of 17.5 mio. ECU x 3-5 % = 0.5-0.9 mio. ECU. 
3.2.5 Fire Protection Products 
Harmonized standards do not exist in this field. 
Considerable differences exist in each country 
regarding the demands on the products in the case 
of fire. The strictest regulations are int'he FRG, 
followed by the UK, France and Italy. 
Production of fire protection doors and panels 
(in mio. ECU) 
Production UK 1 ) F I FRG 
1983 102 34 2 99 
1984 110 33 4 100 
1985 114 34 5 88 
1986 116 37 7 106 
1992 130 85 20 140 
Total 
237 
247 
241 
266 
375 
1) also contains, among others, fire protection 
adhesives and mortar 
Source: estimations, based on interviews 
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Trade is negligible due to regulatory divergences, 
which or example raise UK and German product priees 
in Italy, e.g. a domestic fire protection plate 
costs 5-6 ECU per m2 in Italy; a German product 
costs 12.3 ECU per m2 ; an English product costs 
9.6-12 ECU per m2 • 
Manufacturers would incur prohibitive fixed costs 
if they tried to meet more than one set of specifi-
cations. 
The high costs of approval (FRG e.g.: 14,000 ECU 
per plate type, UK approx. 2,500 ECU) have the 
effect of acting as a barrier to market entry, 
because related to a volume of approximately 
500,000-1 mio. m2 , this represents a product priee 
increase of less than 0.1 %. Transport costs at 
10-20 % of sales priee also restrict experts. 
In the long run it may be assumed that harmonization 
will take place at the level of UK or German 
standards. If so the priees throughout the EEC could 
not differ by more than transport costs from the 
priee at which the most competitive EEC producers 
could meet these specifications. 
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PART C: CONCLUDING COMMENTS: 
THE PRODUCT POSITION IN THE MARKET 
When the life cycle of the products is considered, 
it can be seen that most of the products for which 
harrnonization measures have been established are 
on the decline. That this is possibly not purely 
coincidence arises from the harrnonization procedure 
up to now. Product-specific stipulation of 
technical standards takes sorne years - even at the 
national level. If the rnulti-nationality of the 
procedure is taken into consideration, a period of 
5-10 years was necessary to corne to an agreement. 
In the meantirne, the relevant market developed in 
such a way that harrnonization was "overtaken" by 
market developrnent. If the intention is to realize 
a domestic market by the end of 1992 then it is 
necessary to reverse the harrnonization policy, 
i.e. the replacement of national regulations by 
EC regulations. This is in accordance with the 
"new approach" in which only cornerstone data is 
defined. The following was ascertained with regard 
to the developrnent of each product: 
turnover 
market entry 
Product life cycle 
multi-spindle 
wood-working-machine 
- electronic balancers 
Eire protection 
products 
market penetration 
IIJ\R-cables 
market saturation 
mechanical/electro-
mechanical balancers 
single-spindle 
wood-working 
machines 
market degeneration 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Our task was to analyse in qualitative and, if possible, quantitative terms the 
economie costs incurred in transborder business activity (TBA) in the Community 
which are caused by divergent and/or discriminatory laws and regulations. Our 
brief was limited to manufacturing industries. 
We use the term "transborder business activity" in contradistinction to arms-
length trade and define it as any relationship between two firms in different coun-
tries linked in a long-term contractual relationship, and each of which carry out 
at least two functions with sorne autonomy from each other (e.g. selling; produc-
tion; research). Only one of these functions need to be the object of a special con-
tract. 
The link is often, but not necessarily, accompanied by equity holdings, e.g. 
a subsidiary or a joint venture. Our empirical sample was largely limited to these 
two forms of TBA. 
In identifying obstacles to TBA we did not limit ourselves to company law 
and related issues, but tackled the problem from the standpoint of enterprises. 
The broader question therefore became: in what way does regulatory diversity in 
Europe either discourage firms from engaging in TBA; or cause significant extra 
costs, relative to purely national operations, when they do. 
Methodology 
Our methodology required the scaling up of micro-economie insights to 
macro-economie consequences. These insights were derived from actors (both 
first hand through interviews; and second hand from academie surveys of business 
behavior); and from academie analysis on the nature of modern industrial organi-
sation. Only at one level, i.e. the costs of"Non-Europe" to firms engaging in trans-
border business, was direct observation conceivable. Even here, given the time 
constraint, we relied on estima tes of business executives interviewed. Interviews 
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also served to identify the chief obstacles to TBA, and their micro-economie ef-
fects on company performance. 
Our empirical work was based on a standardised interview of sorne 70 com-
panies in four countries (D, GB, F, 1) which ( collectively) bad subsidiaries (or par-
ents) in most Member States. In addition, we interviewed experts in national and 
EEC industrial federations and others with a working experience of our area of 
enquiry. 
The key to our analytical approach is contained in Figure 1, which we re-
use, with variants, throughout this report. We start from the assumption that the 
potential benefits of a contractuallink between two Community firms vary from 
very high to negative. This is the sloping curve on the Y -axis. 
Coapera~lon 
b-v1t.s l'l-oft + 
TBA 
co 
Figure 1 
These potential benefits are reduced by diseconomies in management and 
production which are caused by non-Europe. This is the part of reality one can 
actually observe (Chapter II), and which we tried to "measure" (point Co). Multi-
plied by the number ofTBA cases actually existing in the Community, these costs 
are represented by the integral A in our graph. Chapter III presents the results of 
our attempts at quantification. 
There is a point - BM - where these Euro-caused costs become larger than 
the benefits ofwhat would otherwise be profitable cases ofTBA. This creates in-
tegral B, a theoretical construct which we cannot directly observe although we 
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have ample empirical evidence that it exists. Integral B contains the "might-have-
beens" of European industrial cooperation which were discouraged by non-Eu-
rope. To measure the cost of this loss we have developed a "theory" of the bene-
tits of TBA adapted to the concrete situation of the Community today, defining 
the costs as the reciprocal, i.e. non-realised benefits. We discuss these opportunity 
costs in Chapter IV. 
Integral C represents that part of industry where TBA would not make sense 
even in a Europe with uniform regulations for business. These are firms, or acti-
vities, with local markets and no need for outside technology or components, e.g. 
brick making; or small and very specialised firms who are in effect global monop-
olists in their particular niches: certain machine tool and instrument makers for 
instance. 
Chapter II Findings from the business survey 
Interviews were conducted in four major countries on the basis of a stand-
ardised interview. They were conducted between September 3 and N ovember 11, 
1987, and lasted from 11/2 hours to seven hours. They usually involved severa! 
of the following executives: 
Chief executive Head of the legal department 
Acquisitions manager Export manager 
Finance manager Logistics manager 
In order to increase the chance of making valid comparisons even with very 
small samples (15-20 companies in each country), we tried to set up interviews 
with comparues from a limited number of sectors: 
automobiles machinery/machine tools 
pharmaceuticals telecommunication 
textiles 
E.RA./PROGNOS Page3 
- 200 -
In addition we interviewed severa! companies from the food industry, two 
computer manufacturers, a chemical company, a major rubber producer, and pro-
ducers of professional and consumer electronics. 
A third break-down planned in our sample, in addition to the sectoral and 
national one, was that between large companies and SMEs. Here, too, we obtained 
robust findings of significant differences. 
1. Individual obstacles 
1.1 Industrial policy 
In this first item we strayed furthest from our brief to examine regulatory 
obstacles, as we are dealing here above ali with the discretionary application of 
national regulation. We were interested in such things as cut-offfrom (para-)sta-
tal credit !ines; discrimination in R&D support and in access to procurement mar-
kets for "foreign" subsidiaries; pressures to increase local content; etc. Our find-
ings can be summarised as follows: 
There was little hard evidence that governments discriminated widely against 
subsidiaries with foreign parents as regards access to R&D funds. However, gain-
ing access to national programmes sometimes necessitated an extra effort to per-
suade authorities of the contribution to employment and exports; and the discre-
tionary nature of decision-making left an ( only slightly discouraging) margin of 
uncertainty. 
However, national R&D programmes may be discontinued altogether if a 
whole sector passes into "foreign" bands (consumer electronics in Germany). On 
the other end of the scale, a country building up a strategie techriology from scratch, 
i.e. one previously dominated by foreign technology, may practise outright dis-
crimination against foreign-owned subsidiaries (telecom in ltaly). 
Sorne countries with inward investment controls ( e.g. Spain) may make the 
take-over of attractive companies conditional on the simultaneous take-over of a 
lame duck. 
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As regards procurement, local content (employment) considerations were 
more important than ownership. Exceptions are newly established subsidiaries 
(often in hi-tech areas) who have not yet acquired a national"smell" and estab-
lished working relationships with the bureaucracy. 
Odd cases of"local content" maximisation could be found in the pharmaceu-
tical industry, where priee controls can be manipulated to that end. In Belgium, 
it was charged, authorities "rewarded" local production with higher priees. In Bri-
tain, it was suggested by non-British companies, priee controls are related to total 
investment, including R&D. This led European companies to "overinvest" in Brit-
ish R&D activities: with 4% of the world market, Britain accounted for 10% of 
world research. 
Non-Europe's competitive national indus trial policies encouraged otherwise 
non-economie local production not just in these cases, and in the procurement 
case mentioned earlier, but also because of export credits. Thus German firms 
may upgrade local content in France in order to benefit from more generons ex-
port finance. On the other band, products from truly integrated operations may 
fall below the local content barrier in any country, and bence be excluded from 
export credits, causing a competitive disadvantage from being "European". 
More generally, sorne companies complained bitterly of the political risk in-
volved in "going European" without the support of a "government" at that level. 
In one case, a company instituted an across-the-board eut of employment of 10% 
in ail its subsidiaries to forestall charges of "job-killing". This economically inef-
ficient step is the politically induced cost of the private sector doing on its own 
what the EC is trying in rationalising the steel sector. 
1.2. Company law and taxation 
Non-Europe in the field of company law, including accounting standards and 
fiscal law, were the single most important source of both high start-up costs and, 
more importantly, of dead-weight administrative costs and sub-optimallocation 
of plant and use of resources in general. 
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Most broadly we can distinguish between: 
different accounting practices, with considerable administrative costs of 
"translation" and integration for central managment control; and 
the administrative costs, and effects on company flexibility, of "fiscal suspicion" 
which sees any transfer of assets and current payments, and of profits 
themselves, as "hidden profit distribution", i.e. an opportunity for tax evasion. 
Au di ting 
Different auditing standards ( e.g. historical cost vs. replacement cost ac-
counting, adjustments for currency changes,etc.) are mainly a problem for inte-
grated European multinationals (EMs). The administrative problem is magnified 
by the fact that companies' internai accounting ( controlling) is coloured by exist-
ing legal auditing systems. Most large companies therefore have to produce three 
sets of figures: th ose conforming to the national requirements of the parent com-
pany, and which include the consolidated (i.e. "translated") accounts of subsi-
diaries; national accounts for each subsidiary; and a standardised, firm-specific 
system used by ali units for controlling purposes. The work involved in producing 
legally required accounts is sometimes complicated by different reporting dates 
and periods in different Member States. 
While sorne of the cost of "translation" can be handled by the appropriate 
software, experts are needed in both subsidiaries and parent companies to fine 
tune the system. Fees for legal consultants and, of course, external auditors, are 
substantial. The Fourth Company Law Directive dealing with accounting stand-
ards was mentioned only by one company as having improved the situation. 
Taxes 
The problems caused by "fiscal suspicion" and beggar-thy- neighbour at-
tempts by national tax authorities to maximise their share of an EMs total tax lia-
bility have much graver consequences. They do not only cause administrative costs 
but influence locational decisions regarding group administration, R&D, and pro-
duction. 
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The root cause of fiscal suspicion are above ail differences in profit taxes, 
including structural elements such as R&D allowances etc. Companies are sus-
pected to use transfer priees to maximise tax liability in the most favorable country. 
There is no doubt that this suspicion is sometimes justified, although even then 
there is a cost (of manipulation) to the firm; and a dead-weight loss to the econ-
omy. 
Responses, notably regarding the desirability of a unified European com-
pany law, differed according to whether one talked to the tax specialists (notably 
external consultants) who rather enjoyed the game of "arbritrage"; and executives, 
notably oflarge companies, who recognised the cost to company management and 
planning imposed by fiscal suspicion. Moreover, a large part of the energies of tax 
lawyers were simply devoted to avoiding double taxation. 
Thus, one French EM bad to institute a complex system of cost-accounting 
at the production lev el to satisfy German authorities ofthe bona-fides of the priees 
charged toits German subsidiary. Difo a large German electronics company to 
satisfy Italian authorities. In addition, companies complained about the periodic 
and prolonged (up to 8 months) presence of controllers on the premises of espe-
cially German subsidiaries. 
Another company pointed out that national requirements on transfer priees 
were inconsistent (e.g. as regards short-term variations of exchange rates), so that 
the company had to be in an illegal situation somewhere. In fact, "Europe would 
grind to a halt if national legislation were fully applied". Living with such ambi-
guities, however, is both costly and highly unnerving to executives. 
The problem of transfer priees sometimes intersected with that of different 
product standards, since "home" and "export" priees for the same product could 
differ because of different specifications. 
Many companies complained of the difficulty of charging its subsidiaries for 
central R&D expenditure. This is particularly awkward in view of the fact that, 
from an economie point ofview (see chapter III below), te--chnology transfer and 
R&D scale economies are among the most useful features of TBA. 
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Particular scrutiny (including at customs) is reserved for the transfer priee 
of software. It was mu ch easier, our respondents claimed, for an independent firm 
to "export" software at its just value than for an integrated TBA. Software makes 
up significant proportions of the value of an increasing number of products (ma-
chine-tools + -30%; telematics (50% + ); it is also the form in which production 
know-how is often transferred. If the full value of this "component" cannot be 
charged by the main technology bolder in an integrated company or a joint ven-
ture, serious distortions result.l.a. a firm may choose to sell "embodied" software, 
i.e. a hard product, rather than utilising local production opportunities. 
Y et a third consequence of suspicion towards "immaterial" transfers was the 
difficulty for central management companies to level a management charge on 
their subsidiaries. This again inhibits economies of scale in administration; and 
the development of Euro-centric rather than national loci of planning and know-
how. 
As regards Italy, many of these problems were accentuated by a second mo-
tive for suspicion, i.e. the circumvention of capital controls. This not only in-
fluenced current TBAs, but also business expansion (i.e. acquisitions; for more 
detail see the notes on individual countries, below). 
In ali, the extra administrative costs imposed by different auditing and fis-
cal systems was estimated at 10-30% of the relevant departments. This, tous, sur-
prisingly high figure was cited by ali large European companies. A partial excep-
tion were British companies which did not, by and large, engage in truly integrated 
operations. (See also section 3, below). 
Many companies cited the impossibility of reducing tax liability by off-set-
ting losses in one branch by profits in another as very costly to their operations. 
One particularly serious obstacle to business expansion is the practice of tax 
authorities to levy capital gains taxes on firms taken over or merged, i.e. treating 
this as a case of "realised assets". The holding company, with both partners re-
maining legally in existence, is a clumsy substitute for a true merger. An excep-
tion are the Netherlands, where (foreign) companies can obtain a "ruling" before 
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a merger. That stillleaves the problem of negotiating their exit from the previous 
tax residences. 
A last item under the heading of company law and fiscal suspicion relates to 
the rigidity of many national company statu tes. The growing preference of Euro-
pean multinationals to choose the N etherlands as headquarters had less to do with 
tax advantages ( dividends }, and more with the flexibility and pragmatism of Dutch 
laws, not least as regards the ability of holding companies to levy and transfer im-
material income, e.g. from royalties, trade marks, etc. Sorne firms have transferred 
from tax-friendly Luxemburg for this reason. Flexibility also extends to such things 
as voting rights - important in joint ventures - where tailor-made agreements be-
tween partners are accepted, provided they are spelled out in writing. 
1.3. Product/production standards 
While this problematique is the object of specialised studies in the Cost of 
Non-Europe project, our interest related particularly toits effect on integrated 
business planning in Europe. 
We found that sorne large firms devoted 1/3 of their R&D budgets to the 
adjustment of their technology to different national settings. This obviously re-
duces the scale advantages from R&Dwhich would otherwise accrue to integrated 
European companies. Alternatively, the innovative output of a given R&D effort 
would be greater. This problem applies particularly to telecommunication on the 
one band and mass-produced electronic components on the other. It has little re-
levance in industrial plant and machinery made to customer specifications. 
As regards product standards, even the most marginal divergences ( e.g. la-
belling requirements) prevented, at the very least, efficient, i.e. centralised and 
flexible, stock management. Stock management, including the option to have a 
central European warehouse in a post-"1992" world, was particularly important to 
relatively small multinationals with specialised products ( e.g. hospital supplies). 
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As regards regulations of production, the piecemeal introduction of pollu-
tion standards in Europe caused major uncertainties in investment planning and/or 
led to distorted locational decisions. 
It is worth noting that ali problems under this heading caused costs to EMs 
and rather discouraged them to increase the level of internai integration; while 
sorne of the same problems encouraged SMEs to seek local production partners 
to adapt their product to local standards; get type approval, etc. 
1.4. Trade Obstacles 
Again we limit our remarks to their impact on integrated business strategies. 
Border delays and uncertainties are becoming increasingly relevant as just-
in-time management of components is gaining in importance. TBA by EMs, with 
their tight logistics planning, is hampered by this even more than arms-length 
trade. While customs are one source of the problem, divergent social and techni-
cal regulation of the transportation industry was cited as an additional risk factor. 
Intra-EEC applications of COCOM controls were mentioned by many firms 
in the electronics and advanced engineering sectors. The problems were hold-ups 
at the border; difficulties in carrying out speedy repairs (spare-parts); and dif-
ferences in national COCO M lists. 
Together with the familiar deadweight administrative and resource cost of 
border-crossing (1% of value in our estimate), uncertaintypenalises otherwise ef-
ficiency-enhancing forms of integrated TBA which would allow large scale econ-
omies through decentralised components manufacture. 
A particular problem is posed by Italy, which prohibits temporary imports 
of components for re-export in a chain of value-added, necessitating the admin-
istrative (fiscal, customs) registration of two sales. Dito for demonstration ma-
chines, test equipment and other temporary exports. 
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Non-Europe was also said to ham.per business planning due to the discre-
tionary and varied national administration of the common external policy by dif-
ferent countries (quota enforcement). 
1.5. Social Policy 
TBA, especially within integrated businesses, requires the ex change of sorne 
managerial and technical personnel. This raises the question of the "portability" 
of social security benefits, notably pension schemes, which are tailored to national 
fiscal systems and/or related to public schemes. In practice, the firm must pay 
twice, raising salary costs by 10- 15%. Lack of "mutual recognition" of secondary 
and other school diplomas by dependents also reduced flexbility of technical and 
managerial staff. 
A different problem is posed by differences in technical training in Europe. 
Man/machine interfaces and production in general are designed with particular 
skill combinations in mind. Sorne firms spend considerable sums to train the work-
forces in their subsidiaries to conform to a particular standard, and to make com-
munication at the various technicallevels possible. 
1.6. Capital and Current Transfers 
Here there were few general problems: most were country specifie. One 
general problem, however, was the difficulty of gaining access to local stock-ex-
changes to finance a new subsidiary for medium-sized companies. 
ltaly, am.ong the major countries, continues to be a special case. We deal 
with it under point 3 below. The main point to make is that only large and very 
sophisticated companies can engage in genuine TBA. 
Currency risks were cited by virtually ali French EMs, sorne of which are 
considering introducing the ECU as internai accounting unit. Complaints about 
currency risks were also occasionally made by companies in other countries. The 
extra problem raised for transfer priees bas been mentioned. One German hi-tech 
E.R.A./PROGNOS Page 11 
- 208 -
EM called for the speedy introduction of the ECU as an official means of pay-
ment. 
2. Large and small companies 
While there were important exceptions, TBA by European multinationals 
(EMs) on the one band, and small and medium- sized enterprises on the other, 
could be clearly distinguished as follows: 
1. Large companies always engage in sorne form of TBA SMEs rarely do so. 
2. SMEs are above ali interested in marketing, with local production an unplanned 
afterthought when it occurs, e.g. via a graduai expansion of after-sales service; 
adaption of products to local standards; or co-production with a former sales 
"agent". 
Large companies are more likely to systematically exploit cost advantages, 
notably labour and transport, and scale advantages; they are also driven by 
formai or informai local content considerations; more rarely by political 
diversification of supply risks (strikes). They also exploit investment and 
export incentives. 
3. SMEs tend to have a relatively arms-length relationship with their production 
subsidiaries abroad, using long-term contracts not very different from those 
concluded with third parties. This reflects their relative scarcity of 
management resources and, in particular, international expertise. 
Most EMs prefer a hands-on approach to management, not only in order to 
exploit ali mann er of technical and economie cost advantages (of which SMEs may 
be only vaguely aware ); but also in order to pursue market strategies which are 
directed not only at the customers (as in the case of SMEs) but at competitors. 
Sophisticated financial management, including tax minimisation; use of capital 
markets; currency portfolio management, etc. is scarcely practised by firms with 
less than 2000 employees. 
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This makes sense in terms of relative management cost; but suggests un-
tapped opportunities for external service providers, e.g. banks, with the requisite 
economies of scale. 
3. Country variations 
United Kingdom 
The most striking peculiarity of UK companies is the extreme arms-length 
approach to management. Even world-sized companies seemed to look at their 
European subsidiaries more in terms of investment diversification than in exploit-
ing the opportunities of continental integration. Thus, for example, the expatria-
tion of staff was not an issue in any of our twenty interviews. R&D was pursued 
in parallel (duplicated) by closely related subsidiaries. "The first time we saw our 
colleagues was in the BRITE programme", according to an executive of a hi-tech 
Italian British-owned engineering subsidiary. Subsidiaries were often managed by 
special holdings with a handful of staff, headquartered in London - far from the 
manufacturing headquarters in the provinces, again confirming the financial over 
the industrial interest. 
Given the low lev el of integration, non-Europe was not perceived as a great 
problem for British companies engaging in TBA. 
France 
In France, bands-on management was typical even for medium- sized enter-
prises. "Expatriation" of management staff was common. The re was great pride in 
being "European". In contrast to the other three countries, being merely French 
was considered provincial. Like Italy, companies in mature sectors threatened by 
both German and extra-European competition saw the European "home market" 
as the only chance for survival through economies of scale. High levels of produc-
tion integration brought out the problems of non-Europe more sharply than else-
where. 
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German y 
German firms are reluctant players in the game of TBA. Direct exports are 
generally preferred over local production, except when it cornes to exploiting la-
bour-cost advantages in Britain, Spain, and Portugal. Formai and informai local 
content pressures also provide an incentive to produce abroad. 
Machine-tool makers were particularly harsh in their comments about TBA 
with France, where a combination of government interference and unreliable de-
livery has produced a legacy of distrust. While state interference was a problem 
in Italy, the fact that there was not actually a government industrial policy made 
such interference less of a problem than in France. 
Italy 
Italian TBA full y confirms to the overall image of Italian industry, i.e. a pri-
vate sector struggling to thrive in spite of the State. 
As mentioned for France, large companies in the more traditional sectors 
see the extension to "Europe" as the only chance of remaining competitive. In 
other words, moves to rationalise European industry will not be spearheaded by 
the strongest country, Germany, but by relatively weaker competitors. 
The major problem for Italian companies were capital controls which effec-
tively prevent smaller firms from engaging in TBA. Getting permission to invest 
in a productive facility abroad is not a problem- itjust takes time (3 months). Per-
mission for an increase in capital already involves more difficult negotiations. 
Most difficult of all is to get permission to crea te a holding abroad. Only very large 
. companies can assume the cost of "negotiating" such a permit with the relevant 
ministries; and to prepare lengthy annual reports to those ministries, which go 
weil beyond normal audit requirement. 
The combination of capital controls with controls on tax evasion, and hence 
the need to negotiate acceptable business plans with both the Finance and the 
Foreign Trade Ministries, was particularly felt to complicate life, even for large 
companies. 
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The extra-territorial application ofltalian controls is another interestingfea-
ture: furtherinvestments by Italiansubsidiaries (i.e.legally French etc. companies ), 
need approval from Rome. 
Chapter III Measuring the costs 
The following table serves to illustrate the methodology we used to get or-
ders of magnitudes of the costs of individual obstacles to TBA expressed in a com-
parable unit, i.e. total turnover. 
Table 1 
ONE FIRM'S COST 
(case study) 
Obstacle interview data published data assumption %of 
turnover 
Fiscal 30% due to NE fisc admin = 15% of all admin; 
administration bence NE = 5% of aU admin. 
white collar = 50% of salary 
costs; all salary = 25% of turnover 
25: 2x5% 0.625 
Training 10 million ECU turnover=? 1/3 for diversity (NE) 0.07 
for systemic inte-
gration 
R&D 25% of total for TotalR&D = 
NE 6.5% of turnover 1.6 
Location optim. 5% savings poss. divide by2 2.5 
Transport 10 - 15 of total transport = 1 - 2% of turnover 0.2 
duetoNE 
Sum 4.995 
Special case 
Unused econ- loss of 10% of$ $ market = reduce by half 2.5 
omies of scale market 1/2 of turnover (resource saving) 
Sum 7.495 
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The figures, which incidentally refer to an advanced auto components manu-
facturer, are surprisingly high; but yet higher figures could be found in state-domi-
nated sectors (see below). The high figures reflect 
- the very high "service" content of contemporary industrial production, i.e. 
administration, technology exchange, marketing, etc.; 
- the considerable - and only partially realised - economies-of-scale 
opportunities which lead many companies to engage in TBA in the first place. 
Of course, precise quantitative estimates were the exception, as most execu-
tives found it difficult to quantify e.g. hypothetical economy-of-scale gains. When 
they did quantify, however, the answers were surprisingly consistent. With these 
elements in band we needed to make a series of - increasingly heroic - estimates 
to scale up our results to sorne level of sector, groups of sectors, and GNP. 
The first step was to estimate an average level of cost for each obstacle and 
each industry for each country separately. The results are not reproduced here. 
The second step involved aggregating the country results, taking into account the 
peculiarities of our not always representative samples. This was done in an itera-
tive round-table discussion among the principal interviewers. The rankings of the 
importance of various obstacles correspond roughly to 1 = less than 1% of turn-
over to 4 = 4% and above of turnover. (see table 2 overleaf) 
These figures aggregate not just apples and pears but apples and cheese. 
Thus the cost of "company law" sums both the administrative cost, and induced 
scale-diseconomies. Both averages would be higher if there bad been more truly 
integrated companies in our sample. Or, taking the example of trade-barriers, the 
figures may refer to actual transport costs; difficulties for just-in-time production-
integration; or COCOM- induced problems for supplying and servicing advanced 
machine tools - problems which do not arise for more conventional producers. 
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Table 2 
ph arma telec auto textiles machinery 
industrial policy 4 3-4 3 0-1 1 
company law ( 1) 2-3 2 3 0-2 2 
"social"regu1.(2) 2 1-2 2 0-3 0 
techn. standards 4 4 2-3 1 1-3 
other trade barr. 2 3 2 1 1-3 
technology trade 2 1-2 0 0 0 
int. payments * * * * * 
(1) includes administrative costs and sub-optimal production 
(2) includes lay-off regulations, education, and "expatriation" 
* taken in isolation, payments restrictions ranked high only in Italy 
Leaving these caveats aside, we felt that our sectors fell into three broad 
groups: 
1 Pharmaceuticals and telecommunications 
These were highly regulated and protected industries with a high incidence 
of obstacles of almost ali kinds, especially "indus trial po licy" and "technical stand-
ards". We estimated the total cost of non-Europe to firms in this group engaging 
in TBA at 9% of turnover. 
II Automobiles 
This group, togetherwith firms in consumer electronics, a large rubber manu-
facturer and food processors, were hampered by indus trial protection; difficulties 
to adjust the labour force in response to market shifts; economy-of-scale losses 
E.R.A./PROGNOS Page 17 
- 214 -
due to quite marginal differences in technical standards; and substantial "admin-
istrative" costs if they were highly integrated. Total cost of TBA was estimated at 
6% of turnover, i.e. higher than both average profits, or average R&D expendi-
ture of firms in these sectors. 
ill Textiles and machine tools 
This group had in common: high specialisation; a relatively low integration 
at the component level; subsidiaries which either served marketing and service 
purposes; or produced fairly independently parts of the product range; few prob-
lems with technical standards. Total cost of TBA = 1.7% of turnover. 
Estimating costs by sector 
Our next step was to estimate, "on the back of an envelope", the points on 
the X-axis of our graph, i.e. the proportion of turnover in each group which was 
generated in a TBA context forming the base-line for integral A ; the proportion 
potentially suited to TBA but discouraged by non-Europe (base-line B); and the 
proportion which would remain "local" under any circumstances (C). This latter 
category included local component suppliers as weil as local repair and other ser-
vices. 
Table 3: Cooperation and potential 
lndustry TBA potential TBA efficient local 
pharma 
30% 40% 30% 
telec. 
40% 40% 20% 
auto 
30% 40% 30% 
auto (US --------
owned) 60% 10% 30% 
textiles, 
machinery 10% 30% 60% 
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With these assumptions our standard graph can be drawn in three illustra-
tive versions. 
Figure2 Cost of non-Europe: sectoral profiles 
GROUPm 
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We can also quantify more precisely the contents of integral A, which is 
cost of TBA x total turnover x % of turnover involved in TBA 
Since we are ultimately interested in the costs for industry as a whole, we do 
not make this calculation separately for our five sectors, but for three groups, "as-
signing" each two to four- digit industry to one of the three groups. Since the EEC 
does not publish very detailed industrial statistics, and only on a country basis, we 
took our data from the OECD's Industrial Structure Statistics 1984 (1986). That, 
however, omits countries such as France, so that we make our calculation for a 
single country, Germany. 
Group 1 
3522 pharmaceuticals 
3825 Office & computing machin. 
3832 Communications equipment 
3841 shipbuilding 
3842 railroad equipm. 
3845 aircraft 
Total 
Group II 
31 Food etc. 
35 Chemicals (exc.351,3522) 
3833 Electrical appliances 
384 Transport ( exc.see 1) 
Total 
E.R.A./PROGNOS 
19 billion DM (rounded) 
15 
55 
8 
1 
9 
107 
172 
200 
15 
152 
539 
Page20 
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Group III 
32 Textiles etc. 66 
33 Wood products 36 
34 Paper etc. 57 
351 Industrial chemicals 106 
36 Non-Metalic Min.Prod. 40 
37 Basic Metal Ind. 90 
381 Metal products 80 
382 Machinery ( exc.3825) 142 
383 Elec.machinery ( exc.3832) 
and 3833) 63 
385 Professional goods 16 
39 "Other" 8 
Total 704 
The integrais A thus become: 
Group I 
35% x 107 = 37; 37 x 9% ( cost of TBA) = 3.4 billion DM 
Group II 
30% x 539 = 162; 162 x 6% = 
Group III 
10% x 704 = 74; 74 x 1.7% = 
Total manufacturing 
9.7 billion DM 
1.3 billion DM 
14.5 billion DM 
Scaling up these results to the Community level needs taking account of the 
relatively large share of manufactures in German output; the relative strength of 
specialised (group III) sectors and weakness of sorne group II industries like elec-
trical appliances, etc. In addition, the "military indus trial complex", which belongs 
into the high-cost group 1, is largely hidden in groups II and III. On the other hand, 
making more precise calculations on the four-digit level for all countries would 
be tantamount to creating a false illusion of precision for what are, after all, py-
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ramidal guesstimates. Nevertheless, we feel that a loss of 30 billion ECU for the 
Community as a whole is a conservative estimate. To this must be added the con-
tents of integral B, i.e. the non-realised TBA benefits to which we now tum. 
Chapter IV The cost to the European economy 
We turn in this last chapter to integral B in our basic graph, i.e. the cost to 
Europe of TBA which is discouraged altogether because of obstacles. This cost 
must be inversely related to the benefits of transborder business activity. So the 
more upbeat formulation of the question asked in this chapter could be: What 
(further) contribution could TBA make to the prosperity and integration of the 
European economy? 
If in what follows we stress exclusively the benefits of TBA, the "classical" 
objections to business cooperation which were stressed in an earlier ERA report 
is not presumed to be invalidated: collusion, and other forms of anti-competitive 
behaviour, may reduce welfare; slow down technological innovation; and lead to 
firms which are too large to respond quickly to the economie environment. We 
do so partially in order to simplify exposition; and partially because the present 
period is not like any other: 
• industry is experimenting with new forms of organisation which overcome 
many of the drawbacks of large size 
• the completion of the Internai Market cannot succeed without TBA 
• Europe is exposed, as never before, to competition from world-scale firms. 
The exchange of goods and services on an arms-length and ad hoc basis, i.e. 
"trade" in a text-book sense, between independent firms in two different coun-
tries, is becoming the exception rather than the rule: Contractual relationships 
between links in the "chain of value added" are becoming an essential feature of 
the modern economy. 
Transborder business links of this kind can involve one or ali of the elements 
of the c~ain of value added, from basic research to R&D, organisational know-
how, production or procurement of intermediate and final products, to market-
ing and other services. 
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The decision on the organisational "mode" of supplying a given link of the 
chain of value added involves a complex optimisation problem where firms seek 
to: 
- minimise 
• information/search costs 
• transaction (negotiation on priee and specification) costs 
• market risks (on supply and demand side) and 
- maximise 
• market control 
• control over uses of technology 
• economies of scale. 
A first conclusion to draw with regard to TBA in Europe is to point out the 
importance of the geographie space in which this optimisation problem can, or 
cannot, be tackled efficiently; and point to the evident properties of TBA as cre-
a tors of markets for intermediate products, services, and, a hove ali technology. 
The benefits of TBA in the Europe of the 1990s appear more sharply if we 
distinguish between two patterns of indus trial organisation: "cooperative network-
ing" and "competitive expansion". 
1. Cooperative networking 
Cooperative networking can exist without equity participation. In practice, 
it is usually associated with minority shareholdings between partners; and even 
with 100% equity control (cf. results form our British sample; and for SMEs in 
general). In organisational terms, the differences to "competitive expansion" is 
that networking implies very loose management control at best; and that the link 
between two partners, and even between a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary, 
is narrowly focussed on e.g. the supply of a certain component, technology, and/or 
service (marketing). 
This being said, cooperation between fairly autonomous, geographically and 
functionally specialised economie units in "networks", provides a combination of 
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strategie control and flexibility, and hence efficient short-term market responsive-
ness which is becoming the essence of modern business organisation. As an alter-
native to both centralised management and arms-length trade, it is an instrument 
for coping with two features of the contemporary economy: the globalisation of 
markets; and the speed of technological change. 
Both lead to information overload. Thus it may become difficult for central 
management to know what technology is available at the production and product 
level in each of its hundreds of specialities; and where to sell "surplus" technol-
ogy which is generated internally. 
The information problem caused by technological and geographie (market) 
complexity is directly reflected in another cost, i.e. transaction costs. Although 
networking, even among equity linked firms, always involves negotiation on priees 
and specifications, these can be routinised in long-standing relationships with 
built-in elements of mutual trust. In this latter context one sometimes speaks of 
the "hostage function" of minority share-holdings. 
Another, frequently observed, pattern is for two large firms to pool risks, 
and achieve economies of scale by developing or producing a component or other 
input, or sharing a service such as marketing. This form is often referred to as 
"strategie alliances". While it may have more than its share of anti- competitive 
dangers, it does provide a highly capital-saving way for firms to achieve world-
competitive technology and scale; and to extend their market presence geographi-
cally so as to reap general economies of scale. 
Last but not least, given the known hesitations of companies to engage in 
arms-length technology transfer (patent sales; licensing) which would compromise 
monopoly rents, cooperation-which allows such trans fers ( often on a barter basis) 
- tends to increase the diffusion of technology. 
These micro-level effects are linked to specifie macro effects. Information 
cost reduction and risk reduction combine to increase potential investment op-
portunities, bence raise total investment in the economy. Capital saving increases 
the overall productivity of capital. And technological excellence, combined with 
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rapid market responses to local opportunities and shifts in requirements, trans-
lates into a better defense of the home market against foreign competitors. 
While the se advantages are valid at any lev el, from sub-national, i.e. regional, 
to global cooperation, information costs and other barriers to transactions are 
relatively high in the European Community. 
Information/transaction barriers are, of course, not higher in an absolute 
sense - geographie proximity and decades of living in a common market favour 
intra-European over extra-European links in this respect- but relative to the pay-
off in terms of the size of individual national markets for a given "investment" in 
information/learning. This pay-off is likely to be much greater when extending 
business activity to the United States. 
2. Business expansion 
While virtually alllarger businesses today engage in sorne form of network-
ing, the creation of an integrated European economy also requires more robust 
forms of TBA. These involve the extension of direct control from the manage-
ment in the firm in one country over productive resources in another. 
The wholly-owned subsidiary, whether greenfield or the result of a take-
over, is the typical instrument of expansion. Mergers are either a polite circum-
locution of the same thing; or, more rarely, involve a genuine centralisation of 
two centers of control. 
Business expansion is economically beneficiai if it asserts competitive ad-
vantages of a firm more quickly and more effectively than is possible by trade 
alone. These competitive advantages may lie in technology and/or production 
know-how; management know-how; marketing skills, etc. 
ln theory trade, i.e. exports by firms having such advantages, will also serve 
to deplace inefficient competitors, with the winner reaping the economies of scale 
of the large market. In practice, however, this process is slow, with the eventual 
losers staying in the market while running down their financial and technological 
E.RA./PROGNOS Page25 
- 222 -
assets. More importantly, adjustment may be inhibited by countervailing national 
subsidies and other forms of local protection. 
This points to the single most important task of transborder "business ex-
pansion" for the completion of the Internai Market: the rationalisation of indus-
try. Overcapacity is a typical feature of too much of European industry. It exists 
both in mature industries whose adjustnient is delayed by national policies; and, 
occasionally, in high-tech industries fostered by other national policies. Equally, 
the two ills of Europe's R&D effort: duplication of national programmes; and 
preferential national procurement, will not disappear with legislation, but only 
when the nationality of the firms themselves will be sufficiently confused to make 
nonsense of national preference. No one in Europe can buy a national Airbus. 
The difference between networking and business expansion is illustrated by 
the automobile industry. Ail manufacturers and component suppliers are cooper-
ating; i.e. they are situated in the upper triangle of figure 3. Partial economies of 
scale in R&D and manufacture ( e.g. engin es) are achieved. But virtually ali are 
in the lower triangle as regards business expansion. Rationalisation has taken 
place within the national context. 
Figure 3 
( TBA 1n the automobile industry 1 
CooperaT-Ion bomef'lt.!l 
+ ~ .. TBA 
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In practice, "networking" and expansion are often present simultaneously in 
business links, with the relative emphasis on de-centralisation and control shift-
ing according to the strategie necessities of a technology (maturity) and a market. 
To sum up, transborder business activity is a pre-condition for the function-
ing of a modern exchange economy. Its relationship to the overall1992 project is 
therefore one of an accelerator or inhibitor of the positive effects, both static and 
dynamic, expected from trade and services liberalisation in general. As such it is 
a parameter to be put before the entire welfare function established for the 1992 
project. 
In turn, the likelihood ofTBA increasing beyond present levels not only de-
pends on the realisation of the White Paper's targets for company law, but on ad-
vances in the liberalisation and de-regulation of trade and services. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This study is part of a research programme undertaken at the 
European Commission by the Directorate General for industrial Affairs 
and the Internal Market, under the title the Cost of Non-Europe. The 
studies in this programme investigate the costs to the Community economy 
of the continued fragmentation of the internal market, each study 
addressing a particular sector or type of cost. This study addresses 
the cost of non-Europe for business services. By implication the study 
also assesses the economie benefits which are implied by the removal of 
barriere to trade in business services envisaged through the completion 
of the internal market by 1992. 
The main elements of the study were to: 
examine the process of externalising services, that is 
contracting services out to specialist firms and investigate 
the degree of externalisation in the European Community, 
examine whether the existence of barriers within the 
internal market limits the ability of firms to purchase the 
most cost effective business services provided within the 
Community, and to provide estimates of the extra costs borne 
by enterprises, 
estimate the benefits from completing the internal market, 
both for enterprises purchasing business services, and for 
the business services sector itself. 
Business services include the technical, professional and 
operational services generally consumed by firms rather than households 
and are those commonly defined as business services for most statistical 
purposes in European countries. They exclude financial services such as 
banking, insurance and securities. 
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This executive summary outlines the main findings of the study. 
The broad findings of the existing research helped shape our 
questionnaire and the conclusions were tested and in the main confirmed 
by our sample interviews. Despite our small sample, therefore, we felt 
happy with the overall trends in our conclusions. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 General 
The original research for the study was based on two sets of 
face-to-face interviews and the completion of two corresponding 
questionnaires. One set related to the demand side, the us ers of 
business services, and consisted of a sample of companies in sectors 
spread across the economy from Benelux, France, Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom. The other related to the supply side of the question, 
and consisted of interviews with companies whtch provide business 
services. In order to draw on a broad spread of experience we 
interviewed trade associations rather than individual firms in those 
sectors, generally at the national, but in sorne cases at an 
international, level. 
The demand questionnaire on which the interviews have been 
centred covered a number of aspects of service provision: 
the demand and supply of business services: the range of 
services employed, the source of supply (whether internally 
or externally supplied) , the extent to which externally 
supplied services are imported, and the domestic 
availability of services, 
decision making and trends in the demand for business 
services from outside sources: the factors underlying the 
decision to externalise (1. e. shift the provision of a 
business service function from in-house to an external 
supplier of those services), orto internalise, the process 
of decision making, recent trends, and the effect in terms 
of cost implications and employment turnover of these 
trends, 
the internai market for services: perceptions of barriere 
to trade which exist in the business services market, and 
the effects of removing barriers on the demand for business 
services and on the overall economie activity. 
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The supply side questionnaire had four points of emphasis: 
the extent to which services are traded internationally, 
the trend towards externalisation, 
the importance of trade barriers in the interna! market, 
the likely effects on cost and demand for business services 
as a result of the completion of the interna! market. 
In addition to the supply side and demand side surveys we carried 
out a literature search which provided statistical information about the 
business services sector, insight into the economies of the 
externalisation process, as well as priee and income elasticities. 
Further information about the business services sector in Europe came 
from the Peat Marwick McLintock factsheets, prepared for DGIII, which 
gave indications of the turnover in the main business service 
categories. 
Finally, for guidance on the quantitative analysis of the cost of 
non-Europe for business services some existing econometrie research was 
consulted, as was Peat Marwick McLintock information relating to 
comparative cost structures within Europe in certain business service . 
sectors. 
2.2 The survey 
Wide ranging interviews were carried out with 100 companies which 
are usera of business services and 20 trade associations representing 
business service suppliera. These were more or less evenly spaced 
between France, Germany, Italy, Benelux and the United Kingdom. 
2.2.1 Demand side 
The companies selected constituted a sample representing a wide 
spectrum of industries. They were of sizes ranging from small family 
run businesses to the larger corporations. They ranged from companies 
operating only in local markets to multi-national organisations with 
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links worldwide. Around one-third of the sample consisted of small and 
medium sized enterprises. One-third of the sample bad a turnover of 
less than Sm ECU in 1986, and a similar proportion bad turnover in 
excess of 250m ECU. 
ln all 61% of the panel was made up of service sector companies 
(of which around one-third were the financial services sector): the 
remaining 39% were companies in the manufacturing sector. 
Nearly two-thirds of the sample functioned in some capacity in at 
!east one Community state other than their own. Around half the sample 
operated additionally in non-EEC markets, North America being the most 
frequently mentioned. 
2.2.2 Supply side 
The trade associations covered commercia~ communications (2), 
engineering and related services (5), management consultancy (4), 
computing services (3), various operational services (such as security) 
(3) and legal services (2). 
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3. THE USE OF BUSINESS SERVICES 
Having established the characteristics of the company sample the 
questionnaire then sought to establish the nature of the demand for, and 
sources of supply of, business services. 
3.1 Degree of externalisation by service 
Table 1 summarises the degree of externalisation of each category 
of business service. 
Table 1 Degree of externalisation of business services 
Degree of Externalisation 
(% of Total Sample) 
Purely Purely 
Sec tor External Combination Internai Subsidiary 
Engineering & Related Services 55 29 14 2 
Management Consultancy 36 25 36 3 
Advertising 48 25 25 2 
Public Relations 10 31 59 0 
Computing Services 21 54 24 0 
Research & Development 13 22 58 7 
Financial Review 48 18 32 2 
Operational Services 59 17 21 3 
Legal Services 40 38 21 1 
TOTAL 40 27 31 2 
-= 
-
Sorne 40% of business services used by our sample were entirely 
sub-contracted, 31% were provided exclusively in-house, 27% were 
provided in combination and 2% were provided by a parent or subsidiary 
company. This broad picture conceals considerable disparities between 
the individual business service sectors. 
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Operational services followed by engineering and related services 
had the highest degree of pure externalisation. Financial review and 
advertising services also had an above average degree of pure 
externalisation. Public relations, research and development, and 
computing services had the lowest degree of pure externalisation. 
The services with the highest degree of pure internalisation 
(in-house provision) were public relations and research and development, 
with management consultancy also above average in this category. 
Those services most often done by combination of in-house and 
external provision include computing services, legal services and public 
relations. Provision by subsidiary or parent companies representa 
everywhere an insignificant proportion of total provision. 
3.2 Degree of externalisation by country 
Table 2 shows the degree of externalisation for each country in 
the survey. 
Table 2 Degree of externalisation by country 
Externalisation Internalisation Combinat ion 
% % % 
France 57 31 12 
Germany 32 47 21 
Ital y 48 35 16 
Netherlands 39 18 43 
United Kingdom 35 22 43 
TOTAL 40 31 27 
== ""= =-= 
Based on our sample, France has the highest percentage of 
exclusively externalised business services (57%) and the lowest degree 
of combined provision (12%). Italy follows a similar pattern with 48% 
of business services externalised and only 16% provided in combination. 
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have very similar externalisation 
profiles. Both have a below average degree of in-house business service 
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provision and a considerably above average level of combined business 
service provision (40%). Germany has the highest percentage of in-bouse 
provision of business services, wi th correspondingly below average 
levels of both pure externalisation and combined provision. 
3.3 Degree of externalisation by company size 
The very smallest companies internalised a very high percentage 
of business services (45%) (see Table 4). This drops sharply for medium 
sized firms which externalised a high proportion of business services 
(54%) and internalised only a very low proportion. For larger companies 
a larger proportion of services were internalised and the degree of 
externalisation drops (as it becomes economie to bring services 
in-bouse). However, perhaps reflecting an awareness of the wider 
benefits of externalisation, the percentage of combined provision is 
above average for the larger firms. These broad findings bear out the 
conclusions of the current literature on business services. 
Table 3 Degree of externalisation by size 
Em2loi!ent Externalisation Internalisation Combinat ion 
% % % 
0 - 50 36 45 19 
51 - 500 54 21 24 
501 - 1,000 39 30 31 
1,001 - 5,000 39 35 26 
5,000+ 36 33 31 
TOTAL 40 32 28 
== == == 
3.4 Trends in externalisation 
A significant increase in the last five years in the amount of 
services bought from external compani~s was reported by 53% of demand 
side respondents. A significant re-internalisation of business services 
was reported by over 4%. The services most frequently mentioned in the 
context of a higher degree of externalisation in recent years were: 
marketing and sales promotion, 
- 8 -
- 237 -
computing services, 
taxation advice, 
legal services, 
consultancy, 
external audit. 
The reasons cited for an increased trend towards externalisation 
included changes in company policy in favour of externalising all 
non-core activities. In a number of cases this was as a result of a 
strategie review of all company operations. Other ressons mentioned 
included cost cutting (implying that companies see externalisation as a 
money saving option), the need to reduce the workforce to a minimal 
sustainable lev el, and the need for flexibility arising from using 
services provided on a contract basis. Organic growth was also 
mentioned as a factor in increasing externalisation. The implication 
here is that companies find expansion easier by sub-contracting rather 
than by building up interna! resources, particularly in the absence of 
the interna! expertise necessary to start the process. 
In the handful of cases in which services were being 
re-internalised the reasons cited included cost-cutting (as the company 
grew to a size at which services could be provided economically 
in-house) and company policy for reasons of control. 
The supply side interviews confirmed these trends. 
3.5 The externalisation decision process 
3.5.1 Decision factors 
Companies were questioned on all aspects of their decision making 
with particular reference to externalisation decisions taken in the 
recent past in order to ascertain the likely effect of a reduction in 
the cost of business services or any other changes resulting from the 
completion of the interna! market. 
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Table 4 ranks the general factors underlying the selection of 
external business service suppliera. The table shows that although cost 
and availability are undoubtedly important factors in the selection of 
externally provided business services, the quality of these services is 
ultimately more important. This bas clear implications when assessing 
the likely benefit that result from eliminating barriers in Europe. 
Table 4 Service supplier selection factors (%) (1) 
Very Important Çuite Important Less Important 
Quality 70 8 0 
Cost 32 50 4 
Availability 39 27 4 
Tradition 0 16 51 
(1) Expressed as a percentage of total panel (multiple responses 
allowed) 
3.5.2 Decision processes 
The evidence of the survey is that iri many cases a strategie 
decision is taken to externalise non-core activities after the general 
benefits of such an approach have been assessed often by external review 
of operations. In the majority of cases, however, and particularly 
prevalent in France, Germany and the UK, it would appear to be a 
management philosophy which bas evolved as a means to cost cutting and 
reducing the workforce to a sustainable minimum, possibly in response to 
the painful experience of many countries in the world recession of the 
early 1980s. Given this underlying philosophy, individual cases are 
then decided on their own merits. The initial externalisation of a 
service, or the externalisation of a one-off need, is often subject to 
some form of cost-benefit analysis. Established contracte are managed 
via the business's usual annual operating process. In the few cases 
where inertia is given as a reason for externalisation it is often in 
areas of very long standing externali~ation, such as for legal services. 
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3.5.3 Externalisation and economie performance 
Firms had great difficulty quantifying either cost or employment 
effects suggesting that very little subsequent analysis of decision 
outcomes is made to assess whether externalisation decisions had been 
justified in practice. However, interviewees usually had overall 
perceptions of the costs and benefits of externalisation: 
cost: Over half the sample were unable to say whether 
savings had been achieved or not. Of those companies able 
to answer the question, 84% claimed that expected services 
had been realised and 89% found that the quality of services 
matched expectations. In the cases for which estimates of 
cost savings could be made these averaged between 10 and 15% 
for each business service (although the point was repeatedly 
made that cost is often not the prime motivation for 
externalisation). 
employment: Some 38% of the sample reported that contracting 
out of services had enabled them to reduce their own staff, 
compared to 14% who reported no change in the level of 
employment. The picture is not as straight forward as these 
figures might suggest. Frequently, externalisation appears 
to occur as a natural part of the organic growth process of 
a company. In these cases, representing 12% of the sample, 
job growth is foregone as companies sub-contract rather than 
recruit. Altogether, therefore, from the point of view of 
the client company there are negative effects on the 
employment levels which would have occurred without 
externalisation. It is difficult to quantify "average" 
employment effects from the survey since estimates (when 
they do exist) range from a "handful" of staff to 
"substantial" numbers where externalisation is undertaken as 
part of a general cost cutting exercise. 
Clearly, however, there is a potentially positive effect on 
employment of externalisation arising from: 
additional company growth from externalisation benefits, 
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additional employment by business service companies. 
Average job losses were between 0. 6% and 0. 9% of the total 
workforce. This average is somewhat distorted by the exclusion of firms 
reporting either no job losses, foregone job growth, or those unable to 
quantify jobs lost. 
The overall conclusion is that externalisation undoubtedly bas an 
effect on employment, at the very least shifting employment from client 
companies indirectly to the business service sector. The net effect is 
not quantified by this survey, but the overall effect is unlikely to be 
significant relative to the size of the workforce. 
3.5.4 Motivations for externalisation by business service 
Particular examples of externalisation which bad taken place in 
the last five years were examined to identify which sectors have 
featured in recent trends towards externalisation (discussed in 
Section 2.1.3) 
The reasons which emerge can be classified into the categories 
shown in Table 8 together with a broad indication of the frequency of 
occurrence. 
Clearly the list is not exclusive: externalisation may be 
motivated by more than one of these factors. The list is also not 
exhaustive but it does include all the factors which occurred 
frequently. The re is also clearly an overlap between some of the 
motivations. 
The cost motivation for externalisation is straightforward to 
interpret and applied particularly to operational services. Lack of 
interna! expertise generally applies to areas which require a high 
degree of specialist knowledge and therefore includes computing 
services, marketing (often in overseas markets), research and 
development and consultancy. While cost saving is the single most 
important motivation, altogether cost motives account for only a third 
of cases of externalisation. 
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Table 5 Motivations for externalisation by business services used 
Motivation 
Coat saving 
Lack of internal expertise 
Desire to eut employment/ 
fixed costs 
Need for external 
perspective 
Flexibility 
Economies of scale 
One-off exercise 
Lack of internal resource 
Need for higher quality 
service 
Main Sectors 
Operational, IT, Marketing 
IT, Marketing (overseas), 
R&D, Consultancy 
IT, Operational services 
Consultancy, IT, PR 
Marketing, Consultancy, IT 
Operational, Legal, Marketing 
Consultancy, Audit, Recruitment 
IT 
Operational, IT 
Frequency 
% 
26 
18 
10 
10 
10 
8 
7 
7 
5 
Other sectors such as engineering and related services and legal 
services, although falling into the specialist category, are already 
widely externalised and do not feature in this analysis of recent 
trends. 
- 13 -
- 242 -
4. BUSINESS SERVICES AND THE INTERNAL MARKET 
In this section we examine the issue of trade in business 
services within the Community and trade barriers encountered. We begin 
with the experience of the demand side in obtaining an adequate supply 
of business services domestically (4.1) and the extent to which they go 
beyond their national borders for services (4.2). We then address the 
nature and significance of barriers to trade in business services both 
from the demand side (4.3) and supply side (4.4) experience. Finally, 
we consider these barriers in the context of the volume of intra-
Community trade (4.5). 
4.1 Domestic availability of services 
Sorne 26% of companies reported that they bad tried to contract 
out a service but bad failed to find a sui table domestic supplier. 
These companies were concentrated particularly in Italy, but also in the 
Netherlands. In the former case difficulties appear to be largely 
associated with recent changes in company accounting procedures for 
which the domestic accounting profession is not yet fully prepared. The 
most frequently mentioned services included: 
audit, 
consultancy, 
taxation advice, 
specialist software, 
marketing in foreign markets, 
foreign legal and tax advice. 
With the exception of areas such as audit, tax and consultancy, 
in which countries such as the UK and the US appear to have developed 
internationally recognised expertise, services which are unavailable 
locally usually relate either to the need for local knowledge of a 
foreign market or are of a highly specialist nature (such as the example 
of research and development in a specialist field) of a type not 
generally available. 
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4.2 Purchases of services from foreign owned companies 
In the sample 68% of firms bought some of their externally 
provided services from a foreign-owned firm. The services affected are 
general! y those mentioned in 4. 1. It was frequently stated that 
nationality is irrelevant in the selection of sub-contractors and that 
work is given to firms purely on the basis of the most favourable 
tender. Specifie reasons given for using a foreign firm were: 
policy to use local firms by overseas subsidiaries, 
the reputation of foreign firms (in terms of cost and 
quality) in certain fields, mainly audit, consultancy and 
computing services, 
the need for advice on foreign markets or legal and taxation 
systems. 
Reasons were also mentioned for not using foreign owned firms. 
These included: 
adequacy of locally available services, 
language, cultural and geographical barriers, 
government procurement policies (discriminating against 
contracta with a significant element of foreign sub-
contracting) 
lack of information about the availability of foreign 
services. 
The conclusion of this section of the survey is that there is 
already considerable cross-border provision of business services within 
the EEC and that generally firms were not averse to using those 
services, their main concern being to obtain the best available product. 
It was not, however, possible to tell from the replies how important 
lack of information was and whether the use of foreign firms would have 
been larger if their existence were known. 
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4.3 Barriers to trade in business services: demand side view 
Only 17% of the sample recognised barriers to business services, 
over half the sample stating that they were aware of no barriers. For 
those companies recognising barriers, the most common reasons fell into 
the "fact-of-life" category and included mainly language and cultural 
differences or proximity. Availability of information and shareholder 
or official pressure to buy domestically were also mentioned. 
The ranking of those barriers which were recognised is given in 
Table 6. 
Table 6 Importance of selected business service barriers 
Barrier 
Financial 
Administrative 
National Standards & Regulations 
Legal 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Financial barriers (such as exchange controls) and administrative 
barriers (such as paperwork) were regarded as marginally more important 
than barriers related to differences in national standards and 
regulations and legal barriers. These resulta are, however, based on a 
very small sample and should be treated,with appropriate caution. 
Larger companies with offices throughout the Community indicate 
that barriers were not really regarded as obstacles, given the systems 
and structures which bad evolved for trade within the Community. 
4.4 Barriers to trade in business services: supply side view 
The overall picture from the supply side is that most business 
services are perceived by their suppliera to suffer from some barriers 
even though they are not considered to be of great significance. Two of 
the services on the other band could think of no barriers at all (beyond 
problems such as cultural and market differences, which we are not 
classifying as trade barriers), these being management consultancy and 
operational services. 
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Table 7 Barriers to trade in business services 
Sec tor 
Commercial Communications 
Engi~.teering & Related 
Management Consultancy 
Computing Services 
Research & Development 
Operational Services 
Legal Services 
Nature of Barriers 
Satellite broadcasting barriers 
Differences in advertising 
law (regarding permissible 
advertising material) 
Limitations on media time for 
advertising 
Lack of access to equity markets 
(Germany) 
Qualifications of professionals 
Government procurement 
Technical standards 
Licensing of professionals 
Tax treatment 
None 
Government and PTT procurement 
of computer services 
Bias in government procurement 
None 
Freedom to practice 
Overall Significance 
of Barrier 
Generally regarded as 
reasonably free market 
i) Engineers: 
barriers quite 
significant 
ii) Architects: 
barriers very 
restrictive 
No barriers of 
significance 
UK reports this barrier 
only 
Reported by Germany 
(demand side interview) 
Largely unregulated 
market 
Not generally recognised 
by professional bodies 
as significant 
In four sectors barriers are recognised but are not viewed as 
very significant impedimenta to the exchange of services - namely 
commercial communications, computing services, research and development 
and legal services. The associations generally replied that the 
significance of these barriers for individual service companies would 
depend on the nature of the services they provided. Sorne would be 
affected quite significantly while others hardly at all. The view of 
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all these four services is that the removal of barriers will have some, 
if quite a limited, effect on the ability of service providers to sell 
in other European countries. 
Some specifie points should be made in relat:l.on to individual 
services: 
in advertising, the development of satellite broadcasting is 
creating a new medium of international broadcasting which 
allows cross-border television advertising. As cross-
boarder advertisements are not currently allowed for there 
could be a significant raising of barriers in the near 
future unless changes are made to the current regulations, 
with regard to legal services, the profession does not 
regard the most fundamental restriction on cross-border 
services, that is the existence of entirely separate legal 
systems in each member state, as a trade barrier but as a 
fact of life. This is understandable given that the removal 
of such a restriction could only be a long term aim. 
Nevertheless, there are examples of lawyers being restricted 
in practising even when appropriately qualified, 
while we did not formally interview representatives in the 
accountancy profession, it is common knowledge that within 
certain member states accountants are prohibited from 
offering non-auditing services to their audit clients. 
Moreover, non-auditing activities have become an important 
growth market for most large firms. However, in practice 
there is said to be only a moderate inconvenience in setting 
up legally separate firms for consultancy and tax services. 
In no countries have firms been prevented from providing all 
the services which they would like to offer. 
The remaining sector, engineering and related services, appears 
to suffer most from barriere, which were described as a significant 
limitation on competition. This is reflected in the degree of trade in 
these services, which is qui te limited within the Community. The 
barriers which have most effect are the licensing of professionals and 
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bias in public procurement. While these professions are significant 
exportera Table 5 shows that very little of the export market is within 
the Community. Instead exporta are concentrated on developing countries 
which lack the skills to perform the se services themselves. In 
countries where qualified professionals do exist (which would include 
the whole of the Community) such services are imported to a very limited 
degree. Bias in public procurement is an important barrier, given that 
public bodies are significant purchasers in relation to infrastructure 
projects. While both consulting engineers and architects feel that 
barriers are significant, the latter group appears to find them 
particularly restrictive. 
Finally, one should note that there were some more general 
problems reported by some sectors, although they are not business 
service barriers directly. In particular the high costs of air 
transport and telecommunications created by an imperfect market were 
raised by sever al respondents. Some also reported restrictions on 
access to foreign exchange and the repatriation of profits. 
4.5 Extent of intra-Community trade in business services 
Supply side respondents were asked for information regarding the 
significance of exporta for domestic suppliera. This information, 
combined with data taken from a series of service sector factsheets is 
presented in Table 8. 
Table 8 Internationalisation of business services 
Location of .Business Service Clients 
(% of turnover) 
Business Service Domestic Other EEC Non-EEC 
Engineering & Related 55 4 41 
Consultancy 90-95 2-5 2-5 
Commercial Communication 50 40 10 
Computer Services 90 5 5 
Research & Development N/A N/A N/A 
Financial Review N/A N/A N/A 
Operational Services 98 1 1 
Legal Services N/A N/A N/A 
Source: Supply side interviews and PMM factsheets 
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Business service sectors divide into three clear categories: 
engineering and related services and commercial 
communications, where roughly half the turnover of business 
services is for foreign clients. In the case of commercial 
communications, most exporta are within the Community, 
against only a small proportion of engineering and related 
services (where developing countries are the biggest export 
market), 
consultancy, computer and operational services in which 
there appears to be very little international trade, 
research and development, financial review and legal 
services, on which the re is no data available on export 
shares of turnover. 
The picture given by Table 5 roughly bears out our demand side 
interviews. Those services which are not traded significantly according 
to the table were generally contracted to local firms, with the 
exception of consultancy. For this service, Table 5 is probably 
misleading since international consultancies generally have subsidiaries 
or partnerships in European countries. "Foreign" services of this kind 
would therefore not be registered as experts. This also applies to 
financial review, on which there are no figures in Table 5. Foreign 
accountancy services are very widely used in the sense that the "Big 
Eight" firms are international partnerships, though this would not be 
reflected in export figures. 
The highly domestic orientation of operational services was also 
reflected in our demand side interviews. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Most business service trade associations recognise the existence 
of barriers. While they feel that their significance is somewhat 
limited this view does seem at variance with the demand side perception 
- 20-
- 249 -
of barriere, whereby most firms know of no barriere and the few that do 
acknowledge their existence believed them to be either insignificant or 
marginal. 
The following seem the most likely explanations of this 
dictonomy: 
the associations say that only some of their services are 
affected and these have not touched upon our demand sample 
significantly, 
barriere are not fully recognised by users of business 
services and despite prompting, are taken as facts of life, 
many services are not sophisticated and can easily be 
provided by local firms, such that consumera of services may 
not feel deprived by having local supply only (though it 
could mean a more restricted choice and possibly higher 
priees). It is perhaps significant that those services for 
which consumera most often turn to foreign suppliera are 
specialised, sophisticated services not available in the 
local market. 
The general impression from the interviews is that the latter two 
explanations are most.likely. Interestingly companies did not tend to 
regard the purchase of foreign services as a natural option, even though 
many imported foreign inputs in the goods sector in substantial 
quantities. 
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5. THE COSTS OF NON-EUROPE FOR BUSINESS SERVICES 
5.1 Background and methodology 
In order to quantify the economie and financial coste of 
non-Europe for business services we used a number of sources. The 
literature review and the Peat Marwick McLintock factsheets provided 
background statistical information about the business services sector 
and the underlying economies of externalisation. The factsheets also 
discuss the current state of internationalisation of business services 
within the Community. The demand and supply side surveys and sorne 
existing econometrie etudies provide the mechanisms by which to quantify 
the effects of completion of the internai market. 
Four factors complicate the analysis of the cost of non-Europe in 
the case of business services: 
relative lack of statistical information, 
absence of existing etudies in the area of service sector 
trade barriere, 
poor perception of barriere by questionnaire respondents, 
complexity of quantifying indirect effects for an 
intermediate service. 
Given these difficulties the emphasis in this section is on a 
discussion of the elements of the costs of non-Europe supported by 
quantitative assumptions as to the range and likely values of these 
effects. These effects are summarised below in Table 11. 
5.2 The size of the business service sector 
The Peat Marwick McLintock factsheets yielded estimates as to the 
size of the business service market in the Community. Turnover figures 
are shown in Table 7. 
- 22 -
- 251 -
Table 7 Business services turnover, 1986 
Sec tor 
Engineering & Related Services 
Consultancy 
Advertising (1) 
Public Relations 
Computing Services 
Research & Development 
Financial Review 
Legal Services 
TOTAL 
(1) including media costs 
Turnover 
bn ECU 
7.5 
3.5 
57 
2 
13 
15 
13 
13 
124.0 
===== 
Business services are an important sector in the Community 
economy. The sector is also one of rapid growth even when compared to 
other service industries. 
5.3 Effects of the removal of business service barriers 
Respondents in the demand-side questionnaire were asked about the 
likely effects of removing business service barriers. 
5.3.1 Changes in demand for business services 
Even in the cases in which barriers were recognised over half of 
the respondents did not consider that removal of these barriers would 
affect purchases of business services. 
5.3.2 Priee sensitivity 
Companies were asked to assess the priee reduction for business 
services which would be required to indu ce additional purchases. 
Although average response was in the region of 10% there was a 
considerable spread from 5% to 20% plus. 
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5.3.3 Effect on company sales 
Of those companies recognising barriers to trade in business 
services 41% considered that removal of those barriers would have no 
effect on sales and 44% thought that sales would increase by up to 5%. 
The remainder anticipated larger increases. 
Almost equal weight was given to the following factors as 
explanations for anticipated sales increases: 
reduction in product priees, 
improved competitiveness, 
ability to enter new markets in Europe, 
generally faster market growth. 
5.4 Cost of non-Europe 
We have divided the costs of non-Europe for business services 
into four sources: 
i) The higher costs of business services which results from 
limited competition. 
ii) Lower output across the economy which results from these 
higher business service input costs. 
iii) Lower demand for business services which results from higher 
costs and more limited range of business services. 
iv) Lower levels of (cost-saving) externalisation which result 
from higher costs, and more limited range, of business 
services. 
The completion of the internal market for business services can 
therefore be expected to produce the following corresponding benefits: 
i) Savings due to reduction in business service priees. 
ii) Increase in output across the economy. 
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iii) Increase in output of business service sector. 
iv) Savings due to increase in externalisation of business 
services. 
In the commission's model of direct and indirect effects, the i) 
above is a direct effect of removing business service barriers. Effects 
ii) to v) are the indirect effects on the economy as a whole of the 
completion of the internai market for business services. One should 
stress however that these are effects of removing business service 
barriere in isolation. In reality completion of the internai market as 
a whole will result in changes in many sectors, which will impinge on 
the business service sector. 
5.4.1 Reduction in business service priees 
One of the fundamental arguments for an internai market is that 
opening sectors to increasing competition will result in efficiency 
gains and cost savings which will then be passed on to consumera (in the 
case of business services to intermediate consumers). A reasonable 
assumption therefore, is that business services priees might gravitate 
to those of the state which is currently the most efficient producer, or 
at least move part of the way to that level. 
There is very little comparative information on the cost 
structures of business services which limits the analysis which can be 
undertaken. The information which is available relates only to general 
consultancy, accountancy and tax consultancy. The figures suggest that 
if all priees when converted using purchasing power parity to reflect 
differing local overheads in different markets, and if all producers of 
business services were to reduce costs to that of the most efficient a 
maximum reduction of 15% might be expect~d. If all priees were to fall 
to the current average level (a working lower limit assumption) then a 
reduction of 3% might be expected. 
However, this rather simplistic analysis needs to be tempered 
with the conclusions of the demand-side and supply-side surveys. One of 
the main conclusions of the demand side survey was that quality of 
business services was a major factor in determining demand - frequently 
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costly services were used when cheaper were available for reasons of 
quality. Such behaviour tends to support the view mentioned in many of 
the supply-side interviews that competitors are not likely to enter new 
markets on a priee cutting basis, but rather by offering an improved 
product. Clearly this does not imply that business services clients 
will not be better off; it does however make it very difficult to 
qualify the gains to be made. 
This view is further supported by the fact that when companies do 
go to foreign companies for business services it is invariably because 
of availability or quality reasons and not for reasons of cost. 
It must also be stressed that very few respondents on the demand 
side recognised any barriere other than "fact-of-life" type barriers 
(such as language, proximity etc) to prevent them already from obtaining 
the best possible service in europe. This was borne out by those on the 
supply-side of the business service sector, most of whom did not foresee 
a significant fall in priee. 
Combining these survey results with the fact that the statistical 
comparison of cost is limited by lack of data and narrowness of coverage 
it seems reasonable to assume that the 3% priee fall mentioned below 
might be seen as the most likely estimate of coAt reductions to be 
expected from the completion of the internal market in business 
services. Based on existing turnover and a priee reduction of 3%, the 
cost savings to users of business services will be around 3.5 bn ECU. 
The gains in efficiency made from access to better quality 
services may be considerably greater but they cannot be quantified. It 
is also clear that there will be differences between sectors. Sectors 
in which substantial barriers exist (e.g. legal services) may witness 
larger priee falls than advertising which already has a high degree of 
internationalisation. 
5.4.2 Increase in output in all sectors 
Any reduction in the priee of business services or improvement in 
quality will ultimately have a positive effect on demand for the final 
output of business service consumera, and for goods generally. 
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Severa! factors must be considered, however when the extent of 
this increase in damend is assessed. Firstly, externalised business 
services represent only a small through increasing proportion of a 
firm' s total costs ( typically in the region of 3%). Secondly, the 
hypothesis of section 5.4.1 is that priees of business services will not 
fall greatly. Thirdly, and confirming the first two points, demand side 
respondents did not expect a large increase in general sales as a result 
of the removal of barriers to business services. Even in instances in 
which business service barriers were recognised, effects on general 
sales were not perceived to be significant. The general effect on sales 
of around 0.1%, and maybe less seems reasonable. A range of between 0% 
and 0.2% (0 to 3 bn ECU) might be the lower and upper limits. 
5.4.3 Increase in business service output 
A relative priee reduction and general increase in economie 
activity will, via priee and income multipliera, increase the demand for 
business services. The conclusion of the demand side survey is that 
priee elasticity is low. Competition is mainly on quality, and 
respondents indicated that an average 10% priee reduction would be 
required before any increase in demand for business services would be 
realised. However, there was a considerable spread around this average. 
There is no econometrie work which includes a priee or income 
elasticities of business services but there are figures for the service 
sector as a whole which we have used as a base for estimating business 
service elasticities. Income elasticities in the service sector seem 
typically in excess of 1%. Our survey results point to a very low priee 
elasticity but a reasonably high income elasticity of demand for 
business services, most probably higher than for services as a whole 
which includes income inelastic government services. Long run priee 
elasticity of 0.2% and a long run income elasticity of 1.4% was a 
reasonable working assumption using the se figures. The increase in 
demand for business services derived from a relative priee reduction and 
income growth and range between 0.7 and 2.5bn ECU. 
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Table 8 Elements of the costs of non-Europe 
Element bn ECU 
Fall in priees of business services 
General sales growth 
Growth in business service sales 
Savings due to increases in externalisation 
5.4.4 Increases in externalisation 
0 3.5 
0 - 3.0 
0.7- 2.5 
0.1- 0.2 
Increased competion in the business services market will reduce 
costs, improve quality, increase availability and improve the 
information and marketing of business services, consequently increasing 
the degree of externalisation ( that is the number of services 
externalised). The demand side survey bas revealed that this leads to 
cost savings. The true opportunity cost of non-Europe from this source 
is the net gain, since externalisation implies a transfer of jobs and 
income from the consuming sector to the business service sector. 
The demand side survey suggest that of those firms recognising 
business service barriers (a small proportion) only about half, 
representing 8% of the sample, expected to contract out more services on 
their removal. This small figure is again consistent with the finding 
that business service barriers are not substantial. The increase in 
externalisation from this source is therefore unlikely to be very 
significant and overall business service demand is unlikely to rise by 
more than 1% from this source (on the basis of demand side questionnaire 
responses). This representa a maximum gain of 1. 25bn ECU for the 
business service sector and, on the basis of 10 to 15% savings stemming 
from externalisation, and on the fact that business services account for 
only 3% of total costs, it accounts for a 0.1-0.2bn ECU saving on the 
cost of business services to consumer companies. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Table 9 summarises our estimate of the costs of non-Europe. 
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Table 9 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
Estimates of the cost of non-Europe 
Direct effects 
Higher costs of business services 
Indirect effects 
Lower output in whole economy 
Lower demand for business services 
Higher costs from foregone externalisation 
Range (bn ECU) 
3.5 
0-3.0 
0.8-2.5 
0.1-0.2 
The corporate sector bas for severa! years been in a process of 
externalising many of its business services and this process is clearly 
continuing. Y~reover this process is economically beneficia!, largely 
because of the higher quality of service which specialists are able to 
provide, but in some cases also because there are cost advantages. 
In contrast to the purchase of goods as inputs into their 
products, firms are not inclined to look abroad for the provision of 
business services. It is clear that some trade barriere exist for 
severa! services, even though they have limited effects in impeding 
trade. In general, however, these barriere are not acknowledged by 
service users, largely because of their tendency to rely on domestic 
provisions. Trade in most business service sectors is low; service 
companies are heavily dependent on domestic markets, which have been 
growing strongly in most countries. This fragmentation of the market is 
not only unusual in comparison with the goods sector and some other 
services, it also seems at odds with the varying strengths and 
weaknesses of different countries in each sector. 
The continued fragmentation of the market bas effects on both 
providers and users of services. For providers it hinders the expansion 
of their services and reduces the range of services they provide in 
other countries. As a result it bas some effect of inflating priees 
(effect i) above). 
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However it has more significant implications in terms of the 
quality and range of service available, which is a more significant 
determinent of whether business services are purchased from outside. 
Thus the use of external business services is lower in a fragmented 
market (effect iii) above). This in turn means that the benefits of the 
foregone externalisation are lost (effect iv) above) and output as a 
whole is reduced (effect ii) above). 
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 This report was prepared by Priee Waterhouse and represents the 
results of an economie study of the costs of "Non Europe" in 
financial services. The study's geographical coverage was as 
follows: 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
the Benelux countries and Spain. 
1.2 The principal objectives of this study were to: 
assess the importance of financial services to the Community 
economy; 
analyse the present organisation of the market for financial 
services; 
evaluate the economie impact of completing the interna! 
market in financial services. 
1.3 For clarity and ease of reference, the organisation of the main 
report is described below and a brief outline of each section is 
given in this executive summary. 
In Section 2 a review of methodological issues is presented. 
This is followed in Section 3 by a macroeconomie and 
sectoral analysis with the object of evaluating the 
importance of financial services to eight economies of the 
Community under review. 
In Section 4 an overview of the present structure of the 
financial services market is set out. The focus of this 
section is on regulatory barriers which have the potential 
to affect the establishment of financial service 
institutions in overseas markets or the potential to affect 
cross border trade directly. 
In Section 5 an analysis of the scope for quantitative 
assessment of the effects of completing the interna! market 
is considered. 
Finally, in Section 6, the estimation of the economie impact 
of integration is presented. Detailed analyses relating to 
a number of important areas of the study have been included 
as appendices to the main report. 
1.4 In view of the complex and sensitive nature of the information 
and analysis in this report it is important that disclosure of 
specifie parts of the study are not made out of context. 
- 266 - - 2 -
1.5 It should be appreciated that certain key assumptions were made 
in the conduct of our field work and in the preparation of this 
report. These include, inter alia, the assumption that the 
central aim of the Commission is to create a framework for a free 
and competitive interna! market in financial services whilst at 
the same time ensuring adequate standards of consumer protection. 
The intention is that this will be achieved through a legislative 
programme which is aimed at stimulating cross-border trade and 
encouraging investment and establishment in foreign territories. 
1.6 It is also envisaged that the economie climate thus created will 
lead to an intensified interest in Pan-European acquisition and 
merger opportunities and that this will need to be supported by 
an appropriate regime of freedom for capital movements. Our 
analysis considers the likely economie consequences for the 
Community of this scenario. 
1.7 An evaluation of the 1ikelihood of progress towards an integrated 
financial services market or the likely responses from national 
governments to opening up of the financial markets is outside of 
the scope of the study. Similarly, an evaluation of the likely 
response of producers in different countries to the assumed 
integrated market is outside the scope of this economie study. 
1.8 It should also be recognised that in the achievement of the 
economie goals, summarised above, any significant changes in the 
pattern of market concentration may need to be kept under review 
in the early stages 1eading up to the following liberalisation in 
order to alleviate market distortion effects which undermine the 
aims of the 1992 initiative. This will have a wide range of 
implications for Commission competition policy, for example in 
the approach adopted towards multi-national industry groupings 
and the balance of investment opportunities between Community and 
external providers of financial services. 
1.9 We would like to thank the Steering Committee for advice provided 
to the consultancy team during the course of the study and for 
input made by externa1 advisors. We would also like to thank al! 
individuals and institutions who provided information, during 
this study. 
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SECTION 2: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
2.1 The purpose of this section is to resolve three methodological 
problems: 
0 
0 
0 
to provide a comprehensive operational definition of 
financial services. 
to dentify producers and users of financial services. 
to clarify the link between liberalising the market for 
financial services and liberalising capital movements. 
2.2 Definition of Financial Services 
It was agreed with the Commission at the outset that financial 
services should be defined to include the provision of a 
financial service or the sale of a financial product or both and 
that the following activities should be included in the 
definition. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
international, commercial and private banking 
corporate financial services 
offshore banking and money market activities 
broking 
funds management 
assurance, insurance, and reinsurance 
consumer credit 
building societies 
stock exchange services. 
A description of the financial products and services covered by 
each of these activities is outlined in the main report. The 
activities can be grouped under three headings: 
0 
0 
0 
banking and credit services 
insurance services 
brokerage and securities services 
These categories have been used, as far as possible, throughout 
the study, and particularly in the macroeconomie and sectoral 
analysis and in the analysis of the market. In the examination 
of the scope for a quantitative assessment of the effects of 
completing the internal market, representative services have been 
selected from each of the above groups of activities. 
2.3 Identification of Producers and Users 
It was necessary from a methodological viewpoint to decide how to 
treat the identification of producers and users in the sectoral 
analysis. It was also clear that, in identifying producers and 
users of financial services, segmenta! differences between 
countries would need to be recognised. In addition it was 
decided that only primary users could be identified. 
-
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This methodological decision implied the need for sectoral 
analysis to be undertaken on a country-by-country basis. It also 
highlighted the need to attempt to identify differences in the 
type and range of services offered by different institutions in 
different member countries. This issue is considered at sorne 
length under the section on macroeconomie and sectoral analysis 
in the main report. It should also be appreciated that in the 
analysis of the economie impact of integration in Section 6, 
consumers are defined as including all consumers including 
private, commercial and institutional groups. 
2.4 The Lint Between Trade in Financial Services and Capital 
- Movements 
An important methodological issue examined related to the link 
between trade in financial services and exchange controls. In 
view of its importance and complexity we consider this issue in 
detail in Appendix 3 of the main report. The main question 
addressed is the extent to which freedom of trade or overseas 
establishment can yield consumer benefits despite the persistence 
of controls on capital movements. The Commission's objective is 
a regime of freedom of capital movements as well as freedom to 
establish and trade, with home country prudential regulation 
being recognised in the first place. However it is important to 
assess also the consequences of a partial or intermediate stage 
in the achievement of this objective. 
Our analysis indicates that maintenance of strict exchange 
controls may well inhibit the full consumer benefits from freedom 
of trade and freedom of establishment. This is principally 
because financial institutions will not be able to take full 
advantage of the economies of a wider market. Although an 
attempt to maintain a regime of strict regulation may well run 
into difficulties under a system of home country control, it is 
not certain that these regulations will create competitive 
disadvantages for home financial institutions. Market 
segmentation rather than global loss of competitiveness may often 
be the consequence. 
Under host country regulations, the result of freedom of 
establishment may be very little improvement where uncompetitive 
market structures exist or may result. In contrast, the prospect 
for welfare gains from a liberalisation of exchange controls does 
not seem to depend so heavily on freedom of establishment, at 
least for financial services of a wholesale type. 
At present the persistence of exchange controls prevents the free 
flow of capital from moving to the countries with the highest 
rates of return. Even if there were no differences between the 
efficiency of the financial services in various member states, 
the removal of exchange controls could therefore be expected to 
have beneficia! effects. 
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SECTION 3: MACROECONOMie AND SECTORAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 In this section aggregate datais presented for each of the 
countries in the study to indicate the relative economie 
importance of the financial services sector. Data will be found 
covering: 
employment; 
value added; 
output; 
In the main report we also present information on the demand for 
financial services by households, companies and government. In 
addition data is presented on external transactions in financial 
services and on the profitability of the banking and insurance 
sectors. 
3.2 Employment in Financial Services 
Total Employment 
Table 3.1 shows that employment in the banking, finance and 
insurance sectors in the countries studied exceeded 3.1 million 
in 1985. Banking and finance employed in excess of 1.7 million; 
and there were more than 700,000 employed in insurance (Note 1). 
Banking, finance and insurance represented 3.5 per cent of total 
employees in the eight countries in 1985. Individually, most 
countries were close to this average except Luxembourg at 7.7 per 
cent and Italy at 2.5 per cent. 
Table 3.1: Employment in Banlting and Insurance by Country 
1985 (See Note 2) 
Employment (•ooo) 
Banlting 
Country and Finance Insurance Total 
Total as % of 
Total Employees 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
L 
NL 
UK 
TOTAL 
89 
604 
n.a. 
448 
n.a. 
9.9 
111 
527 
30.0 
230 
n.a. 
154 
n.a. 
0.9 
42 
245 
119 3.9 
834. 3.7 
292 3.9 
602 3.4 
379 2.5 
11 7.7 
153 3.5 
772 3.6 
3,162 3.5 
Source: Statistical Office of the European Commission (s.O.E.C.) 
Notes: (1) These figures exclude Italy and Spain for which there 
is no breakdown between employment in insurance and 
banking. 
(2) These data exclude agents not acting as principals in 
the financial sector. 
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Value Added 
In the subsequent economie analysis, value added represents the 
sum of compensation of employees and profits accruing to the 
resources employed. It is an important indication of the 
economie significance of financial services. The table below 
shows value added for credit and insurance. 
In the National Accounts data, transactions are classified by 
branch and by sector. Branches consist of units of homogeneous 
production engaged in the production of a single product or group 
of products and sectors are based on the institutional 
arrangements in force. The sectoral data shows a breakdown 
between credit and insurance and is broadly comparable with the 
employment data. Data on value added by both branch and sector 
are shawn in the table below. The data on value added is 
provisional and may be subject to revisions. 
In 1985, value added at market priees in credit and insurance on 
the basis of branch data represented 6.7 percent of GDP. The 
countries with the highest contribution were Luxembourg (14.0%) 
and the UK (12.6%). The lowest percentages were in France 
Netherlands and Germany. 
Table 3.2: Value Added in Credit and Insurance in 1983 & 1985 
Country 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
L (Note 1) 
NL 
UK 
Total 
1985 
ECUm 
(Branch) 
5,966 
44,417 
13,929 
29,277 
26,998 
535 
8,537 
70,240 
199,899 
(1) 1982 data 
Source: S.O.E.C. 
% GDP 
5.9 
5.5 
6.1 
4.5 
5.6 
14.0 
5.4 
12.6 
6.7 
1983 
ECUm 
(Branch) 
4,442 
40,925 
8,889 
22,156 
24,051 
535 
8,049 
53,896 
162,943 
% GDP 1983 % GDP 
-- (ECUm) 
(Sector) 
4.9 4,584 5.1 
5.7 41,874 5.7 
5.1 9,131 5.1 
3.9 28,462 4.9 
6.0 25,027 6.3 
14.0 535 14.0 
5.4 8,207 5.5 
11.2 30,004 5.9 
6.2 147,824 5.6 
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3.4 Output/Turnover in Financial Services 
In this analysis a number of turnover measures are related to GDP 
as further indicators of the significance of financial services 
in each member state. 
Table 3. 3: Insurance Premiums, Bank Loans Outstanding 
and Stock Market Capitalisation as % of GDP 
Country 
Insurance 
Premiums 
1984 
B 3.9 
D 6.6 
ES 2.5 
F 4.3 
I 2.2 
L 3.1 
NL 6.1 
UK 8.1 
Bank Loans 
1984 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation (Note 2) 
142 (Note 1) 92 
139 89 
99 69 
93 (Note 1) 85 
96 75 
6,916 11,125 
130 165 
208 149 
Source: S.O.E.C, Sigma, O.E.C.D., F.I.B.V 
(1) 1982 data 
(2) End 1986 data 
Table 3.3 shows that relative to GDP the banking and securities 
markets were by far the largest in Luxembourg and that the 
insurance market relative to GDP was largest in the UK. 
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SECTION 4: ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF THE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES MARKETS 
4.1 This section focuses on regulatory barriers and how they are 
implemented. In particular, attention is given to those barriers 
affecting the establishment of a financial service in a foreign 
state and affecting trade directly. In this section we use 
"foreign" to refer to other European Conununity countries as well 
as to countries outside the EC. 
4.2 Regulatory Barriers to Trade and Establishment in Banking 
In general there are no overt barriers to the establishment of 
foreign banks in the countries surveyed. 
Foreign banks must in general comply with the same procedures as 
domestic banks. This does not imply that successful entry by a 
foreign bank is easy since the costs involved in meeting the 
requirements for establishment of branches and subsidiaries may 
be considerable. There is however control over the acquisition 
of domestic banks by foreign entities in all the countries in the 
study and some details of licensing requirements in each country 
are outlined in the main report. 
In all countries except the UK, branches of banks are required to 
maintain their own minimum endowment capital. Some countries 
also impose solvency ratios. While it has not proved feasible to 
quantify the impact of differences in such ratios a study carried 
out by the Economists Advisory Group reflected a consensus in the 
banking world that lack of harmonis~tion in this area constituted 
a barrier to trade. 
Moreoverr there are often restrictions on the services which may 
be offered by a branch or subsidiary of a foreign bank. 
The overall conclusion drawn in this section is that barriers lie 
not in overt rules or practices but in national practices that 
apply equally to all banks. Clearly differences in national 
practices may make sorne countries more attractive than others for 
foreign banks wishing to establish operations. 
4.3 Regulatory Barriers to Trade and Establishment in Securities 
Exchange controls may be a significant barrier in this market 
sector. Many of the operators in this market are banks and the 
points made earlier in relation to freedom of trade and 
establishment in banking apply equally. 
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The major obstacle to establishing a presence in a foreign 
securities market would appear to be regulations. which prevent 
foreigners being licensed as brokers. However, this may not be a 
significant drawback if securities may be dealt directly between 
banks. Sorne difficulties may be encountered for companies which 
wish to offer only security trading, in markets such as Germany 
and Belgium, where full banking licenses can only be obtained if 
a full range of services is offered. There are sorne signs of an 
easing in this position though. There are also restrictions on 
the establishment of offices to solicit secondary market business 
and on dealing directly with the public to execute such business. 
In addition to exchange controls there are sorne restrictions on 
thè balance sheet holdings of foreign securities. In addition, 
in a small number of countries discriminatory taxes are levied on 
purchases of foreign securities. 
4.4 Regulatory Barriers to Trade and Establishment in Insurance 
The position in insurance is similar to that in banking. In 
general there is freedom to establish but restriction on trade 
without establishment. 
Generally a permanent presence is required in the importing 
country in order to sell insurance. This position may change 
following a recent case brought to the Court of Justice by the 
Commission. Compulsory insurances are exempt from the ruling but 
member states may insist that insurers have a permanent presence. 
Sorne of the eight countries again have discriminatory tax 
measures against foreign insurers. 
4.5 Ezchange Control Restrictions on Trade in Financial Services 
Free movement of capital is allowed in Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, although there are reporting and 
authorising procedures in force for certain transactions. France 
and Italy are in the process of liberalising controls while they 
remain in Spain. Exchange controls have been removed in the UK. 
As we indicated earlier, exchange controls form an important 
barrier to trade in financial services where they continue to be 
applied. 
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SECTION S. QUANTIFICATION OF THE EFFECTS OF REGULATIONS 
5.1 Introduction and Review of Approaches 
The abject of this section is to determine the scope for a 
quantitative assessment of the effects of completing the internal 
market in financial services. In particular, the section provides 
quantitative measures of the effect of regulation, and of the lack of 
Community wide competition. 
In the main report we present a quantification of the impact of 
regulation on the basis of a set of priees for selected financial 
services and products. We believe, however, that such an approach is 
on its own not sufficient and we have therefore obtained additional 
measures of the effects of regulation from other sources. 
In attempting to quantify the effects of regulation we considered a 
wide range of approaches including the following: 
Comparative priees of specifie products/services; 
Value added/output ratios; 
Survey data on net margins; 
Indirect measures of impact of specifie regulations. 
A case study of the impact of deregulation. 
The rationale and the limitations of each of the above approaches 
are discussed below. 
(1) Comparative Priees of Specifie Products/Services 
In reviewing comparative priees as a measure of the effect of 
regulation or market segmentation, there are bath concepttial and 
technical difficulties to be resolved. 
A conceptual difficulty with using priee differences as a measure 
of the effect of regulation is indicated by the fact that there 
are significant priee differences within national markets 
although suppliers in these markets are faced with the same 
regulations. It is, therefore, unlikely that the removal of 
regulatory barriers to trade would result in a single priee. It 
is also important to realise that there are market as well as 
regulatory barriers to trade. An example of a market barrier is 
the information required to gain entry. We formed the opinion 
that priee divergence within countries may well be due to 
information barriers as well as to legislative obstacles. 
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In addition to this conceptual difficulty there are severe 
technical difficulties in measuring priees. Firstly, there is 
the question of comparability of products. For example the priee 
of motor insurance for the same class of insurance etc may differ 
as a reflection of differences in the underlying risk. The issue 
of comparability of priee data is particularly important and the 
difficulties in obtaining strictly comparable data are discussed 
in detail in the main report. A second problem arises due to the 
effect of cross subsidies between financial services products. 
In our analysis, we have selected a range of products/services in 
such a way as to attempt to minimise these factors. There are 
also severe practical difficulties in obtaining priee comparisons 
as relative priees can change rapidly and clearly given 
significant priee variations within countries there is also a 
danger that priee divergences between countries may reflect 
sampling errors. 
(2) Value Added/Output Ratios 
In considering value added to output ratios we have attempted to 
quantify the effect of market segmentation by measuring the 
resources used in producing a unit of output. In many service 
industries the ambiguity of the concept of output, and the 
difficulty of measuring it, has often led statisticians to turn 
to resource inputs themselves in arder to overcome these 
difficulties. It should be appreciated that the measure of 
output used has to be conceptually independent of inputs. 
There are also deficiencies in using value added/output ratios as 
an indication of efficiency and these are discussed in detail in 
the main report. These deficiencies are likely to be 
particularly severe in making comparisons between individual 
financial institutions. Aggregation over all institutions, and 
the use of time series for cross-country comparison will tend to 
reduce limitations in this respect. Notwithstanding the residual 
problems which have been recognised we believe this provides a 
useful aggregate check on the micro data. 
(3) Survey Data on Net Margins 
An alternative approach to exam1n1ng priees is to look at differences 
in the costs or profits obtained by different financial institutions 
in the different countries. In particular, an examination of margins 
in the banking sector and of cost-to-output ratios in such 
sectors as insurance can be of use in evaluating the effect of 
regulations. This represents a micro cross-check on the value 
added to output ratios considered above. 
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(4) Indirect Measures of Impact of Specifie Regulations 
It was recognised at the outset of the study that the impact of 
selected specifie regulations could also provide useful input 
into the quantification of the effect of regulation. This, 
however, would only measure static effects. In addition, it 
would only measure the impact on institutions who decided to "pay 
the cost" of meeting the regulations. Our judgement is that such 
an approach is very unlikely to prove worthwhile. For 
illustrative purposes we have however reported on the results of 
selective research on the impact of specifie regulations in the 
banking and insurance sectors. 
(5) Case Studies of Impact of Deregulation within a National Boundary 
A potential approach to quantifying the effect of regulation is 
offered by individual case studies on the priee impact of 
deregulation within a national boundary. This could be a useful 
additional source of input into the evaluation of the effects of 
removing or reducing regulations in Europe. We have, therefore, 
taken as a case study the example of deregulation of the UK 
securities business. 
The remainder of this section sets out the quantified data for 
comparative priees, value added/output ratios, survey data on net 
margins, indirect measures of the impact of specifie regulations, and 
the case study of impact of deregulation. 
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Quantification of Comparative Priees 
In the following paragraphs we present a quantification of 
comparative priees for a range of financial services products 
in the eight countries. We present details of priees in the 
banking and credit sectors, in insurance, and in the securities 
and brokerage sectors. In particular, we analyse details of 
priees for the following services/products: 
cost of commercial loans; 
cost of consumer credit; 
cost of mortgages; 
cost of credit cards; 
cost of purchasing foreign exchange drafts and travellers 
cheques; 
cost of letters of credit; 
cost of current bank accounts; 
cost of term insurance; 
cost of home and contents insurance; 
cost of motor insurance; 
cost of fire and theft insurance; 
cost of public liability insurance; 
and cost of stock exchange transactions. 
Our selection of products was designed and agreed with the 
Commission to overcome sorne of the difficulties referred to 
earlier in Section 5.1. 
Many of the priees have been obtained directly via a sample of 
financial providers. As we have already noted however, it is 
important to treat comparative priee data with care. Priees of 
financial services change frequently and the data presented 
represents a "snap-shot" at a given point in time. Also of 
critical importance is that for a wide range of financial 
services there is a substantial variation in possible priees on 
offer, and in many cases there is cross-subsidisation between 
different financial services. 
- 278 -
- 14 -
Another important issue relates to how representative the chosen 
products are, of the output of the financial services sector as a 
whole. This is a difficult issue to judge but given the large 
number of different services chosen which caver bath private 
consumer and commercial services in the banking, insurance and 
securities sectors, these services are believed to be broadly 
representative. The services covered do not include advisory 
services. The reason for this is methodological in that it was 
not felt possible to obtain priees for standardised advisory 
services. The sources of the data presented are indicated. 
It should be appreciated that we have attempted to present 
information in a standard manner for the same financial services 
products in different countries. In certain cases regulatory or 
market practices have prevented this and these cases are 
discussed in our main report. We have also attempted to 
standardise the presentation for different types of financial 
services products. 
A key issue in interpreting the priee data is that we have 
attempted to focus on the cast of the service provided by the 
financial institutional and have adjusted the figures to remove 
the influence of interest rate differentiais. The impact of 
interest rate differentiais is considered separately in 
Section 6. In the table overleaf we define the financial 
services and products for which priees were obtained. As many of 
the products represent the margin over wholesale money market 
rates the priees do not represent the cast to the consumer. This 
is consistent with our economie modelling requirements. The data 
would not be suitable as a definitive measure of consumer priees 
in different countries. 
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"Standard" Service 
Banking Services 
Commercial Loans 
Consumer Credit 
Credit Cards 
Mortgage 
Commercial Draft 
Travellers 
Cheques 
Current Cheque 
Account 
Letter of Credit 
Insurance Services 
Term Insurance 
Home Insurance 
Motor Insurance 
Commercial Fire 
and Theft 
Public Liability 
Cover 
Brokerage Services 
Private Equity 
Transactions 
Private Gilts 
Transactions 
Institutional 
Equity 
Transactions 
- 15 -
TABLE 5.1 
Description of Service 
Annual cost to a medium size firm of a commercial 
loan of 250,000 ECUs. Measured as excess over 
inter-bank rates. 
Annual cost of consumer loan of 500 ECUs. Excess 
interest rate over money market rates. 
Annual cost assuming 500 ECU debit. Excess 
interest rate over money market rates. 
Annual cost of home loan of 25,000 ECU. Excess 
interest rate over money market rates. 
Cost to a large commercial client of 
purchasing a commercial draft for 30,000 ECUs. 
Cost for a private consumer of purchasing 
100 ECU's worth of Travellers Cheques. 
Annual cost assuming 200 cheques P.A., 20 standing 
orders, 50 cash withdrawals, 20 credits. 
Cost of letter of credit of 50,000 ECUs for 
three months. 
Average annual cost of term insurance. 
Annual cost of fire and theft caver for bouse 
valued at 70,000 ECUs with 28,000 ECUs contents. 
Annual cost of comprehensive insurance, 1.6 litre 
car, driver 10 years experience, maximum no claims 
bonus. 
Annual caver for premises valued at 387,240 
ECUs with stock and contents at 232,344 ECUs. 
Annual premium for Engineering company with 20 
employees and annual turnover of 1.29 million 
ECUs. Includes employer liability caver. 
Commission costs of cash bargain of 
1,440 ECUs. 
Commission costs of cash bargain of 
14,000 ECUs. 
Commission costs of cash bargain of 288,000 ECUs 
Institutional Gilt 
Transactions Commission costs of cash bargains of 7.2m ECUs. 
... 
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Priees of a number of the financial services examined in the eight 
countries are presented below. Additional details are presented in 
the main report. 
Table 5.2: Comparative "Priees" of Purcbases 
of a Range of Financial Services in the Eight Countries 
Banting Services 
Commercial Loans 
Consumer Credit 
Credit Cards 
Mortgages 
Foreign Exchange 
Drafts 
Travellers Cheques 
Current Accounts 
Letters of Credit 
Insurance Services 
Term Insurance 
House Insurance 
Motor Insurance 
Commercial Fire and 
B 
4,500 
12 
94 
480 
43 
7.3 
0 
575 
380 
118 
494 
D 
5,000 
46 
84 
575 
53 
5.0 
117 
425 
225 
144 
436 
ES 
5,625 
27 
66 
800 
120 
7.0 
2 
750 
294 
135 
758 
ECU 
F 
4,375 
40 
37 
653 
63 
7.5 
10 
438 
285 
195 
413 
I 
5,125 
43 
99 
350 
50 
6.6 
240 
515 
392 
253 
942 
L 
5,000 
14 
46 
499 
54 
5.0 
8 
600 
355 
220 
671 
NL 
6,750 
26 
75 
343 
22 
7.2 
0 
550 
195 
164 
354 
UK 
6,875 
43 
61 
290 
47 
5.0 
112 
510 
150 
266 
316 
Theft 1,296 2,023 1,765 3,587 4,896 1,204 1,412 1,797 
Public Liability 
Co ver 
Securities Services 
Private Equity 
Transactions 
Private Gilts 
Transactions 
Institutional Equity 
Transactions 
968 1,257 1,364 1,852 
14 11 17 9 
65 108 180 69 
1,727 2,302 3,453 1,292 
1,508 934 714 798 
10 11 22 23 
21 72 148 77 
2,014 2,302 1,726 719 
Institutional Gilt 
Transactions 21,583 5,395 8,993 8,844 10,791 3,597 4,640 n/a 
Source: Survey Results 
1) Consumer credit in Italy assumed to be equal to the average of Germany, 
France and UK 
2) The London Gilt market is now on a net of commission basis 
3) Mortgages in Luxembourg assumed to be equal to average in other Countries 
Caution must be exercised in interpreting the above priee comparisons, and 
the analysis in the report concerning cross subsidisation and the problems 
in priee comparability must be noted. It is also important to stress as 
indicated earlier that many of the products represent the margin over 
wholesale money market rates and therefore the "priees" do not represent the 
cost to the consumer. This is consistent with our economie modelling 
requirements but the data would not be suitable as a measure of consumer 
priees. Priees are also exclusive of consumer taxes. 
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Value-Added to Output Ratios 
The value-added to output ratios provided in the main report 
gave sorne indication of the resources used to produce a unit of 
output, since value-added represents the return to labour and 
capital before allowance for depreciation and excluding 
transfers. In the case of banking, the measure of output 
generally used is loans outstanding. This is not entirely 
satisfactory since it does not take account of a number of 
elements affecting the output of banks such as differences in 
risk attaching to loans, the extent of deposit and money 
transmission services, and a number of off-balance sheet 
transactions. The comparisons made using aggregate data across 
countries tend to reduce sorne of these difficulties but 
nevertheless problems remain. Taking insurance as an example 
the use of premiums as a measure of output masks the problem 
that for sorne policies the premium may cover more than one year 
and in others may partly represent a pure investment sum. 
Insurance 
Value-added in the insurance sector does not include interest 
and dividend earnings which, for national accounts purposes, are 
regarded as transfers. The value-added to premiums ratio in 
1983 was highest in the UK at 25.5% and lowest in France at 
6.0%. However, when net interest earnings are taken into 
account the UK percentage falls to 1.1% and that of France 
rises. Belgium's percentage was highest at 32.2% in this case. 
When dividend earnings are also added to the value-added figure 
Germany emerges with the lowest ratio and Belgium remains the 
highest. 
Banking 
In the banking sector the value-added to loans ratio (including 
interest earnings) was lowest in the UK and the Netherlands at 
3.0% and highest in Italy at 6.3% on average over the period 
1978-84. 
5.4 Survey Data on Net Hargins/Costs 
This approach represents a micro cross-check on the value-added 
to output measures considered above. The data relating to 1982 
shows that the gross earnings margin in large banks was highest 
in the UK at 4.72% of assets and lowest in the Netherlands at 
2.9%. 
A sample of the accounts of insurance companies in different 
countries was evaluated to establish the ratio of expenses to 
premiums. Non-life insurance management expenses and 
commissions were the largest percentage of premiums in Belgium 
at 39.6% and lowest in the UK at 21.2%. 
In life insurance the percentage was highest in Spain and lowest 
in the UK though it was possible to identify life business 
separately in the published accounts for only three countries. 
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Indirect Measures of Specifie Regulations 
This section summarises the main findings of studies carried out by 
EAG (1) on 11 the impact of prudential regulations on banking11 and by 
Carter and Morgan (2) on the impact of regulation on insurance. 
Banking 
Banks in different countries may be required to observe a combination 
of minimum absolute capital requirements, gearing ratios, own 
funds/risk assets ratios, fixed asset ratios and large loan ratios. 
The EAG study indicated that it would not be possible to provide 
quantitative comparisons of the effects of these requirements but on 
the basis of the opinions of those interviewed it was felt that in 
the three major banking countries, the UK, France and Germany, French 
banks had a significant advantage over the other two. Banks in the 
UK probably enjoyed a slight competitive advantage over those in 
Germany. 
Insurance 
In life insurance the degree of regulation varied between countries. 
The supervisory authorities generally control the mortality rates to 
be used in premium calculation (apart from the UK) but controls in 
sorne cases cover interest rates, the calculation of expense overheads 
and the distribution of profits. The study carried out in 1986 by 
Carter and Morgan showed that the mortality rates used in the 
calculation of term insurance were in most cases 2-4 times more 
conservative than in the UK. The UK is the only country in which the 
mortality rates used are based on insured lives rather than 
population averages. As an example, pure premiums for a 20 year term 
using UK and Belgian mortality rates and 6 and 4% interest rates were 
calculated. This showed a difference of 227% of which only one 25th 
was accounted for by the interest differentia!. 
From this it can be seen that the measurement of the effect of 
specifie regulations is difficult to quantify and more importantly, 
is likely to under-estimate the costs of "Non-Europe". 
5.6 Case Study E!ample of the Impact of the Deregulation 
The impact of deregulation of the London Stock Exchange has been 
taken as an example of the effects of regulation. The effect may be 
seen by examining commission rates, the number of market makers, 
equity dealing spreads and the depth of markets for different types 
of shares. These are considered in detail in the main report. 
Overall, the case study indicated that while there were small 
increases in commissions for small transactions, for the 
institutional transactions sector, commission rates fell by between 
20 and 36 per cent. It is not certain however if these priee 
reductions will remain given the level of capacity in the market. 
(1) An Evaluation Of The Consequences Of The Existence Of Different 
Prudential Ratios For Competition Between Credit Institutions In The 
European Community, EAG Report 1986, Report Prepared for European 
Commission. 
(2) Carter R.L., Morgan E.V. Freedom To Offer Life Insurance Across 
EEC State Boundaries, EAG Report 1986. 
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SECTION 6: ESTIMA TING THE GAINS FROM EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
6.1 In this section we present our estimates of the gains from 
European economie integration. In particular we consider two 
aspects of this important issue. Firstly, we examine our 
estimates for the microeconomie gains from integration of 
European financial services markets. Secondly we review the 
macroeconomie welfare gains from integration of the European 
capital markets. In this connection we also consider the gains 
from risk pooling and equalisation of interest rates. 
6.2 Our estimates of the costs of "Non-Europe" are based primarily 
on assumptions of the likely movement of priees in an integrated 
financial market. Earlier in this study, data on the existing 
priees of financial products was presented. The data indicated 
a wide range of priees both within and between countries and it 
is clear that while priees for certain financial services were 
lower in some countries, the priees of other services were 
higher than in the other countries examined. Later in this 
section we consider our assumptions for the likely priees of 
financial services in an integrated market. 
6.3 At present in a non-integrated Europe the various barriers to 
the completion of the interna! market in financial services 
result in different priees being charged in the different 
countries. The net effect is as if there were a set of tariffs 
protecting the producers of financial services in the high priee 
countries. 
6.4 From this perspective the evaluation of welfare gains (i.e. net 
economie benefits) from the completion of the interna! market 
involves an exercise similar to the calculation of the gains (in 
terms of consumer surplus, etc.) from a move to free trade, or 
the establishment of a customs union. 
6.5 In our main report we consider in detail a methodology for 
moving from assumptions of the likely range of future priee 
changes to economie welfare gains. In this executive summary we 
focus on our assumptions for future priees and the results of 
our calculations. 
ruture Priee Levels 
6.6 The level by which priees of financial services will change in 
an integrated European market is by definition speculative and 
difficult to verify. Our analysis in this report is intended to 
provide a basis for producing estimates of the potential change 
in the value added element of priees that could be expected. In 
particular our estimates are guided by a number of factors 
including data on existing priee differentiais, value 
added/output ratios, net margins/cost data and the extent of 
specifie regulations. Our future priee scenarios are also 
guided by the case study example of the impact of deregulation 
within national boundaries. 
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The study of priee reductions resulting from deregulation within 
a national market summarised earlier, referred to the UK 
securities market. This case study indicated that while there 
were small increases in commission for small transactions, for 
institutional transactions commission rates fel! by between 
twenty and thirty six per cent. In arriving at an estimate of 
the costs of barriers, we have utilised scenarios where priees 
for the financial services sector are assumed to decline by 
between one and twenty six per cent in different countries. 
Again we stress that these assumed "priee" reductions do not 
represent absolute reductions in consumer priees as in the 
banking sector they are based on priees or costs in excess of 
money market rates. The implied reduction in real consumer 
priees in these cases would be significantly less than the 
assumed priee reductions used in this study. In view of the 
difficulties inherent in estimating likely priee movements we 
have also considered in the main report the sensitivity of our 
findings to alternative priee assumptions. 
It is possible to construct a wide range of possible priee 
scenarios which could emerge in an integrated market. For 
example one could assume that priees would fall to the leve! of 
the lowest existing priee observation. Indeed there would be 
sorne grounds for assuming that the expanded market opportunities 
presented by an integrated European financial services market 
would enable priees to fall below existing lowest priees, as 
economies of scale are exploited. In this study we have taken a 
more conservative estimate of the potential gains which could be 
secured. 
Our priee scenarios are based on assuming a range of priee 
reductions. In order to highlight the reasoning behind our 
future priee scenarios it is useful to consider the existing 
priee differentiais. The points raised regarding relative 
priees in Section 5 of the report should be noted in 
interpreting the analysis in this section. In the main report 
we also analyse sorne of the other factors referred to in 6.6 
above. 
The priee comparisons are based on assuming for each category of 
financial services (e.g. banking, insurance and securities) a 
weighting for each of the financial services priees presented 
within the category, based on estimates of the relative economie 
importance of the particular service. Details of the weighting 
system used are presented in the main report. 
In table 6.1 comparative "priees" for financial services in the 
eight countries are presented. In particular we present 
calculations of differences in priees compared with the average 
of the four lowest priee observations together with figures for 
the implied potential priee falls and assumed potential priee 
falls. The costs of current accounts are excluded in 
recognition of the widespread belief that these are very 
significantly affected by cross subsidisation. The cost of 
credit cards and letters of credit used represent the particular 
examples referred to and defined in Section S. 
; 
- 285 -
6.12 
6.13 
- 21 -
The comparative costs of insurance products and stock exchange 
transactions are also presented in the table overleaf. These 
include beth consumer, company and institutional transactions. 
The particular examples used in the calculations were described 
and defined in Section 5. 
We believe the assumption that priees would fall to the average 
of the four lowest observations as measured by the implied 
weighted priee reductions would still tend to overestimate the 
economie gains from integration. There are a number of reasons 
for this including the fact that the value added figures used in 
our economie mode! include value added incurred in producing 
financial services which are sold outside of the Community and 
also services at present subject to intense international 
competition. 
6.14 In addition, differences in priees undoubtedly reflect in part 
differences in underlying risks which are unlikely to be. 
affected by European integration. 
6.15 In view of these factors and the recognised difficulties in 
obtaining comparative priee figures we have therefore scaled 
down these implied priee reductions to arrive at the assumed 
reductions which have been used in our estimates of economie 
welfare gains. In particular we have used a range of 
assumptions of between 40-60 per cent of the implied priee 
reductions. We have also in our estimates of the economie gains 
from integration constructed a range of assumed potential priee 
falls of five percentage points above and below our estimates. 
As indicated earlier these are based on our analysis of existing 
priee levels and are also guided by our analysis of margins, 
cost structures and the extent of specifie regulations. A more 
detailed analysis of the reasoning behind these priee 
assumptions is included in our main report. 
Resulta of Impact of European Intesration 
6.16 Using the assumptions regarding future priee changes it is 
possible to estimate the impact of European integration. In the 
table on page 24, estimates of the economie impact of European 
integration of financial services as measured by the change in 
consumer surplus are presented for each of the countries 
examined. The estimates indicate that the gain in consumer 
surplus would be in the range 11-33bn ECUs. The lower estimate 
is based on a lower assumed priee reduction while the higher 
estimate is based on a scenario of greater priee reductions. 
~ 
C011111ercial Loans 
Cost of Consumer Credit ( 4) 
Cost of Credit Cards 
Cost of Mortgages ( 5) 
Cost of Letters of Credit 
Cost of Foreign Exchange Drafts 
Cost of Trave11ers Cheques 
Implied Potentia1 Priee Fall (2) 
Assumed Potentia1 Priee FaU (3) 
IDiunDce 
Cost of Contents and House Insurance 
Cost of Motor Insurance 
Cost of Fire and Theft 
Cost of Public Liability 
Cost of Tera Insurance 
Implied Potential Priee Fall 
Assumed Potential Priee FaU 
!AlLI 6.1: DIIIVA'mll Of PIOPOSID lAUS D riiAICJAL PIIDJCr PIICa AS A IIISDLI Of 
aJIPLitliG a IIDIIAL IIAID! 
Belpu. Ital y 
-4.6 6.0 19.2 -7.3 8.6 
-41.0 135.9 38.5 105.1 121.0 
79.0 60.0 25.7 -29.5 88.6 
31.3 57.3 118.8 78.5 -4.3 
21.8 -10.0 58.9 -7.2 9.1 
6.2 30.9 196.3 55.6 23.5 
35.2 -7.4 29.6 38.9 22.2 
16.0 33.0 34.0 25.0 18.0 
8.0 13.0 20.0 13.0 9.0 
-15.9 2.7 -3.7 39.0 80.4 
30.0 14.7 99.5 8.7 147.9 
-8.7 42.5 24.4 152.8 245.0 
13.4 47.3 59.9 117.0 76.8 
77.6 5.1 37.4 33.2 83.2 
31.0 10.0 32.0 24.0 51.0 
16.0 5.0 19.0 12.0 26.0 
letharlauda 
6.0 43.0 
-26.9 30.8 
-12.4 42.9 
36.5 -6.3 
27.1 16.5 
33.3 -45.7 
-7.41 33.3 
16.0 10.0 
8.0 5.0 
56.9 16.9 
76.6 -6.8 
-15.2 -0.5 
9.5 -16.3 
65.9 -8.9 
37.0 1.0 
19.0 0.5 
45.7 
121.5 
16.2 
-20.7 
8.1 
16.1 
-7.4 
18.0 
9.0 
89.7 
-16.8 
26.6 
-6.5 
-29.9 
4.0 
2.0 
N 
00 
o-
IV 
IV 
Securltiu 
Cost of Private Kquities 
Cost of Private Gilts 
Cost of Institutional Kquities 
Cost of Institutional Gilts (6) 
Implied Potential Priee Fa11 
Assumed Potential Priee Fall 
Implied Potential Priee Fall 
Assumed Potential Priee Reduction 
Assumed Range of Priee Reductions (7) 
Belgium 
35.9 
14.4 
26.4 
284.1 
53.0 
26.0 
23.0 
11.0 
6 - 16 
tAIU 6.1 WltDUID 
Germany Spain France 
6.8 65.0 -12.6 
90.1 216.9 21.5 
68.5 152.7 -5.4 
-4.0 60.0 57.4 
11.0 44.0 23.0 
6.0 26.0 12.0 
PIICI lALI.S lOI 'IO!AL liiAICIAL :unD::IIS SIIC10I 
25.0 
10.0 
5 - 15 
34.0 
21.0 
16 - 26 
24.0 
12.0 
7 - 17 
Caution 111.1st be exercised in interpreting the above data. See footnote to Table 5.1. 
Ital y 
-2.9 
-63.0 
47.4 
92.0 
33.0 
17.0 
29.0 
14.0 
9 - 19 
Luxembourg 
6.8 
26.8 
68.5 
-36.0 
9.0 
5.0 
17.0 
8.0 
3 - 13 
Netherlands 
113.6 
160.6 
26.3 
-17.4 
... 
18.0 
9.0 
9.0 
4.0 
1 - 9 
United Kingdom 
123.3 
35.6 
-47.4 
-47.4 
12.0 
6.0 
13.0 
7.0 
2 - 12 
(1) While the data is referred to as 11priees11 it should be noted that the data in the banking sector refers to the cost over money market rates and therefore do not represent the 
cost to consuaaers. Data is also exclusive of const~Er taxes. 
(2) Implied priee faU is calculated as weighted average of priee cœparisons cœpared with average of the four lowest observations. The weighting system used was designed to attempt 
to reflect the importance of the different services in value added. Details are presented in the main report. Also of significance is the fact that where priees are below the 
average of the four lowest it is assUIIed that no increase in priees would result frœ integration. 
(3) Assumed priee fall is calculated as a percentage of implied priee faU (see main report for details) 
(4) Cost of Consumer Credit in Italy assumed to be equal to the average of Germany, France and the UK. 
(5) Cost of mortgages in Luxembourg assumed to be equal to the average in the other countries. 
(6) Cost of institutional gilts in the UK assUIIed to have the same priee difference as institutional equities. 
(7) Asswaed range is derived as five percentage points above and below the assumed priee reduction. 
N 
00 
...... 
"-1 
w 
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6.17 In the event of the consumer surplus gains being used as a 
measure of economie welfare gains we believe it would be prudent 
to use the mid-point in the range as the upper estimate of 
economie welfare gains. The results represent a snapshot of the 
position before and after integration. The figures also assume 
a competitive market structure after integration and indicate 
the net gains in consumer surplus country-by-country but do not 
make any assumptions about the redistributive effects between 
producers in different countries. Thus the results indicate the 
benefits to the consumers in each country and the overall gain 
in consumer surplus to the Community, after all of the benefits 
of integration have been achieved. 
Table 6.2 
Estimated Gain in Consumer Surplus Resulting from Integration of 
European Credit and Insurance Markets 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
LU 
N 
UK 
ECUsM 
Range 
366 - 1,081 
2,264 - 7,074 
2,376 - 4,040 
2,105 - 5,330 
2,516 - 5,542 
16 - 73 
86 796 
1,415 - 8,837 
11' 144 - 32,710 
Mid Point* 
Estima te 
685 
4,619 
3,189 
3,683 
3,996 
44 
347 
5,051 
21,614 
* Mid point refers to mid point in assumptions regarding priee 
range and not the mid point in estimated gain in consumer 
surplus. 
6.18 The extent to which the above estimates represent a gain in 
economie welfare depends on the assumptions made regarding the 
extent to which the priee reductions used result in a loss in 
producer surplus. The particular framework which we have adopted 
would indicate that it would be necessary to subtract from this 
gain in consumer surplus sorne estimates of the likely decline in 
producer surplus. In so doing we recognise that it could be 
argued that this results in an underestimation of the gains from 
European economie integration but consider that a conservative 
approach is more likely to represent the real situation as 
barriers are removed. In an appendix to our main report we 
present a methodology for estimating economie welfare gains. 
Macroeconomie Implications 
6.19 In addition to estimating the microeconomie impact of integration 
of the European financial services sector it is also necessary to 
consider the macroeconomie welfare gains from integration of 
European Capital markets. In particular it is important to 
consider the gains from risk pooling, and equalisation of 
interest rates. These issues are summarised in subsequent 
paragraphs. 
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Conclusions Regarding Rist Pooling by Capital Markets 
6.20 Our analysis of risk pooling indicates that the European capital 
markets are not integrated in the sense that rates of return do 
not fully reflect all diversification possibilities. 
Furthermore, investors who are restricted to domestic assets can 
not achieve as good a trade-off between risk and return as if 
there were freedom to choose from foreign assets. 
6.21 In terms of the importance of greater portfolio diversification 
possibilities, sorne estimates can be obtained by computing the 
expected rate of return on an internationally diversified 
portfolio with the same risk as the actual risk of the market 
portfolio in the particular country. The difference between this 
and the actual market return represents the annual gain in rate 
of return which could result from integration. For example, 
using data from previous research (Levy & Sarnat) an 
appropriately levered international portfolio could generate mean 
returns almost three-quarters as high as the mean return on the 
EEC-6 market portfolio, for the same risk. In fact research 
indicates a mean levered return, for the same risk, over 11% per 
annum higher. More recent US research, referring to the US 
rather than EEC-6, also suggests very substantial gains from 
international diversification. 
Equalisation of Rist P'ree Rates 
6.22 At present the existence of exchange controls prevent the free 
flow of capital from moving to the countries with the highest 
rates of return. Even if there were no differences between the 
efficiency of the financial services industries in the various 
Member States, the removal of exchange controls could be expected 
to have beneficia! effects through the convergence of real 
interest rates. 
6.23 Given information on the marginal efficiency of capital and the 
real interest rates prevailing in the different countries, it is 
possible to quantify the gains from a move to common interest 
rates. A caveat should be recognised in respect of the 
assumption that the removal of exchange controls would 
necessarily equalise the real rates of interest across Europe. 
Until there is a much tighter exchange rate mechanism in the EMS, 
and one covering all of the countries, convergence of real 
interest rates will remain imperfect. In order to consider the 
potential benefits it is nevertheless useful to consider the 
economie impact of an equalisation of interest rates, resulting 
from the integration of European capital markets. 
6.24 The size of the welfare gains to be achieved from equalisation of 
real interest rates depends both on the size of the differences 
and on the responsiveness of the demand for capital to interest 
rate changes in different countries. 
1. Levy, Sarnat "International Diversification of Investment 
Portfolios" American Economie Review 1970. 
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6.25 The table below shows estimates, for real interest rates, of the 
responsiveness of the demand for capital ta a one percentage 
point decline in the real cast of capital and deviations from the 
equilibrium real interest rate. The equilibrium rates are 
derived on the basis of an assumption that interest rates would 
tend over time ta equalise. This analysis is based largely on 
O.E.C.D. (1) research and is described in detail in the main 
report. It is important ta stress that real interest rate 
~~ .• !·•·~reductions will also affect consumer's income and welfare. 
Table 6.3 
Welfare Gains from the Equalisation of Real Interest Rates 
Real Interest Rates Changes Deviations From Deviations 
Rates 1986 in Demand EquilibrillDI From Long 
Short Long for Short Term ~erm 
Term Term Capital Interest Interest 
* ECU BN Rate Rate 
Percentage Points 
1 2 3 4 5 
B 9.4 6.9 16 1.3 0.8 
D 7.6 6.4 135 -0.4 0.3 
ES 5.7 3.6 33 -2.3 -2.5 
F 8.6 6.3 80 0.6 0.2 
I 8.8 6.2 104 0.7 0.8 
L 9.4 6.9 0.6 1.3 0.8 
NL 8.2 7.4 28 0.2 1.3 
UK 7.9 5.9 96 -0.1 -0.2 
* 
As a result of a 1 percentage point decline in interest rates. 
Sources: Real Interest Rates - Central Banks 
6.26 The potential welfare gains from equalisation of interest rates 
can be calculated using the deviations of real interest rates 
from equilibrium (columns 4 + 5 above), the estimates of the 
change in the demand for capital shawn (column 3) and using the 
formula outlined in our main report for the approximation of the 
loss of non-integration. In view of the primary focus of this 
study on the microeconomie gains and the nature of the 
methodology described above we have not presented the results of 
the macroeconomie gains of interest rate equalisation in this 
report. The results using this methodology, however, indicate a 
rouch smaller welfare gain compared with our estimates of 
microeconomie benefits. 
(1) See "Internationalisation of Financial Markets: Some 
Implications for Macroeconomie Policy and for the Allocation of 
Capital". Furao, M. Hanozaki, M; OECD Working Paper, November 
1986. 
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Conclusion 
6.27 Our research indicates that there are significant potential gains 
to be secured in terms of increases in consumer surplus and 
economie welfare, resulting from integration of the European 
financial services markets. 
As we have indicated though, extreme caution must be exercised in 
interpreting any quantification of the potential gains as the 
results will of necessity be speculative. Viewed in this context 
our estimates indicate that the gain in consumer surplus would be 
of the order of 11-33bn ECUs. If the consumer surplus 
calculations are used as a measure of the net economie welfare 
gains we believe it would be prudent to use the mid-point in the 
priee range namely, 22bn, as the upper estimate of the potential 
welfare gains. These gains represent the potential microeconomie 
benefits of integration of the main European Community financial 
services markets. 
6.28 In addition to the above gains, it is also likely there will be 
macroeconomie welfare gains from integration of the European 
capital markets. The gains from risk pooling by capital markets 
could generate mean returns almost three-quarters as high as the 
return on existing market portfolios. Also of importance is the 
potential gains from equalisation of interest rates. 
6.29 The gains from integration will result from the dynamic effect of 
economie integration and not simply as a result of removing the 
costs of meeting sorne of the existing regulations. In all 
countries consumers will benefit from European integration but 
sorne producers will come under pressure to survive in the single 
market. It is important to stress however that these benefits 
would only occur in a competitive market. 
6.30 In this study the importance of financial services in terms of 
output and employment was indicated. The critical macroeconomie 
importance of capital markets was also highlighted. From an 
economie standpoint, in view of the potential benefits of 
European integration of both financial and capital markets it is 
important that steps are taken to rapidly complete the interna! 
market in financial services within the framework of free 
competition between and within member states. 
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Executive Sumrnary 
The Benefits of Completing the Interna! Market for 
Telecommunication Servises in the Community 
1. Industry Background 
1.1 Goals of European Integration in Telecommunication 
Services 
One of the objectives of the European Comrnunity in completing 
the internal market by 1992 is to elirninate all current 
barriers to trade. This does not only apply to goods, but 
also to services (including telecommunication services), an 
issue specifically addressed in the EEC's Green Paper on the 
development of the Common Market for telecommunication 
services and equipment (COM (87) 290 Final). The purpose of 
the Green Paper is to initiate a wide-ranging discussion on 
those issues and to help in the establishment of a coherent 
Cornmunity-wide framework in the ongoing changes to the 
present system of telecommunications regulations. 
1.2 The Product 
Telephone services are based on telephone networks, which 
link various parties through fixed (or mobile) networks 
electronically with each other, so that interactive exchange 
of information (voice, message, data, image) is possible. 
They are generally provided by national telecommunication 
administrations, who exercise the monopoly for providing 
these services. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the size of 
these services in different Community countries. Most of this 
revenue is from voice (85 - 95 percent). The rest is 
accounted for by telex and data services, 1 as well as TV 
1 Telex revenue ranges from 5 to 6 percent of revenue in 
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal, to 3 to 4 
percent for Germany and the U.K. Revenues from Data 
services are probably equivalent to this sum. See ITU 
Yearbook 1987. 
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programme transmission. With the introduction of ISDN, data 
and image transmission should increase significantly. 
Important applications can also be expected with respect to 
value added network services (VANS), such as message storage, 
processing and distribution; code and protocol conversion 
between different data processing systems; information 
retrieval services, for example from videotex data bases; 
information processing services, for example through 
electronic data interchange; safety and alarm services etc. 
Table 1.1: Income from Telecoms Service Provision 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
German y 
Greece 
Italy 
(1985) 
Ire land 
Luxemburg 
Netherla~?s 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom2 ) 
Total 
Operating Income 
in mill. ECU 
1,405.45 
1,075.90 
13,428.15 
15,123.62 
720.58 
8,351.00 
623.54 
82.07 
2,538.72 
678.90 
3,154.35 
14,244.99 
61,714.31 
=========================================================== 
1) CCT and CLT 2) BT only 
Source: Telefonica/ITU 
Exchange rates as of 1985 
1.3 Trade in Telecommunication Services 
The international telecommunications network infrastructure 
has traditionally been produced jointly by the national Tele-
communications Administrations so that trade in telecommu-
nication services does not really take place. For connecting 
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international traffic, neigboring carriers will forward 
(transit) traffic onward to its final destination and vice 
versa and are therefore reimbursed accordingly. For traffic 
that may transit a number of countries or go via alternative 
routes, sorne elements of competition are introduced since the 
possibility to play off one transit country against another 
can lead to rate reductions. The access to competing 
satellite networks creates a similar incentive. 
Trade does, of course,take place on services transmitted via 
the telephone network or produced in direct conjunction with 
it, as in the case of VAN!services. The attractiveness of 
telephone tariffs may, for example determine where the "host 
computers" for data banks are located. With the increasing 
internationalization of the economies, the growing importance 
of tourism and international financial services, demand for 
international telecommunication services is increasing so 
that the telecommunication administrations see this as an 
important source of revenue. Increasingly, domestic carriers 
will set up international companies in another carrier's 
territory, not only to assist its customers, but also to 
explore the potential for economie activites in that 
2 
country. 
1.4 Barriers to Integration 
In the 1985 White Paper by the Commission (COM (85) 310) the 
costs of physical and technical frontiers are identified as 
basic obstacles to completing the internal market by 1992. 
The main advantage of reducing these frontier costs would be 
a greater integration of markets, in other words making them 
more competitive, while at the same time allowing increasing 
specialization and utilization of economies of scale. In 
telecommunication services provision economies of scale are 
2 Cable and Wireless, the parent company of the British 
carrier Mercury has bought a network in the U.S.; 
Ameritech, one of the seven large American regional 
carriers has bought the VAN carrier AirCall in the U.K. 
etc. 
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already realized at a national level since,except for the 
U.K., we have only one operator and one physical network (for 
the moment ignoring the sizeable networks of public utilities 
and the military). 3 Increased integration could therefore 
bring about only limited scale effects, unless one envisaged 
rather unrealistically the merger of a number of national and 
geographie telephone networks. But a harmonization of the 
different regulatory procedures may be possible and has 
important economie effects, as European governrnents are 
attempting to adjust their national regulatory structure to 
the effects of the''telematics revolution." 
Each of these regulatory parameters affects a number of markets 
either on the input side (affecting the national base of telecoms 
equipment manufacturers) or on the output side (affecting the 
performance of individual sectors or the services available 
to indivjdual customers). If the market for inputs is 
harmonized in such a way that a uniform European-wide market 
with competitive procurement practices results, sizeable 
savings as a consequence of product and production 
rationalization are possible 4 . The same applies to the market 
for customer premises equipment, where barriers to entry and 
restrictive certification practices sofar inhibit the full 
Community-wide market integration and the benefits that can 
be derived fro~ such a policy. 
On the output side, performance can also be increased through 
more cost effective service provision, fewer restrictions on 
q 
network utilization and the availability of additional, 
Community-wide standardized services. These effects may be 
due to (a) lower cost per given output and (b) better network 
utilization through more rational pricing. Concerning the 
first effect, our study shows that differences in operating 
practice may significantly affect productivity and the cost 
3 There are several network operators in Italy, Denmark and 
Portugal, but their responsibilities are strictly 
delineated according to geographie or functional lines. 
4 See the INSEAD report on the benefits of completing the 
internai market for telecommunications equipment in the 
Community. 
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at ~rhich services are provided. Sorne administrations have had 
to pursue a restrictive investrnent policy so that there 
exists excess dernand: manning levels had to be kept high in 
spite of large productivity advances in network services, 
because rationalization and the associated shedding of laber 
was politically not feasible. 
Concerning the second effect, we found that most 
administrations have also kept long distance tariffs 
artificially high in order to cross-subsidize ether services, 
and postal and parcel services. Such decisions not only raise 
tariff levels, but also influence tariff structures (i.e. the 
ratio of connection to call charges, the cost relation 
between local and long-distance calls, between switched and 
fixed network services, etc), thereby further distorting 
input decisions for telecom users. As a consequence, re-
strictions must be placed on the utilization of the network 
(especially for the use of leased lines), so that service 
provision on the basis of the available network infrastruc-
ture, for exarnple value added services, may be harnpered. 
Both effects raise production costs, thereby rnaking "the 
nervous system" of modern economie societies more costly and 
less effective. Furtherrnore, by rnaking especially long 
distance communication unnecessarily expensive, the incentive 
to broaden the arena of competition and to integrate 
neighbouring areas into one market is harnpered, reducing the 
potential effects of integration. 
1.5 Recornrnendations of the Green Paper 
The recommendations of the Commission are set out in points 
A-J of the Green Paper along with a set of lines of action 
and an acceleration of existing action lines such as the 
Cornrnunity prograrns RACE and ESPRIT. The airns of the Green 
Paper to bring about a more coherent frarnework in the 
ongoing regulatory change, to encourage the developrnent of 
new services in a more competitive frarnework and to establish 
(and utilize politically, for exarnple in international trade 
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negotiations) a wider European Market for telecommunication 
services. The acceleration of existing action lines is 
intended to speed up and to support this process. 
2. Scenarios to Analyze the Likely Effects of a Unified 
European Telecommunications Service Market 
2.1 A Status Quo Scenario 
In order to have a reference point against which to analyze 
the effects of the completion of the internal market, a 
status quo scenario as an "antimonde" is necessary. The basis 
of this is to assume that the recommendations of the Green 
Paper had not been made, but other developments would still 
take place. 
In our study we have noted the high degree of service inte-
gration already achieved between the national telecommunica-
tion operators, for example through the Conference of Euro-
pean Post and Telecommunication Administrations (CEPT) and 
its Coordination Committee on Harmonization (CCH), and the 
activities of the ITU and its International Telephone and 
Telegraph Consultive Committee (CCITT). Standards for new 
services and interconnection continue to be harmonized as, 
for example, in the case of videotex, teletex and facsimile 
services. Joint interfaces developed in that context allow 
the creation of private telecommunication services on the 
basis of public networks (via leased lines). On the inter-
national side, especially over longer distances, sorne com-
petitive effects are already being felt so that the high 
priee cost margins on international calls are likely to be 
reduced further. On the input side production continues to be 
rationalized due to the current industrial restructuring. The 
trend of regulatory reform in the individual countries will 
also continue though in a much less harmonized manner than 
that evisaged by an acceptance of the recommendations of the 
EEC's Green Paper. 
- 303 -
2.2 
-7-
A Scenario in Accordance with 
the Community's Green Paper 
the Recommendations of 
When comparing the status quo scenario with the recommen-
dations of the Green Paper we notice that the EEC goes 
further in its recommendations concerning: 
the provision of competitive "non-reserved" services by 
private firms (Proposition C), 
open network provision on the basis of non-
discriminatory terms (Proposition E), and 
a more liberalized market for CPE (including receive-
only satellite earth stations (ROES) in combination with 
more Co~~unity-wide standard setting) (Proposition F). 
Important are also the insistence on stronger anti-trust 
rules (Propositions H and I) and the recommended separation 
of regulation from operation (Proposition G) which should 
give important support to those competitive activities that 
are permitted to take place in competition with the public 
telecommunication operator (PTO). 
2.3 A Scenario of Full Service Competition 
A scenario of network competition in long-distance services 
seems highly unlikely in the Community. However, it must be 
noted that this is already possible in the very large U.K. 
market moving in this direction. This together with increased 
international competition might be enough to suggest a third 
scenario of full network competition. Even if politically 
unrealistic, it also represents a useful reference point 
against which to compare the scenario based on the current 
Green Paper. 
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3. Estimating the Costs of Non-Europe 
3.1 Identifying the Effects of the different Policies 
We are mainly concerned about the economie effects of 
alternative scenarios, and therefore attempt first to analyze 
those effects which directly reduce telecommunication costs, 
to be followed by an investigation of the effects on changes 
in service offerings and their indirect effects on the 
economy as a consequence of more rational and less 
restrictive tariff policies. 
There are several (direct) cost reducing effects that might 
be iàentified as a result of completing the internal market. 
The first effect refers to the benefits of joint, open pro-
curement. They have been identified in two separate exper-
tises for the Commission. 5 Depending on the divergence of 
current domestic market priees from competitive market 
priees, tariff levels could be reduced between 2 to 8 percent 
as a result of more competitive purchasing. 
The second direct effect is related to differences in opera-
tional efficiency. We have attempted to estimate these ef-
fects by comparing productivity between different telecommu-
nication administrations and with an analysis of total factor 
productivity for different administrations over time. 
The third direct effect relates to the consequences of a more 
rational tariff policy, when the recommendations of the Green 
Paper to move tariffs closer to cost take place. These 
effects will be larger with the introduction of network 
competition, as the current political opposition to tariff 
rebalancing is overtaken by more direct economie pressure. 
The fourth direct effect relates to CPE equipment, as a 
consequence of a more liberal certification policy in a 
larger market. The ether effects are more indirect in nature, but 
5 See the studies by WS/ATKINS and INSEAD. 
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may be equally important, since they concern the range of 
service offerings. This is not only the case with respect to 
CPE, where a large product variety is expected, but 
especially with respect to VANS and services offered in 
competition to "reserved" monopoly services. Both aspects are 
directly related to a refinement of the regulatory structure, 
i.e. a "narrowing" of the remaining monopoly area and a more 
effective interfaces between the regulated "reserved" and the 
"non-reserved" competitive area. 
3.2 Productivity Comparisons 
The ain of a productivity comparison is to see whether 
one telecommunication ad~inistration, say the Spanish one, 
could produce the same output in the U.K. as BT actually does 
but using fewer resources. Such a comparison relates 
bundles of national outputs to their corresponding national 
input indices or alternatively compares pairs of output with 
input ratios. Scale effects must also be considered. If they 
are important, an administration with a small territory may 
be more efficient, but operate at a lower scale level. 
Differences in X-inefficiency also play a role. 6 
The effects of externally imposed constraints, for example 
concerning procurement or employment rules, must also be 
taken into account. They may prevent an organization from 
achieving the same degree of operational efficiency as an 
., 
organization which does not operate under such constraints. 
Productivity comparisons are difficult to carry out because 
inputs, outputs and production structures differ 
across ad~inistrations even for such a homogeneous product as 
telecommunication services. Simple (partial) measures of 
productivity such as mainlines or revenue per employee (Tab. 
3.1) are onlv a first step, since they ignore differences in 
the degree of vertical integration. A PTO may install and 
6 X-inefficiency refers to those unexploited efficiency 
gains which an organization could make by moving to its 
production possibility frontier. 
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maintain telephones with its own staff or subcontract this 
service to private companies; it may or may not operate 
CATV networks; it may produce value added services together 
with its othe~ activities or have a separate subsidiary for 
this purpose (Fig. 3.1). 
To account for these differences, the most important input 
and output variables must be combined into a total factor 
productivity index based on weighted input and output 
variables. 7 They allow a series of binary comparisons between 
countries. 
Table 3.1: Main line per Full-time Telecommunication Staff 
1984 
Country Main Lines Staff Main Lines 
Staff 
Be1gium 2951.327 28.394 103 
German y 14602.734 207.693 118 
Denmark 2465.993 17.395 141 
United King dom 20192.894 241.817 85 
France 22086.000 167.130 132 
Netherlands 5800.000 27.760 208 
Italy 16520.763 108.782 151 
Norway 1618.200 17.302 93 
Spain 8881.727 71.199 124 
Source: ITU 
7 The comparisons are based on weighted standardized input 
and output variables. Outputs are standardized in terms of 
local and long distance calls which means that all ether 
outputs have to be converted to this measure; inputs are 
standardized for an average worker, material and capital 
input are related as far as possible to a physical 
measure (either relative priees or costs are used as weights.) 
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F1gure 3.1: aange of tlort DDdert.ùen by P!'Os 
xx a only by adrr.inistrat1on: X K partly by adm1nistration; 
Installat.1on Ma1ntenance Exchange External Plant 
Country Manu:ac-:u~e 
Busi- 'es1- Bus!- ResJ- tola.;.n- Cons truc- Ma1n- Cons truc-
ness denee ness de ne~ tenance ti on te nance è.lor, 
Belgiwr x x x x xx x 
Denmark x x • x xx x xx x 
France x xx x x xx xx x x 
F~ Cermany x x x x xx x xx x 
Ital y (SJP) xx xx xx xx xx 
Netherlands x x JI x x JI 
Norway x xx JI xx xx JI xx 
Spain xx xx xx xx xx x x x 
UIC (British 
Telecom) x x x x xx x xx x 
Source: BT and Telefonica 
Table 3.2 shows the results of this more complex exercise. As 
a standard of comparison we have used British Telecom, set-
ting its productivity level at 100. Norway was also included 
because of data considerations. This more comprehensive 
analysis changes the previous ranking obtained with a partial 
productivity measure in Table 3.1 dramatically. At the same 
time, even when accounting for most inputs and outputs, 
significant productivity differences remain. They show that 
Norway and 
appear 
to be less 
Denmark, which have rouch smaller networks than BT 
more productive8 . Telefonica and SIP now seem 
efficient than BT and the Bundespost. 
The results vary with the output measure used. The 
Bundespost performs better if short-ha~l calls are used as 
output weights but worse when using long distance calls. The 
ambiguity arises because the pricing structure of output 
8 Denrnark actually has four different telephone companies. 
x 
x 
P.&D 
x 
x 
x 
xx 
x 
- 308 -
-12-
diffe~s significantly between the two countries. BT, in addi-
tion, has a larger number of international calls while SIP 
only supplies domestic calls. 
Table 3.2: International Comparison of Telecommunications 
Total Factor Productivity 
Output UK German y Denmark Spain Ital y Norway 
measure (1986) (1985) (1985) (1986) (1986) (1986) 
With constant returns to sc ale 
a) short lOO 125.6 137 90 97 189 haul 
b) long 100 97.6 144 82 58 122 haul 
c) number 
of 100 91.2 171 
calls 
With increasing returns to sc ale 
a) short 100 132 240 131 121 324 haul 
b) long 100 105 251 120 79 218 haul 
c) number 
of 100 98 256 
calls 
1) SIP only; 
2) Norway included because of data availability. 
These measurements fail to consider the effect of economies 
2 
of scale, i.e. productivity differences due to network size. Assum-
ing increasing returns to scale (assuming cost elasticities 
of0.8, i.e. proportional increase in inputs by a factor of 
0.8 doubles output) thé productivity advantage is even larger 
for the smaller networks of Spain and Norway, but also helps 
to bring Spain and Italy in line with BT. 9 
9 Obviously, further refinement on these measures are 
necessary, especially to account for differences in 
standard or service, waiting time for connections, 
national topography or social obligations. All the data 
and measurement concepts employed in computing Table 3.2 
show room for improvement and therefore these results are 
obviously provisiona. 
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These calculations so far suggest significant productivity 
differences between the PTOs, perhaps as a consequence of 
differences in production technology and the degree of x-
inefficiency, as well as the result of important outside 
constraints on the PTOs that prevent a movement to the least 
cost frontier. 
The next question was whether ~roductivity differences exhibit 
the same pattern over time.We measured total factor 
productivity growth for those countries, where data w~re 
available (U.K., West Germany) and collected and interpreted 
available studies for other countries (U.S.A., Canada, 
France, Italy). The results(Table 3.~ show not only large 
differences in (average) productivity growth, but also very 
sharp yenr-to-year fluctuations. The cause of these 
variations is due to different rates of movement of input and 
Table 3.3: Rates of Growth of TFP for Selected Countries 
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output indices within and among the countries. The inter-
esting point is that the German growth in total factor 
productivity (TFP) almost parallels the evolution in the U.K. 
from 1974 up to 1980. France seems to differ significantly 
from the other countries, with substantially higher pro-
ductivity growth, at least since 1980. 10 
What do these measurements tell us about international 
productivity differences? They suggest that at least compared 
to the U.K., the U.S. and Canadian environment seems to have 
supported a higher productivity growth rate. But network size 
and speed of expansion also play arole. To analyze these two 
factors we note that productivity growth can be divided into 
two components: 
shifts of the production function as a consequence of 
superior production techniques (technical or organiza-
tional change), and 
better use of inputs with increasing scale, which has a 
more than proportionate effect upon output growth (econ-
omies of scale) (see Fig. 3.2). 
Thus, if Q. is the rate of growth of telecom output, A. the 
rate of technical progress, X. the rate of growth of inputs 
and E the scale elasticity, the following relationship holds 
Q. =A. +EX .. Keeping this relationship in mind, we have 
analyzeà the relation between total growth rates of the 
telecommunication network in the different countries and 
productivity growth (Table 3.4). Productivity growth in the 
German network seems to have been faster than in the British 
system (2.6 percent p.a. compared to 1.65 to 2.1 percent, 
depending on whether the last observation is included). But 
the German output also grew faster than the British over much of 
10 But the French method of computing total factor 
productivity growth included an extra contribution to net 
operating capital. Once this measure was included in the 
analysis for West Germany, the average growth rate in TFP 
between 1971 and 1985 rises from 2.6 percent to 3.6 
percent and is then in line with the French growth rate 
during the same period. 
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the same period (13o19 percent poao for 1970'to 1985 compared 
to 8o74 percent poao for 1964 to 1980), suggesting that the 
Bundespost also benefitted more from scale effectso 
Table 3o4: International Telecom 'l'FP Growth Comparisons 
Input Telecom TFP 
%growth %output growth 
poao growth poao 
(x 0 ) ( Q 0) (Qo-Xo) 
United 6o64 8o75 2oll 
Kingdom (lo65) 
(1964-80) 
German y 10.59 l3ol9 2o6 
(1970-85) 
Canada 5o3 8o74 3o44 
(1973-81) 
Figure 3o2: Changes in Telecom Costs as a Function of Scale 
and Te::hnical Change 
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Table. 3.5: Relation between Scale and Technology Shift 
Scale elasticity: 
1.45 
1.30 
1.124 
Production function 
shift factor: 
A,~ A.UK 
-2.16 -.87 
.58 .12 
1.287 1.287 
The shift in the production function implied by different 
scale elasticities may be computed given historical values of 
both Q. and X .. Table 3.5 shows that the scale elasticity at 
which Gerrnany and British technical progress would have been 
equal is 1.124, implying at the sarne time an identical yearly 
"technology shift" of 1.287 percent. This shifts the 
production function 50 percent faster than the historical 
Canadian rate of .83 percent p.a •• It is unlikely that German 
and British technical progress was so much higher than 
Canadian. Instead, and keeping in mind the higher scale 
elasticity estimates for the US and Canada seems to suggest 
that the true scale elasticities are higher than 1.124, so 
that it is necessary to reduce the estimated German and 
British coefficient of technical progress. Because if Germany 
and Britain had scale elasticities similar to those estimated 
for the United States and Canada, i.e. 1.3 and 1.45, and also 
had the historical Canadian rate of technical progress (.83 
percent p.a.), productivity growth would have had to be 
roughly 25-50 percent higher than it actually was. This too 
suggests that the outside constraints put on the British and 
German system may have been more significant than in the 
situation of Bell Canada. 
The importance of creating conditions under which the full 
effects of technical progress can be implemented in a 
telephone network should not be underestimated. This can be 
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illustrated by assuming a 1 percent higher productivity 
growth rate between 1988 and 2000. W ith a 12.75 percent 
higher productivity rate in 2000, 11.3 percent less inputs 
would be needed to produce the same output, as illustrated in 
Fig. 3.2, Taking the priee elasticity of telephone demand 
also into account enhances this effect. Calculations in the 
study show that with a priee elasticity of -.6 and a unit 
cost elasticity of -.2 the ultimate effect on telecom output 
(an increase f~m· o1988 to o2000 in Fig. 3.2) is 7.7 percent. 
Higher scale and priee elasticities raise this number, lower 
ones reduce it. Keeping the overall service revenue of 6lb 
ECU of 1985 in rnind suggests that the resource savings due to 
higher productivity rates are substantial, while the extra 
traffic generating effects would also result in resource 
savings (due to economies of network fill) and in extra 
service output. 
3.3 Influence of the Tariff Structure 
The overall role of telecommunication tariffs is 
to provide rneans for obtaining efficient use of existing 
capacity, for example through peak-load pricing, 
to give signals for new investment and 
to yield revenue on past investment. 
Greater network efficiency is not only achieved through lower 
cost per given output, but also through better u tilization 
as a consequence of a more rational pricing structure, since 
current telecommunication tariffs diverge significantly from 
costs. As a consequence the priee signals to the users of the 
telecommunications network are distorted, causing the users 
to rnake allocatively inefficient decisions. 11 For example, to 
11 Over longer distances, he may make less use of telecom-
munication services than the true economie costs would 
suggest. This leads not only to an underutilization of the 
productive resource telecommunication, but also to a 
reduction of the potential geographie market size. These 
indirect effects - a lessening of the potential compe-
tition - may be an important side effect that has so far 
been overlooked in this discussion. 
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these allocative costs for the telephone user, and the 
dynamic cost of insufficient market expansion, one has to add 
the dynamic costs to potential service producers whose entry 
is prohibited, because of the danger of cream-skimming 
through arbitrage. 12 While arbitrage may hurt an 
administration financially, its prohibition also prevents the 
innovative offerings of certain services, or the spreading of 
others, because "shared use and resale" of such services, 
which could lead to arbitrage, is not permitted. Those 
enterprises that have developed certain telecom applications 
in-house or between their subsidiaries (or cooperating 
partners, for example in the case of airlines, banks, etc.) 
are allowed to sell these services to third parties only 
under certain restrictions and sometimes not at all. That 
implies not only a significant barrier to entry for VAN 
services based on the telephone network, but also 
discriminates against smaller users that cannot develop or 
utilize these services in-house because of their small scale. 
Only a rebalancing or "harmonization" of tariffs can reduce 
the arbitrage incentive, so that the current restrictions 
which are based on the use of leased lines (i.e. •no 
connection to the switched network, no use for third 
parties") can be removed. Tariffs may be harmonized on the 
basis of cost (implying a •rebalancing", i.e. a lowering of 
long-distance, and in sorne countries leased line, tariffs and 
a raising of local calls to reduce the losses or in relation 
to the tariffs of a major service - dialed voice. While this 
second option brought about a volume-related tariff on leased linesl3 
and also reduces the danger of arbitrage, it still 
12 This refers to the incentive that any potential suppliers 
of telecoms services (either on the basis of leased lines 
or competitive physical networks) would want to enter 
mainly in the lucrative long distance market, thereby 
"skimming" the cream needed to subsidize the deficit 
services - rentals and local calls. The fact that the 
tariffs between the different long distance services (i.e. 
dialed services, leased lines, data services, br~ad band 
transmission rates) differ significantly may also lead to 
skimming because of the potential to arbitrage. 
13 This is the option which the Bundespost has chosen. 
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leaves the allocative problem unresolved, because tariffs now 
diverge significantly more from costs than with a rebalancing 
on the basis of costs. 
To identify the importance of tariff distortions and to 
obtain a rough estimate of the current cost of this policy, 
14 the economie measure is the consumer surplus foregone. 
Table 3.6 shows the four important tariff components, i.e. 
for connections, rentals, local and trunk calls in ECU for 
switched voice services in all the EEC countries. We observe 
indeed a wide variation in tariffs that seems inconsistent 
with what is perhaps a more uniform cost structure across 
countries that must surely be prevailing, even in the absence 
of telecoms services being traded. Connection charges range 
from a low of 31 and 36 ECU in Germany and France, where the 
use of second telephones has been encouraged in an 
essentially saturated network, to the cash-poor 
administrations of Ireland, Italy and Greece, where the 
residents must pay most of the initial cost of a telephone 
connection in the connection fee. 
---------
14 T~e 7onsumer surplus is how much buyers would have been 
w1ll~ng to pay over and above what they actually paid for 
serv1ces. The measure therefore is to compare tariffs with 
c?sts and to assure that the loss and gains are propor-
t1onal across countries. 
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Actual connection costs are probably in the neighborhood 
of 250 to 400 ECU, showing that in all countries sorne 
externality effects (i.e. the benefits to existing sub-
scribers if a new subscriber joins) are still taken into 
account.15 
Comparing rental rates with the actual depreciation costs 
for the local loop (independent of installation costs) 
suggests that they are also being subsidized from call 
charges. The marginal costs for maintaining and depre-
ciating old established lines are perhaps 6 to 8 ECU 
per month per line, with 8 to 10 ECU in rural areas. The 
marginal costs for new lines are more in the neighborhood 
of 15 to 20 ECU, given todays very much higher wage costs. 
Marginal costs of local (measured) calls are about .03 
to .04 ECU per minute, with the initial minute being 
somewhat higher. This suggests a marginal cost for 
3-minute local call in the neighborhood of .1 ECU o~ 
slightly above, depending on cost conditions and the size 
of the local calling area. Table 3.6 indicates significant 
deviations below this figure for Spain, Greece, Pvrtugal, 
and the Netherlands, but also somewhat higher rates for the 
U.K. and Italy. Sorne of this differences may be explained 
by the wide variations in calling area size indicated by 
the average number of exchange lines there. 
Most important in terms of a typical telephone bill are 
charges for trunk calls (50- 500 km), since they make up 
50 to 70 percent of telephone costs. Marginal costs per 
additional minute in the neighborhood of 0.1 ECU Cwith the 
initial minute being about .03- .OS ECU higher), suggest 
a marginal cost for a 3-minute call of .3 to .4 ECU. 
Only the Netherlands and Denmark come close to this range 
(mainly because of the short trunk distances involved) 
with the U.K., Belgium and Spain somewhat above. The big 
15 To make more people join the network, new subscribers 
receive their connection often significantly below 
actual connection cost, the rest being paid back in call 
charges. 
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'l'able 3.6: Major Tariff Variables in the EEC (1987) 
in ECU 
(includes VA charges where applicable) 
Country Connections Monthly Rentais Local Cali (LC) Cali Arca 
Housholds Business Tariffs Size 1) 
(3 min) 
Great Britain 150 9.00 14.02 0.21 221 
Ital y 151 4.48 11.54 0.20 9 
Belgium 116 1050 1050 0.14 78 
lreland 235 11.20 15.10 0.14 78 
Luxemburg 58 5.78 5.78 o.u na 
France 36 5.67 13.82 0.11 uo· 
West Germany 31 10.80 10.80 0.11 135 
Denmark 189 9.88 9.88 0.10 na 
Netherlands 97 9.81 9.81 0.06 5 
Portugal 66 7.98 7.98 0.05 1 
Gree ce 199 2.23 2.23 0.03 s· 
Spain 83 6.66 7.03 0.03 na 
Tariff for Trunk Calls 
(3-min.) lntem. Cali lntem. Leased TCl TC2 
up to 100 Km max. Dist. Index (3 min)2) Lines3l LC LC 
(TCl) (TC2) 
Great Britain 0.56 0.56 0.57 1162 2.7 2.7 
Ital y 1.62 1.72 0.94 3500 8.1 8.6 
Belgium 0.69 0.69 0.80 1625 4.9 4.9 
lreland 1.26 1.26 0.88 1878 9.0 9.0 
Luxemburg 0.67 1702 
France 0.85 1.59 0.65 1541 7.7 14.5 
West Germany LOO L66 0.48 2352 9.1 15.1 
Denmark 0.36 0.36 0.41 13U 3.6 3.6 
Nctherlands 0.26 0.26 0.41 1743 43 4.3 
Ponugal L19 L19 0.90 2889 23.8 23.8 
Grecce 0.97 LlS 0.89 2582 323 383 
Spain 0.06 1.07 1.00 2A81 20.0 35.6 
1) measurcd in average number of excbange lines in 1 000 • estimates 
2) refcrs to ca11s bctwecn Madrid and corresponding cOuntry, i.e. calls from Dcnmark arc 41 % of 
the tariff in the reverse direction tw tr tl ti. 
3) al d • ch . s~ .:wl. ••• d. d 0 ansaanc. rent an conncction arge m &Or ~t pnvatc arcwts to a ~acent country an 
ŒM 1987, reproduced in Fmancial Times Business Information 
Source: Tclcfonica. Rcvista T, No 16, Oct. 1987; DIW, British Telecom 
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distortions arise in Italy, Ireland, West Germany, Portuga~ Spain 
and Greece, especially over the longer distances. It is 
here where much of the negative allocative effects and 
the large welfare losses take place, because the elasticity 
for long distance calls ((-0.3 to -0.6) is significantly 
higher than for local calls (-0.02 to -0.2). 
As a consequence, an adjustment of tariffs for trunk calls 
nearer to cost, for example by more than 50 percent in the 
case of W. Germany, could easily lead to a 20 percent in-
crease in call volume. In the case of international calls, 
where the deviation of priees from costs is greater, and 
elasticities are higher (-.8 to -1.5), the allocative 
distortion and the associated welfare losses are even 
larger. To raise the charges for local calls on the other 
hand causes a much smaller proportionate traffic loss. 
The positive benefits for efficient resource utilization 
(defined in terms of consumer surplus forgone) form such 
a move are clear. Effects on the distribution of benefits 
across the population are best dealt with by explicit, 
rather than cancelled subsidies. 
There have been a number of studies to estimate the welfare 
gains from a move towards marginal cost pricing. Neumann 
et al., who have carried out such a study for Germany, 
concluded that a move from the 1979 German pricing structure 
to a marginal cost pricing structure would have resulted in 
a welfare gain of 2b DM, almost 10 percent of income from 
voice services. This figure is confirmed by our more recent 
calculations. 
3.~ Influence on Service Offerings 
Two of the Green Paper's recommandations are bound to in-
fluence the variety and range of service offerings if they 
are fully accepted. The first concerns the proposai to allow 
competitive services in competition with the "reserved" 
services provided for by the telephone administrations 
(they too, of course, may provide competitive services 
but it is in "reserved" services where they have an 
exclusive right). The other one concerns open, non-dis-
criminatory network provision which should help to enhance 
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access for the value added network market, especially 
if it is combined with a tariff harmonization that allows 
the abolition of current restrictions on network use. 
The effect of the first is not only to increase service 
offerings, but also to allow sorne elements of "network" 
competition to creep in, even if only in an indirect 
way, if that may serve as a check on X-inefficiency of 
the PTO's. 
It is the effect of the second, however, that is of interest 
here, as from a more harmonized, liberalized VANS market, 
additional service offerings are bound to arise. The precise 
effects are difficult to quantify, depending on the actions 
of the PTO's themselves in this service area. It suffices 
here to outline sorne of the likely effects, like 
- the elimination of geographie space as a barrier to the 
spreading of certain services; 
- the spreading of existing services from within organization 
or large centres throughout the economy; 
- the creation of larger geographie markets for already 
existing services; 
the creation of new services made possible by the 
"economie" linkage of computers through telecommunications, 
for example through electronic data interexchange; 
- the further integration of office functions and the 
integration of design, manufacturing and component pro-
duction, leading to the "Office" and the "Factory of the 
Future" with CAD, CAM, FMS, etc. and their huge potential 
for electonic data interexchange; 
- the increasing cheapness of band-width will alter 
significantly the cost of transmission, especially for 
image. 
3.5 Influence of Harmonization 
Products and services which are standardized may become more 
valuable if they are compatible with each other or if they 
can be made compatible (through interfaces) at relatively 
low cost. But the competitive process might not always lead 
to such compatibility. In order to correct for these market 
failure effects, governments must become involved in helping 
to set up standard-setting institutions. An industry run 
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approach alone, which could achieve the same result, brings 
with it the danger of cartelization. It is in this connection 
that the attemps of the Green Paper to increase harmonization 
has to be seen. The economie effects are likely to work simi-
lar to those ovserved in VANS: 
- reduction in barries to entry results in increased market 
size. This will accelerate market growth and thereby also 
create learning and scale effects (for example in mobile 
radio); 
- lower barries to entry imply a lessening of monopoly power, 
reduced price/cost margins and therefore increase market 
volume. 
4. Results of the Scenarios 
4.1 A Status Quo Scenario 
The reference scenario, against which to compare the effects 
of the completion of the internal market will have to be a 
status quo scenario, in essence the "anti-monde". Network 
monopoly has only been abandoned in Great Britain. The fact 
that private cable networks have been allowed to operate in 
a number of countries might increase the likelihood that 
private ROES antennaes for satellite reception will also be 
liberalized, as envisaged in the Green Paper. 
Sorne countries have already adopted the Green Paper recom-
mendation of separating the regulatory authority from 
operating companies or plan to do so in the near future, 
thereby creating fairer competitive conditions with private 
firms. Sorne PTO's have set up separate companies to partici-
pate in competitive markets (for customer premises equip-
ment, VANS, information services, etc.). Tariffs will 
continue to diverge significantly form costs. As a conse-
quence, all PTOs still maintain restrictions on the use of 
leased lines. Both effects will limit the development of 
value added and information services. In the CPE market, 
li~klization is progressing only slowly, especially 
concerning the first telephone apparatus. Except for 
perhaps in Denmark and Great Britain, industrial policy 
goals in procurement still play an important role. This 
means that PTOs are forced to support their domestic 
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.industries, sometimes at a considerable cost. This is 
_characterized by a small reduction in the degree of public 
ownership of the PTO, a weakened link to mail service and 
a slight reduced network monopoly. 
This overview of the status quo development shows already 
sorne moves towards the recommendations of the Green Paper, 
with the most important issues remaining in the area of 
tariff policy, network access and a liberalization of the 
CPE market. Improved performance as a consequence of 
liberalized procurement policies, increased operational 
efficiency and a move towards a more business like environ-
ment remains also a crucial issue. 
4.2 Recommandations of the Green Paper Fully Realized 
4.2.1 The Effects of Open, Competitive Procurement 
One of the objectives of the completion of the internal 
market by 1992 is community-wide competitive equipment 
market. At the moment, the procurementrecommendation 84-550 
stipulates that only 10% of public contracts are opened to 
international tender. If this quota is raised to 40 or 50%, 
as suggested in the Green Paper, the barries to entry that 
exist as a result of the current preferencial procurement 
rules would be significally lowered. A complementary INSEAD 
study16 shows, that depending on the current national 
procurement policies, savings of 1 to 3 bn ECU in 1985 
priees may be realized, to that tariffs may be lowered 
between 2 and 8%. Since these effects are already accounted 
for on the equipment side, they must not be double counted 
on the service side. 
However, as we have seen in the discussion about productivity 
development, lower tariffs also imply a higher traffic volume. 
That traffic which can be accommodated on current network 
capacity (due to economies of fill) implies high profits for 
the PTO that are equivalent to resource savings. On the 
traffic that has to be accommodated through extra network 
16 The Benefits of Completing the Internal Market for 
Telecommunications Equipment, Fontainebleau, Dec. 1987. 
- 322 -
-25-
investment, a 10% profit margin will be used as an indicator 
of extra benefits. With an overall service revenue of 61 bn 
ECU for 1985 a 3 bn cost reduction as a consequence of lower 
equipment priees could lower tariffs by roughly 5%. Ignoring 
the temporary benefits of economies of fill, and concen-
trating only on the extra traffic and network size effects 
results in annual benefits of 0.75 bn ECU; (i.e. 70 percent 
of 1.5 bn ECU extra traffic revenue because of lower tariff 
plus an 1 percent overall cost reduction as a result of lower 
unit costs with increasing network size). 
4.2.2 Keeping the Arena of "Reserved Services" Small 
The Green Paper recommends that the legal monopoly area for 
"reserved services" is defined more narrowly. In the extreme 
it might only entail basic dial ed telephone services while 
giving up the monopoly on all CPEs. But, even with the 
emergence of ISDN and increased data and image transmission 
- the voice segment of the market (as much as 70 percent of 
total "public" or commercial telephony markets), remains 
as a "reserved area" for the PTOs. These effects of a 
small reduction in the size of the regulated area are 
difficult to assess. Much will depend on the amount of 
"non reserved service offerings" as a response to "reserved 
services" and the interface and interaction between them. 
We expect sorne service enlargement, and more significantly, 
sorne substitution effect (where private supplies offer a 
close substitute to "reserved" dial .ed voice service). But 
there will be little incentive for increased productivity 
performance, as leased line tariffs are set in such a way 
that substition effects, and the associated incentive 
effects to increase performance, will be limited arbi-
trarily. Our discussion of VANS above suggests also that 
a more liberal use of "reserved" network services will 
tend to encourage VANS as well. We state these positive 
effects without being able to quantify them. 
4.2.3 Competitive "Non-reserved" Services: CPE and VANS 
Regarding the prevision of competitive "non-reserved" 
services we are mainly concerned with CPE, VANS and services 
that arise out of the ONA concept. If uniform EEC-wide type 
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approval according to minimal standards was possible for CPE 
and based exclusively on the safety of the user (avoidance 
of first-party harm) and the network (avoidance of second-
party harm), a sizeable enlargement of the CPE market, in-
creased product variety and considerable cheapening of 
products could be expected. Cheaper and more versatile 
terminals will also generate extra traffic, as more terminal 
functions may become integrated, leading to a substitution 
effect from physical communication, but also to a market 
extension effect, because competition is possible over a 
wider range. Our interviews and the development in the US 
suggest as a consequence a slightly higher growth rate in 
traffic, so that compared to a status quo scenario, a 
2-3 percent overall increase in telephone traffic seems 
plausible. With unchanged telephone tariffs and the same 
priee elasticity that we discussed above, this would mean 
0.6-0.9 bn ECU extra network revenue p.a. 
Since sorne of the initial traffic increase will benefit 
from economies of fill and economies of scale, sorne tariff 
reductions might be possible, leading to a further tariff 
stimulus. There will also be sorne additional investment in 
CPE deviees that may help to reduce telephone use, for 
example related to telephone answering machines, electronic 
mail, etc., which may have an offsetting effect. 
The direct effects of 0.6-0.9 bn ECU additional traffic 
will again have to be considered in terms of opportunity 
costs. This can be interpreted in terms of 0.2-0.4 bn ECU 
due to economies of fill and economies of scale plus the 
extra 10 percent profit obtained from this additional 
service revenue, perhaps 0.05-0.1 bn ECU, resulting in 
economie gains of 0.25-0.5 bn ECU. The indirect effects 
of a larger and more diversified CPE base and the asso-
ciated resource savings in their application could be a 
further 0.2 bn ECU. 
Concerning VANS, exact figures about the European market 
size are rather vague; even for the U.S.A. only approximate 
figures are available. A Frost & Sullivan (1984) forecast 
predicts the market for VANS in Western Europe of $ 5.7 bn 
(in 1984 priees) by 1990. Of this, $ 2.5 bn is for tele-
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communication services; text and message services are 
expected to earn S 1.256 bn, and on-line data bases S 1.3 bn. 
The estimates for revenues accruing to PTO {50 percent) are 
overly optimistic, however. Our interviews and literature 
research suggest that most value added networks currently 
spend at most 10 - 15 percent of their sales volume on PTOs' 
services, making them less vulnerable to high tariffs and 
restrictive use of the telephone network. Predicting such 
high growth rates for services with relatively little value 
added {compared to costs of carrier services) suggests that 
the more priee elastic application segment of VANS will 
eventually dominate the market growth. 
To achieve such figures would require not only a full 
implementation of the Green Paper, a very cooperative 
approach by the PTTs, but also an increasing coordination 
of standards and interfaces at the European level. We would 
attribute at least half of this growth in transmission volume, 
namly 1.2 bn ECU to achieving the goals of the Green Paper. 
In terms of opportunity cost, the effects of economies of 
fill and scale are 0.25 b ECU, plus 10 percent profit on 
extra network services, i.e. 0.12 b ECU, in total .3 - .4 b 
ECU. Since these gains only occur in 1990, we can, under 
status quo consideration, estimate the benefits that would 
have been possible in 1985, had these recommandations been 
in place, as closer to 0.1 bn ECU p.a. 
In addition to liberal network use and cheap transmission 
facilities, a further aspect crucial for the growth of VANS 
is that of "Open Network Architecture" ONA. It allows pro-
videra of VAN services an easier access to the public 
network, employing all the tools of traffic economy in the 
process, as well as the utilization of the increasing 
intelligence in the network (such as reversed charging, 
closed user groups, diagnostic and control options). If 
the ONA Concept is successfully implemented, we envisage 
that a number of VAN services, and also information and 
add-on services that have only a marginal application at 
the moment (for example, because of high transaction costs), 
may increasingly become economical. This might also lead 
to private households becoming more interested in these 
services, especially on the higher income end, thereby 
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greatly increasing the volume for such services and the 
amount of revenue generated within the network. As a 
consequence, the estimate of 2.5 bn ECU network revenue 
for VANS mentioned above could be increased by another 
50 percent by 1990. Employing the same calculations as 
above, yields benefits in the neighborhood of .2 bn ECU 
by 1990, and 0.05 bn in terms of the 1985 calculation. 
4.2.4 Other Effects 
The Green Paper also envisages an improved regulatory 
structure through the separation of the regulatory from 
the operational responsibility and a strengthening of 
the antitrust provisions. This should facilitate the 
interface of competitive services with "reserved" services, 
thereby encouraging entry and a widerning of service options, 
whose quantification is, however, beyond the scope of this 
research report. Simular effects are expected as a result 
of increased standardization efforts in services. Increased 
compatibility would have a cost-reducing effect in terms of 
resources saveé., as well as a market enlargement effect as 
a consequence of lower service costs. Again we have not 
attempted to quantify these effects here. 
4.2.5 No Provisions for Increased Performance and Tariff 
Rebalancing 
In this "Green Paper" scenario there is little incentive to 
harmonize tariffs, implying that many of the current allo-
cative costs of tariff distortions are maintained or perhaps 
even increased, not to speak of the associated dynamic costs. 
This latter possibility is indeed a real one, as technical 
change is occurring much faster than tariffs are being ad-
justed. Furthermore, the existing differences in operating 
efficiency between different networks will barely be 
affected by the current regulatory change. This would 
imply that further welfare and efficiency gains in addition 
to the above mentioned are still possible. It is for this 
reason that we explore next a scenario of full network 
competition, even so this seems at the moment politically 
unfeasible. 
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4.3 Full Network Competition 
The potential of network entry or an improved regulatory 
structure will give established telephone administrations an 
incentive to adjust tariffs and to improve performance, an 
incentive which is often missing under the current regula-
tory structure. The size of the expected tariff adjustment 
depends on the difference between the current and future 
amount of cross-subsidization. 17 The cost estimates and the 
divergence from cost from section 3.3 suggest that a size-
able tariff rebalancing with associated welfare benefits 
would be possible. In countries, where trunk calls are 
priced very high and local calls are considerably under-
priced, welfare losses might well be above the 10 percent 
welfare loss as a proportion of total call volume. These effects, 
excluding the already partially rebalanced U.K. segment, 
indicate welfare effects in the neighborhood of 4 b ECU 
p.a. for the EEC as a whole. 
The amount of the productivity improvement as a consequence 
of network competition js difficult to estimate. The pro-
ductivity comparisons carried out above suggest sizeable 
productivity differences between PTOs. Our comparisons of 
the Bundespost and BT with Bell Canada in Section 3.1 
suggested that a 25 to 50 percent higher annual productivity 
growth rate may be possible for these two PTOs. With produc-
tivity growth rates currently ranging from 1 to 2 percent, 
an increase of at most 0.5 to 1 percentage point p.a. seems 
possible. Equal effects may be possible for Belgium, Italy 
and Spain. 18 In terms of resources saved, this is equiva-
lent to .5 b ECU p.a. If one assumes that these productivity 
gains are fully passed on in further tariff reductions beyond 
the rebalancing effects already mentioned above, a further 
exploitation of network economies could lower tariff annually 
by 0.15 percent, yielding extra resource saving of 0.1 bn ECU p.a. 
17 If access charges to the local loop are levied on 
entrants, a certain amount of cross-subsidies may 
continue. 
18 We have no view (yet) on the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Greece and Ireland. 
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4.4 A Summary 
Table 4.1 summarizes the main results of the two scenarios. 
The major difference between the two is the greater effect 
of a competitive procurement policy and of tariff reform 
under network competition. Without a network monopoly, 
entry, even if only on the fringes, forces PTOs towards 
a more cost concious procurement and operating policy and, 
as we see under point 6, a policy of tariff rebalancing. 
The example of the Swedish PTO - Televerket - shows that 
such policies are also possible without network competition, 
but our interviews in the different countries suggest that 
industrial and regional policy considerations, labor market 
obligations and union pressure prevent the PTOs from carrying 
them far enough. The increased pressure the EEC is putting 
on tariff harmonization is therefore a step in the right 
direction, as is. the policy on VANS and ONA. But only if 
the regulatory framework can be strengthened to increase 
performance and if the PTOs are released of the other 
policy task by pursuing them through more direct policy 
tools (taxes, subsidies, retraining, etc.) will more rational 
tariff and operating policies result. 
The likely effects of the Green Paper towards the completion 
of the internal market by 1992 are of a sizeable magnitude, 
but the remaining policy problems are large enough to warrant 
further efforts, before the market for telecommunications 
services are truly integrated in such a way, that their full 
technology potential can be realized on an EEC-wide basis. 
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Table 4.1: Effects of Regulatory Reform on European 
Telecommunication Services (1985) 
Measures/Effects 
1) Lower equipment cost 
Implies lower tariffs 
and through network ex-
pansion, utilization 
of economies of fill 
and scale 
2) Keeping Arena of 
"Reserved Services" 
small 
Implies increased prod-
uct spectrum and market 
enlargement effects 
3) More competitive "Non-
reserved Services" 
3a) easier CPE certi-
ficationJincreased 
product variety, 
lower CPE priees, 
increased network 
use (by 0.6 -
0.9 bn ECU) 
3b) liberalized VANS 
3c) open network pro-
vision 
4) Improved regulatory 
structure, facilities 
entry, competitive 
interface 
5) Standardization, com-
petitive interface 
6) Tariff Reforms(closer 
to cost) 
7) Improved operating 
efficiency 
Green Paper Effects Full Network 
Competition 
Effect 
2-4 bn ECU p.a. 4bn ECU p.a. 
(not to be double counted) 
0.75 bn ECU p.a. slightly 
larger 
not estimated not estimated 
0.25 - 0.5 bn ECU direct 
plus 0.2 bn ECU indirect 
resource savings (p.a.) 
0.3 - 0.4 bn ECU by 1990 
i.e. 0.1 bn ECU p.a. 
0.2 bn ECU by 1990 
i.e. 0.05 bn ECU p.a. 
not estimated 
not estimated 
marginal effects (no· 
EEC instruments as yet) 
marginal effects (no 
EEC instruments as yet) 
not estimated 
larger, 
because fewer 
network 
restrictions 
not estimated 
same 
same 
4 bn ECU p.a. 
0.6bn ECU p.a. 
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1. Industry Background 
1.1 Goals of Integration 
One of the objectives of the European Community in completing 
the internai market by 1992 is to eliminate all current 
barriers to trade in telecommunications equipment. The 1985 
White Paper by the Commission identifies the costs of 
physical and technical frontiers that need to be eliminated. 
The "Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for 
Telecommunication Services and Equipment" spells these issues 
out in detail. Upon closer analysis, it is mainly "technical 
frontiers", due to different national equipment and network 
standards and certification requirements and nationalist 
procurement policies, which account for the delay in 
achieving an effective internal European market. 
1.2 The Products and their Markets 
Telecom~unication equipment is used to construct a 
telecommunications network infrastructure, for example with 
the aid of transmission and switching equipment and to have 
access to such networks with the aid of customer premises 
equipment (CPE). These three categories therefore make up the 
most important market segmentt, in addition to a small set of 
miscellaneous products. Table 2.1 gives an overview over 
these four markets in Western Europe for the year 1986. These 
data are based on market surveys by the consultancy firm 
Frost & Sullivan since no official statistics with a similar 
breakdown by products and countries exist. Table 1.1 
indicates the dominance of central office (CO) equipment with 
~lmost half of the market volume. The total market in 1986 is 
estimated at $ 15 bn, to reach $ 19 bn by 1990. 
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Table 1.1: European Telecom Equipment Market (1986) 
Switching Equipment 
Terminal Equipment (CPE) 
Transmission Equipment 
Other Equipment 
in Mill $ 
7050 
3600 
1950 
2250 
Source: Frost & Sullivan, E 882, 1987 
in Percent 
47 
24 
13 
15 
The next significant market, according to the Frost & 
Sullivan definition, is terminal or CPE equipment with 
roughly 24 percent of total value, followed by transmission 
with 13 percent and a set of miscellaneous products with 15 
percent. The overall market size was estimated to be 15b US $ 
in 1986, growing to 19b by 1990. 
Different consultancy reports come to different agreements 
about the size of the market and the weight to be given to 
different product groups (Tables 1.2 and 1.3). The problem is 
apparent in Table 1.2, which represents the individual 
European markets on the basis of another consultancy study, 
in this case by Arthur D. Little (WTIP). Its market estimate 
for the EEC Market of the 12 with 17.5b is already above the 
Frost & Sullivan Study's market estimate of $ 15b for all W. 
European countries. 
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Table 1.2: Telecommunications Equipment Market in the BEC, 
o.s. and Japan 
1984 1986* 
$bn % of total $bn % of total 
Belgium 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.9 
Denrnark 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
France 3.1 4.4 4.2 4.6 
Ire land 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Ital y 1.4 2.0 1.7 1.9 
German y 2.9 4.1 3.6 3.9 
Gree ce 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Netherlands 0.6 0.8 0.62) 0.7 
Portugal 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Spain 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.7 
UK 3.3 4.7 4.1 4.5 
(Sub total) (14.0) (20.0) (17.5) (19.1) 
us 26.41) 37.7 34.5 37.8 
Japan 6.8 9.7 7.9 8.6 
EC, US, Japan total 47.3 67.4 59.9 65.5 
World total 70.0 100.0 91.3 100.0 
Source: Arthur D. Little (WTIP) 
1) 1985; 2) 1984; * 1986 estimate is in 1985 US dollars. 
Table 1.3: Yeleca.munications Bqui~nt Markets in the 
Principal OECD Coantries, 1984 (in Mill US $) 
public private public 
switching switching transmission CPE 
(incl. broadcast) 
World Market 10000 9420 14590 6495 
France 730 251 650 448 
West Germany 457 492 690 400 
O.K. 687 361 460 250 
Ital y 710 129 400 131 
USA 2850 5400 5220 2830 
Japan 627 808 1520 316 
Canada 327 210 210 72 
Source: Rausch (1987, p. 20) 
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Other market studies include rouch of the office equipment 
market in their figures for CPE equipment (thereby yoising 
its significance), even if such equipment is only 
occasionally linked to a telephone network. These 
distinctions are nevertheless important because different 
procurement rules hold in the CPE market, as rouch of the CPE 
tends to be procured by private individuals (except for main 
telephones) so that restrictive certification rules and 
incompatible standards matter more than in the publicly 
procured switching and transmission market. Already, an 
increasing amount of switching activity is carried out at the 
customers' premise in so-called private branch exchanges 
(PABX). This segment is being enlarged through the 
introduction of local area networks and other data services. 
As a consequence, 20 to 30 percent of the switching market 
may in the future lie outside the public procurement realm 
and be subject to different, more open procurement 
conditions. 
1.3 Economies of Scale and Benefits from Specialization 
The three main product categories to be analyzed, CO, 
transmission, and CPE equipment, all allow different degrees 
of international specialization, due to varying economies of 
scale in equipment production. Economies of scale are highest 
for CO equipment. Over 50 percent of value added consists of 
software cost that are independent of market size for given 
switches. AT&T's Western Electric has the capacity to produce 
7m access !ines p.a. at one plant in the USA, compared to a 
total market demand below lm access !ines p.a. in sorne large 
European countries. Even if a plant also produces large 
private branch exchanges (PBX), for which sorne component, 
software and testing tools might be simultaneously used, the 
European scales are still small, suffering from a cost 
disadvantage that is equivalent to 20 - 30 percent, when 
comparing a plant of 7m lines capacity p.a. to one of lm 
lines p.a •• 
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Table 1.4: The Presence of Major Central Office Equipment 
Suppliers in Different European Countries (EEC and 
EFTA) 
E E c E F 
B DK E F UK IRL I NL p D A CH 
Ericsson xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx 
GTE xx 
Alcatel xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx ~.~~ 
ATT-Philips xx 
GEC-Plessey xx 
Siemens xx xx xx xx 
Ital tel xx 
Northern/STC :x x x.x 
Te li 
That even scales of this size are not possible is indicated 
in Table 1.4 which shows the distribution of CO manufacturers 
across Europe. Sorne of them have often more than one plant 
per country, with the smaller countries actually accounting 
for only a very small market demand. 
The production of CPE products especially in PABX equipment 
is also characterized by significant economies of scale. They 
are less important in the case of handsets and simple key 
telephones, as the absence of software costs, (which could 
inflate fixed costs) increases the s~gnificance of variable 
costs. In addition, more components are standardized, offthe 
shelf types, allowing access to international specialist 
suppliers. As a consequence, we observe usually a much lower 
concentration ratio in this sector. This impression is 
reinforced by Table 1.5, which shows the current distribution 
of CPE suppliers. 
xx 
T A 
s N 
xx 
xx 
xx 
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Table 1.5: The Major Suppliers of CPE Equipment in Different 
European Countries 
B DK 
Ericsson xx xx 
IBM xx 
GTE 
Alea tel xx xx 
Philips xx xx 
Siemens/GTE xx xx 
Northern/STC xx 
TIE 
Nixdorf 
Other Suppliers 
Sweden: 
Austria: 
Swi tzerland: 
Denmark: 
Spain: 
France: 
Great Britain: 
Ital y: 
Netherlands: 
Portugal: 
West Germany: 
E E C 
E F UK I 
xx xx xx xx 
xx xx xx 
xx 
xx xx xx 
xx xx 
xx 
xx 
xx X J' 
STA/Teli 
Kapsch, Schrack 
ASCOM 
JTAS 
E F 
NL p D A CH 
xx xx xx 
xx 
xx 
xx xx xx xx xx 
xx xx xx 
xx xx xx xx xx 
xx xx xx 
xx xx xx 
Arnper, Elasa, Telefonica, Eletronica 
Matra-CGCT, AOIP, Barphone, SAT 
Plessey, GTC, Morris 
Matra, Jeumont-Schneider, Dial, Telit, 
Olivetti, Safnot 
NEC, Nitsuko 
CAEP 
DeTeWe, Hagenuk, Krone, Bosse 
The significance of economies of scale in the production of 
transmission equipment (Table 1.6) is somewhere between CO 
and CPE products. For the production of cables, large plants 
(relative to the size of national markets) are required to 
fully utilize all the benefits of large scale production, but 
the scale p~anlties are not so large as in the case of co 
equipment. While set up costs are high, fixed R&D costs are 
small by comparison, making the ratio of fixed to variable 
TA 
s N 
xx xx 
xx 
xx 
xx 
xx 
xx 
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costs that much lower. Microwave transmission equipment is 
similar to CPE in its scale economies, especially for more 
standardized components, like repeaters and amplifiers. 
Table 1.6: The Major Suppliers of Transmission Equipment in 
Different European Countries 
B DK E 
Ericsson xx xx 
Alcatel xx xx 
Marconi xx 
Philips xx xx 
Siemens xx xx 
xx xx 
Other Suppliers 
Sweden: 
Austria: 
Belgium: 
Spain: 
France: 
Great Britain: 
Portugal: 
West Germany: 
Switzerland: 
E E c 
F UK I NL p D A 
xx xx xx 
xx xx xx xx xx xx 
xx xx 
xx xx xx xx xx 
xx xx xx xx xx 
xx 
Relicana, STA/Teeli, Noika, NEC 
Kapsch 
ACEC 
Indelec, AEG (Rail) 
Matra 
GEC, Ples~, STC 
CAEP 
ANT 
Northern Telecom 
E F T 
CH 
xx 
xx 
In summing up, most equipment production is characerized by 
significant scale economies that would lend itself to 
extensive international specialization. 
1.4 Limits to International Specialization 
A 
s 
xx 
xx 
Taking the four major markets together (CO, transmission, CPE 
and other products), we currently find highly protected 
national markets within each EEC member country. There is 
little intra-EEC trade, but a fair amount of exports to 
N 
xx 
xx 
xx 
xx 
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countries outside of the EEC (experts are roughly 23 percent 
of output, but only 30 percent of this goes to other EEC 
markets). Exports and imports are distributed fairly unevenly 
·J 
with W. Germany being the greatest exporter to non-EEC 
countries, followed by France and the UK; the UK is the 
largest importer, followed by W. Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands. Total imports, at the moment, account for much 
less than 10 percent of final demand, a further confirmation 
of the national orientation of these markets. In addition to 
a small amount of intra-EEC trade, more than 50 percent of 
imports come from the USA and Japan. 
The reasons for this peculiarly "closed" market structure are 
threefold: selective procurement and certification policy, 
incompatible standards and "input specificity". 1 
Selective procurement policy is related to the insistance of 
national governments - for industrial policy reasons - on 
maintaining a "technology base" in such an advanced 
manufacturing sector as telecommunication equipment. As a 
consequence there are not only high barriers to entry for 
ether suppliers, but also high barriers to exit for firms who 
want to centralize their multinational operations in one or 
two places. Even if the significance of economies of scale 
for certain products increases significantly, and there are 
strong signs for this especially in CO equipment, national or 
multinational manufacturers might not be allowed to 
rationalize and to close sorne national plants in order to 
reap the available benefits of economies of scale and 
international specialization. Instead, they are forced to 
maintain a production site and a technology base in each 
national market. 
1 The supplier delivers a good or a service which is specifically 
customized to the user's specification, for example to 
allow compatibility with previous investment in a complex 
network system. 
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Restrictive certification policy and incompatible 
international standards are sometimes also used as 
instruments of such a "technology base" policy, but often 
they are related more to a specifie technology orientation of 
an administration, often in close accordance with domestic 
manufacturers, who use their influence in certification and 
standard setting to raise entry barriers for outsiders. 
"Buyer or input specificity" is especially relevant for CO 
equipment. It makes it difficult to open up these national 
markets quickly, given the high adjustment costs of moving 
from one type of system or standard to another. The degree of 
buyer specificity is less strong for transmission equipment, 
because the interfaces between different types of equipment 
have already been more or less internationally standardized, 
allowing specialist suppliers to survive in different 
national markets. The same can be said for CPE equipment, 
except that here too nationally different certification 
standards play a role. 
2. Results of the Analysis on the Costs of Non-Europe 
2.1 Status Quo Forecast 
When analyzing the benefits of European integration, an 
"anti-monde" to the completion of the internal market by 1992 
must be constructed as a reference point. This reference 
scenario is based on what would happen if current industry 
trends were to continue without the extra stimulus of 
Community policy: We notice that significant structural 
changes are already taking place in the face of stagnant 
national markets, with increasing international competition 
to better exploit the available economies of scale, even as 
rouch of each country's industry remains nationalistic in 
output. This would imply that sorne of the expected benefits 
of completing the internal markets will be realized in any 
case. Furthermore, the market already has such an 
international dimension, that the large equipment suppliers 
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tend to look more at market aggregates when deciding their 
new product policy and their overall, long term strategy, 
rather than just looking at individual national markets. 
2.2 A Scenario in Accordance with the Recornrnendations of 
the Community's Green Paper 
The next step is to assess the policy effects that would 
arise out of an implementation of the recent Green Paper's 
Recommendations and to differentiate them against status quo 
developments. Under the assumption that the Council of 
Ministers will act for these recommendations to take place 
before 1992 we would expect the current regulatory change to 
take place in a more consistent framework with a preference 
for a wider arena for competition and the availablility of 
more standardized European-wide services. 
The likely effects of such a scenario have to be 
distinguished between those recommendations applying to the 
market for publi~ procurement (mainly CO and transmission 
equipment) and that for customer premises equipment. 
2.3 A Scenario of Full Service Competition 
The Commission does not question the right of the 
telecommunication administrations to maintain their monopoly 
provision of infrastructure services. Nevertheless, recent 
developments in the UK suggest that a scenario of full 
network competition ought also to be considered. It 
represents a useful reference point against which to compare 
the status quo scenario and that based on the current Green 
Paper. 
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3. Methodology to Estimate the Costs of Non-Europe 
3.1 Priee Comparisons as Indicators of Selective 
Procurement Policy and Incompatible Standards 
3.1.1 Observed Priee Variations 
From the consultancy study on public procurement (WS/Atkins), 
plus our own interviews and market surveys, we have obtained 
estimates of the priees for different equipment types 
currently being paid in Europe and compared them with 
"competitive world market priees" •• The resulting differences 
in priees may - as a first approximation - be used as an 
indicator of the potential savings that could arise with the 
competitive effects of the completion of the internal market 
by 1992. However, as the main study shows, these differences 
must be analyzed more thoroughly before such interpretations 
are justified. On the one hand, there may be quality 
differences associated with current priee disparities. On the 
other, the products being compared differ in their features 
and functions. Furthermore R&D costs are often paid out of a 
separate budget so that sorne priees reflect only variable 
manufacturing cost. The same is true for many export 
contracts that form the basis for the observed "competitive 
world market priees". The priee deviations in Table 3.1 must 
be seen with these caveats in mind. 
Table 3.1 also sumrnarizes the 1985 construction budgets of 
the telephone companies in the EEC member countries on the 
basis of the ITU statistics. These figures often also include 
a fair amount of expenditure for buildings, cabling and 
vehicles as a comparison with the total market estimate of 
ADL indicates. In most countries, the ITU figures would seem 
to overestimate the actual public market by 20 to 30 percent 
as a comparison with tables 1.2 and 1.3 shows. The figures 
for Italy and W. Germany are clearly out of line and must be 
adjusted downward, to be more in line with the figures in 
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Table 3.1: Total Telecom Equipment Investment and Observed 
Priee Deviations (Public Market, 1985) 
PTO 1nvestment percent pr1ce dev1at1ons 
Country ECU million co transm. CPE 
(% more than) 
Belgium 500.00 120 60 40 
Denmark 350.00 30 30 40 
France 3,800.00 50 30 40 
German y 5,200.00 100 50 80 
Greece 325.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Italy 3,100.00 lOO 30 40 
Ireland 200.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Luxemburg 15.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Netherlands 550.00 50 n.a. 60 
Portugal 235.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Spain 1,600.00 50 40 30 
United Kingdom 3,400.00 40 30 40 
Total 19,275.00 
====================================================================== 
Source: Priee deviation:Country Interviews, investment!ITU 
Table 1.2. The next three columns in Table 3.1 represent 
estimated priee deviations from competitive world markets. 
They are highest in central office (where they are, as in the 
case of Belgium and W. Germany, sometimes more than twice the 
"competitive" priee level). The deviations are lower for CPE 
and transmission equipment. 
Sorne of these priee deviations are transitory, however, and 
have to be interpreted with great care. The UK has for a long 
time been among the high-price countries, but BT hassince 1982, 
with a more open internationally oriented procurement policy, 
been able to bring down its equipment priees significantly 
when it _ decided to abolish its system of "Court 
suppliers". Belgium too .tried in 1987 to abandon its 
relative high domestic pricing policy, which it needs to 
sustain current R&D and export activities in the equipment 
industry (almost 50 percent of Belgian output is exported, 
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one of the highest ratios in Europe). The relatively low 
deviations in France may also be explained by paying 
separately for R&D. 2 
As a consequence, these deviations are at best indicators of 
a structural imbalance between different national markets and 
the associated policy of differentiai pricing. A complete 
move to competitive world market priee levels may therefore 
not be realistic, as the amount of R&D necessary to sustain 
technical developments in the industry could be significantly 
curt ai led. 
3.1.2 The EEC Green Paper fully Implemented 
3.1.2.1 The Effects on the Public Market 
Two effects are likely to be dominant in the public market: 
One of them arising out of increased Community-wide 
standardization, another arising out of increasing the 
proportion. of public procurement contracts that fall under 
the earlier EEC Directive 77/62 3 and its more recent re-
commendation 84-550. 
Concerning standardization, the most important effects will 
be felt in central office equipment, where a number of 
different non-compatible systems currently exist. Comparing 
the EEC's role in addition to that already carried out by the 
other international standard-setting bodies would lead us to 
suggest sorne priee reductions in future switching costs if 
more of the interfaces can already now be standardized and 
greater interworkability of different systems is achieved. 
Our interviews suggest that savings in the neighbourhood of 5 
to 10 percent out of a total European CO switching market of 
2 The DGT will very often first pay for the development of a 
prototype and therefore for most of the initial R&D, so 
that subsequent equipment tenders can be priced on a 
different basis. 
3 According to the recommendation 84-550, only 10 percent of pub-
lic procurement contracts in telecoms equipment have to be 
advertised internationally; that proportion is to be raised 
to 50 percent as an interim proposai before a full opening of 
the market by 1992. 
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about Sbn ECU would be possible, i.e. 0.25 - O.Sbn ECU p.a. 
because of greater compatibility. Indirect dynamic effects 
out of the subsequent increased competitive pressure have to 
be considered as well. They might in the medium term lower 
central office costs by another 5 percent, so that the total 
effect could be as high as 0.4 - 0.7bn ECU p.a. 
For transmission equipment we expect much smaller effects of 
the Community's policy on standardization as much has already 
been achieved through other effects. It is only the indirect 
effects as a result of more competitive procurement that 
might help to reduce transmission costs by 5 percent. Similar 
arguments hold with respect to CPE equipment and other 
components. 
The second effect concerns the opening of the public 
procurement sector in telecommunication equipment mainly 
regarding network equipment. The EEC recommendation 84-SSO 
foresees that 10 percent of total tenders are advertised 
internatinally. If this is used selectively, in 
other words applied only for those products, for which the 
domestic industry does not have to be protected, or where the 
size·of the order is so small to not attract international 
offers, the effect could be quite minimal. On the other hand, 
if it was used to the strategie advantage of the telephone 
administration, for example in the area of central office 
equipment, the effect could be quite large. This latter 
potential could be seen quite clearly by the recent struggle 
for the takeover of the French equipment manufacturer CGCT 
with a national market share of only about 15 percent. 
For this reason we shall make two assumptions. The first 
assumes that the 10 percent rule is very restrictively 
applied. The second assumes that the envisaged opening up 
reaches 40 to 50 percent of public contract volume by 1992 
and is used to the greatest advantage of the purchaser. 
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In the first case, the effect would essentially be zero. In 
the second assumption, the effect could be quite significant, 
as is evident from the figures obtained in Table 3.2 on the 
basis of the priee deviations in Table 3.1. The possible 
priee reductions are calculated on the assumption that the 
deviations from world market priees overstate the difference 
to a viable long term competitive priee level by 20 percent. 
Nevertheless, significant savings might still be possible. 
The savings would be largest in the high priee countries 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, but also significant in France and 
the Netherlands. They would be relatively small in Denmark 
and the UK. 
While the assumptions underlying Table 3.2 are somewhat crude 
and estimates have not been attained for all countries, the 
potential savings as a consequence of opening up 40 - 50 
percent of the public market could be as high as 3bn ECU (out 
of a total of 17.5 ECU). 
What is the likelihood of the full exploitation of a 40 to 50 
percent open procurement rule? Given the magnitudes involved 
and the restructuring necessary to achieve such savings, 
considerable political opposition could be expected. This 
would make it very difficult for the PT~ to adapt an 
aggressive open procurement rule. If they were able to do so, 
recourse could nevertheless be taken to extra government 
funding from other public sources to maintain the current 
level of activity and employment in the industry. As a 
consequence, the 3tmECU savings estimated in Table 2.2 
represents only the maximum priee reductions possible, 
together with the 0.4 - 0.7bn ECU from an effective 
European-wide standardization. 
But both effects are not likely to be achieved in practice 
because of t~e political opposition to a restructuring so 
that the savings associated with the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Green Paper concerning a more open 
procurement policy will be significantly lower. Instead, most 
Table 3.2: "-ci._ Priee Reductians for M.jor Product Groups <1985> VI .j:'-
00 
Possible Prie. ReductiCWl Possible Priee R.O..CtiCWl 
Total Trans-
ttarkwt. • œ - : - Atkins aissiCWl - - : • 
<• EDJ>: (30 X) in X :in • EaJ : in X lin • ECU (23 X) in X :1n a ECU: in X :in • ECU 
------- --------
-· 8 800 240 50 120.0 . 60 144.0 184 25 46.0 . . . 
[IC «<l 120 10 12.0 . 92 10 9.2 : . 
F 4200 1260 20 252.0 . 40 504.0 966 10 96.6 . . . 
D 3600 1080 «l 432.0 : 70 756.0 829 20 165.6 . . 
SR 2ŒI 60 : 46 . . 
1 1700 510 «l 204.0 . 50 255.0 391 10 39.1 : . 
IR 100 30 . 23 . . . 
.._ 600 180 20 36.0 : 138 : 
p 200 60 . 46 . . . 
E 1600 480 20 96.0 . 368 15 55.2 : . 
lJC 4100 1230 15 184.5 : 50 615.0 943 10 94.3 : 
-------- ----------
TOTfl. 11500 5250 : 4025 . . 
-> 
"' 
Possible Priee ReductiCWl Possible Priee R.O..CtiCWl 
Total Total 
tt.rk.t. • a»E - : -• Atkins - others - : AlldiiCt ion 
<• EDJ)I <23 X> in X :in a ECU : in X :in a ECU <23 :iC) in X :in a ECU: in X lin • ECU in • ECU 
------------------ -: 
8 800 184 15 27.6 : 20 36.8 184 15 27.6 : • 221.2 • [IC «<l 92 15 13.8 . 92 15 13.8 : 48.8 . 
F 4200 966 15 144.9 . 43 415.4 966 15 144.9 . 638.4 . . 
D 3600 829 30 248.4 . 38 314.6 829 15 124.2 . 910.2 . . 
GR 200 46 . 46 : . 
1 1700 391 15 58.7 . 0 0.0 391 15 58.7 . 360.4 . . 
IR 100 23 . 23 : . 
N. 600 138 25 34.5 . 138 15 20.7 . 
p 200 46 . 46 . . . 
E 1600 368 10 36.8 : 368 20 73.6 . 261.6 . 
lJC 4100 943 15 141.5 . 0 0.0 943 15 141.5 . 561.7 . . 
----- --------------, TOTfL 11500 4025 : 4025 . . 
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administrations will be obliged to apply open procurement 
rules much more selectively in areas where structural 
adjustments costs are lower and receive more political 
support. But even this would still require a fair amount of 
prodding by the Commission, a policy not necessarily 
conducive to the spirit of collaboration needed to reach 
agreement on ether issues, such as standardization and joint 
certification. 
3.1.2.2 Private Markets 
Table 3.2 already included estimates of potential priee 
reductions in the market for CPE equipment and ether 
telecommunications equipment. These effects are partly 
related to the increased competitive effects in the public 
market, since the telecommunication administrations will act 
as a competitive distributor in these ether markets as well. 
There is, however, also a significant dynamic effect to be 
considered, namely that of market enlargement and product 
diversification as a consequence of Community-wide 
certification according to minimal certification criteria. 
The likely dynamic implications are illustrated by the recent 
growth in the liberalized US CPE market. As a consequence of 
private purchasing, depreciation rates dropped considerably, 
simple handsets were replaced much more frequently than 
before, leading to significantly larger turnovers. Similar 
tendencies, though perhaps less dramatic, occurred in PABX 
and key systems. As a consequence of faster depreciation, 
sales have been rising significantly above the previous 
trend. In addition, the increased competition reduced 
equipment priees faster making telecommunications 
applications rouch more attractive and leading to increased 
network utilization as well. 
To sum up, the potential dynamic efficiency gains in the CPE 
market arise mainly through influencing the innovation 
process and the associated market growth effects as a result 
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of lower entry barriers. If that can be combined with a 
larger market, allowing firms to innovate faster while at the 
same adapting a much more aggressive pricing strategy to gain 
a long term market share, the increased competitiveness will 
have further innovative and priee reducing effects that may 
yet further stimulate total demand for both CPE equipment and 
network use. 
On the basis of these considerations, the dynamic effects 
could be equivalent to 50 percent of the static potential for 
priee reductions identified in Table 3.2 (i.e. 50 percent of 
.7b ECU). In addition, one could envisage an increase in the 
market volume of CPE equiprnent by 10 to 20 percent above the 
current growth trajectory. If a profit margin of 10 percent 
of this market growth is used as an indicator of the extra 
economie benefits, a further economie gain of up to .lbn ECU 
could be achieved. 4 
3.1.4 The Effects of Full Network Competition 
We have argued above that the recommendations to open up the 
public procurement market might not be carried out because of 
political opposition from equipment suppliers, unions and the 
regions affected by the subsequent rationalization of the 
industry. If network competition were introduced however, the 
PTOs would have to behave very differently. Given the threat 
of market entry, they could no longer afford to purchase at 
preferential rates, thereby weakening their competitive 
position, but would have to purchase on commercial terms, as 
has been illustrated by the changing behaviour of BT and the 
Arnerican long-distance carriers. Only in this case would the 
full effects of open procurement be realised that we 
indicated in Table 3.2. The effects of network competition, 
even if at the moment relatively unrealistic, provide at 
least another reference point against which to adjust the 
results of the recommendations of the Green Paper. 
4 A 10 percent markt increase is equivalent to .4bn extra 
sales, yielding O.OSbn ECU extra benefits, a 20 percent 
increase yields O.lbn ECU. 
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3.2 An Integrated Approach 
Our analysis so far rested on the interpretation of priee 
deviations as a consequence of segmented European markets. 
Priees in sorne markets are significantly higher than in 
others and firms use the different price-cost margins in each 
market to sustain their overall production operation. In a 
truly integrated market there would be a movement towards a 
one-priee area in which priees should not differ 
siqnificantly from one area to another or to other outside 
markets. Sizeable savings would only be possible if they were 
realized through higher productivity in production, increased 
specialization because of utilization of economies of scale 
and scope and a reduction in the number of products available 
overall (even though it is likely that there will be 
increased product variety in each national market as a 
consequence of increased international trade. Only in such an 
environment will a priee drop of the magnitude suggested be 
feasible without the firm's in the industry going out of 
business or being unable to maintain their R&D effort 
necessary to sustain current and future levels of research 
and development and product innovation. 
To model such an evolution and to compare the outcome with 
the results so far, we have analyzed the production structure 
of the major equipment firms (CO, CPE, transmission) 
and considered what happens under different assumptions about 
scale and priee elasticities if a number of countries are 
involved in an integration and rationalization process that 
may be characterized by the completion of the internal market 
by 1992. 
The basic idea behind this model, which follows very much an 
earlier study on the specialization arising from 
international trade in the presence of significant economies 
of scale, is derived from Dixit and Norman (1980). Their 
basic assumption is that if significant economies of scale 
are present which are not exploited in national markets, any 
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enlargement of the market (i.e. through a customs union) will 
allow further rationalization to take place. The surviving 
firms will be able to move along their declining long-run 
average cost curve, thereby passing significant productivity 
savings on to consumers, until a new equilibrium is reached. 
The size of a market is described in conjunction with scale 
economies by the number of firms it can support. In order to 
keep the model simple we assume equal sized firms. We must 
therefore abstract from the actual size distribution of firms 
observed above to an "equivalent number" of equal sized 
firms. Following the data in tables 1.4 and 1.5, we have used 
the following numbers for a typical (large) EEC member 
country: 
Central Office Equipment 
PABX Equipment 
Telephone Handsets 
2 
3 
4 
The priee elasticity of demand is brought in by assuming that 
the size of the market depends not only on the number of 
supplying firms but also on their output per head of 
population. 
If we can assume that the market expansion effects of the 
completion of the internai market by 1992 is equivalent to a 
customs union of six equal sized European countries, 
then integration increases the market size 
available to a national firm by a factor of 5. 5 National 
producers now face a five times larger market, but five times 
as many competitors. With a relatively low priee elasticity 
(-.53) and 10 firms per market, we can show that at the new 
equilibrium there will be 33 firms remaining (instead of the 
previous 60). As a consequence, output per head, the measure 
of benefit in this mode!, increases by 30 percent. The 
5 This is only an approximation as a comparison with table 
1.2 shows. The market expansion effects for a French or W. 
German manufacturer would be smaller, but larger for an 
Italian or Spanish firm. 
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benefits of integration are then directly consumed in 
telecom's output and in other output (as there is to be no 
excessive profits). 
Further simulations show that the gains in consumption (in 
other words, the benefits to the economy) as a consequence of 
greater specialization are greater, the smaller the number of 
firms in the closed national market and the greater the 
expansion of the market. This would imply that small 
countries, for example Belgium, the Netherlands or Portugal, 
will gain more from market integration than large countries 
if they start out with the same number of firms. While this 
is not normally the case in other industries, it does seem to 
be true in telecommunication equipment, as Tables 1.5- 1.7 
show. On the other hand, they may have no national producer 
left at all, a conséquence which they may not be willing to 
accept for industrial policy considerations. 
As long as priee elasticity is below 1 and the number 
of initial firms large, the larger the number of firms 
that will remain in the industry. If priee elasticity is 
above 1, and the number of firms is small (an indication of 
significant economies of scale), the proportionate change in 
the number of firms increases. In other words, a high priee 
elasticity indicates that the tradeoff between specialized 
and uniform products favours the lower cost uniform products. 
As a consequence, the proportional reduction in the nurnber of 
firms as a result of a market enlargement increases much more 
in those markets where economies of scale are especially 
important (for example CO equipment), while the effects are 
somewhat smaller for those products, where economies of scale 
are exploited earlier. The lesson is clear, however. The 
eventual industry structure that emerges depends very much on 
the interaction between economies of scale and demand 
preferences (as indicated by the relevant priee elasticity): 
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- If a national market can support very few firms, because 
economies of scale are high, then the benefits of 
integration are very high, as in the case of CO equipment. 
But welfare gains drop very quickly as the initial number 
of firms increases and economies of scale effects lose 
their importance. 
If the priee elasticity of demand is high, even 
monopolists will find it in their interest to bring priees 
closer to cost so that the proportionate change in the 
number of firms is smaller and the benefits (i.e. the 
change in telecom consurnptions) declines. 
In other words, the big consumption gains as a result of 
integration occur in those sectors where, because of the 
fewness of firms, the degree of monopoly is high and, becaue 
of "input specificity", priee elasticity is low. This 
inëicates not only the assumptions underlying the model, but 
also what we will have to look for in the real world. In 
other words, it is not sufficient to just look at priee 
differences, economies of scale, and the benefits of 
integration, but also at what pricing policies are currently 
pursued by those equipment suppliers who have a degree of 
market power and at the trade-off between economies of scale 
and specialization. 
3.3 An Assessment 
We attempted to identify the effect of the completion of the 
internal market by first analyzing the determinants of the 
current industry structure, secondly observing significant 
priee differences within the EEC (cornpared to the rest of the 
world), and on this basis predicted the likely effects of the 
full implementations of the Green Paper on market priees and 
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volume. The figures were based on two main scenarios: firstly, 
a status quo scenario where current trends continue; and, 
secondly, based on the Green Paper, a comparative scenario 
allowing for the effects of standardisation and with two 
levels of procurement liberalisation, one at 40%, the other 
at 100%. The gains from standardisation (because of better 
exploitation of economies of scale)were estimated at 0.85 
billion ECU to 1.1 billion ECU. The additional gains from 
competitive procurement are estimated at 2.2 billion ECU 
under the 40% scenario and 3.7 billion ECU under the 100% 
scenario. So , totalling all effects, these can vary between 
3.05 billion ECU and 4.80 billion ECU, depending on the degree 
of openness of the procurement market. 
Table 3.3: Possible Effects Under the Green Paper Scenario 
(in billion ECU) 
Effects of Effects from procurement 
standardis- liberalisation 
Products ation: 40% liberalized 100% liberalized 
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static 
Central office 0.25/ 0.2 0.8 
switching 0.5 
Transmission 0.2 0.4 
Customer 
Premises 0.1 0.4 0. -z• 
Equipment 
Other 0.1 0.4 
Total 0.25/0.5 0.6 2.0 0.2* 
* Market expansion effects 
1hese findings were supported in a theoretical model that 
analyzes the tradeoffs between market enlargement, 
1.3 
0.5 
0.7 
0.7 
3.2 
Dynamic 
0.3* 
0.2* 
0.5* 
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economies of scale and priee elasticity and the likely 
equilibrium that would result in terms of industry structure. 
Nevertheless, the positive results so far should not hide 
further stumbling blocks to integration. It seems that 
national industry objectives and differentiated standards 
will continue to play a role for a time to come. The full 
fruits of integration can only take place, if sorne common 
agreement between the governments concerned can accompany 
this restructuring, for example, about where centers of R&D 
and the relevant national technology base ought to be located 
(as in the case of the Airbus Consortium), etc. 
4. Other Points 
The major effects of completing the European market in 
teleco~munications equipment ought not to be seen just in the 
industry itself, but also in the users of these products, 
that means telecommunication network operators and the users 
of their services: 
The more efficient and the more flexible and versatile 
such services can be provided, the greater will be the 
productive benefits at the higher levels of production. 
The more competitive and the more flexible the 
interlinkage between demand for old and new services and 
equipment suppliers can be made, the faster the process 
of innovation, the quicker the benefits of the 
technology potential inherent in modern 
telecommunication equipment can be passed on to the 
economy as a whole. 
Obviously, the effects of more innovative network provision 
are significantly related to the benefits of more efficiently 
organized input markets. But telecoms equipment is only one 
of the inputs: labor, buildings and land are others, for 
which preferential "purchasing" or payment criteria often 
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play a role as well, leading to aditional sources of cost 
inflation. An analysis of the increased efficiency potential 
in this sector must therefore also see to what extent savings 
in the ether input markets are possible and how they can be 
realized and activated. The result would be not only to 
reduce the production cost of a key input into the economy, 
but also to free resources for ether, more productive uses. 
Opening up an effective internal EEC market to outside 
suppliers also implies something about the degree of 
international specialization to be realized. Those markets 
that have already opened their telecommunications equipment 
sector to outside competition (such as the U.S. and to sorne 
extent the UK) have found that in the less sophisticated 
product markets, for example in simple telephone sets and key 
telephones, Far Eastern suppliers have a definite cost 
advantage and have therefore gained important market shares. 
Is this result also to be expected with the completion of the 
internal market? If there was no suitable transition period 
and the domestic suppliers were not adequately prepared, such 
a scenario ii certainly likely. But our interview evidence 
also suggests that already now assembly costs for these types 
of product tend to be very low (below 10 percent of f.o.b. 
priee). As a consequence, there is little reason to assume 
that even for those products a fully rationalized production 
system cannet be set up within the Community, which can 
compete effectively with low-cost suppliers form the Far East 
in order to maintain a significant EEC presence in these 
markets as well. 
5. Conclusion 
In summing up we find significant savings as a result of 
moving towards the completion of the European Cornmunity in 
telecoms equipment. The reasons are insufficient exploitation 
of scale and specialization economies as a result of limited 
national markets and the insufficient competitive pressure 
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because of protective procurement policies. Trade is also 
hampered by insufficient standardization and excessive 
certification requirements in the CPE market. In all telecom 
applications, the geographical enlargement of the 
telecommunications equipment market would have important 
consequences. To move from a national regulatory framework to 
at least an EEC-wide regulation would help to exploit sorne of 
this potential as it creates right away a larger unified 
market. As a result a number of marginal applications will 
come into the realm of profitability, allowing further 
experimentation with technology and demand. 
For this reason the issue of the unified European market in 
telecommunications equipment must not be seen as a threat but 
rather as a potential. The potential lies not only in 
increasing the available market area and therefore making 
certain applications profitable, which otherwise would have 
to be foregone, but it also stimulates the competitive 
pressure at each of the different levels of equipment 
production and utilization. Increased competitiveness means 
painful restructuring for sorne, but it also means lower 
priees and an increased application potential for ethers with 
important demand expanding effects. Furthermore, since 
telecommunications equiprnent is to a large extent an 
intermediate input, these competitive effects will be felt 
throughout the Community by creating a larger and wider 
activity of application. "The relevant geographie markets" 
would be extended so that regionally or nationally 
concentrated markets may become more competitive within a 
more international framework. The benfits of this are 
obvious. It seems therefore worthwhile to take on sorne of the 
current restructuring costs which are necessary to get there 
not only for component and product suppliers but also for the 
network providers and their staff. 
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I. OBJECTIVE AND WORKPLAN 
A. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of the work undertaken by Ludvigsen Associates 
Limited (LAL) under contract to the Commission of the 
European Communities is the identification and quantification 
of the economie benefits that will accrue to the EC 
automobile industry and to its customers through the removal 
of the fiscal, physical and technical internal barriers that 
now divide the Community's Member States. 
The pro ject has the aim of 'assessing the specifie costs 
imposed on the Community automotive industries as indeed on 
consumers as a result of the currently fragmented nature of 
the EC automobile market.' The sector studied is defined as 
including the design and manufacture of volume-produced 
passenger cars in the European Community, the sale of such 
EC-built cars abroad, and the sale within the Community of 
passenger cars from all sources. 
The principal focus of the work is on two phases of auto 
industry activity: design and engineering, and manufacturing 
and assembly. These were selected in consultation with the 
Commission as having the potential to make important 
contributions to the benfit of EC92, especially in the area 
of scale economies, and also because they are of continuing 
interest and value to the Community and the Commission. 
Also referenced in the project are selected findings from a 
Preliminary Study that LAL conducted under contract to the 
Commission from January to April 1987. This encompassed a 
comprehensive search of the existing knowledge on the cost of 
Non-Europe in the auto industry. In parallel LAL carried out 
a study of the principal influences on the evolution of the 
open internal market in automobiles in the United States. A 
summary of the findings is provided in Section II.A. 
B. WORKPLAN 
The main elements of the workplan are reported upon in this 
Summary in the Sections indicated. They are as follows: 
A. A programme of questionnaires and interviewing of auto 
manufacturers and suppliers to ensure that the findings 
are current and in conformity with industry practice. The 
results are summarised in Sections II and IV. 
B. Determination of the overall economie dimensions and 
constitution of the sector i~ the Community in the study 
base year 1985. Findings are reported in Section III. 
C. Specifie study of the design and engineering costs in the 
industry, reported and analysed in Section IV. 
D. Research into the cost structure and the economies of 
scale of the production of components and assembly of cars 
in the EC industry, as described in Section V. 
E. Computation in cost and priee terms of the immediate 
direct effects, deferred direct effects and indirect 
dynamic effects of the changes caused by the postulated 
EC92 conditions, reported in Sections VI and VII. 
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II. BACKGROUND STUDIES AND EC92 PARAMETERS 
As background elements to the present study this section 
provides reports on three aspects of the work: a summary of 
the findings of the US market investigation carried out in 
the Preliminary Study, an overview of the types of barriers 
experienced in EC85 by the auto industry, and the parameters 
for EC92 that have been used in the conduct of this study. 
A. US INTERNAL MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
The United States automobile industry distributes its 
products today in essentially the same open integrated market 
that the industry entered when it was founded at the 
beginning of the 20th Century. For its first thirty years 
the American motor industry had the benefit of a 
laissez-faire attitude on the part of the expansionist 
federal government. 
Federal regulation was impose? on t;he USA motor industry 
concerning certain of its business, marketing and· labour 
practices during the Great Depression. The industry adapted 
successfully to these, and indeed was able to turn sorne of 
those regulations to its advantage. For example, it secured 
the suppression of internal technical barriers when state 
vehicle design laws were essentially superseded by the 
introduction of federal motor vehicle safety regulations. 
The USA motor industry experienced a substantial technical 
disruption of its national market as a result of the adoption 
of emissions control. This occurred as a consequence of the 
state of California's success in convincing the federal 
government that for specifie health reasons it should be 
allowed to have stricter exhaust rules than the federally-
established standards of the other states. Subsequently the 
values of the standards have converged and the technical 
requirements across the nation have become similar. 
It has been evident from the study that the provision of the 
USA Constitution giving the federal government the power 'to 
regula te commerce ••• among the sever al states' has played a 
key role in ensuring the maintenance of an open internal 
American market, especially as that provision has since been 
interpreted and extended by the courts. 
Also important, according to the study, is the ease with 
which a company in one American state can register to d<;> 
business in other states. This facilitated the evolution of 
enterprises that thought and acted in national terms. 
The USA study has shown that an open internal market is 
effectively maintained although the states retain significant 
legal and economie powers. These include the power to impose 
taxes on businesses and individuals resident in the state in 
order to pay for those services that the state renders. The 
states impose taxes in significantly different ways, 
including sales taxes that range from nought to 7 percent and 
vehicle use taxes that are based on differing criteria. 
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The ability of Americans to think and act in national terms 
has been enhanced by excellent low-cost communications. This 
has included the rail system, an efficient national telephone 
system, an integrated highway network, and a competitive 
deregulated airline system. Without this infrastructure the 
establishment and operation of national networks of design, 
production and sales would have been much more difficult in 
all industries, including the motor industry. 
In the USA the trend of legislation has led to a relatively 
balanced relationship between the manufacturer and the dealer 
in the auto franchise system. This has given more freedom to 
the dealers, and less power to the car makers and importers, 
than is generally granted in Europe. 
Best viewed as a form of modified selective distribution, the 
relationship between maker and dealer in the USA is such that 
a highly competitive open market exists for both new and used 
cars that of fers the consumer a very wide choice. The 
Federal Trade Commission is active at the national level to 
ensure the maintenance of that freedom of choice. 
B. EXISTING INTERNAL BARRIERS 
As a consequence of the substantial extent to which it is an 
integral part of the lives of all the citizens of the Member 
States, the automobile industry is presently affected by a 
very broad spectrum of internal Community barriers. These 
barriers were defined and researched as part of the 
Preliminary Study and the current project to provide a basis 
for the work and a reference to the assumptions on which it 
is founded. 
LAL' s researches undertaken among Community auto industry 
suppliers and manufacturers provided detailed information on 
many internal barriers in the three categories that are dealt 
with in the Commission White Paper on the internal market: 
fiscal, physical and technical barriers. In this Executive 
Summary sorne specifie barriers are indicated in selective 
outline form according to those categories, as follows: 
1. Fiscal Barriers 
* Taxation levels on car sales that differ in virtually all 
of the EC Member States, from 12 percent in Luxembourg to 
200+ percent in Denmark and Greece. 
* Policies on the refunding of VAT for company purchases of 
vehicles that differ from country to country. 
* Maintenance by sorne Member States of priee regulations 
and/or margin controls. 
* Distortion of competitive conditions by excessive aid to 
'national champion' producers in the form of Member State 
grants, loans, equity injections and debt writeoffs. 
* Inconsistent application of standards for imposition of 
annual use taxes on cars, and differing tax levels. 
* Use of fiscal incentives in sorne Member States (West 
Germany, Netherlands) to encourage sales of vehicles built 
to differing emissions and noise standards. 
* Inconsistent levels of taxes on motor fuels. 
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2. Physical Barriers 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Border crossing documentary and inspection requirements, 
with attendant delays having consequences in the loss of 
time and money in the shipping of components and vehicles. 
Customs and immigration checks on persona! movements 
within the Community. 
High cost of regulated air travel within the Community, 
imposing an implicit physical barrier on the volume of 
travel for business purposes. 
Differences in communications standards between Member 
States that present physical barriers to cooperation in 
vehicle development and production. 
3. Technical Barriers 
* Lack of a single EC-wide Type Approval procedure, 
requiring costly and time-consuming duplication of cars 
and tests. 
* Exhaust emissions standards which are not definitively 
fixed at a common leve! with agreed dates for 
implementation. 
* Unique national vehicle equipment requirements such as 
side repeater flasher lights in Italy, reclining driver's 
seat in West Germany, dim-dip lighting in the UK, yellow 
headlamp bulbs in France and unique rear reflectors in 
West Germany. 
* Maximum speed test required for sorne but noy all Member 
States (West Germany, Italy, Spain). 
C. PROJECT PARAMETERS FOR EC92 
To provide a basis for study, LAL drew upon the research 
findings to set the assumptions and parameters for the work; 
these are published in full in the Final Report. The intent 
in this Executive Summary is to provide highlights of those 
key points which have had a significant effect upon the 
findings. They include as well sorne of the project 
assumptions concerning events that will occur as a 
consequence of EC92. The summary highlights are as follows: 
The EC negotiates agreements and understandings with its 
global trade partners as an unified entity. These unified 
external trade policies are arrived at so that national 
restraints, regulations, agreements and understandings on 
auto imports may be phased out progressively. The leve! of 
local content that qualifies an automobile to be considered 
EC-produced is assumed to be 70 percent of the factory cost 
by value (project assumption). 
A new regime permits EC-wide business operations by a single 
corporate entity. EC member governments cease providing 
extraordinary aid to 'national champions'. National and 
local aid to enterprises is still permitted, but brought by 
EC actions within ranges that do not threaten to distort 
trade. Competition policies and activities in the Community 
are strengthened and refined to ensure that EC92 does not 
lead to the formation of monopolies that will tend to defeat 
the achievement of higher scale efficiencies. 
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Unilateral use of priee controls by Member States is 
suppressed by legislative actions taken by Community members 
in response to requirements of internal market completion. 
VAT applicable to the sale of autos is approximated at levels 
ranging from 14 percent to 20 percent. The application of 
VAT on the sale of used cars is harmonised. 
Vehicle use taxes are approximated by the EC at a level which 
does not distort trade. An EC action achieves harmonisation 
of taxes on motor fuel throughout the Community at levels per 
1, 000 litres of 340 Ecu for leaded petrel, 310 Ecu for 
unleaded petrel, 17 7 Ecu for diesel fuel and 85 Ecu for 
liquid petroleum gas (project assumption). 
Future technical regulations directly affecting the design of 
autos are phased in simultaneously by all EC Member States, 
with adequate lead time, at values agreed either unanimously 
or by majority under the Single European Act. 
Testing and certification standards and procedures for 
automobiles to be sold in the Community take effect EC-wide 
and permit EC Type Approval to be achieved through a single 
national application. Tests and standards for acceptability 
of replacement parts are harmonised among Member States. 
Flexibility of use of hire purchase of automobiles is 
enhanced throughout the Community by EC measures taken to 
liberalise competition in services. Liability insurance 
requirements are consistent among Member States. Procedures 
for registering in one Member State a vehicle purchased in 
another are made routine, as are terms for temporary vehicle 
use in ether than the state of registration. 
Research and development activities take place using 
technical standards and communications that are common to all 
the EC industry suppliers and manufacturers. Standards are 
agreed and implemented throughout the Community, among the 
assemblers and suppliers, for the CAD systems that are used 
in the design and engineering of vehicles and parts. 
Manufacturers and their suppliers reach agreement on a 
protocol for the coordination of in-factory electronics 
throughout EC vehicle production plants. 
Car marketing patterns in Community countries shift under the 
influence of the new tax regimes and the phasing out of 
internal market limitations on third-country BU imports·. 
Vehicle makers and distributors exert central control qf 
their sales and marketing for all of the Community from a 
single headquarters. 
Parts distribution is streamlined and centrally controlled. 
All dealer training activities, including service trarning, 
are conducted on a pan-European basis. Vehicle makers 
provide a Eurowarranty, fully valid at all their EC dealers. 
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III. DIMENSIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
EUROPEAN MOTOR INDUSTRY 
Page 6 
Broadly EC auto manufacturers account for in excess of 85 
percent of registrations in their home market. In 1985 
Europe was the world's second-largest car market, and by 1986 
it had overtaken the USA to become the largest single market. 
In 1985 the EC manufacturers accounted for 37 percent of 
world passenger car production. 
While the EC car and component manufacturers have shed 
significant amounts of labour in recent years to gain 
competitiveness, they still directly employ in excess of 1.7 
million people across the Community. The EC motor industry 
absorbs between 5 and 8 percent of all industrial output and 
accounts for approximately 20 percent of production of steel 
and machine tools, 15 percent of rubber production and 5 
percent of all glass output. 
A. INDUSTRY ECONOMIC VOLUME 
In view of the very substantial economie role on the part of 
the EC auto industry, it was judged necessary to make a fresh 
determination of the industry's dimensions in the study base 
year of 1985, the most recent for which adequate EC-wide data 
are available. An analysis was conducted to determine the 
retail value of the car markets in Europe, net and gross of 
tax, and the retail value of car and car component production 
in the various producing countries. 
The findings of the analysis are summarised in separate 
tables for cars and components. One shows the volumes of 
cars produced (Table 1). Another defines the total value of 
this production in billions of Ecu for both retail and 
wholesale markets (Table 2). Another table defines the value 
in billions of Ecu of European component production, showing 
also the value of components used for national production 
(Table 3). 
Table 1: AUTOMOBILE VOLUMES (1985) 
Units: millions PRODUCTION % SALES % VARIANCE 
Germany 4.17 35.9 2.38 24.9 1.79 
France 2.63 22.6 1.77 18.5 0.86 
Ital y 1.39 11.9 1.75 18.3 (0.36) 
Spain 1.23 10.6 0.56 5.9 0.67 
UK 1.05 9.0 1.83 19.1 (0.78) 
Belgium 0.99 8.5 0.39 4.1 0.60 
Netherlands 0.11 1.0 0.49 5.1 (0.38) 
Portugal 0.06 0.5 0.10 1.0 (0.04) 
Denmark 0.00 0.0 0.16 1.7 (0.16) 
Gree ce 0.00 0.0 0.08 0.8 (0.08) 
Eire o.oo 0.0 0.06 0.6 (0.06) 
Total 11.63 100 9.57 100 2.06 
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Table 2: AUTOMOBILE VALUES 
All in billion Ecu 
COUNTRY PRODUCTION 
----MARKET-----
Retail Wholesale 
Germany 34.6 19.3 16.1 
France 13.9 12.9 12.2 
UK 7.3 14.6 12.3 
Ital y 6.6 12.0 9.2 
Bel/Lux 7.1 2.3 2.6 
Spain 5.2 4.2 2.9 
Netherlands 0.8 3.5 2.4 
Denmark 1.1 0.9 
Eire 0.8 0.6 
Greece 1.1 0.9 
Portugal 0.6 0.4 
Non-Add (3.5)* 
Total 72.0 72.4 60.5 
* Allowance for double-counting of production, i.e. completed 
cars shawn in bath Belgian and German figures. 
Table 3: COMPONENT VALUES 
All in billion Ecu 
COUNTRY TOTAL LOCAL 
PRODUCTION USE 
Germany 19.7 19.0 
France 10.0 8.3 
UK 4.7 4.5 
Ital y 3.8 3.6 
Bel/Lux 2.4 5.2 
Spain 2.6 3.1 
Netherlands 0.5 0.6 
Denmark 
Eire 
Greece 
Portugal 
Total 43.7 44.3 
One of the principal findings of this analysis is the 
substantial importance and dimension of the German car and 
component industry within the EC. The value of German car 
production at 34.6 bn Ecu represents over 48 percent of the 
total EC output. This reflects the high-value mix of German 
production and the relatively law-value mix of French, 
Spanish and Italian production. The total value of the 
German production of components, at 19.7 bn Ecu, represents 
45 percent of the total European output. 
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The production values of the French car and component 
industries are also of sign1ficant size at 13.9 bn Ecu and 
10.0 bn Ecü, representing 19.3 percent and 22.9 percent of 
their respective EC markets. 
B. TRADE FLOWS 
In 1985 the EC manufacturers exported 2. 01 million cars to 
external markets worth 19.1 billion Ecu. The major markets 
for these were the EFTA countries with 0.69 million, closely 
followed by the USA with 0. 64 million vehicles. The EC 
countries imported 1.1 million cars worth 5.41 billion Ecu. 
The major exporter to the EC was Japan with 0.8 million cars. 
The graphs below show that the dominance of Germany in 
production/sales terms was also reflected in 1985 in terms of 
both intra- and extra-EC trade. The high value mix of German 
cars is especially marked in terms of extra-EC experts, in 
which Germany accounts for 67 percent by value of total EC 
experts. 
Figure 1 
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IV. DESIGN AND ENGINEERING COSTS AND SAVINGS 
As shown in the Section V.A analysis of car cost structure, 
the overall cost of designing and engineering a vehicle to 
the production-ready stage is a small proportion -- typically 
5 percent -- of the total cost of building the production 
vehicle. The proportion tends to fall to a lower level for 
cars that are in very large-scale production, and for cars of 
relatively simple design. 
Four distinct phases exist within the design and engineering 
process: project definition, detail design, engineering 
development, and submission for homologation and type 
approval. In each of these four areas a potential effect on 
costs arises from the changes in legislative workload that 
will derive from the creation of EC92. 
The cost of project definition is relatively extremely small, 
since it involves only a few people. The cost of detail 
design is inevitably -greater, .although it is still 
essentially a question of paying for ·man-hours. The more 
complex the issues of technical legislation that must be 
addressed, the higher will be the cost of detail design. It 
is unlikely, however, that technical conformity alone will 
absorb more than 15 percent of the total detail design effort 
and thus cost. 
Costs increase rapidly when vehicle engineering enters the 
stage of development, since, for the first time, a 
significant investment is required in hardware, in the form 
of component test rigs and operating prototypes. 
EC92 implies a common set of technical regulations, and 
common procedures for vehicle homologation and type approval, 
applied uniformly throughout the Community. A benefit of 
such complete technical harmonisation will be the 
simplification of homologation and type approval procedures. 
Given common technical regulations throughout the EC, the 
submission of vehicles and data to the type approval 
authorities in each member state would constitute needless 
duplication. Current type approval exercises frequently 
require more than 100 prototype and pilot-build vehicles. A 
typical cost for a hand-built prototype passenger car is 
100,000 Ecu. In manufacturer interviews, it was suggested 
that a saving of at least 20 such prototypes could be made if 
type approval could be applied for and obtained in a single 
country. This would result in a direct cost saving of at 
least 1 million Ecu, plus further savings in manpower. 
Estimates of the staff reductions which might become possible 
in the event of 'unified' homologation, by whatever method, 
varied from 15 to 40 percent, among department staffs 
numbering from 50 to 100 engineers. 
The design and engineering cost savings which can be achieved 
through technical and regulatory harmonisation (including 
EC-wide homologation) will depend on the level at which such 
harmonisation takes place. For example, to harmonise 
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Community technical requirements on the basis of a 'highest 
common factor' which includes all current national 
requirements (ether than those which are mutually exclusive) 
would increase car unit costs by 2 to 5 percent, according to 
manufacturer interviews. The cost impact would be relatively 
the highest on the smallest, simplest and cheapest cars. 
The larger proportion of the added cost in this case -- as 
for the car production process as a whole would be 
accounted for by the higher direct cost of purchasing the 
extra components needed. According to the interviews, an 
added cost would also be generated by the need to design and 
engineer all the elements of every car model to the 'highest 
common factor' of Community standards. Such cost increases 
would, however, be offset in whole or in part by savings 
achieved through simplified homologation and type approval 
procedures. 
Investigation of the design and engineering cost aspects has 
shown several ways in which EC92 can contribute to savings in 
this area. EC harmonisation to encourage design cost 
reduction could proceed along two principal lines, as 
follows: 
One line would be a move toward harmonisation of the national 
technical 'break points' in fiscal regulations. At present, 
design and engineering (and production) efforts are forced to 
be divided among too many specialised car versions by the 
many 'break points' created by different national fiscal 
approaches to car purchase and ownership taken by EC member 
states. A more nearly harmonised fiscal approach could 
substantially reduce the design and engineering load on the 
major EC car producers, permitting a smaller number of 
variants to be engineered to higher standards. 
A second line of action suggested by the design and 
engineering interviews should be in the removal of fiscal and 
customs barriers, to ease the process by which car 
manufacturers could exchange common components across 
internal European borders. This is part of the study 
findings relating to variable cost savings; it is seen as 
having a potential for engineering cost reduction as well. 
This section of the study showed opportunities for design and 
engineering cost savings in EC92, as well as certain possible 
offsetting cost increases. The net effect of the savings is 
estimated to be 10 percent of the design and engineering 
cost, or 0.5 percent of the vehicle cost. This saving is 
incorporated in the calculations in Section V.C. 
It should also be noted here that LAL assumes in this study 
that the EC car industry will reinvest part of the savings 
achieved in EC92 in more active advanced R&D to keep European 
cars at the forefront of world technological trends. The 
amount and disposition of this reinvestment, assumed to be 
one percent of costs, is addressed in Section VI.!. 
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V. AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTION SCALE ECONOMY 
The research and analysis undertaken in this project have 
shown relatively few instances of immediate direct effects of 
the implementation of EC92 that are unique and distinctive to 
the auto industry. The removal of border controls, for 
example, will reduce transportation costs, an effect which is 
generic to EC industry as a whole and which, as such, is 
covered by separate Commission research. 
The principal auto industry effects are those which will be 
delayed in their implementation, because they will only be 
realised after the industry has taken actions that the 
improved internal market conditions will facilitate. 
Important cost reductions are expected from the improvements 
in production economies of scale that will occur when EC92 
conditions permit more extensive transborder interpenetration 
of individual parts, components and assemblies, and built-up 
vehicles. The levels of scale efficiency achieved in the 
industries of the USA and Japan have been referred to in this 
work, as have the best levels currently achieved in Europe. 
In this section of the Executive Summary the topic of 
production scale economies is addressed in three elements. 
The first element (Section V.A) establishes the segments 
being studied and the variable and fixed costs of a typical 
car in each segment. It also discusses the research and 
findings that show the variations in cost with changing 
production volume that occur in the making of these cars. 
In the second element (Section V. B), the concept of car 
platforms is introduced as a means of analysing the 
differences between the annual production volumes of EC85 and 
EC92. The findings of the platform study and the cost 
variations are combined in the third element (Section V.C), 
together with the engineering findings and other fixed cost 
considerations, to show the overall savings achieved in EC92. 
A. VEHICLE COST STRUCTURE 
The essential linkage in the production cost element of the 
study between the cost of components and the economies of 
scale that are achievable with built-up vehicles is the 
factory cost structure of the vehicle itself. Because the 
distribution of passenger car costs differs significantly 
according to the size and category of the vehicle, separate 
structures were evolved to suit the five main volume segments 
for cars that are made and marketed in Europe. The segments, 
and typical vehicles in each of them, are as follows: 
Lower Upper 
Utility Small Mediwn Mediwn Large 
Panda VW Polo VW Golf Peugeot GM Omega 
Renault 4 Fiesta Escort 405 Renault 25 
Cit. 2CV Renault 5 Fiat Ritmo Sierra Fiat Croma 
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The total cost structure is divided into variable cost and 
fixed cost elements. These are discussed in the following 
sections of this Executive Summary. 
1. Variable Costs 
The variable cost benefit of EC92 at the supplier level was 
researched and analysed by means of two parallel programmes. 
One programme consisted of a direct sourcing and pricing 
activity, gathering data on priee/volume relationships of a 
comprehensive menu of parts used in automobiles. The ether 
programme made use of structured interviews of component 
producers to gain insight into their actions and attitudes. 
a. Component Cost Research and Analysis 
A professional automotive component purchasing organisation 
was engaged to contact European suppliers to obtain priee 
quetes on the supply of their products at annual volumes of 
50,000, 100,000, 200,000, 300,000, 500,000 and 1,000,000 car 
sets. Approximately ninety items were selected for this 
research, as being representative of the range of components 
and sub-assemblies found in European cars. 
A study finding was that the incremental volumes used for the 
research appear, at the high end of the volume scale, to 
represent the maximum potential output per component now 
prevailing in Europe. The European supply industry was found 
to be not tooled or equipped to provide many of the major 
components at rates beyond levels of 500,000 sets per annum. 
An immediate impetus toward greater volume would be generated 
if car makers were to curtail the practise of awarding the 
supply of a single part or assembly to several suppliers. 
The research shows, however, a continuing reluctance among EC 
auto makers to source major componentry from a sole supplier. 
b. Car Variable Cost Structure and Volume Variation 
For the purpose of this research the variable cost element of 
a car has been divided into seven categories, using groupings 
that are in accord with motor industry practise. The 
categories are power train, body in white, electrical, 
chassis, interior, exterior, and paint and assembly. 
Although a strict definition would include indirect labour as 
an element of fixed cost, a necessary simplification has been 
the decision to show all labour as an element of variable 
cost. Thus labour is included in the variable cost of 
producing each group of components shown, with the exception 
of the separate paint and assembly category. 
Making use of industry data and research findings, as 
detailed in the full report, a base variable cost structure 
for each of the five segments was established. This is shown 
in tabular form (Table 4). 
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Table 4 
UNIT VARIABLE COST STRUCTURES IN FIVE EUROPEAN SEGMENTS 
Variable Cost Element Utility Small Lower Upper Large 
(Status: Ecu 1985) Med. Med. 
Engine and Transmission 575 715 810 1040 1550 
Electrical 130 225 450 680 1160 
Chas sis 355 540 855 1040 1545 
Interi01:· 250 370 610 835 1235 
Exterior 70 110 205 315 465 
Body in White t+LL5 535 550 730 925 
Paint and Assembly 255 340 485 575 850 
Total Variable Cost 2080 2835 3965 5215 7730 
From the base costs, the component cast/volume data 
researched and oth~r industry data have been employed to 
obtain a view of the typical overall scale volume effects on 
the costs of volume-produced passenger cars in each of the 
five study segments. The changes in the variable costs in 
each segment that occur with changing annual volume are shawn 
in graphical form (Figure 3). 
Figure 3 
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2. Fixed Costs 
Again follmving EC auto industry practise, the fixed costs 
associated wi th car production have be en researched unàer 
seven categories, as follows: tooling, engineering, warranty, 
marketing, sel ling, administration and other fixed costs. 
Base typical fixed costs for the five EC car segments have 
been established, and are shawn in tabular form (Table 5). 
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Table 5 
UNIT FIXED COST STRUCTURES IN FIVE EUROPEAN SEGMENTS 
Fixed Cost Element Utility Small Lower Upper Large 
(Status: Ecu 1985} Med. Med. 
Tooling 265 3SO 30S 580 680 
Engineering 160 210 27S 360 sos 
Warranty 90 135 175 26S 355 
Marketing, Selling, 65S 680 710 75S 830 
Administration, Other 
Total Fixed Cost 1170 1375 1465 1960 2370 
B. ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTION BY PLATFORMS 
1. Platform Survey 
The vehicle platform was selected as the basic analysis 
parameter for the study of vehicle variable costs. An unique 
'platform' is defined by the motor industry as a single 
vehicle floorpan design to which common components are 
attached in the areas of running gear, suspension, and 
steering. With relatively minor changes, the floorpan may be 
varied in length without departing from the concept of an 
unique platform. 
It was determined during the research that the analysis of 
car production according to platforms offers the only method 
that provides a direct correlation with the data obtained on 
the cost/volume relationships of car components. In 
principle, the most tooling-intensive parts of a platform are 
common to it and to the vehicles built on it. Thus in theory 
all the mechanical parts of a platform will be alike in all 
the car models it carries, making component volume equal to 
platform volume. This provides a direct and clear 
relationship that is not possible with the study of either 
marque or model output. 
In this phase of the work the base-year 198S European market 
was analysed in terms of the typical number of platforms 
produced in each segment and the number of car production 
facilities that are required to reach the total industry 
volume. This aspect of the platform analysis is detailed in 
full in the Final Report. 
An EC85 basis for comparison with EC92 conditions was 
obtained by selecting platform volumes achieved by the 
typical car models that prevail in each segment, and 
ad jus ting for non-typical volume factors. The selected 
method has generated platform numbers and volumes that are 
taken for the purposes of this study as being representative 
of industry practise in EC85 (Table 6}. 
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Table 6 
EC85 PLATFORM PRODUCTION VOLUMES BY SEGMENT 
Segment Number of Volume Total 
Platforms Per Platform Production 
Utility 3 110,000 330,000 
Small 6 440,000 2,640,000 
Lower Medium 6 525,000 3,150,000 
Upper Medium 6 315,000 1,890,000 
Large A 6 140,000 840,000 
Large B 3 70,000 210,000 
Total 30 9,060,000 
2. Factors Affecting Changes in 
Platform Production Volumes in EC92 
In the preceding section, analysis has been conducted of EC85 
platform production volumes by segment and typical platform 
production volumes in EC85. In EC92 the European platforms 
will be produced according to a different pattern, as a 
consequence of two main factors: sharing of platforms between 
makers, and strong specialisation in particular segments by 
producers. 
EC92 conditions will substantially facilitate the sharing of 
platforms between and among makers, following trends that are 
already evident and that are forecast to prevail in EC92 
(industry interviews). The elimination of physical barriers 
to joint engineering work, the establishment of common 
production protocols, the greater ease and lower cost of 
travel by engineers and executives, and the more rapid and 
assured movement of parts and assemblies throughout Europe 
will contribute to this sharing of platforms. 
In addition, in EC92 conditions car and component makers will 
be able to implement more fully a policy of specialising in 
particular product segments to gain longer annual production 
runs and hence higher manufacturing efficiency. Such trends 
are already evident among EC car producers in vehicles such 
as the Fiat Uno in the Small segment and the VW Golf in the 
Lower Medium segment. 
Taking into account the factors described, and extrapolating 
from current trends by considering the best performances 
being achieved by manufacturers in EC87 in the various 
segments, LAL has forecast the EC92 conditions for platform 
numbers and volumes (Table 7). To permit direct comparison 
with EC85 conditions in the subsequent calculations, the 
total production volumes for both sets of platforms are held 
at the same level. 
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Table 7 
EC92 PLATFORM PRODUCTION VOLUMES BY SEGMENT 
Segment Humber of Volume Total 
Platforms Per Platform Production 
Utility 2 160,000 320,000 
Small 4 650,000 2,600,000 
Lower Medium 4 800,000 3,200,000 
Upper Medium 5 380,000 1,900,000 
Large A 4' 220,000 880,000 
Large B 2 80,000 160,000 
Total 21 9,060,000 
C. AUTO PRODUCTION ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
This section describes the methodologies that have been 
employed for the analysis of the economies of scale and, 
subsequently, the automobile cost and priee changes that are 
forecast to occur in the change from EC85 to EC92 conditions. 
The work described in this section is based on the assumption 
that no change in overall industry volume occurs in the first 
iteration of the effects of EC92. Volume changes in later 
iterations are possible according to the indirect dynamic 
effects experienced, described and quantified in Section VII. 
1. Variable Costs 
By applying the findings concerning EC92 platform volumes to 
the trend data established on variable costs, the total level 
of car variable cost under EC92 conditions has been 
established. The change from EC85 thus established can be 
attributed to the direct effects of EC92, because the overall 
level of Community production is assumed to remain static. 
Thus the identified cost savings arise from the structural 
changes in production for which the catalyst and prime mover 
is the introduction of EC92 conditions. 
The cost/volume graph of variable cost (Figure 3) has been 
used to establish the levels of variable cost per unit that 
are applicable at the platform volumes postulated to prevail 
when EC92 conditions are in existence. The findings, 
detailed in tables in the full report, show that overall the 
change to EC92 produces a 2.36 percent reduction in aggregate 
variable costs, valued at 898.9 million Ecu. 
2. Fixed Costs 
-
The selected approach to quantifying the impact of EC92 on 
fixed costs is to apply to the fixed cost structure the 
findings on platform volumes, and to establish the impact 
that these changes in production methods will have on 
overheads and fixed costs. The specifie effects of the 
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projected EC92 platform changes on the fixed cost categories 
are outlined in the following sections on tooling costs, 
engineering costs, warranty and ether fixed costs. 
a. Tooling Costs 
The principal tooling cost savings will result from the 
economies of scale caused by higher platform volumes in EC92. 
These savings will take effect at both the component and car 
producer/assembler levels. 
It is envisaged that the development of large basic parts 
suppliers capable of an arder of magnitude higher production 
volume will be accelerated by EC92. The economies of scale 
associated with this development will reduce fixed as well as 
variable costs. 
In EC92 the automobile manufacturers will continue to produce 
a large number of superficially different- models, with 
discrete external sheet metal, while at the. same time they 
share more common platforms. For this study it has been 
assumed that approximately 50 percent of tooling costs relate 
to areas which can be commonised, and thus where direct 
economies of scale will be realised. 
Table 8: TOOLING COST COMPARISON 
Lower Upper 
Utility Small Medium Medium Large 
EC85 Unit Cast (Ecu) 
EC92 Unit Cost (Ecu) 
Total Tooling Costs 
Utility Small 
EC85 
EC92 
87,450 
70,720 
924,000 
756,600 
COST SAVING (000 Ecu) 
b. Engineering 
265 
221 
Medium 
350 
291 
Lower 
Medium 
305 
250 
960,750 1,096,200 
800,000 997,500 
Upper 
Large 
580 
525 
714,000 
585,840 
680 
551 (a} 
631 (b} 
Total 
3,782,400 
3,210,660 
571,740 
As a consequence of the move to EC92 the benefits in terms 
of engineering fixed cost reductions are threefold, as 
follows: 
(1} Scale Economy Improvements 
As a direct result of the reduction in the number of 
platforms being utilised, the fixed cost ~lement of 
engineering will be spread over a higher production volume 
per platform, bringing about economies of scale. The 
relevant saving will be reduced by the approximately 50 
percent of the componentry of the automobile that is in those 
areas which will continue to be differentiated. 
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(2) Component Commonisation 
An indirect consequence is forecast to flow from the greater 
use of common components. This will occur because the actual 
cost of designing the automobile will fall as a 'learning 
curve effect' is experienced by using already tried and 
tested components/designs. 
It may be taken from the preceding elements of this study 
that up to 20 percent of automobile components could be 
commonised. If the use of common engineering design and 
testing for these components yields a 2S percent saving in 
terms of design time/costs, the total engineering cost saving 
will be in the region of S percent. 
(3) Staff/Overhead Savings 
An element of the fixed cost of engineering which must be 
borne by the finished vehicle is the cost o;f retaining an 
in-house engineering /product maintenance department. As a 
result of the simplification of type approval procedures and 
the greater use of common components it would be reasonable 
to expect sorne savings in this area, as discussed in Section 
IV. These savings would be in the arder of O.S percent. 
Table 9: ENGINEERING COST COMPARISON 
Lower Upper 
Fixed Engineering Utility Small Medium Medium Large 
Cost Per Unit 
EC8S (Ecu) 160 210 27S 360 sos 
EC92 (Ecu) 127 166 21S 311 390 (a) 
447 (b) 
Total Fixed Engineering Cost 
Lower Upper 
Utility Small Medium Medium Large Total 
EC8S S2,800 SS4,400 866,2SO 680,400 S30,2SO 2,684,100 
EC92 40,640 431,600 688,000 408,SOO 414,720 1,983,460 
COST SAVING (000 Ecu) 700,640 
c. Warrant~ 
The cost of providing warranty caver on automobiles should be 
reduced by the effects of the change to EC92, as a result of 
three factors. First, the longer annual production runs 
should enable the cost of any service failures to be spread 
more widely, resulting in a lower unit cast. Second, the use 
of well tried and tested common components and designs should 
further reduce such failures, especially during the warranty 
or early-life failure period of a vehicle. 
Third, in EC92 the direct communication between dealer and 
manufacturer will remove a tier of administration in dealing 
with warranty claims, and also remove an added administrative 
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cost on the sale of warranty parts in cases where the 
manufacturer deals directly instead of through a national 
importer. Overall warranty cost savings in the region of 10 
percent could therefore be expected. 
Table 10: WARRANTY COST COMPARISON 
Lower Upper 
Warranty Utility Small Medium Medium Large 
per Unit 
EC85 (Ecu) 90 135 175 265 355 
EC92 (Ecu) 81 122 158 239 320 
Total Warranty Provision 
Lower Upper 
Utility Small Medium Medium Large Total 
EC85 29,700 356,400 551,250 500,850 372,750 1,810,950 
EC92 25,920 317,200 505,600 454,100 332,800 1,635,320 
COST SAVING (000 Ecu) 175,330 
d. Other Fixed Costs 
(1) Administration and Other Overheads 
At present the manufacturers indirectly finance the costs 
that dealers incur by holding stocks of their automobiles. 
This is because the national importers, which are often owned 
and run (albeit with a degree of autonomy) by the 
manufacturers, directly finance the dealers' inventory. 
Since the cost of finance is an overhead to be borne by 
productive output, any steps which· are taken to reduce these 
stocks and the resulting finance costs will reduce the 
overhead cost of producing automobiles. 
If by exploiting the potential of EC92 for improved shipping 
and communications the manufacturers and the national 
importers succeed in reducing the stock inventory period in 
Europe by one month, the saving to the producers, in their 
cost of financing, could be as much as 213,333,000 Ecu. 
(2) Selling and Marketing 
An immediate cost reduction in sales and marketing will be a 
consequence of the increased interpenetration of the market 
by car makes and models in EC92. The model ranges offered by 
makers throughout the EC will differ country-by-country less 
than they do in EC85. This will allow increased pan-European 
advertising, promotion and launching of automobiles, which in 
turn will allow the fixed cost element of preparing the 
relevant promotional material to be reduced. 
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It is estimated that a saving of 5 percent in the cost of 
advertising could be obtained by the centralisation of 
advertising/marketing budgets and the greater use of common 
material. This is expected to generate savings in the region 
of 42,476,000 Ecu. 
Table 11: SUMMARY OF FACTORY FIXED COST SAVINGS (000 Ecu) 
Tooling 
Engineering 
Warranty Provision 
Administration/Finance Costs 
Advertising 
571,740 
700,640 
175,330 
213,333 
42,476 
COST SAVING 1,703,519 
The total saving thus achieved represents 11.5% of total 
factory fixed costs. 
3. Non-Factory Costs/Overheads 
Other costs, including those of distributing vehicles from 
the factory to the marketplace, have an impact on the priee 
at which the car is sold to the dealer and eventually to the 
consumer. Though not a principal focus of the study 
requested by the Commission, such costs require a brief 
review. 
The principal overhead in this category is the cost of 
maintaining national importer organisations in the respective 
EC Member States. The direct business relations between 
manufacturer and dealer which will be stimulated by EC92 
conditions will significantly reduce this cost to the 
manufacturer by allowing relatively slimmed-down national 
offices to replace national sales companies. An initial 
costing of the magnitude of the potential savings in this 
area suggests a level of 1,600 million Ecu. 
Potential savings also derive from an attribute of the 
current delivery chain, from producer to consumer, which 
directly impacts upon the retail priee. Referred to is the 
practise of adding a company charge at each point of 
transfer. In addition to the variable and fixed cost savings 
on ex-factory costs/prices already discussed, a company cost 
is also incurred as part of the de li very charge from the 
storage compound to the customer. 
In EC92 the direct communication between dealer and producer 
will lead to the dealer taking up functions that were 
previously within the domain of the national importer. This 
is likely to include order and payment for vehicles in 
advance at the factory gate and dockside collection where 
required. The removal of the intermediate role of the 
national importer will reduce this layer of cost, which under 
EC85 conditions has a magnitude of more than 400 million Ecu. 
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VI. DIRECT/DEFERRED EFFECTS OF EC92 
The findings of the project have been organised in accord 
with a specified EC Commission format, which provides for 
responses showing the effects of given topic areas in key EC 
countries and in the Community as a whole. The study 
findings reported in this section are organised according to 
the Commission format. 
A. SHARE OF VALUE ADDED IN FINAL DEMAND 
This establishes the percentage of the retail value of car 
and component sales within the EC and Member States that is 
represented by the value added by the home country producers. 
Table 12 
(percentages) 
West 
Germany France Italy 
31.6 21.1 20.2 
UK 
17.9 
Other Total 
4.2 20.6 
The findings were determined by applying the gross value 
added (GVA) percentage to the retail value of production 
retained within each home market and comparing the resulting 
value to the retail value of total sales in that market. 
The results 
applicable to 
low value of 
percentage of 
show clearly that the high GVA percentage 
West German production, when combined with the 
import penetration, gives a relatively high 
GVA in final demand for Germany. 
B. SHARE OF VALUE OF PRODUCTION IN TOTAL DEMAND 
This establishes the share of retail sales in the home market 
that is accounted for by home production. 
Table 13 West 
(percentages) Germany France Ital y UK Other Total 
79.5 71.2 60.2 51.2 15.8 59.1 
C. SHARE OF VALUE ADDED EXPORTED 
This establishes what percentage of value added is exported. 
Table 14 West 
(percentages) Germany France Ital y UK Other Total 
48.6 38.9 26.0 28.4 79.5 46.5 
The findings confirm that West Germany is very export-
orientated and also that the other EC producing countries, 
which are dominated by Belgium and Spain, produce principally 
for the export market. It also shows the very important role 
the home market plays for UK and Italian producers and thus 
the threat which further import penetration would pose to the 
home producers in these countries. 
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D. CHANGE IN UNIT COST OF PRODUCTIVE LABOUR 
Table 15 
(percentage 
reduction) 
West 
Germany France Italy 
8.9 12.3 13.3 
UK 
9.7 
Page 22 
Other Total 
12.2 11.00 
The LAL study of automobile costs indicates that under EC85 
conditions labour accounts for approximately 22 percent of 
variable costs. Although considerable variation between 
individual countries does exist, it is anticipated, on the 
basis of interview findings and LAL analysis, that the 
introduction of EC92 conditions will further enhance trends 
in labour utilisation which are already being observed, such 
as the use of robotics and the increased automation of 
previously manually performed tasks. LAL concludes that 
under EC92 conditions the share of vehicle variable cost 
attributable to labour will fall from 22 to 20 percent across 
the car segments. 
By analysing the manner in which variable costs move in the 
transition from EC85 to EC92 across the five car segments, 
and by weighting this change by reference to the significance 
of each segment in the total production of each country, the 
above reductions in unit labour costs have been established. 
E. CHANGE IN DIRECT UNIT COST OF PRODUCTION 
Total unit cost of production has be en ta ken as including 
variable cost plus those fixed costs directly attributable to 
production. 
Table 16 West 
German y France Ital y UK Other Total 
Reduction (%) 2.93 4.49 4.94 3.09 4.25 3.50 
Attributable to: 
Labour savings 1. 55 2.53 2.84 1. 75 2.49 1.97 
Intermediate 0.15 0.32 0.34 0.01 0.12 0.17 
Tooling savings 1.23 1.64 1.76 1.33 1.64 1.36 
The total cost saving in percentage terms is a consequence of 
those reductions ~n labour unit costs, lower costs of 
producing and/or procuring components, and also to those 
reductions directly attributable to the changes in platform 
volumes. 
The greatest change occurs in the Italian automobile 
industry, where a high level of labour content gives greatest 
scope for productivity gains and also where output is heavily 
concentrated in those product segments where considerable 
scope for economies of scope occur. 
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F. CHANGE IN TOTAL UNIT COST OF PRODUCTION 
This finding reflects the total EC92 change in unit 
costs/prices. It includes those fixed costs/overheads that 
are not directly attributable to production, but are included 
within the ex-factory cost of vehicles in each segment. 
West Table 17 
(percentage 
reduction) 
Germany France Italy UK Other Total 
Total 
Attributable to: 
Pure Cost 
Res truc turing 
4.34 5.54 
4.80 4.90 
( 0. 46) 0. 64 
5.68 
5.00 
0.68 
4.30 
4.80 
(0.50) 
5.32 
4.90 
0.42 
5.00 
5.09 
(0.09) 
The magnitude of change is greater than for production costs 
alone because the fixed cost · element of total unit costs 
experiences a higher percentage change in the transition from 
EC85 to EC92 conditions. However the change differentiai 
between countries is lower because the segments exhibit 
similar platform volume behavior from one country to another. 
Pure cost savings are defined as those savings which would 
occur as a result of the development of platform sharing, 
technical advances and other changes brought about by the 
move to EC92. This excludes the changes in overall segment 
volumes brought about by a restructuring of production. The 
overall impact of the restructuring has been to reduce the 
potential benefits because the restructuring involves a shift 
in emphasis towards the high-volume lower and upper medium 
segments. The greatest pure cost reductions occur in the 
lower volume segments, where the potential economies of scale 
are greatest. The variations between countries reflects the 
different segment mixes in their car production. 
G. CHANGE IN LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
West Table 18 
(percentage 
improvement) 
Germany France Italy 
9.93 14.42 15.76 
UK Other Total 
10.87 14.09 12.58 
Labour productivity is defined as output of vehicles per 
person employed in the industry. The change in labour cost 
per unit produced, outlined above, is assumed to occur as a 
result of the reduction of manning levels. Given the 
underlying assumption of static production volumes, this 
brings about the improvements shown in labour productivity. 
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H. CHANGE IN CAPITAL PRODUCTIVITY 
Table 19 
(percentage 
improvement) 
West 
Germany France 
16.64 17.63 
Ital y 
19.33 
UK 
18.50 
Page 24 
Other Total 
17.41 17.48 
Tooling costs have been used as a proxy for productive 
capital investment. This is judged to be valid because the 
tooling cost per unit is effectively the aggregate capital 
investment amortised over the number of automobiles a 
manufacturer produces. Given that the study assumption at 
this stage is that the volume produced remains static, any 
changes in tooling cost per unit reflect the change in 
aggregate capital invested and thus in productivity. 
I. CHANGE IN PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENTS 
Productive investments are taken as consisting of the book 
value of tangible fixed assets plus the level of research and 
development expenditure. Reductions in the level of capital 
investment will be possible in EC92 because the increased 
level of platform sharing will facilitate more efficient 
utilisation of plant and machinery. To produce the same 
volumes and model variations in EC92 as those achieved in 
EC85, fewer production machines will be required. 
Table 20 West 
(percentage German y France Ital y UK Other Total 
reduction) 
Scenario A 14.95 16.73 18.30 16.97 16.12 16.15 
Scenario B 12.90 14.90 17.30 14.20 14.90 14.30 
In Scenario A, R&D expenditure stays at constant levels. In 
this Scenario, the change in productive investments will be 
the change in capital productivity weighted for the 
importance of tangible fixed as sets. In Scenario B, auto 
manufacturers will take advantage of the cost savings arising 
from the move to EC92 conditions to invest one percent of 
total costs in advanced research and development in order to 
maintain their products at a high level of international 
technological competitiveness. 
Amounting to 600 million Ecu, the resulting R&D funding is 
assumed to be distributed amongst producing countries in 
proportion to the total costs which each accounted for in 
EC85. 
R&D development expenditure has two effects which can be 
classified into direct and deferred. The direct effect of 
such expenditure is to reduce auto manufacturers profits, 
raise ex-factory priees and depress demand. There is, 
however, a deferred consequence which encourages such 
expenditure to take place. This is the R&D 
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expenditure which can lead to improvements in the utilisation 
of both raw materials and machinery, reducing the unit cost 
of production, reducing the priee of the car and hence 
increasing demand in the longer term. 
As R&D is an ongoing process it is not usually possible to 
identify a specif~c cost benefit as stemming from a defined , 
item of expenditure. Because many of the benefits of R&D are 1 
qualitative it is very difficult to quantify its impact on 
demand. 
J. EC MARKET VOLUMES 
Table 21 
(absolute increases 
in units sold) 
Domestic market: 
Scenario 1 (000) 
Scenario 2 (000) 
EC-XII market: 
(excluding domestic) 
Scenario 1 (000) 
Scenario 2 (000) 
Extra-EC-XII market: 
Scenario 1 (000) 
Scenario 2 (000) 
EC-Producer Totals: 
Scenario 1 (000) 
Scenario 2 (000) 
West 
Germany France Italy UK 
72.3 
51.7 
70.3 
45.6 
55.9 
38.7 
198.6 
136.0 
42.8 
32.9 
63.9 
53.4 
33.4 
21.6 
140.2 
107.9 
45.2 
41.1 
21.9 
14.5 
8.7 
5.1 
75.9 
60.7 
35.3 
29.6 
5.7 
2.9 
5.8 
2.9 
46.8 
35.4 
Other Total ' 
24.8 
17.8 
76.7 
54.3 
12.5 
8.4 
113.9 
80.5 
220.4 : 
173.1 1 
238. 5 : 
170.7:. 
116. 3 . 
76.7 ' 
575.4: 
420.5 : 
The changes shown for Scenario 1 in units sold in the home 
market, the EC-XII market (excluding home country sales) and 
the Extra-EC-XII market are a consequence of the application 1 
of an elasticity of demand factor to the percentage change in 
production priees calculated above. 
The changes shown in Scenario 2 in units sold assume that the 
non-EC producers will respond to the new EC market conditions 
and reduce their own priees. Their priee reductions are 
expected to be mid-way between the EC85 position and that 
calculated for EC92. 
Studies of demand behaviour have indicated that the ~ 
automotive elasticity of demand factor for the European 
Community countries is typically in the region of -1.2 (Ref. 
Prof G Rhys). This factor has been employed for the purposes 
of this study. 
Strictly speaking this factor may not be appropriate when , 
applied to experts of automobiles outside the EC. This is 
due to the fact that each export market will have a different 
elasticity of demand for imports from the EC. 
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In the absence of specifie information on the elasticity of 
demand in foreign markets, LAL consider the application of 
the -1.2 factor is preferable to not providing results for 
this important source of sales. 
In Scenario 1, to assist in the quantification of the effects 
of priee changes on the structure of consumer demand in the 
EC, recourse has been made to the following assumptions: 
1. That Extra-EC producers of automobiles are unable or 
unwilling to respond to EC producer priee decreases. 
2. That a process of substitution of demand takes place in 
faveur of EC automobile producers so that existing 
purchasers of non-EC produced cars will change their 
purchase decision to EC-produced cars in proportion to the 
percentage decline in their priees. 
K. CHANGES IN NON-EC IMPORTS 
Table 22 West 
(percentage German y France Ital y UK Other Total 
reduction in sales) 
Scenario 1 39 100 100 35 23 42 
Scenario 2 24 84 90 19 13 28 
The findings for bath pricing scenarios shawn in Table 21 
illustrate that the priee reduction ~n EC-produced cars 
developed above for EC92 has the effect of reducing the sales 
volumes of non-EC producers' imports. The percentage 
reduction in sales for Scenario 2 is lower due to the non-EC 
producers responding to EC92 by reducing their priees. 
The largest degree of change is forecast in those countries 
where non-EC imports represent a small percentage of sales in 
EC85. Thus the effect is most notable in France and Italy, 
where non-EC imports would effectively cease to hold any 
meaningful market share. 
Full appreciation of the basis for this forecast may be 
derived from a study of the market conditions that obtain in 
the affected countries. In Italy, non-EC imports account for 
only 9 percent of total imports and less than 5 percent of 
sales. Of the non-EC imports, 60 percent are from East 
European producers and a further 33 percent are from the 
developing countries. These producers, often utilising 
antiquated technology, compete chiefly on priee. Thus it is 
reasonable to postulate the virtually complete elimination of 
such demand. 
France is another country with a law percentage of non-EC 
imports and a significant East European content in those 
imports. Thus similar results to those of Italy will occur. 
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The 1 other 1 EC countries have a high non-EC import 
penetration; in Scenario 1, 26 percent of all imports are 
from outside the EC-XII, of which 76 percent are from Japan 
and a further 4 percent from EFTA countries. These producers , 
are not competing solely on priee and therefore the reduction 
in imports from those sources in response to EC priee 
reductions will be less marked. 
In respect of France and Italy it is possible that the impact 
of priee reductions may be overstated. This is because the 
import quotas for Japanese automobiles may distort the 
pattern of demand. In the absence of a specifie study on the 
impact of such quotas it would be prudent to regard the 
results as the best estimates of what is achievable. 
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VII. DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF EC92 
The cost savings described and computed in Sections V and VI 
consist of the deferred direct consequences of introducing 
EC92 conditions. They are the savings/efficiencies that 
result from the actions taken by the auto industry to make 
full use of the potential of EC92. As noted they have been 
calculated on the basis that total EC market volume remains 
static; thus they omit the dynamic effects that are a 
consequence of the priee reductions that the lower 
manufacturing costs make possible. 
In this section, the dynamic consequences are analysed and 
discussed. In a sense, the dynamic consequences are 
infinitely iterative. Each dynamic improvement has the 
potential to reduce costs further, and thus to trigger a 
further dynamic improvement. In order to simplify analysis, 
LAL eschewed the creation of a multi-period dynamic model of 
single-market Europe because beyond the initial period it 
would be increasingly difficult to distinguish between direct 
EC92 consequences and those ·effects that stem from secondary 
developments. 
It is evident that as a result of the initial direct benefits 
of EC92 a multiplier effect will be triggered that will be 
felt for a number of years. In successive stages this 
multiplier effect will take the following form: 
1. The EC92 conditions liberalise internai trade and 
stimulate commonisation of parts and platforms, leading 
to lower costs. 
2. Due to intense competition and underutilised total 
industry capacity, the cost savings will be passed on 
to the consumer through lower real priees, less an 
allowance for intensified advanced R&D activity. 
3. The increased priee competitiveness of EC-produced 
automobiles vis-a-vis non-EC production leads to 
increased demand for vehicles from EC production, both 
inside and outside the Community. 
4. The greater EC volumes produced as a result of (3) will 
allow additional economies of scale to be achieved and 
exploited and, as a result, a further stimulation of 
demand will occur. 
A domestic direct/dynamic cycle very similar to this, built 
on an initial advantage of lower net labour costs, allowed 
the Japanese motor industry to make the inroads into world 
markets that it achieved, beginning in the 1970s. Now, 
however, the Japanese compete more on quality, style, 
technology and reliability than on the priee differentiai 
that gave them their market entree. 
In part as a consequence of the appreciation of the Yen, 
Japanese makers have restructured their product lines for 
export. As a result their penetration has been steadily 
moving up-market, well into the lower and upper medium 
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segments, and is forecast to be directed even higher. Thus 
it is conceivable that under EC92 conditions the European 
volume producers will be able to regain the grip on the 
'value for money' auto market that seemed, in the earl y 
1980s, to be lost to them forever. 
For these effects to take place as outlined, the demand for 
EC automobiles must be sufficiently priee elastic to give the 
manufacturers and their distributors an incentive to pass on 
cost savings to the retail level. Studies by Prof Garel Rhys 
of University Col lege at Cardiff, Wales indicate that the 
European market priee elasticity of demand is approximately 
-1.2 to -1.3 for consumer goods and for automobiles is in the 
range of -1.0 to -1.5. 
LAL has elected to take a prudent view by selecting a figure 
of -1.2 for auto priee elasticity across the EC market. On 
this basis, for every 1.0 percent decline in priee, demand 
will increase by 1.2 percent. This priee elasticity factor 
was employed in generating the responses to EC Commission 
requirements as described in Section VI. It triggered 
significant changes in the pattern of demand/trade. 
The dynamic effects are also highly relevant with respect to 
the total impact of EC92 on auto industry employment. The 
response in Section VI dealing with labour productivity in 
EC92 envisaged that improved labour productivity would occur, 
with a concomitant reduction in the labour requirement. This 
finding, however, was based on the direct effect assumption 
that production remained static in the move to EC92. 
As the dynamic effects of EC92 are realised, a proportional 
increase in the requirement for labour will occur. The priee 
elasticity calculation indicates that the 5 percent reduction 
in priee arrived at as a result of the direct effects will 
(multiplied by the 1.2 elasticity) increase demand for 
vehicles produced in the EC by at least 6 percent initially. 
If employment is recouped at the same rate, the employment 
reduction that would be assumed from the productivity 
improvement of EC92, would be approximately halved. 
A further recoupment of employment is seen as having the 
potential to occur in EC92. It will be accelerated as the 
multiplier process outlined earlier begins to take effect. 
In EC92 demand may prove to be more priee elastic than the 
-1.2 factor taken for this calculation. Also, the improved 
export potential of EC production resulting from the priee 
reduction may outperform the selected priee elasticity 
factor. 
In concert, these considerations off er the potential for a 
European car industry in EC92 which is a substantially more 
rationalised and vigorous international competitor, and which 
at the same time maintains a level of employment that is 
little changed from the present. 
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Annexe I 
SUMMARY OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
HYPOTHETICAL CHANGE IN UNIT COSTS 
1. Variable Cost savings can be broken down as follows: 
Labour Cost 
Other variable Cost 
Total 
Million Ecu 
826.6 
72.3 
898.9 
This re•flects the positive impact of improved labour productivity 
on variable costs despite representing only approximately 20 
percent of variable costs, and highlights the difficulties of 
reducing costs in an area with a high raw material content. 
2. Fixed Cost savings can be broken down as follows: 
Tooling 
Engineering 
Warranty Provision 
Administration/Finance 
Advertising 
Total 
Million Ecu 
571.7 
700.7 
175.3 
213.3 
42.5 
1 703.5 
The Engineering total includes savings that result from 
rationalised type-approval procedures. 
3. 
Variable Cost Saving 
Fixed Cost Saving 
Million Ecu 
898.9 
1703.5 
% of Category 
2.36 
11.50 
This indicates that it is in the area of fixed costs that the 
benefits of the completion of the internal market will be most 
significant through economies of scale. 
4. 
(percentage 
reduction) 
Total 
Attributable to: 
Variable Cost 
Fixed Cost 
West 
Germany France Italy 
4.34 
1.44 
2.90 
5.54 
2.16 
3.38 
5.68 
2.37 
3.31 
UK 
4.30 
1.42 
2.88 
Other Total 
5.32 
1.97 
3.35 
5.00 
1. 73 
3.27 
This represents a saving in value terms of 2602.4 million Ecu. 
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Preface 
The European Commission retained the MAC Group to study the 
completion of the internai market by 1992 in the foodstuffs 
industry. Four reports and an executive summary resulted from 
this effort : 
Report 1 
Report Il 
Report Ill 
Report IV 
Identification of barriers and selection of pilot 
barriers 
Analysis of pilot barriers (Volumes 1 and Il) 
Extrapolation of benefits 
Consolidation of the European food industry : An 
implication of the 1992 Common Market. 
Executive summary 
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1. Introduction 
A. Objectives of the study 
This study was motivated by the European Commission's "white paper"<1l 
and was designed to answer the following question : What will be the 
impact of the "1992 Common Market" on the foodstuffs industry 1 
ln this context, the 1992 Common Market means a European Community in 
which any foodstuff produced and commercialized in one member country 
may be freely commercialized in any other member country. Non-tariff 
trade barriers represent one of the main obstacles to the 1992 Common 
Market. Evaluating the impact of removing these barriers was therefore the 
principal objective of this study. 
Two corollary objectives followed from the principal objective. The first was 
to evaluate and quantify the total net benefits to the EEC from eliminating 
trade barriers; and the second was to identify the countries and product 
sectors that would be most significantly affected. 
(1) "Completing the Internai Market," June 1985. 
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B. Summary of conclusions 
• Europeanization in the foodstuffs industry is facing a critical transition. 
ln ten product sectors, this study identified over 200 non-tariff trade 
barriers. Recent years have witnessed an increase rather th an a decrease 
of barriers. 
• Creating a single market in the foodstuffs industry will engender 
significant benefits. Within the sectors studied, the positive impact will 
be on the order of 500-1000 million European currency units (Ecus) in 
annual cost savings. These benefits represent two to three percent of 
total industry value-added, and correspond to a one- to two-year gain in 
industry productivity. The benefits are, however, highly concentrated; 
over 80% can be traced to the elimination of six barriers. 
• The indirect effects of a single market are likely to considerably enlarge 
the benefits that result from the removal of trade barriers. One-third of 
the primary 50 product/markets studied will enjoy major positive effects, 
the most important of which will be an increase in consumer choice. On a 
case-by-case basis, sorne industry restructuri~19 will occur, intra-
community trade will increase, and in a few cases extra-community 
competitive ness will be enhanced. 
• The "missed opportunities" of not achieving the 1992 Common Market 
are great. Trade barriers reinforce a national focus among food concerns 
that, in turn, creates a fragmented industry. While few EEC food 
companies have built strong competitive positions across a majority of 
EEC markets, several non-EEC companies have succeeded in doing so. 
• Removing trade barriers will encourage EEC food concerns to increase 
their geographical coverage and market leadership, both measures 
necessary to ensure future EEC competitiveness. As a consequence, a 
wide-scale industry restructuring and consolidation among the largest 
companies could take place. 
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• While dismantling trade barriers is a necessary prerequisite for 
exploiting these opportunities and maintaining EEC competitiveness, it 
is not the only one. The overall impact will be hindered or enhanced by 
commitment changes in related trade barriers, rules on competition, the 
regulation of financial markets, and the attitudes of member 
governments. 
• Although not sufficient in itself, the advent of a single European market 
in the food industry will be necessary to : 
- reverse the observable trend of an increase in trade barriers within 
the EEC; 
allow market forces to provide consumers with a wider choice of 
products at a lower cost; 
influence positively trade, investment. and the structure of the EEC 
food industry to reinforce its compe~~tiveness in the European and 
world markets. 
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2. Study methodology and scope 
A. Design of the study 
The study was conducted in three phases, as illustrated in Exhibit 1. 
Phase 1 
Defi ne typology 
of barriers and 
select pilot 
barri ers 
. ldentify food-
stuffs sectors 
. Oevel op barrier 
typology and 
identify barriers 
. Select 20 pilot 
barri ers 
Exhibit 1 
Design of the study 
Phase Il 
Evaluate the 
impact of 
removing 
pilot barriers 
. Perform detailed 
evaluation of 
pilot barriers 
. Gather data for 
extrapolation 
Phase Ill 
Estimate total 
net benefits of 
achieving the 
"1992 Common 
Market" 
. Extrapolate results of 
Phase Il to estimate total 
net benefits 
. ldentify barriers and 
sectors that will be 
principally affected 
Provide an 
objective view 
on the impact 
of the "1992 
Common Market" 
The absolute size and diversity of the foodstuffs industry make it especially 
complex to analyze thoroughly. Therefore, the study was designed to begin 
with a detailed analysis of high-impact trade barriers in a limited number of 
sectors, followed by an extrapolation of the analysis to estimate a more 
general impact. 
Du ring the first phase, ten foodstuff sectors, which became the focus of the 
study, were evaluated and selected. Next, specifie barriers were identified 
and classified according to barrier type. The objective of this exercise was 
not to produce an exhaustive list of ali trade barriers, but rather to identify 
the most significant ones. Finally, 20 pilot barriers were chosen from among 
the more than 200 barriers identified to serve as case studies for the next 
phase of the study. 
ln the second phase, the 20 pilot barriers were evaluated based on existing 
industry information and over 200 interviews with major companies and 
industry experts. 
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The effects of removing each of these barriers were classified into three 
categories 
Immediate direct effects : 
Principally a measure of the fall in production or distribution cost as an 
immediate result of removing a barrier. 
Deferred direct effects: 
Direct effects of eliminating a barrier which appear gradually over time. 
An increase in competition or the realization of scale economies are 
examples of this second category of effects. 
Indirect dynamic effects : 
Long term effects such as changes in intra- or extra-community trade, 
increased consumer choice, industry restructuring, etc. 
During the study's final phase, the net benefits of removing the pilot 
barriers were extrapolated across barriers, countries, and the ten product 
sectors to arrive at the total net benefits of achieving the 1992 Common 
Market. The direct effects of removing the barri ers were quantified, and the 
indirect, longer term efteds were analyzed in a qualitative manner. 
par3727agro188 171 
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B. Definitions and assumptions 
Throughout the study, a barrier is defined as a gene rie impediment to trade, 
or a regulatory discrepancy, within the EEC. Purity laws or specifie 
ingredient restrictions are both examples of barri ers. 
A specifie barrier is a combination of a barrier with two other dimensions : 
product sector and country. An example of a specifie barrier would be the 
"Reinheitsgebot" or the beer purity law in Germany ; a second example 
would be the restriction against using aspartame in soft drinks in France. 
A pilot barrier is a specifie barrier th at was selected to be studied in-depth in 
Phase Il of the study, to understand the net benefits of removing the 
barrier. 
Net costs are the total direct and indirect costs incurred by the existence of a 
barrier. Net benefits of removing a barrier are defined as equal to the 
elimination of net costs. ln this study, the terms net cost and net benefits 
will be used when referring to the existence and the elimination of barriers, 
respectively. 
Finally, the costs of non-Europe are equal to the sum of ali net costs across 
the barriers and product sectors covered. 
The reader should be aware of two important assumptions made in this 
study about the removal of barriers. The first relates to what is meant by 
removing a barrier. ln general, this means that a good produced in one 
country may no longer be impeded from travefing freely and being 
commercialized in another. This is the basis of the principle of mutual 
recognition, which in a strict sense only concerns intra-Community trade. 
However, for some of the cases, in evaluating the effects of removing 
barriers, the study assumed that barriers are removed within as weil as 
between countries in the EEC. As an example, the study assumes that the 
beer purity law is lifted in German y both for domestic brewers as weil as for 
importers. Such an assumption is stronger therefore than the simple mutual 
recognition principle, and is akin to an assumption of a total harmonization 
of regulations. 
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The second assumption is related to the first in that the study does not take 
a position on whether the removal of trade barriers {or the harmonization 
of regulations) could undermine public health, safety, or the environment. 
These potential "social costs" are not explicitly evaluated, even though 
member states often justify the existence of trade barriers for reasons of 
protecting the consumer and the environ ment. 
C. Product sectors and pilot barriers 
The ten product sectors studied were selected based on the importance to 
EEC trade, the absolute size, and the likelihood of containing important 
trade barriers. ln addition, the study focused on downstream, rather than 
upstream, products in arder to avoid the complications introduced by the 
Common Agricultural Policy and its related support programs. For this 
reason the product sectors were chosen from the four processed food 
sectors : breads and cereals, confectionery, beverages, and other grocery 
products. Excluded from the study's scope were : meats, fish, fruits and 
vegetables, dairy products and eggs. The former group of processed food 
seciors accounts for about 40% of total food expenditures in the 5 largest 
EEC countries. 
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The ten product sectors selected include : 
Food sector 
Breads and cereals 
Confectionery 
Beverages 
Other grocery products 
Selected product sectors 
* Biscuits and cake 
* Chocolate and confectionery 
* lee cream 
* Beer 
* Mineral water 
* Soft drinks 
* Spirits 
* Pasta 
* Soup 
* Babyfood 
As shown by Exhibit 2, these sectors account for about 18% of total EEC 
household food expenditures: 
1985 total EEC household food 
expenditures (377 Billion Ecus) 
Source: Eurostat 1985 data 
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Exhibit 2 
Ten product sectors (66 Billion Ecus) 
...... 
. . . . . . . 
Pasta 
Soups & 
Baby food 
Soft dnnks 
GROUPE MAC 
M1neral 
Sp1nts Water 
3.9% 3.6% 
Beer 
Chocolate 
& 
BISCUitS, 
cake & 
pastry 
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Pilot barriers were selected from among the over 200 barriers identified in 
the first phase of the study. Each barrier was classified with respect to its 
likely impact on trade, consumer choice, production costs, and industry 
structure. ln selecting the 20 pilot barriers, high-impact barriers were 
favored, and care was also taken to ensure adequate coverage of the 
largest five EEC countries, the ten product sectors, and the different types 
of barriers. 
Exhibit 3 contains the list of 20 pilot barriers selected during Phase 1, and 
analyzed during Phase Il. Six to eight interviews of industry players and 
experts were conducted to evaluate the impact that removing each barrier 
would have. 
Exhibit 3 
Pilot barriers 
1. Beer purity law in Germany 
2. Pasta purity law in ltaly 
3. Aspartame restriction in soft drink industry in France 
4. Vegeta ble fat restriction for chocolate in France 
5. Vegetable fat restriction for ice cream in Germany 
6. Juice content li mit in soft drink industry in ltaly 
7. Recycling law for beverages in Den mark 
8. Wort excise tax in beer industry in UK 
9. Health registration requirement for baby food in Spain 
1 O. Bulk transport regulation for mineral (spring) water in France 
11. Saccharimetric content law for beer in ltaly 
12. Chlorine restriction for biscuits and cake 
13. Carotine restriction for biscuits and cake in the UK 
14. "German water botties" for mineral water in Germany 
15. Tax differences for Dom Rum in France 
16. Label detail for soup in Spain 
17. Plastic containers for mineral water in ltaly 
18. Wort tax method for beer in Belgium 
19. lmport certificates for spirits in ltaly 
20. Double inspection for spirit imports in Spain. 
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3. Findings 
A. Trade barriers in the foodstuffs industry 
i. Over 200 barriers exist in the ten product sectors 
Over 200 specifie barriers were identified in the ten product sectors studied. 
The barriers identified are diverse, so it is useful classify them into five 
categories : 
1. Specifie ingredients restrictions 
2. Content/denomination regulations 
3. Packaging/labeling laws 
4. Fiscal discrimination 
S. Specifie importing restrictions 
Specifie ingredient restrictions. These barriers prohibit the consumption of a 
product containing specifie ingredients, such as additives, pesticide 
residu es, or vitamins. An example of this type of barrier, which is generally 
erected by a country under the auspices of protection of consumer health, is 
the restriction of aspartame in the French soft drink industry. 
Example : Aspartame 
Aspartame is a non-nutritive sweetener used for the "diet" segment 
of the soft drink industries in North America and in most EEC 
countries. Aspartame can not be used, however, in soft drinks in 
France or Spain. One result of the restriction is that in France a mass 
diet segment does not exist. If the barrier was removed, it is 
estimated that such a segment would emerge, ultimately capturing 
10%-15 % of the soft drink market. 
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Content/denomination regulations.These barriers prevent a producer from 
using a generic name unless its product conforms to certain content 
requirements. The most well-know content law is the reinheitsgebot, or 
beer purity law, in Germany. 
Example : Beer purity law in German y 
The Reinheitsgebot, in effect for four and a half centuries, stipulated 
that beer containing substances other than hops, malted barley, 
yeast, and water could not be sold in Germany under the name 
"beer". Partial/y as a result of this law, the German beer market is 
highly fragmented--over 1200 breweries exist--and imports make up 
on/y about 1% of consumption. Recent/y, the European Court of 
Justice ru led that imported beer containing other substances can use 
the beer product na me. 
Packaging and labeling laws make up the third category of barriers. These 
laws affect ali aspects of packaging, including the shape, materials, size, 
recycling and disposai, as weil as labeling requirements. 
Example : Labeling laws 
Despite the Community labeling directive (791112/EEC), severa/ EEC 
countries operate with different label requirements, which implies 
that an EEC producer is effective/y prohibited from using a uniform 
label for its EEC sales. ln Spain for instance, labels must contain the 
followed information : 
- Definition of the product 
List of ingredients 
- Netweight 
Number of units 
- Consumption date ("best-before" date) 
- Conservation instructions 
- Manufacturer's lot number 
- lmporter's na me 
- Manufacturer's na me 
Country of origin 
- Health registration number. 
Certain of these requirements (notably the health registration 
number) differ from the Community labeling directive, and th us form 
a subtle but effective barrier to trade. 
par3727agro188 /13/ 
GROUPE MAC 
- 418 -
Fiscal discrimination is the fourth type of barrier examined. The only fiscal 
laws considered in this study are only those that might disadvantage an 
importer vis-à-vis a local producer. While wide differences in excise and VAT 
taxes between neighboring countries (e.g., Denmark and Germany) will 
ultimately have a large impact on the ability to create a single market, they 
are not considered in this study. For other reasons, differences in excise 
taxes among different types of alcoholic beverages were not included. An 
example of a fiscal law th at cou Id discriminate against importers is the wort 
taxation method for beer. 
Example: Wort tax method for beer 
Five EEC countries levy excise taxes on beer prior to fermentation, 
less a set wastage allowance. Excise taxes for imports into these 
countries is levied on the final product. If a domestic producer can 
routine/y beat the pre-set wastage factor, it may derive a cost 
advantage compared to an importer. 
Specifie importing restrictions. This final barrier type captures many of the 
diverse and subtle types of discrimination that a producer/exporter must 
undergo before the cross-border commercialization of goods. ln the words 
of one barrister, these are ali the barriers that "make life difficult for the 
producer/exporter". lncluded in this category are import licenses, health 
registration requirements, border inspections, and product testing. 
Excluded from this study are delays resulting from the monetary 
compensatory amounts scheme. While clearly significant based on the 
responses from company interviews, they are not considered, because they 
are inextricably linked to the Common Agricultural Policy and thus could 
not be analyzed in isolation. 
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Barriers were fou nd in each of the ten product sectors and in each major EEC 
country. lnterestingly, a significant number of barriers were found in each 
of the barrier c~tegories, which reflects the appropriateness of this 
typology (see Exhibit 4). 
Exhibit 4 
Distribution of specifie barriers by category 
(Total number of barriers : 218) 
Specifie importing 
restrictions 
(64) 
Specifie ingredient 
restriction 
(33) 
Content/denom ina ti on 
regulation 
Fiscal 
discrimination 
(14) 
Source: MAC Group interviews. 
ii. The number of barriers is not diminishing 
(39) 
Packagi ng/labell i ng 
(68) 
Of concern to EEC food producers and exporters is the fact that the number 
of barriers does not appear to be decreasing; on the contrary, new barriers 
appear each year as A. Mattera reports, "modern restrictions on free trade 
are the new types of frontier barriers wh ose proliferation is one of the most 
disturbing features of the last few years". (1) 
(1) "Protectionism inside the European Community," Journal of World Trade Law, Vol18, 
N° 4 {July/August 1984). 
par3727agro188 /15/ 
GROUPE MAC 
- 420 -
-
Seve rai of the 20 pilot barri ers have emerged and evolved over the past few 
years. The health registration requirement for food products in Spain was 
implemented at about the time Spain entered the Common Market. As one 
EEC producer/exporter put it, "our products were readily acceptable by the 
Spanish government up until the ti me Spain joined the EC. Now we have to 
go through the registration procedure. n 
Other barriers are becoming more widespread over time. For instance, 150 
municipalities in ltaly now ban the use of plastic botties for soft drinks and 
mineral water. This ban limits the ability of sorne foreign producers to 
export to these communities because transportation costs for glass botties 
make it uneconomic. Moreover, despite the EEC Directive on liquids, which 
encourages competition between glass and plastic containers, this ban may 
be extended throughout ali of ltaly by 1991, and German y reportedly is 
considering a similar law. 
iii. Barriers are not easily eliminated 
Legal attempts to remove barriers have had sorne striking successes--such 
as Cassis de Dijon, and Reinheitsgebot--but in many case i, manoeuvres by 
the enforcing states can drag out the process for years. The history of the 
recycling laws in Den mark provides a telling example. 
Example : Recycling laws in Denmark 
ln 1977, the Danish government enacted decree 136, which banned 
the imports of soft drinks in non-refillable containers. Three years 
la ter, the European Commission ru led against decree 136 --reasoning 
that it violated article 30 of the Treaty of Rome--and the Danish 
go vern ment prompt/y replaced it with decree 397, which banned the 
sale of soft drinks and beer in non-refillable botties, imported or 
domestic. While on the surface it wou/d appear this does not 
discriminate against importers, the transportation costs of two-way 
botties makes them impractical over about 200 km--a distance easily 
surpassed when exporting to Den mark. 
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Beer imports into Denmark had been dropping since the mid-1970s. 
ln 1981, after article 397 was enacted, what low leve/ of beer imports 
that remained was further reduced by a factor of 10 (see Exhibit 5). 
Den mark has the lowest leve/ of beer imports of any member of the 
EEC. 
000 Hl 
220 
165,25 
110,5 
55,75 
1970 
Source : CBMC. 
1972 
Exhibit 5 
Beer imports into Den mark 
1974 1976 
Strike at Tuborg/Carlsburg ; 
law is temporarly rescinded 
Returnable bottle 
law goes into effect 
Taxon botties 
! 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 
ln 1982, the European Commission opened a new case against decree 
397, but be fore it could be referred to the European Court, the Danish 
government introduced decree 95, which modified decree 397 by 
permitting the sale of non-refillable containers, but on/y in limited 
volumes and on/y if a return and manda tory deposit system on non-
refillables was introduced. Decree 95 went into effect in Apri/1985. 
This last substitution of one decree for another has su-cceeded in 
keeping the case out of court at /east to the date of this writing. 
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iv. Partially as a result of trade barriers, intra-EEC trade has been 
stable. 
lntra-EEC food imports represent about 6% of consumption in the 
community (see Exhibit 6). This proportion has been stable over the years. lt 
can be surmised that if it were not for trade barriers, the relative a mount of 
intra-EEC trade would be higher. 
Exhibit 6 
lntra EEC imports as a proportion of consumption 
10% 
5% 
0% 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Source: Eurostat : Food, beverages and tabacco imports of EEC 9. 
ln theory, Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome ensures free trade among 
member states of the EEC. ln practice, this is not fully the case. What, 
therefore, is the cost of "non-Europe"? 
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B. Benefits of removing barriers 
i. The direct benefits of removing trade barriers are significant 
The total direct benefits of removing trade barriers in the ten product 
sectors covered are estimated to be 500-1000 million Ecus per year. This 
total represents 1% to 2% of total food sales (at manufacturers' priees) or 
2% to 3% of total industry value added. Such a savings corresponds to a 
one- to-two-year productivity gain for the sectors concerned. (lt is 
appropriate to state the benefit in terms of a productivity gain, because it is 
a benefit that occurs year after year.) 
a.) Direct benefits result from three types of cost reductions 
Quantifiable direct benefits are classified into three categories: 
- use of Jess expensive ingredients, 
reductions in labeling or packaging costs, 
- elimination of "red-tape". 
Use of Jess expensive ingredients is the principal source of quantifiable 
direct benefits engendered by the removal of barriers. The restriction 
against the use of soft wheat in pasta in ltaly demonstrates such a costs 
savings. 
Example : Pasta purity law 
Pasta can be made from two types of wheat--duram or soft. ln /ta/y, 
France and Greece, pasta made from soft wheat is not permitted. ln 
other countries--and in ltaly during the 1960s before the law was 
established--pasta can be made from both duram wheat and from a 
combination of duram and soft wheat, the latter being less expensive 
by 10%-15%. lndustry experts believe that if the ltalian law were 
removed, the penetration of the softlduram combination could rea ch 
10%-20% of total pasta consumption, reaching 2 billion Ecus by 1992. 
Taken together, these estimates suggest that the direct cost savings 
from the substitution of a less costly ingredient could be 20-60 
million Ecus in 1992. The direct cost savings from removing similar 
pasta purity barriers in France and Greece increase the total net 
bene fit to 35-100 million Ecus per year. 
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Net benefits due to the substitution of less costly ingredients are also 
significant for beer purity laws and for laws concerning the use of 
vegeta ble fats in ice cream and chocolate. 
The second type of direct cost savings is the reduction in labeling and 
packaging costs. ln most cases, however, resulting cost savings are 
comparatively low, with one exception--the restriction against plastic 
containers in sorne 150 ltalian municipalities. lt is estimated that, due to the 
10% to 30% cost savings realized by using plastic botties instead of glass, 
removal of this barrier could engender a savings of 5-15 million Ecus by 
1992. ln addition, if the ban on plastic is extended throughout ali of ltaly, 
the cost savings could rise to 115 million Ecus. As an order of magnitude, if 
these savings were ali passed on to consumers, it would be the equivalent 
of a 10% rebate on every bottle of mineral water purchased. 
Potential cost savings to producers from using a common EEC label for 
exports are minimal, mainly because producers/exporters would choose to 
use country-specifie labels, even without the various restrictions, for 
marketing reasons. As one exporting producer put it, "Foreign languages in 
Spain are not weil understood. We would always use a Spanish label to 
make sure our product is understood and stands out." Another producer 
made a comment echoed by many others polled on this and other barriers: 
"The requirement to have a separate label for Spain is insignificant 
compared to the other marketing and distribution obstacles we face." 
The third type of cost saving is the elimination of "red tape" surrounding 
the importing process. These cost savings are, in general, difficult to 
quantify. However, an estimation is possible regarding the double 
inspection th at spirit imports must undergo by Spanish customs authorities. 
While the total quantifiable benefit is small --0.6 million Ecus per year-- it 
represents just over 1% of the value of spirit imports, and th us redu ces the 
attractiveness to spirit producers of mounting an export campaign to Spain. 
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b) Immediate direct benefits are concentrated. 
Quantifiable direct benefits are highly concentrated within the ten product 
sectors studied. Over 80% of quantifiable benefits could be generated by 
the re moval of six types of barriers (see Exhibit 7). 
Exhibit 7 
Concentration of immediate direct benefits 
among specifie barriers 
Total benefits 
(500-1000 Million Ecus) 
Vegetable fat restriction 
in chocolate 
Beer purity laws 
(Germany, Greece) (Ali EEC except UK, IRL, OK) 
Other barri ers 
Plastic containers 
in ltaly 
Vegetable fat restriction in 
ice cream (Germany, France, 
Greece, Luxembourg) 
Pasta purity laws 
(ltaly, France, Greece) 
Sacchari metric 
content in Beer 
(ltaly, Spain, Greece) 
The restrictions on vegetable fat in chocolate and ice cream alone account 
for over 40% of the estimated benefits. Other high-impact barriers are the 
purity laws for beer and pasta, the saccharimetric content restrictions in 
beer, and restrictions on the use of plastic containers for mineral water and 
soft drinks in ltaly. 
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c) Deferred direct effects are low. 
Reductions in most of the pilot barriers considered would stimulate 
imports. Any increase in imports has a positive influence on the degree of 
competitive rivalry in an industry. lt is not surprising, therefore that an 
increase in competition would result from eliminating eleven of the fifteen 
pilot barriers. The subsequent effect on end-user priees is more difficult to 
estimate, and is tempered by the fact that for many of these industries, 
profit margins are so low that significant priee reductions are unlikely. This 
is the case, for example, for beer in Germany and for chocolate in France. 
The effect on scale economies--which is the second type of deferred direct 
effect--is less frequent across the sample of pilot barriers. Removing 
barriers would have an appreciable effect on scale economies for only three 
out of the fifteen pilot barriers. The Danish recycling law provides an 
example of how scale economies could be achieved. Very simply, if the 
requirement to use refillable botties were dropped, beer exporters into 
Denmark could avoid the down-time in their bottling plants that is 
necessary to switch to refillable botties. 
d) Removing barriers cou Id engender sorne costs. 
For each pilot barrier analyzed, consideration was given to possible costs 
that would be incurred by its removal. ln ali cases, the types of costs 
centered on production, such as labor or raw material suppliers. For 
example, if aspartame cou Id be used in French soft drinks, sugar producers 
might suffer from reductions in demand. For two reasons, however, the net 
impact of these costs is arguably zero. First, many of the suppliers affected 
are raw material producers outside the EEC. Cocoa producers and sorne 
sugar producers fall into this category. From a pure EEC standpoint, then, 
these effects would occur outside the Community, and can be assumed to 
have a negligible impact on EEC social welfare (and might, in fact, have a 
positive impact, notably on the EEC balance of payments). Second, for 
affected suppliers within the EEC, their loss is another's gain, so it can be 
argued that what is at stake is the distribution of social welfare, not the 
absolute size. If beer imports from the Netherlands into Germany were to 
displace sorne German brewery workers, their local unemployment would 
be balanced by increased employment in the vicinity of the exporting Du teh 
breweries, whose volumes would increase. 
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ii. The largest benefits from removing barriers are the indirect 
effects 
Although quantifiable direct benefits are significant, amounting to 2% to 
3% of total industry value-added, it is in the area of indirect benefits where 
the removal of trade barriers cou Id have the most profound impact. ln total, 
one third of the fifty product/markets (2) considered in the study would be 
significantly affected, including : 
- Beer in Germany,ltaly and Spain 
Pasta in ltaly and France 
- Soft drinks 1n France and Spain 
- Chocolate in Germany, France,ltaly and Spain 
- lee cream in Germany and France 
Mineral water in Germany and ltaly 
- Spirits in Spain. 
a) The most frequent benefit is the broadening of consumer choice 
The broadening of consumer choice, emerged as the most frequent indirect 
effect. Removing barriers would significantly increase consumer choice for 
sixteen of the fifty productlmarkets considered. ln ten cases, this would 
result from an increase in imports. Beer imports into Germany, for example 
could increase from '1% to 5% of total consumption as the German market 
opens up to large European breweries in close proximity to key population 
centers. ln six other cases, consumer choice could be enhanced through 
product-line extensions by existing domestic producers. Spanish chocolate 
producers might begin substituting high-grade vegetable oils, mainly palm 
oil, for butter fat in selected li nes of chocolate products if that barrier were 
removed. 
(2) Formed from the ten product sectors and the five largest EEC countries. 
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Product/markets that could benefit from a particularly significant increase 
in consumer choice are summarized below: 
ln these product/markets ... 
Soft drinks in France and Spain 
Pasta in ltaly and France 
Beer in Germany 
Beer in ltaly and Spain 
... Consumers would be able to 
consume the following products 
Diet soft drinks 
Less expensive pasta products 
Wider range of imported beers 
Lighter beers 
b) Ten product markets could experience a significant increase in trade 
Closely related to the increase in consumer choice is the indirect effect of an 
increase in trade. Wh ile sorne trade increase would result from the removal 
of nearly every barrier studied, ten product/markets would experience 
moderate to large increases in imports. ln two sectors, the increase cou Id be 
substantial, with imports rising from negligible levels to 3%-5% of 
domestic consumption. These are the beer market in Germany, discussed 
above, and the pasta market in ltaly, where removing of the pasta purity 
law could engender an influx, at least in the short term, of pasta made from 
soft wheat from neighboring countries. 
c) Removal of barriers cou Id improve the efficiency of selected industries 
lmprovement of the efficiency of a domestic industry is a third important 
indirect effect of removing barriers. Nine out of fifty product/markets 
should experience moderate to large effects, including industry 
restructuring and consolidation. 
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Removing trade barriers in the ltalian pasta industry and the German beer 
industry could significantly increase the efficiency of these sectors by 
reinforcing the industry consolidation currently ta king place. 
Example: Consolidation of the German beer industry 
The beer industry in German y pro vides a striking example of how the 
removal of a barrier could help further consolidate an industry 
already going through consolidation. There are currently about 1200 
breweries in Germany, accounting for 75% of al/ breweries in the 
EEC. Moreover, two thirds of these breweries are located in Ba varia, 
where the tradition of drin king on/y local/y brewed beer is strong. 
As might be expected, the German beer industry is consolidating; 
each year about 3% of the breweries are closed. Some breweries are 
rumored to be trying to establish the first national branded beer in 
German y through acquisition and consolidation of smaller breweries. 
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The relative fragmentation of the German beer industry is 
demonstrated by a comparison with that of France, shown in 
ExhibitB: 
Exhibit 8 
Distribution of beer production by brewery size 
% oftotal production 
96 volume 
0-10 10-60 60-120 120-500 
Brewery output (000 hectolitres) 
D Germany ~ France 
Source : CBMC. 
89% 
500+ 
ln German y, 45% of output is produced by breweries whose volume 
is less that 500,000 hectolitres, compared to just 11 % for France. 
With the relaxation of the purity law, the consolidation process in the 
German brewing industry will be augmented. lt is estimated that 
foreign breweries will begin exporting to Germany, which could 
displace up to 20 small and medium sized breweries. Domestic 
producers, sensing this threat, could step up their consolidation 
efforts, which could lead to the displacement of an additional 30 
breweries. Structural changes in the German retail trade could 
reinforce these effects, as growing retail chains seek out producers 
willing to supply branded beer on a nationwide basis and promote it 
with media advertising. 
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Such a consolidation will most likely affect the medium-sized German 
breweries (100,000 - 500,000 hectolitres). Sma/1 breweries will 
probably be able to continue servicing local market niches, whereas 
medium and sorne larger breweries will be too large to play a niche 
strategy and yet too sma/1 to benefit from the considerable scale 
economies in beer production (see Exhibit 9). 
Costs per HL (1) 
(Ecu) 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Estimation : 
0 
Exhibit 9 
Economies of scale in beer brewing 
Unit cost (Ecus) for a hectolitre of beer 
1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 
Brewery output 
(000 hectolitres) 
5,000 
• 5.300KHLisminimumefficientscaleforabrewery (Scherer F.M. chal. <M75) 
The Economies of multiplant operations, Cambridge (MA) 
• 5% cost disadvantage for a brewery 1/3 this size 
• Cast data for smaller breweries: Schwalbach; We111enstephan; interviews. 
(1) Production, sales and marketing, administration; transportation costs are not included. 
Given these scale economies, the industry restructuring will 
ultimately genera te a cost savings, as a larger proportion of beer will 
be produced by scale-efficient breweries. ln total, the net benefits 
from removing the German puriz law are on the order of 100 to 200 
million Ecus per year, or 3% to 7 % of beer industry value-added. 
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d) Extra-community effectiveness is the least significant effect 
The least important indirect effect from the removal of trade barriers would 
be an increase in extra-community effectiveness, where this is taken to 
mean the competitive position of EEC food companies vis-a-vis their non-
EEC counterparts. ln two product/markets--mineral water in ltaly and beer 
in Germany--removing trade barriers could possibly strengthen the 
domestic country's ability to compete in the long term. ln both cases, the 
market is highly fragmented, and a global producer does not yet exist. An 
industry consolidation, resulting in part from the removal of barriers, might 
produce large competitors capable of developing strong competitive 
positions within and outside the EEC. 
Pursuing further the question of extra-community competitive ness requires 
an evaluation of how EEC food companies are positioned competitively 
within what could become the largest unified market in the world--the EEC. 
This question forms the basis of the next and final chapter. 
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C. "Missed opportunities" and EEC competitiveness 
Exploring the question of missed opportunities required an expanded scope 
of study beyond the product sectors and barriers examined so fa~. The 
primary conclusion from this broader view is that there cou Id be significant 
missed opportunities in not creating a single market in the foodstuffs 
industry, and that removing trade barriers is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
prerequisite for capitalizing on these opportunities. 
i. The world food industry is consolidating, and global food 
groups are being created. 
The last ten years have been a remarkable period for the world food 
industry. From 1976 to 1986, over a hundred major mergers of $50 million or 
more took place in the food industry. Moreover, the pace of merger activity 
seems to be quickening. From 1984 to 1986, nine acquisitions of over $ 1 
billion oc cu rred: 
Date Acquiring Country Sector Target company Country Sector Priee CS million) company 
5/84 Beatrice Foods USA Diversified Es mark USA Diversified 2840 
food food 
products products 
9/84 Nestlé Switzerland Diversified Carnation USA Dairy; 3000 
food diversified 
products food 
products 
5/85 RJ Reynolds USA Tobacco Nabisco USA Biscuits; 4907 
canned foods 
9/85 Phillip Morris USA Tobacco General Foods USA Diversified 4750 
food 
products 
12/85 Han son Trust UK Diversified Imperial Group UK Food and 2800 
products tobacco 
1186 Guinness UK Brewery Distillers UK Spirits 3481 
4/86 Allied Lyons UK Diversified Hiram Walker UK Spirits 1860 
food 
products 
6186 Coca-Cola USA Soft drinks BCI Holdings USA Bottier 1000 
7186 Coca-Cola USA Soft drinks JTL Corp USA Bottier 1400 
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Global food corporations are being formed through acquisition of 
increasingly larger companies. ln these days of debt financing, nearly any 
large food company could become the target of a takeover bid. 
US companies, by and large, have led this consolidation trend, and they 
continue to dominate the world food industry. Over thirty US food 
companies have annual sales of $1 billion or more. With the exception of 
Unilever and Nestlé, the world"s top ten food groups are US-based firms. 
Given their importance in the food industry, and given the comparable size 
of their home market to that of the EEC, it is useful to examine more closely 
the evolution of the US food industry and the strategies of major players. 
ln the last five years, US food companies have been pursuing a two-fold 
strategy in their domestic market: become the dominant brand in a product 
sector, and achieve nationwide coverage. The logic underlying this strategy 
is straightforward. Within a product sector, profitability of brand leaders is 
grea ter th an th at of ·second-ti er• brands (see Exhibit 1 0), and nationwide 
coverage maximizes volume over which fixed costs (such as advertising, 
R&D, and marketing)--critical for the food industry--can be amortized, 
leading to further increases in profitability: 
Exhibit 10 
Return on investment for different brand positions 
Brand 
Position 
18% 
1 
1 3% 
2 
1 
-1% 
-6% 
3 4 
Source: PIMS Database, Strategie Planning lnstitute, Cambridge, Mass, USA. 
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ln recent years, US food groups have been reevaluating their product 
portfolios. Rather than dominating a region with a diverse range of 
unrelated products, they are now focusing on achieving nationwide brand 
dominance with a selected product range. As a result, US companies have 
been acquiring new companies and, more importantly, "swapping" 
business units with each other to realize their dual objectives. One top-ten 
US food manufacturer is a case in point (see Exhibit 11): 
Exhibit 11 
Portfolio adjustments by a US food manufacturer 
Relative 1. 5 
market share (1) 
1.0 
0.5 
1984 b. 
1987. 
DAI~~TS~ P'10DE ASTA 
1984 0 
0 
1979-1981 
7 
.. 1987 
• 1987 
0 ~------L-------~--------~------~--
20% 40% 60% 80% 
Geographie coverage (% pop.) 
The company's two strategie thrusts are to dominate a selected number of 
product sectors and achieve nationwide coverage. ln the last several years, 
through acquisition and "swapping'', it has established leadership in 
snacks, dairy products, and pasta. 
(1) Relative market share for a company is equal toits market share divided by the market 
share of the market leader. If the company is the market leader, the relative market 
share is equal toits market share divided by the share of the next largest competitor. 
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Statements in its 1986 annual report underscore the brand 
dominance/nationwide strategy : 
"We are expanding our leading snack brands ... towards nationwide 
distribution." 
""We purchased (a leading dairy company) ... picking up many well-l<nown 
brands and broadening our geographie rea ch substantially" 
""We"ve gone most of the way ... in launching our flagship ... pasta brand 
a cross the country." 
Given this trend in the US, what is the current trend within the EEC among 
European food groups 7 
ii. European food corn pa nies are nationally focused 
By contrast to the US experience, EEC companies operating in the Common 
Market do not follow an "EEC-wide"" strategy. Out of a sample of 46 major 
EEC-based food companies, half have a presence in only two or less 
countries. 
Exhibit 12 
Average major countries per product line 
for EEC-based<1> companies 
Total = 46 companies 
< 1 country 
3-4 countries 1-2 countries 
(1) Major countries are EEC-5: France, Germany, Ital y, Spain, UK. ; 
EEC-based companies are those whose world headquarters are in the EEC. 
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Only about one in ten companies follows an EEC-wide strategy with a 
presence in the five largest EEC countries. EEC food companies have by and 
large remained nati·onally focused, which, in the broader context of the 
Common Market, translates into regional coverage. Moreover, EEC 
companies tend to diversify into new product sectors within their home 
country, rather than diversifying across countries in a limited number of 
product categories. 
iii The European food industry will likely undergo a 
restructuring and consolidation 
As a result of a national focus, few major EEC companies enjoy high brand 
strength with wide geographie coverage. lnstead, many companies ope rate 
in one or a small number of countries, with both strong and weak brand 
positions. 
Exhibit 13 arrays thirty-eight large EEC food companies across two 
dimensions: geographie coverage and brand strength. The shaded area in 
the upper right corner represents the desirable position of high brand 
strength and wide geographie coverage. This is the comparable position 
that US firms have been targeting in the North American market. 
Exhibit 13 
Brand strength versus geographie coverage 
~,B-ra-nd:-st-re-ng"""':th-:"(1~'1 for major EEC companies 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
• 
60% 
__________________________ ! __________________________ ~ 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
0% 10% 
Legend : EEC Sales($ 810) 
us CH 
0 6 
. ~ 
• Â 
..... 
EEC 
0 0.5-1.0 
• 1.0·2.0 
• 2 0. 5.0 
• Above5.0 
0 
0 
• 
• 
20% 
• 
0 
• • 
• 
1 
• 
• • 
• 
0 • 
• 
30% 40% 50% 
0 
.... 
i 
• 
• 
60% 
' 
' ~ 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' Cl 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
70% 
• 
80% 90% 100% 
Geographie coverage 
of product line(s)l2r 
Note : Only those companies in sample with sales above $ 500 million are 
represented in this graph. 
(1) Proportion of products/markets where the company is the brand leader or co-leader 
(2) Average number of EEC-5 countnes per product line 
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lt is apparent from Exhibit 13 that very few companies operating in the EEC 
have reached the desirable quadrant, where they would have a dominant 
brand position in most or ali major EEC countries. Obvious historical reasons 
account for this result. Differences in taste, culture, and language--not to 
mention the national characteristics of the retail trade--have ali explicitly 
contributed to the national focus, and thus to the relative fragmentation of 
the EEC food industry. But additional, less tangible factors, such as trade 
barriers and governmental "protection" of domestic companies from 
foreign competition and control, have also played a role. With the creation 
of a single market in 1992, ali of these elements will be decreasing in 
importance . 
. As the single market is increasingly realized, it is reasonable to expect EEC 
food companies to seek to substantially increase both their brand strength 
and their geographie coverage to reach the desirable position. Exhibit 14 
plots the average food company operating within the EEC and indicates the 
relative increases required across the two dimensions. 
Exhibit 14 
1986 Average position for companies operating in EEC markets 
Brand strength 
100% 
60% 
1986 
Average EEC (1l 
38% --------------
49% 
(1) We1ghted average based on sales of all67 compan1es m sample. 
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Such movements, however, could trigger--as they did in the US--a major 
consolidation and restructuring of the food industry. EEC companies will 
begin initiating mergers or "'swaps"' of competiting companies within their 
home country as weil as across borders to achieve brand dominance and 
broaden geographie coverage (1). 
Given the potential for consolidation of the food industry, complex 
questions emerge: Which companies seem poised to undertake such a 
restructuring? Within the Common Market, how do EEC-based food 
companies compare with their non-EEC counterparts? 
iv. EEC-based food companies may get left behind 
The data suggest that EEC-companies are weaker than non-EEC companies, 
on the EEC market itself. This is true from a brand strength and a 
geographie coverage standpoint. ln Exhibit 15, the average score for US, 
Swiss, and EEC food companies operating in the EEC are plotted on the 
brand strength/geographic coverage ma tri x. 
Exhibit 15 
Brand strength versus geographie coverage 
for EEC versus non-EEC based companies <2> 
.....------, 
Brand strength 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
•us CH 
EEC Â 
• 
20% 
Geographie 
20% 40% 60% 80% 100% coverage 
• (1) lnterestingly. this scenario for the future of the European food industry is not 
inconsistent with the findings of Jürgen Miller and Nicholas Owen. ln their article "The 
effect of trade on plant size"~Miller and Owen found a positive correlation between 
growth in trade and the size of plants in twelve German manufacturing industries. 
However. it should also be noted that such a scenario is only one possible result. Many 
factors specifie to the European market. such as different cultures. tpste~ and 
languages cou Id mitigate such an outcome. 
(2) Weighted average based on sales. 
* M. J. SCHWALBACH éd., Industry Structure and Performance, Sigma Berlin 
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Both US and Swiss companies operating in the EEC are doser to reaching 
the desirable quadrant than domestic companies. Though they represent 
one third of the companies in the sample, non-EEC companies control nearly 
half of the strong brand positions within major EEC markets. They account 
for over 60% of total equity devoted to the food business. Non-EEC 
companies have also been very active in making food acquisitions within 
the Common Market. 
lt appears, therefore, that in the context of a restructuring of the EEC food 
industry, non-EEC firms could be in a relatively stronger position compared 
to EEC-firms, and thus could become relatively more successful than their 
EEC counterparts. 
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iv. Removal of trade barriers is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for ensuring EEC competitiveness. 
While removing trade barriers is a necessary prerequisite for achieving the 
benefits the "1992 Common Market", and for ensuring the continued 
competitiveness on a global scale of the EEC food industry, it is not enough. 
The removal of trade barriers will have a direct benefit on the order of 2%· 
3% of total industry value-added. Indirect benefits will be significant, and 
will serve to increase consumer choice and improve the efficiency of 
selected industries. 
The existence of trade barriers, both those that were the subject of this 
study as weil as others, has also served to protect potentially weak 
domestic companies, and has encouraged strong companies to expand only 
domestically rather than attempt cross-border expansion. These results of 
trade barriers have reinforced the relative fragmentation of the EEC food 
industry. Removing these barriers should decrease or eliminate these 
tendencies. 
However, other critical factors have a major impact on achieving the full 
benefits of the "1992 Common Market". Among the most important are 
ru les on competition, and in particular merger and acquisition laws. If there 
were to be a natural trend towards consolidation in the food industry, and 
at the same time mergers were restricted, EEC firms could be prevented 
from exploiting the full benefits of the Common Market. Given that EEC 
firms are relatively behind their non-EEC counterparts, such restrictions 
cou Id widen this gap. 
Regulations on financial markets must also be considered. Global 
companies no longer rely on local financing, but seek funds on a global 
basis. Restrictions in cross·border financing could serve as a further 
impediment to EEC companies seeking to expand across borders. 
Finally, the attitudes of member governments are very important. ln many 
cases the attitudes are a deciding factor in the success or failure of a major 
cross-border merger. Prevailing nationally-based attitudes cou Id be a major 
(albeit invisible) obstacle to EEC companies seeking to expand their 
geographie coverage and grow torea ch a global scale. 
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GROUPE MAC 

- 443 -
13. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1 - La spécificité des produits de la construction 
suggère, a priori, deux argumentations contradictoires quant à 
f'ampleur du coO.t de la Non-Europe dans ce domaine. 
- La première considère la très forte dimension culturelle 
de la filière construction. Les modes de vie, la répartition des 
revenus, les préférences esthétiques imposent des particularismes 
nationaux, régionaux, parfois locaux dans le mode de construire. 
Chaque ouvrage, et il s'agit toujours d'un prototype, est inséré 
dans un tissu réglementaire extrêmement contraignant. Pour un 
produit, passer une ·frontière, c'est changer d'univers sociologique, 
économique, réglementaire et technique. 
Ce mouvement est de plus particulièrement difficile pour 
les produits de construction qui n'ont pour la plupart pas connu la 
substitution de l'intelligence à la masse et au volume constatée 
dans d'autres secteurs: un seul logement pèse généralement plus de 
100 tonnes. On connaît beaucoup d'exemples de prix de produits 
manufacturés destinés à la construction qui doublent tous les 150 
kilomètres en raison des frais de transport. 
Les tenants de cette thèse 
producteurs locaux bénéficient sur 
avantage comparatif dont les entraves 
sont qu'un aspect marginal. 
démontrent ainsi que les 
leur marché intérieur d'un 
visées par le Livre Blanc ne 
- L'autre argumentation privilégie la dimension 
exceptionnelle du marché final de la construction dont les 320 
milliards d'Ecus représentent, selon l'expression d'un grand 
industriel, le véritable marché de l'avenir. Pour un industriel qui 
entre sur un nouveau marché national, le potentiel de chiffre 
d'affaires est très élevé. De même, "l'industrialisation" du 
processus de production et la pénétration de l'informatique n'en 
sont, dans cette filière, qu'à la première phase de développement. 
Par ailleurs, les flux d'importation et d'exportation de 
produits de construction, qui ne sont pas tous pondéreux 
{équipements électriques, produits manufacturés en plastique et en 
bois), sont loin d'être négligeables et progressent régulièrement. 
Les taux de . pénétration {importations/marché intérieur) atteints en 
1986 sont de l'ordre de 15% en Italie, 20% en RFA, 30% en France et 
50 % au Royaume-Uni. 
En l'absence d'entraves, il y aurait donc à la fois un 
potentiel et une possibilité de développement des échanges des 
produits de construction entre les pays européens. La perspective de 
- 450 -
l'abolition des entraves justifierait les stratégies de conquête du 
marché européen que s'apprêtent dès maintenant à engager la majorité 
des industriels rencontrés. 
2 - Pour évaluer le coût de la Non-Europe, les instituts 
membres d'EUROCONSTRUCT se sont efforcés de surmonter la grande 
difficulté due à la diversité des produits et des situations locales 
en enquêtant dans les 12 pays de la Communauté un échantillon de 
plusieurs centaines d'entreprises. Une sélection d'une cinquantaine 
de produits a résulté d'un compromis difficile entre la nécessité 
d'une couverture typologique complète des produits utilisés dans la 
construction et celle d'un choix de produits pour lesquels 
l'ouverture du marché européen représente un enjeu économique réel. 
C'est sur cette base qu'ont été valorisées les variables 
exogènes des modèles économétriques utilisés par la Commission des 
Communautés Européennes pour mesurer le coût de la Non-Europe. Les 
difficultés méthodologiques de cette démarche sont nombreuses, la 
plus évidente étant l'extrapolation au niveau macro-économique des 
informations essentiellement qualitatives recueillies au niveau 
micro-économique. 
3 - Cette synthèse comporte quatre parties: 
- La première partie établit une évaluation des 
principales données macro-sectorielles du marché et du commerce 
extérieur des produits de construction, à partir des informations 
très fragmentaires disponibles sur un "secteur" qui n'est 
individualisé dans aucune des sources statistiques existantes. 
- La deuxième partie évalue l'importance relative de 
toutes les entraves qui s'opposent à l'achèvement du marché européen 
des produits de construction; elle décrit succinctement les entraves 
les plus lourdes et les plus spécifiques du secteur. 
- La troisième partie présente le scénario d'achèvement du 
marché européen des produits de construction que nous avons retenu; 
elle précise les échéances de disparition des entraves à la libre 
ciculation des différentes catégories de produits. 
- La dernière partie consacre un chapitre à chacun des 
deux types d'effets dont les services de la Commission ont souhaité 
obtenir une quantification distincte: les effets directs qui 
découlent de la répercussion mécanique sur les prix des économies 
permises par la suppression des entraves; les effets indirects que 
l'on peut attendre des efforts de rationalisation et des nouvelles 
stratégies européennes qu'engageront les entreprises pour répondre à 
l'accroissement de la pression concurrentielle et aux opportunités 
créés par la suppression des entraves. 
2 
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I - DONNEES MACRO-SECTORIELLES: MARCHES ET ECHANGES 
I.l - MARCHES NATIONAUX 
L'estimation globale des marchés 
intérieure} des produits de construction 
manière suivante: 
nationaux (consommation 
a été effectuée de la 
-la part des consommations intermédiaires de produits de 
construction de la branche construction (bâtiment et travaux 
publics} a été évaluée à partir des tableaux entrées-sorties 1980 
des 12 pays de la Communauté (source: Eurostat}; 
-les coefficients techniques ainsi calculés ont été 
appliqués aux estimations EUROCONSTRUCT concernant la production de la 
branche B.T.P. des 12 pays de la Communauté en 1985. 
Pour les 5 pays sur lesquels a été effectuée une 
quantification des effets directs et indirects de l'achèvement du 
marché européen, les marchés nationaux des produits de construction 
ont été décomposés selon des nomenclatures plus fines en 5 et 60 
postes (cf. annexe 1}, à partir des informations partielles obtenues 
auprès des fédérations professionnelles des industries concernées. 
Notre évaluation du marché des produits de construction de 
l'Europe des 12 s'établit à 110 milliards d'Ecus, soit 29 %du montant 
total de leur production estimée à 380 milliards d'Ecus (1). La répar-
tition en valeur des consommations intermédiaires de produits de cons-
truction des entreprises de BTP dans les 4 plus grands marchés (RFA, 
Italie, France, UK) est la suivante 
.produits à base minérale non métallique: 43 % 
.produits à base métallique ••..•.•....•. : 22% 
.produits à base de bois •.....••.•.....• : 14% 
.produits à base chimique ou textile .••. : 13% 
.produits d'équipement électrique •...... : 8% 
I.2 - COMMERCE EXTERIEUR 
Notre évaluation 
construction est basée 
publiées par l'OCDE 
sur 
pour 
des échanges extérieurs de produits de 
une exploitation spécifique des données 
l'année 1985, par application de 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
(1} dont 320 milliards d'Ecus de production des entreprises de 
construction et 60 milliards d'Ecus d'achats directs des clients et 
d'autoproduction des entreprises hors BTP et des ménages. 
3 
BIPE/EUROCONSTRUCT 
En mi 11 i ards 
d'Ecus 
30 
20 
10 -
R.F.A. Italie 
LES MARCHES NATIONAUX DES PRODUITS DE CONSTRUCTION EN 1985 
(Y compris la consommation des entreprises hors BTP et des ménages) 
Total 
France Roy.-Uni ·Espagne Pays-Bas Belgique Danemark Grèce Portugal Irlande Luxeml>ourg 
~ 
U1 
N 
- 453 -
coefficients techniques BTP à 11 postes de la nomenclature à deux 
chiffres {CTCI Rev 2). 
Des recoupements ont été effectués avec les chiffres 
fournis pour le secteur bâtiment par le ministère de l'Equipement de 
la France, seul pays ayant à notre connaissance effectué une étude 
détaillée de ses échanges de produits de construction {"tableau de 
bord bâtiment des industries de la construction 1985-1986"). 
Le commerce extérieur des 5 plus grands pays est à peu 
près également réparti entre la CEE et les pays hors CCE, mais il 
est pratiquement équilibré avec la CEE {taux de couverture = 
exports/imports = 1,1), alors qu'il est largement bénéficiaire vis-à-
vis des pays hors CEE {taux de couverture= 1,6). Cette situation 
d'ensemble recouvre des disparités assez importantes: les soldes 
commerciaux de la RFA, de l'Italie et de l'Espagne sont assez 
nettement positifs, tandis que celui du Royaume-Uni est négatif et 
que celui de la France présente un équilibre précaire {les données 
disponibles pour 1986 montrent que le solde français est également 
devenu négatif). 
La répartition CEE / hors CEE du commerce de chacun de ces 
pays est assez significative des positions concurrentielles et des 
traditions commerciales des uns et des autres. On constate en 
particulier une nette extraversion des échanges du Royaume-Uni, 
alors que les importations de l'Espagne, de la France et de l'Italie 
proviennent très majoritairement de la CEE. 
Pour les 
données relatives 
suivantes: 
4 plus grands pays (RFA, Italie, France, UK), les 
aux différentes catégories de produits sont les 
E-I I/C (E+I)/C 
.produits à base minérale non métallique: +2,9 Gécus 22% 52 % 
.produits à base métallique ............. : +1,1 Gécus 25% 55 % 
.produits à base de bois .•...•.......... : -0,8 Gécus 18% 28 % 
.produits à base chimique ou textile .... : +1,2 Gécus 47% 105 % 
.produits d'équipement électrique ....... : +0,7 Gécus 64% 139 % 
(E: Exports; !: Imports; C: Consommation intérieure) 
Bien que le commerce extérieur des produits minéraux soit 
limité par les coûts de transport, leur poids économique très 
important dans l'ensemble des produits de construction (43% en 
valeur) leur donne une place essentielle dans le solde commercial 
des 4 pays. L'hypothèse selon laquelle les produits de construction 
seraient moins concernés par la suppression des barrières à la libre 
circulation des biens en Europe est réfutée par l'importance des 
taux d'internationalisation constatés ((E+I)/C). 
5 
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II - ANALYSE DES BARRIERES 
II.l - METHODE DE TRAVAIL ET RESULTATS D'ENSEMBLE 
L'évaluation du poids des entraves rencontrées sur le 
marché européen est le résultat d'environ 200 entretiens directifs 
avec des industriels des 12 pays de la Communauté (30 dans les 5 
plus grands pays et 8 dans les autres). 2 à 12 catégories de 
produits ont été sélectionnées dans chaque pays (cf. annexe 2), avec 
une représentativité variant de 9 à 19 % pour les grands pays et de 
3,5 à 12 % pour les petits pays (nombre de catégories de produits 
sélectionnées 1 nombre total de catégories de la nomenclature 
retenue pour l'étude}. La représentativité de l'échantillon étudié 
en termes de chiffre d'affaires total des entreprises interviewées 
est de l'ordre de 5 %de l'ensemble de la production communautaire 
de produits de construction. La pondération des entraves au niveau 
communautaire a été effectuée en tenant compte de l'importance 
relative des marchés nationaux. 
En interrogeant les industriels sur l'ensemble des 
obstacles ressentis, on a tenté de mesurer le poids relatif des 
entraves résultant des réglementations nationales prises en 
considération par le Livre Blanc et des obstacles de nature 
sociologique ou économique dont la disparition ou l'affaiblissement 
éventuels ne pourront être qu'une conséquence indirecte à moyen 
terme des mesures programmées par le Livre Blanc: exigences 
diversifiées de la clientèle, coûts des facteurs, etc. 
Les deux tableaux ci-joints résument le résultat de cette 
évaluation; les entraves les plus importantes sont commentées dans 
les paragraphes suivants. Les résultats globaux par pays doivent 
être interprétés avec une grande prudence, car il est clair que 
l'appréciation d'un industriel sur les difficultés de pénétration 
d'un marché est liée à l'enjeu économique plus ou moins important 
qu'il représente pour lui. 
II.2 - BARRIERES LIEES AUX NORMES,AGREMENTS ET AVIS TECHNIQUES 
Parmi les entraves, les problèmes liés aux normes arrivent 
en tête: 70 % du nombre de produits étudiés connaissent des 
difficultés dans leurs démarches pour obtenir l'homologation aux 
normes étrangères et 60% ne sont, d'une manière ou d'une autre, pas 
conformes à ces normes. Ceci est dû à la multiplicité et à la 
complexité des normes spécifiques au domaine de la construction, qui 
traduisent l'ensemble des impératifs pesant sur l'édification d'un 
ouvrage dans un pays donné; elles sont le reflet des divergences 
liées à l'art de construire en Europe. C'est pour cette raison que, 
même si les producteurs citent peu les réglementations nationales 
6 
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BIPE/EUROCONSTRUCT NON-EUROPE DES PRODUITS DE CONSTRUCTION 
EVALUATION DES ENTRAVES PRISES EN COMPTE PAR LE LIVRE BLANC 
Poids de~ Pays oO sont rencontrées les entraves 
entraves 
en % RFA F I UK E NL B+L OK GR p IR 
l. -Préférence nationale des 
maîtres d'ouvrage 10,5 •••• •••• • • • •• •• • • • • 
2 - P~atiques de prescription 9,5 des maîtres d'oeuvre •••• ••• • • • •• •• • 
3 - Pratiques et qualifications 6,0 des entreprises •• •• • • • • • 
4 - Réglementation de la 11,5 
••• • • • • • • construction 
5 - Réglementation et normes rel a-
tives aux produits 17,0 •••• •••• • ••• ••• • •• • • •• 
6- Agréments et homologations 18,0 
•••• •••• • ••• • • •• • • 
7 - Assurances et 3,0 
contrôles techniques • • • • 
8 - Contrôles en douanes 6,5 
• • •••• •••• • • 
~ - Différences de taux de TVA 2,0 
• • 
l.O· Circulation des capitaux 5,0 
• • 
l.l.· lenteur d'élaboration des régle- 11,0 
• • •• mentations européennes • • • 
TOTAL .....•...... 100,0 24 25 6 17 14 11 8 4 7 2 1 
BIPE/EUROCONSTRUCT 
NON-EUROPE DES PRODUITS DE CONSTRUCTION 
EVALUATION DES OBSTACLES DE NATURE SOCIO-ECONOMIQUE 
Poids der. Pays où sont rencontrées les entraves 
entraves 
en % RFA F I UK E NL B+L OK GR p IR 
l. - Exigences différentes de la 
clientèle finale 27 
••• ••• • • •• 
2- Taux de change 17 
.. • •• • 
3 - Différences de coût de 
main-d'oeuvre 21 •• • •••• •• • • 
4- Différences de coût des 
• • •• • •• • • j nputs 35 
TOTAL .•...•.. 
- .. -. 
100 6 6 3 7 6 2 0 0 2 3 0 
7 
- 456 -
relatives à la conception et à la construction des ouvrages où 
s'insèrent les produits comme une barrière, ces réglementations 
constituent la partie immergée de la problématique des normes. 
Cette complexité des normes est accentuée par 
l'hétérogénéité des pratiques des organismes de contrôle et 
d'homologation en matière de test: la résistance au feu est testée 
différemment en France, en Allemagne Fédérale et en Grande-Bretagne, 
et, même pour une donnée homogène comme le coefficient de 
conductibilité, les résultats diffèrent selon les organismes 
nationaux. La difficulté d'obtention des agréments ou des 
certificats de conformité aux normes, du fait de la fréquente 
dispersion géographique des lieux de contrôle, se mesure aussi en 
termes de coûts et de délais. 
Pour la difficulté d'obtention des agréments et avis 
techniques, comme pour les entraves liées aux normes pesant sur la 
nature et les caractéristiques des produits, la R.F.A. et la France 
arrivent largement en tête, en étant citées dans 85 % des enquêtes 
pour les deux entraves. C'est dans ces pays que les normes sont les 
plus nombreuses, et c'est aussi dans ces pays qu'elles ont le plus 
de poids sur le comportement des prescripteurs et acheteurs de 
produits de construction. 
Les exportateurs notent en R.F.A. une vigilance 
particulière de la part des entreprises utilisatrices et des maîtres 
d'ouvrage: il est difficile voire impossible d'y vendre des produits 
hors normes, ou non agréés (produits nouveaux), du fait des 
contrôles systématiquement effectués lors de l'attribution des 
permis de construire. Les normes réglementaires liées à des 
exigences essentielles (sécurité et hygiène) sont également plus 
sévères en R.F.A. qu'ailleurs (résistance au feu et seuil de 
dégagement de formol des colles particulièrement). 
La difficulté d'obtention des certificats de conformité 
aux normes françaises semble également constituer une entrave 
importante à l'exportation pour les divers industriels européens 
interrogés. Les certificats du Centre Technique du Bois semblent 
notamment longs, sinon impossibles à obtenir pour les exportateurs 
européens en France. 
Les exportateurs anglais comptent parmi les industriels 
européens qui sont pénalisés à l'exportation par les niveaux 
d'exigences techniques très élevés et les systèmes de normalisation 
sévères et contraignants existant en R.F.A., en France et en 
Hollande. L'importance de ces obstacles se trouve d'ailleurs 
accentuée par l'originalité des British Standards en comparaison des 
autres systèmes de normalisation européens. Les fabricants anglais 
parviennent, malgré tout, à éviter ce type d'entraves grâce au 
développement de produits conformes aux normes US et UK qui trouvent 
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des débouchés hors CEE dans les nombreux pays qui ont calqué leur 
système de normalisation sur les modèles américain ou anglais. 
Les autres pays cités fréquemment pour les problèmes de 
normes sont tous les pays du Nord de la C.E.E.: Grande-Bretagne et 
Benelux essentiellement. Les pays du Sud, ayant peu de normes en 
vigueur, acceptent souvent les normes étrangères. Il faut néanmoins 
citer le cas de l'Espagne, qui, bien qu'étant peu exigeante en 
général, met en place pour certains produits des homologations 
difficiles à obtenir {notamment pour les produits d'étanchéité). 
Dans ces pays, c'est plutôt la lenteur des contrôles, attribuée au 
sous-dimensionnement des organismes qui les effectuent, qui est 
dénoncée comme un frein à la pénétration des produits. 
D'une manière générale, beaucoup de normes sont 
particulièrement discriminatoires, parce qu'elles sont déterminées 
par l'environnement différent d'un pays à l'autre -de la mise en 
oeuvre des produits de construction. C'est le cas typique de 
nombreux appareils électriques, comme les prises de courant, les 
boitiers, ainsi que les chauffe-eau, et aussi de certains appareils 
sanitaires {robinets): des contraintes extérieures telles que la 
tension du secteur, l'entre-axe des prises ou la pression de l'eau 
courante pèsent sur les conditions d'utilisation. Ceci est 
caractéristique de nombreux produits destinés à l'équipement 
intérieur des bâtiments. 
Face à cette situation, certains producteurs préfèrent 
fabriquer des gammes aux normes étrangères ou, mieux, 
internationaliser leur production. Les industriels néerlandais, par 
exemple, comme d'autres industriels européens, considérant que les 
entraves liées aux normes et procédures de certification différentes 
en Europe {notamment en R.F.A., France et Belgique) sont difficiles 
à surmonter, préfèrent souvent recourir à l'implantation directe de 
filiales à l'étranger. C'est le cas de certains producteurs de 
peinture. 
L'absence de normalisation ou un certain laxisme dans 
l'application de la réglementation, ce qui semble être le cas en 
Italie et en Espagne, ont paradoxalement un effet comparable, 
puisqu'ils créent des conditions concurrentielles insupportables 
pour les producteurs étrangers dont la fabrication respecte de 
sévères spécifications: il ieur faut alors créer une gamme hors 
normes à prix réduit. 
D'après plusieurs producteurs, on peut penser que la 
convergence par le haut et par le bas des exigences des différents 
pays et clients vers des normes européennes supprimerait une partie 
des niches dues aux exigences de certains acheteurs, tels par 
exemple les hôpitaux qui devraient abandonner leurs exigences trop 
spécifiques dans un contexte d'unification technique du marché. 
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11.3 - OBSTACLES DE NATURE SOCIO-EOONOMIQUE 
II.3.1 - DIFFERENCES DE COUT DE LA MAIN-D'OEUVRE 
40 % 
différences de 
nuisent à la 
principalement 
des industriels interrogés déclarent que les 
coQt de la main-d'oeuvre entre les pays de la C.E.E. 
compétitivité de leurs produits à l'exportation, 
les industriels français, anglais et belges. 
Des fabricants français, qui proposent des produits de 
haute technologie incorporant peu de main-d'oeuvre industrielle, 
déclarent rencontrer des difficultés pour exporter en Espagne, au 
Portugal et dans une moindre mesure en Italie. Par ailleurs, les 
entreprises de construction espagnoles ont l'habitude de recourir à 
des technologies comportant une forte part de valeur ajoutée sur le 
chantier, ce qui limite les débouchés de produits industriels conçus 
au contraire pour réduire les temps de mise en oeuvre. 
Les industriels anglais soulignent également l'entrave 
relative à la faiblesse des charges sociales auxquelles sont soumis 
les fabricants espagnols, portugais et italiens. 
Un industriel du verre français donne quelques chiffres 
pour son secteur: 
Coût salarial ouvrier en 1986 {Ecus/heure, toutes charges) 
France R.F.A. Belgique Italie Espagne 
15,1 15,3 13,4 11,8 9.3 
On doit cependant observer que ces différences ne sont pas 
spécifiques à l'industrie des produits de construction et qu'elles 
n'interviennent que pour une part seulement dans la compétitivité 
relative des industries européennes, un autre facteur important 
étant leur intensité capitalistique. Quelques industriels 
considèrent en outre que les différences de coQts salariaux 
disparaitront lorsque les membres récents de la Communauté seront 
parfaitement intégrés aux mécanismes de concurrence au sein de la 
c~. 
II.3.2 - EXIGENCES DIFFERENTES DE LA CLIENTELE FINALE 
Une partie des industriels européens interrogés considère 
comme un obstacle important la diversité des exigences de la 
clientèle finale dans les différents pays de la CEE. Certains 
exportateurs font ainsi de gros investissements dans le design afin 
de satisfaire les préférences esthétiques variées de leurs clients 
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européens. C'est le cas 
de revêtements de sols 
appareil de production 
divergentes des clients. 
des producteurs de carreaux de céramique et 
par exemple, qui se doivent de posséder un 
flexible pour s'adapter aux exigences 
La clientèle finale semble particulièrement exigeante dans 
des pays tels la France, la R.F.A. et les Pays-Bas; les producteurs 
belges se trouvant les seuls à considérer comme un obstacle à 
l'exportation les exigences spécifiques de la clientèle anglaise. 
Pour une partie importante des producteurs européens, 
toutefois, la diversité de la demande ne représente pas un frein 
majeur à l'exportation. C'est le cas de ceux qui proposent des 
produits cachés dans les constructions, tuyaux en plastique et en 
béton par exemple, pour lesquels le design n'est qu'accessoire. On 
peut estimer à 55% environ la part du marché communautaire des 
produits de construction qui échappe ainsi à cet obstacle. 
Si les observations des industriels dans ce domaine 
donnent une idée du prix que doit payer l'Europe pour sa diversité 
socio-culturelle, il est clair que la réponse à cette diversité fait 
partie des contraintes auxquelles doit se plier un industriel dans 
une économie libérale. Ne pourraient être considérées comme des 
entraves que des références abusives aux préférences d'une clientèle 
nationale afin de justifier le maintien d'une entrave normative. 
II.3.3 - DIFFERENCES DE PRIX DES MATIERES PREMIERES ET DE L'ENERGIE 
Les industriels anglais citent comme pays dans lesquels il 
est difficile d'exporter en raison du faible prix de l'énergie, la 
R.F.A., la France, l'Italie et l'Espagne. Certains d'entre eux se 
plaignent de ne pouvoir bénéficier de tarifs préférentiels 
comparables à ceux qui sont consentis aux gros consommateurs dans 
des pays comme l'Italie et l'Espagne. D'autres industriels de 
produits de construction sont affectés par le prix des bitumes, plus 
élevé en Grande-Bretagne qu'en France et en R.F.A. 
En France, 
le faible prix de 
ce pays. 
certains 
l'énergie 
producteurs remarquent également que 
en Italie limite les exportations vers 
On peut toutefois 
em1se à propos des coats 
respectives des différents 
seulement du prix relatif 
facteur dans la technologie 
faire 1c1 la même remarque que celle 
salariaux: les positions concurrentielles 
industriels dans ce domaine dépendent non 
de l'énergie, mais aussi du poids de ce 
de production qu'ils ont adoptée. 
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III - SCENARIO D'ACHEVEMENT DU MARCHE EUROPEEN 
La complexité du secteur nous a contraint à faire reposer 
la quantification des effets directs et indirects sur 
l'extrapolation raisonnée à l'échelle macro-sectorielle des 
résultats des enquêtes, plutôt que sur un exercice de modélisation à 
partir d'une série d'hypothèses théoriques choisies par nous. Les 
hypothèses retenues concernant le scénario d'achèvement du marché 
européen sont en fait celles auxquelles se référaient explicitement 
ou implicitement les industriels interrogés en fonction de leur 
propre analyse, plus ou moins approfondie, des conséquences 
possibles de la mise en oeuvre du Livre Blanc. 
Bien que les questions posées aient invariablement été 
précédées de l'énoncé: "Au cas où toutes les barrières visées par le 
Livre Blanc seraient supprimées ou substantiellement réduites", il 
est possible de reconstituer assez fidèlement le scénario effectif 
sur lequel ont reposé les réponses, à partir des commentaires 
généraux recueillis (cf. graphique à la fin du chapitre). 
A - Hypothèses de court terme 
Les données essentielles 
servi de référence à l'évaluation 
différés sont les suivantes: 
du scénario de court terme ayant 
des effets directs immédiats et 
1°) Barrières fiscales 
fiscalités indirectes, avec 
administratifs et des coûts 
simplification des procédures. 
pour 
de 
et physiques: harmonisation des 
conséquence l'allégement des frais 
passage aux frontières lié à la 
2°) Barrières techniques: 
- déréglementation et donc baisse des coûts des transports 
(liberté des prestations de service); 
- libre circulation des capitaux permettant l'accélération 
de la concentration financière déjà engagée; 
- ouverture de la commande publique à la concurrence 
communautaire, avec des conséquences relativement limitées dans le 
domaine des produits de construction; l'amélioration de la Directive 
"travaux" (71/305/CEE) provoquéra une augmentation sensible du 
pourcentage d'entreprises étrangères remportant des appels d'offres, 
avec une propension à utiliser des produits de leur pays d'origine; 
l'amélioration de la Directive "fournitures" (77/62/CEE) augmentera 
l'ouverture de la commande publique aux produits étrangers, limitée 
toutefois par la faible importance des achats directs de produits de 
construction de la part des promoteurs publics(sauf dans les 
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secteurs actuellement exclus du champ de la Directive: énergie, 
transports, eau et télécommun~cations); 
développement de la reconnaissance par les pays de 
l'équivalence des normes et adoption d'une série limitée de normes 
harmonisées, essentiellement dans le domaine des demi-produits, 
notamment sous l'effet de l'émergence de la "nouvelle approche" de 
la Communauté qui limite l'harmonisation législative à l'adoption 
par les Directives des seules exigences essentielles de sécurité, de 
santé ou d'autres intérêts collectifs. 
Ces hypothèses de court terme, dont la principale est 
l'effet encore relativement limité de la directive "produits", 
devraient conduire à une situation favorable pour certaines 
catégories de produits: les produits de base et les demi-produits 
pondéreux pour lesquels des démarches d'harmonisation ou de 
reconnaissance réciproque des normes sont déjà engagées; les 
produits destinés au bricolage et plus généralement à l'amélioration 
et à l'entretien des bâtiments existants, qui sont peu sensibles à 
l'obstacle des normes et règlements. Ces produits bénéficieront à 
plein de la réduction des coQts de transport et des facilités 
accrues de concentration financière {avec un impact immédiat sur les 
frais de siège et les coQts deR & D). 
B - Hypothèses de moyen terme 
Les effets indirects dynamiques évoqués par les 
industriels interrogés, et donc ceux que nous avons quantifiés au 
niveau macro-sectoriel, doivent être considérés comme situés à 
l'issue d'une période de l'ordre de cinq ans. 
Il est très important de prendre en considération le fait 
que, pour les produits de construction, cette période ne sera 
probablement que transitoire, car elle correspondra à une phase de 
développement- mais pas encore de maturité -de l'harmonisation 
réglementaire. On sait en effet qu'une des conditions de cette 
harmonisation est la mise en place de documents techniques 
intermédiaires {Eurocodes,etc.) nécessaires à l'accélération de la 
production de normes harmonisées et au fonctionnement efficace de 
l'Agrément Technique Européen, du fait de l'articulation étroite 
existant nécessairement entre les textes réglementaires et 
pararéglementaires relatifs à la construction des ouvrages et ceux 
relatifs à une partie des produits industriels intégrés dans ces 
ouvrages {il est fréquent qu'un produit de construction ne puisse 
être considéré comme satisfaisant à une exigence essentielle qu'en 
référence à un mode de mise en oeuvre donné}. 
Or, les textes intermédiaires précités, même si l'on doit 
espérer qu'ils seront élaborés rapidement grâce à l'impulsion donnée 
par la Directive "produits", ne pourront être mis en application que 
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relativement lentement, puisqu'ils supposeront fréquemment la r~mise 
en cause des savoir-faire de l'ingénierie {méthodes de calcul 
notamment} et des entreprises de construction (savoir-bâtir} dans un 
secteur dont la capacité d'adaptation est limitée par son extrême 
atomisation (95% des entreprises de construction européennes ont 
moins de 50 salariés}. 
Même si l'élimination des barrières techniques n'est pas 
encore totalement achevée au bout de cinq ans, notre hypothèse 
principale est toutefois celle d'une diminution importante des 
barrières liées aux normes et agréments, celles-ci s'abattant pour 
deux types de produits: 
- ceux qui ne comportent pas de spécifications techniques 
renvoyant à des exigences essentielles, grâce à la disparition des 
systèmes normatifs de nature descriptive anciennement mis en place à 
des fins implicites de protection des industries nationales; 
- ceux comportant des spécifications techniques renvoyant 
à des exigences essentielles, mais dont la nature n'implique pas une 
articulation forte entre normalisation des produits et codification 
de la construction, notamment les produits de finition {exigences 
essentielles liées par exemple à la toxicité des fumées} et de 
cloisonnement, ainsi que certains produits d'équipement et 
d'enveloppe, pour lesquels on verra apparaître. des normes 
harmonisées. 
Ces produits 
d'échelle permises par 
leur production. 
pourront bénéficier 
la standardisation 
C - Hypothèses de long terme 
pleinement des économies 
de leur conception et de 
Cette phase se situe au-delà 
industriels interrogés se sont référés. A 
espérer un rapprochement des savoir-faire 
en oeuvre suffisant pour que normes 
s'étendent systématiquement aux produits 
du terme auquel les 
cette échéance, on peut 
de conception et de mise 
et agréments européens 
de structure, d'équipement 
et d'enveloppe non encore atteints 
d'harmonisation. 
par la phase précédente 
La généralisation des économies d'échelle et 
l'accélération de l'innovation qui pourraient résulter de cette 
troisième phase, et dont on peut penser qu'elles seront favorisées 
par une plus grande homogénéité de la demande (modes de vie} et de 
l'environnement (tension électrique, pression de l'eau, etc.}, 
justifient notre affirmation concernant l'importance des effets 
dynamiques différés au-delà de ceux quantifiés à l'issue de la 
deuxième phase. 
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IV - QUANTIFICATION DES EFFETS 
IV.l - METHODOLOGIE 
L'ampleur du champ des activités couvert par l'étude et 
son extrême diversité en termes de structures des professions, de 
fonctions de production, d'internationalisation, de sensibilité à la 
mise en oeuvre du Livre Blanc, posaient un redoutable problème de 
représentativité statistique de l'échantillon enquêté. 
De ce fait, il n'aurait pas été légitime de mener des 
extrapolations fondées sur des modélisations, faute de bases de 
données suffisantes pour spécifier ces modèles. On a donc choisi une 
démarche empirique, en traduisant par des valeurs chiffrées les 
relations de comportement des industriels: baisses de coûts 
unitaires associées à des hypothèses d'augmentation de la production 
(économies d'échelle); augmentation des exportations permise par la 
baisse des prix unitaires (élasticité prix relatif des 
exportations);etc. 
La quantification des effets directs a été limitée aux 
quatre plus grands pays: RFA, France, Italie et UK. L'Espagne a 
également été prise en compte pour la quantification des effets 
indirects, car la mesure des conséquences de l'entrée récente dans 
la Communauté de pays de l'Europe du Sud nous a semblé indispensable 
à la compréhension des enjeux à moyen terme de l'achèvement du grand 
marché intérieur. La représentativité de l'échantillon étudié dans 
les cinq pays est d'environ 5 % (production totale des fabricants 
rencontrés/ production totale des cinq pays). 
A - Effets directs 
Pour mesurer les effets directs, immédiats et différés, la 
méthodologie adoptée a comporté plusieurs phases. 
1°) Choix de produits, généralement très finement 
individualisés (par exemple: poutrelles préfabriquées en béton 
précontraint) qui, dans chaque pays, illustrent les interrogations 
que soulève le Livre Blanc. 
2°) Rattachement des produits choisis aux postes de la 
nomenclature des produits de construction en 60 postes établie pour 
l'étude (ci-jointe en annexe 1). 
3°) Elaboration pour chaque pays d'une typologie des 
postes de la nomenclature, sur la base des critères significatifs au 
regard de l'impact de la suppression des entraves (par exemple: 
produits manufacturés complexes non pondéreux). Chaque famille de 
cette typologie peut être quantifiée. 
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4°) Pondération des résultats 
la typologie, conduisant à l'évaluation 
coQts de production pour chaque pays. 
des enquêtes en foncuion de 
globale de la réduction des 
5o) Ultérieurement, à la demande de la DG II, les effets 
directs ont été ventilés entre trois macro-secteurs: produits 
manufacturés intermédiaires, produits manufacturés d'équipement, 
produits manufacturés de consommation. 
B - Effets indirects 
S'agissant des effets indirects, on a considéré que chaque 
pays constitue un ensemble d'acteurs relativement cohérent du point 
de vue de leurs réactions à moyen terme à la disparition des 
entraves. Ce "nationalisme" des enjeux et des défis a été considéré 
comme l'emportant sur le particularisme micro-sectoriel légitimement 
respecté pour l'observation des effets directs. 
Dans un premier temps, on a exploité pays par pays les 
réponses des entreprises aux questions sur leurs perspectives de 
ventes sur les marchés nationaux ou à l'exportation, et sur leurs 
prévisions d'évolution de leurs coûts. Dans la mesure où ces 
réponses traduisent les conséquences de politiques qui vont être 
menées par les entreprises, on peut considérer qu'on dispose pour 
chaque pays d'un "profil stratégique" caractéristique des enjeux de 
chaque question. 
Dans un second temps, on a exploité les questionnaires de 
base (ensemble des enquêtes menées dans les 12 pays de la 
Communauté) pour déterminer les seuils quantitatifs qui sous-tendent 
les réponses qualitatives des entreprises. Par exemple, on a 
constaté qu'une augmentation des ventes n'est qualifiée de 
"substantielle" que lorsqu'elle dépasse 15% . 
Enfin, on a comparé les "profils stratégiques" recueillis 
pour les différents pays afin d'arrêter à dire d'expert des chiffres 
(par exemple: pourcentage d'accroissement des exportations) qui 
s'efforcent de traduire la hiérarchie des pays au regard de 
l'importance de l'effet mesuré. 
Finalement, les chiffres arrêtés traduisent un ensemble de 
facteurs complexes dont le poids relatif a été apprécié par les 
experts d'EUROCONSTRUCT de chaque pays: capacité d'adaptation des 
industries concernées constatée dans le passé, degré de sensibilité 
actuel à la problématique de l'achèvement du marché intérieur, 
capacité financière des entreprises, degré d'internationalisation 
déjà atteint ... 
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Il est clair qu'une telle démarche méthodologique ne peut 
conduire qu'à des résultats d'une grande fragilité. Cependant, on 
doit considérer que la réalité observée, en l'occurrence les 
intentions stratégiques des entreprises et leurs effets potentiels, 
manque trop de consistance pour qu'on puisse espérer améliorer la 
valeur prédictive des résultats par des enquêtes statistiquement 
représentatives. 
IV.2 - EFFETS DIRECTS 
Ce chapitre a pour objet de mesurer les répercussions 
mécaniques des réductions de coat induites par la suppression des 
entraves. L'hypothèse est que les entreprises, à ce stade initial, 
répercutent les baisses de coat dans leurs prix sans modification de 
leurs marges. De même, les entreprises sont supposées ne pas encore 
réagir par des ajustements de volume ou d'organisation de leur 
production. Les consommateurs ne modifient pas non plus leur 
comportement, et le jeu des élasticités prix n'est sensé se 
manifester qu'ultérieurement au titre des effets indirects. 
IV.2.1 - MECANISMES DE GENERATION DES EFFETS 
La suppression des entraves ne détermine une baisse des 
coats, donc des prix, que dans la mesure où les industriels 
supportent des dépenses quand ils exportent leurs produits. Il peut 
s'agir de dépenses directes, frais de passage en douane, ou 
indirectes, coat d'adaptation des produits. 
A - Cas des entraves fortes et décourageantes 
De nombreux producteurs britanniques renoncent à exporter 
vers les pays de la C.E.E. du fait d'importantes entraves liées aux 
formalités d'homologation et d'agrément {cas de normes en France et 
en R.F.A. pour les produits d'étanchéité et la menuiserie 
métallique, cas de l'avis du CTB français pour la menuiserie bois). 
De même, les producteurs européens de carreaux de 
céramique sont peu attirés par le marché allemand, régi par des 
normes très contraignantes {seuil de porosité de la céramique) qui 
expriment une exigence de qualité élevée de la part de la clientèle 
finale. 
Ainsi, pour toute 
suppression des entraves ne 
directs. 
cette catégorie de produits, la 
réduirait pas immédiatement les coats 
- 467 -
B - Cas des entraves fortes mais contournées 
L'implantation locale constitue pour de nombreuses 
sociétés la réponse aux contraintes sévères de normalisation ou 
d'agrément qui pèsent sur certains produits. De même, certains 
industriels adoptent la fabrication de gammes spécifiques destinées 
à un ou plusieurs pays particuliers. 
Mais, pour ces produits, l'homogénéisation des 
réglementations aura des effets directs. Les surcoûts suppr1mes 
immédiatement porteront essentiellement sur l'obtention des 
homologations et agréments (démarches et délais), les frais de 
passage en douane et le coût de transport, qui devraient s'abaisser 
du fait de la suppression du contingentement ·des transporteurs 
européens. 
IV.2.2 - EVALUATION GLOBALE DES EFFETS DIRECTS 
L'évaluation des effets directs sur les prix résultant de 
l'exploitation des enquêtes selon la méthode exposée au paragraphe 
IV.l conduit à un total de 657 millions ·d'Ecus pour les quatre plus 
grands pays (RFA, Italie, France et UK), dont la production de 88,4 
milliards d'Ecus représente 79.9% du marché communautaire des 
produits de construction. On peut donc estimer en première analyse 
que l'économie pour l'ensemble des 12 pays de la Communauté à 
attendre des effets directs de l'achèvement du marché européen 
atteindra un montant de 820 millions d'Ecus. 
Il convient de rappeler que ces chiffres se rapportent à 
la suppression de l'ensemble des barrières, y compris les barrières 
non spécifiques déjà quantifiées par ailleurs (études horizontales 
engagées par la Commission sur l'ouverture de la commande publique, 
sur la libéralisation des services financiers, sur l'abolition des 
contrôles en douane et sur la déréglementation des transports). Nous 
évaluons à 43 % la part des effets directs dus aux barrières 
spécifiques, soit 283 millions d'Ecus. 
Le tableau de la page suivante prec1se la nature des écono-
mies qui découleront de la suppression des barrières, telles qu'elles 
ont été valorisées par les industiels interrogés. 
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BIPE/EUROCONSTRUCT 
NON-EUROPE DES PRODUITS DE CONSTRUCTION 
EFFETS DIRECTS SUR LES COUTS 
RESULT&~T DE LA SUPPRESSION DES BARRIERES 
Principaux domaines de réduc-
tion des coûts par ordre 
décroissant d'importance 
% du nombre de réponses exploitables 
(plusieurs réponses possibles) 
Non pondéré 
Processus de production 24 
Pondéré en fonction 
des volumes de 
production nationaux 
29 
-------------------------------- -------------------------~-------------------------
Coûts de distribution 
(y.c. coûts de transport) 
Coût des facteurs de produc-
27 20 
tion importés 17 17 
Coûts de marketing 11 13 
~--------------------------------~------------------------- -------------------------
Coûts de trésorerie 11 10 
Coût des assurances 5 3 
Autres 5 8 
ENSEMBLE lOO lOO 
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IV.3 - EFFETS INDIRECTS 
L'objet de ce chapitre est d'établir un diagnostic de ce 
que seront les réactions secondaires des agents économiques 
confrontés aux effets directs analysés dans le chapitre précédent. 
IV.3.1 - MECANISMES DE GENERATION DES EFFETS 
A - Choix stratégiques 
En accroissant la menace concurrentielle sur les marchés 
nationaux, la suppression progressive des barrières provoquera sans 
aucun doute possible un changement de comportement des industriels, 
perceptible à travers les enquêtes. Les plus dynamiques mettront en 
oeuvre des stratégies internationales selon deux axes: un axe 
défensif, parce que la majorité des industriels s'attendent à un 
accroissement du taux de pénétration des produits étrangers sur leur 
marché national; un axe offensif, dans la mesure où l'abaissement 
des frontières ouvrira des opportunités qu'il est de la fonction de 
tout industriel d'exploiter. 
Dans la mesure où on assisterait à une unification en 
profondeur des marchés, les stratégies de délocalisation des grandes 
entreprises pourraient engendrer des spécialisations nationales 
intra-européennes. Mais, et c'est semble-t-il le point de vue 
dominant des industriels, les comportements locaux étant 
fondamentalement spécifiques, c'est l'approche des marchés par des 
filiales étrangères qui sera généralement préférée à moyen terme. 
Les seules manifestations physiques {échanges communautaires de 
produits) ne donneront probablement qu'une idée très partielle de 
stratégies fortes mais essentiellement financières (prises de 
contrôle, fusions, etc.). 
Les industriels devront aussi faire le choix du type de 
compétitivité, performances ou prix, qu'ils vont développer. En 
effet, l'Europe des produits de la construction peut être analysée 
par rapport à deux modèles. 
Le premier, le plus fréquent dans les pays du Nord, se 
caractérise par une offre de produits à haute technicité répondant à 
des normes très exigeantes. Leur rapport performances-prix 
correspond à des prix unitaires relativement élevés, et les 
industriels s'efforcent de rester compétitifs par des efforts de 
rationalisation des process, de recherche et développement, de 
maitrise des marges. Le développement de ce modèle repose sur 
l'atténuation progressive des différences de charges salariales 
entre les pays de la Communauté, et une exigence croissante des 
utilisateurs en qualité et fiabilité. 
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Le second modèle est plus fréquent dans les Pays dû Sud de 
l'Europe. Il se caractérise par une offre de produits à technicité 
moyenne ou faible, développée sur des marchés où la réglementation 
technique est peu contraignante en droit et encore moins en 
pratique. Le développement de ce modèle sera favorisé par l'approche 
actuelle de la Commission des Communautés Européennes conduisant à 
la reconnaissance mutuelle des normes dans le cadre d'exigences 
essentielles qui renonceront partiellement aux aspects parfois 
excessivement technicistes que s'efforcent d'imposer les normes des 
pays du Nord. 
Faute de pouvoir mesurer les effets-qualité, il est 
extrêmement difficile de traduire les modifications dans la 
répartition de la production et des marchés entre ces deux modèles 
pour l'ensemble des produits d'un même pays. Mais les contraintes de 
l'exercice imposaient une quantification de tous les effets, ce qui 
a conduit à affecter un seul chiffre à des phénomènes 
multidimensionnels (qualité). Les données proposées expriment donc 
essentiellement des sens et des ordres de grandeur relatifs. 
B - Economies d'échelle 
Les conséquences en termes d'évolution 
ventes et de modification des coQts unitaires 
européennes qui résulteront de l'abaissement 
conduisent à une segmentation de l'industrie 
construction en quatre sous-secteurs. 
du 
des 
des 
des 
volume des 
stratégies 
barrières 
produits de 
1°) Les industries qui n'envisagent pas de croissance de 
leur production, ni d'économies d'échelle: les grands groupes des 
industries intermédiaires capitalistiques, dont le verre plat est un 
bon exemple, ont déjà procédé à l'européanisation de leurs 
structures dans un contexte de concertation professionnelle qui a 
fait disparaitre les entraves techniques. 
2°) Les industries qui n'envisagent pas de croissance de 
leur production, mais dont les coQts unitaires diminueront: même 
pour une production des usines nationales inchangée, la 
concentration financière résultant des croissances externes 
transfrontalières entrainera une réduction des frais administratifs, 
de gestion et surtout de recherche et développement. 
3°) Les industries qui envisagent une croissance de leur 
production, mais pas d'économie d'échelle: les fabricants de 
produits pondéreux, en particulier ceux destinés aux structures des 
ouvrages, ont de grandes difficultés à prolonger la courbe des coQts 
marginaux décroissants, les coQts de transport fixant les limites 
géographiques de leur marché. C'est ce qu'ont démontré par le passé 
les échecs successifs des politiques d'industrialisation du 
bâtiment, la standardisation imposée au niveau de la demande n'ayant 
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pas réussi à assurer des longueurs de séries suffisantes au niveau 
de la production de chaque usine. 
4°) Les industries qui envisagent une croissance de leur 
production et une diminution des coûts unitaires: l'exemple le plus 
clair de relation entre la suppression des entraves et l'apparition 
d'économies d'échelle est celui des secteurs où des produits 
nouveaux bénéficiant d'une compétitivité technique forte et de la 
liberté de circulation à l'échelle communautaire pourront accroître 
rapidement leur marché en imposant une accélération de la 
disparition du quasi-artisanat encore en vigueur dans certains 
domaines de la fabrication des produits de construction. 
Notre évaluation du poids respectif· (valeur de la 
production) de chacun de ces quatre segments est la suivante : 
Pas de croissance Croissance 
de la production de la production 
Pas d'économie 
d'échelle 23 % 16 % 
Economies 
d'échelle 19 % 42 % 
IV.3.2 - EVALUATION GLOBALE DES EFFETS INDIRECTS 
L'évaluation des effets indirects sur les prix pour les 
cinq pays pris en compte (RFA, Italie, France, UK et Espagne), 
selon la méthode exposée au paragraphe IV.1, conduit à un total de 
1722 millions d'Ecus (sur la base des volumes de production de 
1985). Ce chiffre ne peut pas être extrapolé aussi simplement à 
l'ensemble de la Communauté que celui des effets directs. 
Il convient de préciser que la vérification de la 
cohérence des résultats avec le scénario global à moyen terme pour 
les 12 pays de la Communauté n'a pu être effectuée, puisqu'elle 
aurait supposé un même niveau d'information et d'a~alyse pour 
l'ensemble des pays, notamment sur l'évolution de leurs prix 
relatifs et sur leur commerce extérieur intra et extra-
communautaire. 
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CONCLUSION 
Par l'importance du nombre de personnes interrogées et de 
pays pris en compte, l'enquête qui a servi de base à ce rapport est 
une des premières sources d'information prospective sur le vaste 
ensemble des fabricants européens de produits de construction. Il 
s'agit d'une population d'une grande hétérogénéité technique et 
économique, mais dont on a reconnu 1c1 la communauté de 
préoccupations stratégiques au regard d'un même marché, celui de la 
construction. 
De cette approche, on peut retenir quelques enseignements 
importants pour toute réflexion sur l'avenir du grand marché 
européen. 
1 - Avec un 
excédent des échanges 
milliards d'Ecus, et 
personnes, le secteur 
enjeu considérable pour 
marché intérieur de 110 milliards d'Ecus, 
avec le reste du monde de l'ordre de 
un emploi total d'environ 1,7 million 
des produits de construction représente 
la Communauté Economique Européenne. 
un 
8 
de 
un 
La place croissante des produits industriels dans la 
construction des ouvrages de bâtiment et de travaux publics est une 
des manifestations les plus évidentes de la modernisation de tout le 
secteur de la construction, et l'accroissement des échanges -dont 
l'étude a montré qu'ils pouvaient atteindre, même pour les grands 
pays, entre 15 et 50 % de la consommation intérieure - ne pourra 
qu'accélérer cette modernisation. 
2 - La réglementation des procédés de construction génère 
plus d'entraves aux échanges de produits que celle qui leur est 
directement appliquée; or les mesures programmées par le Livre Blanc 
ne feront pas directement disparaitre les particularismes nationaux 
de l'art de construire. Leur impact sera donc certainement plus lent 
que dans d'autres secteurs. 
Cependant, l'enquête a démontré que les industriels 
européens sont convaincus que la disparition des entraves imposera 
des révisions de leurs stratégies actuelles. 
D'une part, ils considèrent que les mesures énoncées par 
le Livre blanc se traduiront par une forte pression concurrentielle 
sur leurs propres marchés, les pertes de part sur ces marchés leur 
paraissant la conséquence inéluctable du processus d'européanisation 
des échanges. Ils ne considèrent pas pour autant qu'ils devront 
enregistrer passivement cette pénétration de leurs concurrents 
étrangers , mais, bien au contraire, qu'il leur faudra faire des 
efforts de rationalisation des processus de production et de 
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réduction des marges. Outre la suppression du coût direct de la Non-
Europe, de l'ordre de 0,7 % du chiffre d'affaires des industriels 
sur le marché européen, soit environ 820 millions d'Ecus, 
l'accroissement de la concurrence déterminera des remises en cause 
profondes des systèmes d'offre de produits industriels et aussi de 
leur distribution aux entreprises de construction, aux artisans du 
bâtiment et aux ménages. 
D'autre part, la grande majorité des industriels 
interrogés considèrent qu'ils pourront compenser leurs pertes de 
marché intérieur par des suppléments d'exportations vers les autres 
pays de la Communauté et vers les pays tiers. Cette stratégie se 
traduira, soit par des délocalisations ou des implantations directes 
dans les pays où la structure des coûts de production est plus 
favorable, soit par une participation et des prises de contrôle 
assurant un supplément de croissance externe, soit par une 
rationalisation des outils de production nationaux. 
Selon les pays, les baisses de coûts et de prix qui 
résulteront de la mise en oeuvre de ces stratégies, conséquences 
indirectes de la suppresssion des barrières visées par le Livre 
Blanc, pourraient s'étager entre 0 et 4 %. et le supplément de 
production attendu pourrait atteindre 2,5 à 10 % . 
3- A l'échelle européenne, les effets macrosectoriels de 
la mise en oeuvre de ces stratégies modifieront assez sensiblement 
les positions relatives des différentes industries nationales . 
Les pays du Nord de l'Europe qui, soutenus par un 
marché intérieur porteur, se sont spécialisés dans les produits de 
haute gamme, à fortes exigences et à niveaux de prix élevés, 
devraient accroître leur compétitivité en poursuivant la 
rationalisation de leurs processus de production fondés sur l'emploi 
d'une main-d'oeuvre chère et très qualifiée. Un élargissement de 
leurs gammes vers des produits moins sophistiqués et aussi vers une 
nouvelle clientèle pourrait donner un nouvel élan à des entreprises 
dont le marché intérieur est menacé de saturation. 
La plus grande ouverture de marchés jusqu'ici protégés par 
des exigences réglementaires parfois excessivement complexes à 
l'offre des pays du Sud, qui bénéficieront encore pendant plusieurs 
années de structures de coûts favorables à la production de produits 
de milieu et de bas de gamme, aura nécessairement des effets 
bénéfiques sur les industries de pays à fort potentiel de 
croissance. 
Enfin, la déréglementation des transports facilitera le 
redéploiement du capital productif européen des industries des 
produits de construction, qui devrait déterminer une spécialisation 
plus conforme aux avantages compétitifs des différents pays. 
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NOMENCLATURE DES PRODUITS DE CONSTRUCTION 
I - PRODUITS A BASE MINERALE NON METALLIQUE 
I.l.Ciments et liants hydrauliques 
I.2.Béton prêt à l'emploi 
I.3.Blocs edbéton 
I.4.Tuyaux en béton 
I.5.Autres petits éléments en béton non armé 
I.6.Eléments de structure en béton armé ou précontraint 
I.7.Produits en fibres-ciment 
I.8.Sables, graviers et concassés de carrière 
I.9.Pierres de construction 
I.10.Ardoises 
I.ll.Chaux aérienne 
I.12.Plàtre 
I.13.Produits en plâtre 
I.14.Briques 
I.15.Tuiles et autres produits en terre cuite 
I.16.Carreaux de céramique et terre cuite vernissée ou 
émaillée 
I.17.Eléments sanitaires et autres produits en céramique 
I.18.Verres, vitrages isolants et autres produits en verre 
I.19.Laine de verre et autres isolants minéraux 
I.20.Matériaux et produits divers à base minérale non 
métallique 
II - PRODUITS A BASE DE BOIS 
II.l.Panneaux de bois aggloméré ou contreplaqué 
II.2.Parquets 
II.3.Portes, fenêtres et autres éléments de 
menuiserie en bois 
II.4.Charpentes et structures en bois 
II.5.Matériaux et produits divers à base de bois 
III - PRODUITS A BASE METALLIQUE 
III.l.Aciers pour béton armé ou précontraint 
III.2.Eléments de structure métalliques 
III.3.Eléments de couverture et de bardage métalliques 
III.4.Portes, fenêtres et autres éléments de menuiserie 
métallique 
III.5.Tuyaux en acier et en fonte 
III.6.Chaudières, radiateurs et divers matériels de 
chauffage 
III.7.Eléments sanitaires métalliques 
III.8.Robinetterie 
III.9.Serrurerie, ferronnerie, boulonnerie et visserie 
III.10.Produits en cuivre et dérivés 
III.ll.Produits en zinc ou en plomb et dérivés 
III.12.Matériaux et produits divers à base métallique 
IV - PRODUITS A BASE CHIMIQUE OU TEXTILE 
IV.l.Matériaux et produits à base d'asphalte ou de bitume 
IV.2.Enduits et mastics 
IV.3.Colles 
IV.4.Peintures, vernis et produits de protection 
IV.5.Matériaux et produits isolants en plastique 
IV.6.Papiers peints 
IV.7.Revêtements de murs et sols textiles ou mixtes 
IV.8.Revêtements de murs et sols en plastique ou en 
caoutchouc 
IV.9.Eléments sanitaires en plastique 
IV.lO.Tuyaux en plastique 
IV.ll.Portes, fenêtres et autres éléments de menuiserie 
en plastique 
IV.l2.Eléments et produits divers en plastique 
IV.13.Eléments et produits divers à base chimique ou 
textile 
V - PRODUITS D'EQUIPEMENT ELECTRIQUE 
V.l.Câbles et filerie électriques 
V.2.Lampes et matériel d'éclairage 
V.3.Matériel électrique de chauffage et de climatisation 
V.4.Ascenseurs, monte-charge et escaliers mécaniques 
V.5.Moteurs, pompes, transformateurs et divers matériels 
électromécaniques 
V.6.Appareillage électrique et électronique de mesure, de 
régulation et de contrôle 
V.7.Divers équipements électriques 
FRANCE 
.Tuyaux en b~ton pour 
assainissement 
.Produits en béton léger 
.Poutrelles en béton 
.Panneaux et plaques de 
plâtre 
.Carreaux de céramique 
.Verre plat 
.Produits isolants 
,Panneaux de particules 
.Produits d'étanchéité 
.Revêtements de sols 
.Tuyaux PVC 
.Matériel électrique 
ALLEMAGNE FEDERALE 
• Produits en b~ton l~gff 
'Briques 
Tuiles 
• Carreaux de céramique 
Robinetterie sanitaire 
Cumulus électriques 
PRODUITS SELECTIONNES POUR LES ENQUETES 
GRANDE-BRETAGNE 
• Carreaux de c~ramique 
, Equipements sanitaires 
en céramique 
, Carreaux d'isolation 
en fibre minérale 
Portes en bois 
• Fenêtres en bois 
Meubles de cuisine 
• Fenêtres en aluminium 
• Chaudières et radia-
teurs 
• Serrurerie 
• Produits d'étanchéité 
• Groupes de condition-
nement d'air 
• Ascenseurs 
ITALIE 
• Carreaux de c~ramique 
, Rondsà béton 
• Fermetures métalliques 
Hohinetterie 
, Cumulus électriques 
Ciment 
Plâtre 
ESPAGNE 
Plaques de plâtre 
Equipements sanitaires 
en céramique 
Verre 
Parquets en bois 
Portes en bois 
Baignoires en acier 
• Menuiseries en plasti-
que 
UNJON BELGO-
LUXE~1BOURGEO ISE 
, Carreaux de revêtement 
décoratif en b~ton 
Planchers et prédalle~ 
en béton 
Briques de parement 
Vitrages isolants 
Verre cellulaire 
Laine minérale 
Polyslyrène 
Moussesde polyur~thane 
PAYS-BAS GRE CE PORTUGAL IRLANDE DANE~!ARK 
. Briques . Ciment Marbre Ciment Systèmes de couverture 
Peintures . Ronds à béton Equipements sanitaires Tuyaux en fibres-ciment . Systèmes de gestion 
en céramique Ardoises fibres- dt! l'énergie en 
Liège ciment 
Carreaux de céramique 
Produits isolants 
Câbles électriques 
Ra<ll.:tl:eurs 
lv 
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I. Introduction 
1. The Textile and Clothing (T-C) industry is unanimously 
considered as the industrial sector which has more benefi-
ted from the economie integration to date. It is often 
argued that the T-C industry has almost completed the inte-
gration process, particularly relative to what other indu-
stria! sectors have been experiencing. We shall try to: 
i) assess the validity of this argument by discussing the 
positive effects of integration in the past; 
ii) evaluate the extent and the impact of the existing 
barriers to trade; 
iii) present the main resulta on the costs of Non-Europe 
with an assessment of the direct and indirect impact 
of the barriers removal by the end of 1992. 
2. Before going into the discussion of the main resulta of 
the study, it is important to note that: 
i) The I-C industry has been exposed to increasing strong 
extra-EC competition from low-wage countries. This 
fact makes difficult to disentagle how rouch of the 
structural changes which occurred in the EC industry 
in the past and will occur in the future are due to 
outside-EC competition or intra-EC competition; 
ii) The T-C industry is by no means a homogeneous sector. 
Sub-sectors have different problems and they experien-
ced different adjustment strategies to cope with eco-
nomie integration. Nonetheless, we think that sorne 
useful insights on the effects of integration can be 
gained without too rouch sectoral details. 
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3. The study is based on three types of data sets: 
i) existing national and EC-statistics: 
ii) data on quantitative production and trade flows by T-C 
products have been processed: 
iii) qualitative insights and quantitative information have 
been gained from 60 interviews (15 in each of the four 
countries: West Germany, France, Italy, United King-
dom) to managers and executives of dynamic, Europe 
oriented firms of the various sub-sectors of the T-C 
industry. 
II. The textile and clothing sector: a general picture 
1. Market structure 
1. The general picture of the EC textile and clothing 
industry is still one of a fragmented industry characteri-
zed by a high number of small and medium-sized firms. Fur-
thermore, there bas been a general reduction in the average 
size of the firms in the textile industry since mid-1970s 
for all the countries under analysis. The figure for EC 
fell from 152 employees in 1975 down to 128 employees in 
1981. The decrease bas been particularly strong in Nether-
lands, France and Great Britain. The average size of the 
firms in the clothing industry (110-114 employees), how-
ever, remained basically the same during the period under 
analysis. 
2. The analysis of concentration based on the GIN! index 
shows that the two industries in the 1970s tended to be 
less concentrated, at least in terms of employment. The 
1981 index for the clothing sector is 17 percentage points 
below the 1975 value, while the gap for the textile sector 
is 11 points. The past experience of the sector, then, 
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shows that 'size• bas not been a crucial strategie vari-
able. Concentration bas not proved to be very important for 
the competitive performance of the industry in the face of 
increased intra-EC and outside-EC competition. In a number 
of cases, the overall organization of the industry (e.g. 
linkages between firms) bas probably been more important. 
Clearly, both size and concentration have played a more 
relevant role in sorne particular segments of the market, 
and in sorne particular stages of production. The man-made 
fibre industry, for example, bas always been strongly oli-
gopolistic. High concentration ratio can also be found in 
the printing and teinture industry, in the classic branded 
jeans, in the production of very standardized clothing 
goods. 
2. An assessment of economies of scale and efficiency 
1. As recognized by severa! studies, product specifie 
economies of scale (PSES) are very important in the T-C 
industry and, in particular, they are more important than 
plant economies of scale (PES) (see Textile Council, 1969; 
Pratten, 1971; Scherer et al., 1975; Mariotti, 1982). The 
importance of PSES increases as we move from upstream sta-
ges of production to downstream stages (particularly from 
weaving onwards). 
2. The existing literature also shows that PES play a 
limited role in the T-C industry. The estimates of the 
minimum optimal size of the plants (MOS) for various sub-
sectors show that, in general, they account for a modest 
share of total domestic production. Furthermore, the esti-
mated increase in costs with 1/3 of the MOS is generally 
slight. 
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These results suggest that static production economies of 
scale, with sorne exception, do not represent an effective 
barriers to entry for the T-C industry, and that for the 
majority of sub-sectors concentration processes could not 
be based on them. 
3. The possibility of exploiting static economies of 
scale, both PSES and PES, is strongly limited by the low 
level of standardization of products, essentially due to 
demand factors. There is a clear trade-off between product 
variety and PES, and the choice depends on the market tar-
get of the firms (segments with highly variable demand in 
terms of product-mix vs. segments with more standardized 
demand). Flexibility of production processes, in the sense 
of the capability of varying the product mix without strong 
increases in costs, is one of the strategie variables for 
many T-C subsectors. Static efficiency as such can be of a 
limited value if demand is highly variables in quantitative 
and qualitative terms. 
4. The key factor which allows the firms to obtain sub-
stantial efficiency gains in those sectors where PES and 
PSES are not important is flexibility. This can be achieved 
in two ways: 
i) The first one relies entirely on technological innova-
tion, particularly by developing flexible manufacturing 
systems (FMS) for textile and clothing productions. Poten-
tially, these systems can allow significant economies of 
scope, in sorne sense solving the problem of the trade-off 
between static efficiency and product variety. In the last 
decade many firms were investing in these new technolo-
gies. 
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ii) The second one is the development of a flexible orga-
nization of the industry. The Italian T-C sector provides a 
clear example. In sorne sub-sectors, dynamic, export-orien-
ted firms 11 put out 11 a large share of production to a great 
number of small production units, which provide the neces-
sary flexibility and efficiency in production. The crucial 
strategie variable which affects the performance of the 
firms is not plant size as such. Far more important is the 
power to 11 0rganize 11 production, to set up a network of 
production units, both upstream and downstream. The knit-
wear industry, for example, is organized in industrial 
districts which work as if they were a single firm with 
hundreds of small, independent, highly flexible, production 
units. The fragmentation of this production system is coun-
terbalanced by the concentration of commercial and marke-
ting activities in a smaller number of firms, often of a 
very large size in terms of turnover, which organize the 
whole system of production. This production system has been 
at the heart of the good export performance of the Italian 
firms of the knitwear, clothing, and wool sectors from the 
second half of the 1970s onwards. The Italian mode!, how-
ever, is not widespread in Europe, although sorne countries, 
like Belgium and France, are moving in this direction. 
5. The efficiency and flexibility leve! required by the 
EC market could also be obtained by subcontracting either 
processes of production or the manufacture of final pro-
ducts to productive units in developing and eastern coun-
tries. Germany extensively used this strategy in the last 
decade with two main resulta. The first one was the gain of 
substantial cost reductions which made the German products 
very priee competitive across Europe. The second one was a 
sort of control of the competitiveness of the imports from 
low wage countries, preventing, in this way, a much more 
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devastating impact to these producers on the European T-C 
industrial structure. German firms control the commercial 
and distributive networks, own brand image and develop 
advertising policies. For all these activities, barriers to 
entry and economies of scale are very important, and very 
few producers from low-wage countries could allow success-
ful entry at these levels. 
6. The increased intra-EC competitiveness brought about by 
the economie integration, together with the competitive 
pressure of low-wage not-EC countries, are at the root of 
substantial technical improvements in the industry starting 
from the early 1970s. Technical improvements have regar-
ded: 
- single stages of processing, usually in the form of 
increasing the speed and the reliability of operations~ 
- increase in the continuity of the overall productive 
cycle with technological innovations~ 
- greater simplification and rationalization of many pro-
cessing stages, with the introduction, whenever possible, 
of automated machines~ 
- introduction of advanced methods of management and con-
trol of the productive process {CAD, CADAM systems, etc.) 
{see OECD, 1987: Mariotti, 1982). 
7. The various subsectors of the T-C industry have been 
affected by technical innovations to a different extent. 
The more relevant changes have occured in the spinning and 
finishing industries, and in the cutting stages of the 
clothing industry. Also weaving has been greatly involved 
in technical improvements. The German leading position in 
sorne sectors of the textile industry is based on an exten-
sive use of technical innovations. 
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8. Technical innovation bas caused a strong increase in 
productivity, with significant cost reductions. In the last 
decade, this bas been the case for the Italian textile 
industry, which showed the highest productivity growth 
rates, for the German textile sector, and for the clothing 
industry in Italy, France and UK. There is no clear evi-
dence of the fact that technical progress has determined a 
significant increase in the optimal size of the plants. 
9. The existence of a common European market bas been a 
crucial factor for the achievement of economies of scale 
due to commercial and marketing aspects. These also repre-
sent strong barriers to entry for low-cost developing 
countries. The main point is that, in order to exploit 
these economies, it is not necessary to be a multi-plant 
firm. As we have already seen, sub-contracting, both at 
national and international level, and "putting out 
systems", can do the job probably more efficiently. 
3. Trade creation and diversion 
1. In the Interim Report we showed with the help of stati-
stical ratios that intra-EC trade bad expanded strongly in 
the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. This was prima-
rily due to the forces of integration emanating from the 
realization of the Common Market. The majority of the firms 
interviewed pointed out that without the Common Market 
their experts could not have been increased as rouch as was 
actually done. 
It cannot be ignored, however, that there were other forces 
at work besides the integration effects, forces which led 
to a strong intensification of trade in textiles and cloth-
ing in the Community. They include: 
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i) The European countries share the same cultural back-
ground, which provides favourable conditions for 
foreign trade; 
ii) after the Second World War there has been a tendency 
towards internationalization, favouring international 
trade especially of such "individualistic" products as 
clothing; 
iii) the export markets outside the EC were in part little 
absorptive, either because of a lack of purchasing 
power (like in the developing countries), or because 
of trade barriers which made (and in part still make) 
access to these markets difficult (Cf. Wettbewerbsver-
haltnisse und Wettbewerbsverzerrungen im Welttextil-
handel, Schriften zur Textilpolitik, Vol. 2, ed. by 
K. Nenndorfer and E.-H. Stahr for Gesamttextil, Frank-
furt/Main 1985). 
The newly industrializing countries impose tariffs of 20 to 
100 % on imports of textiles and clothing, in addition they 
have established non-tariff and non-quantitative trade 
barriers (e.g. cash deposits for imports). The state-tra-
ding countries purchase, via state foreign-trade monopo-
lies, according to set supply priorities and foreign ex-
change reserves; textiles and clothing usually rank very 
low. But imports of textiles and clothing also face tariff 
and non tariff barriers in sorne Non-European industrialized 
countries. 
2. In the mid-1970s, the European integration process in 
the textile and clothing sector entered a late phase. This 
is reflected, for example, by the fact that the share of 
intra EC imports or exports in total imports or exports of 
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Gerrnany, France and Italy was generally declining in the 
second half of the 1970s and the first half of 1980s (Table 
1}. In contrast, during the sarne period the textile and 
clothing sector of the United Kingdorn was still in the 
rnidst of the integration process (due to her late EC 
entry}, which is reflected in rising shares of intra-EC 
irnports in total British irnports (British exports of texti-
les and clothing to other EC-countries lost in importance, 
however}. 
In detail, the analysis of foreign trade for the period 
1978-1985 yielded the following findings: 
i} In the textile sector the rnutual interrelationship of 
the EC rnernber countries is higher than in the clothing 
industry. This may be traced to the large irnports of 
clothing from low-wage countries. 
ii} The establishment of the Cornrnon Market - in coopera-
tion with other factors - led to trade creation in 
sorne subsectors. This benefitted prirnarily the Italian 
textile and clothing industry. The French and in par-
ticular the British producers were not able to take 
equal advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
Cornrnon Market. 
iii} With respect to specialization in intra-EC exports, 
the leading position is held by Italy in the clothing 
sector, by Gerrnany in the textile sector. 
iv} In the period 1978-1985 trade diversion from third 
countries following the establishment of the Economie 
Cornrnunity was ascertained only in sorne sub-sectors of 
the textile and clothing market. In this period the 
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Table 1 
Intra-EX: Trade in Textiles am Clothing 
(Intra-EX: Trade as Percentage of 'Ibtal Exp:>rts or Inportsa)) 
Exporte Inport.s 
Cbmtry / Sector 
1960 1970 1900 1985 1960 1970 1980 1985 
Germany 
Textiles EX:(6) 20,8 42,3 43,0 31,1 57,7 69,8 50,3 49,5 
EX:(9) • • 51,8 44,7 • • 56,1 54,7 
Clothing EX:(6) 23,0 59,8 54,0 40,6 55,9 61,2 47,5 29,5 
EC(9) • • 60,1 52,0 . • 50,6 32,0 
France 
Textiles EC(6) 30,9 53,7 57,2 49,1 50,6 78,9 61,7 61,4 
EX:(9) • • 64,5 61,1 • • 68,5 66,9 
Clothing EX:(6) 15,2 57,6 56,6 41,9 76,5 79,7 44,0 42,5 
EX:(9) • • 62,1 49,8 . • 49,6 47,7 
Italf 
Text1les EX:(6) 31,1 44,5 48,7 44,6 43,1 63,0 45,5 48,5 
EX:(9) • • 58,4 55,9 . • 52,8 55,1 
Clothing EX:(6) 36,0 68,0 65,1 37,1 54,5 75,5 32,1 37,3 
EX:(9) • • 71,5 45,2 • • 43,3 46,1 
United~ 
Textiles EX:(6) 13,0 14,7 33,4 32,6 32,9 27,2 40,2 52,4 
EX:(9) • • 44,6 43,1 . • 50,5 58,9 
Clothing EX:(6) 17,0 17,6 34,6 28,5 32,7 11,3 20,0 29,4 
EX:(9) • • 55,2 46,8 • • 26,2 34,9 
a) Basie: Values in us-$. 
EX:(6): Belgiœi/I.llxenDourg, Frarx:e, Germany, Italy, Netherlan:is. 
!X!(9): In addition to EX:(6) Dennark, Irelard, United ~. 
Source: CECI>, 'l'rade by CcJmoiities: calculations by the Ifo-Institut.e. 
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Common Market had therefore no severe protectionistic 
effect vis-à-vis third countries, despite the exist-
ence of the Multi-Fibre-Agreement {MFA). On the other 
hand, imports from developing countries may not have 
increased to the same extent as the competitiveness of 
low-cost countries has grown. 
3. Trade creation in the Common Market - via greater and 
more varied supply and increasing competition - has led to 
faster growth of the national textile and clothing markets 
than would have occured without the stimulus of the tariff 
union. Especially the German market has expanded greatly, 
whereas the growth of the British market has lagged. The 
extent to which market growth affected the distribution of 
production in the individual countries will be shown below 
for the period 1978-1985. 
i) The distribution of textile production among the indi-
vidual EC countries did not change much during the 
period 1978-1985. Only Italy, Belgium-Luxemburg and 
EIRE {only towards the end of the 1970s) were able to 
achieve share gains. Losses were primarily suffered by 
the British textile industry. French textile producers 
suffered quite significant share !osses in the first 
half of the 1980s. 
At the disaggregated level, the specialization trends 
become even more pronounced. In almost all areas of 
spinning, weaving, and the production of knitted 
fabrics, the Italian textile industry gained conside-
rable production shares. German producers were only 
able to do so in cotton spinning. Great specialization 
occured also in the UK regarding the production of 
knitted fabrics (cotton system, man-made) and in 
Belgium concerning the production of carpets. 
- 494 -
- 14 -
ii) The distribution of clothing production capacities 
among the member countries of the EC changed, in part, 
quite considerably during the period of investigation. 
The clear winner was Italy, which was able to raise 
its production share to almost one third. Italy was 
able to improve its position in most sectors of the 
clothing industry. In the production of knitted gar-
ments (wool system, man-made), however, it had to 
relinguish production shares. Despite the considerable 
shifts within the European clothing industry and the 
specialization related to it, increasing returns to 
scale failed to be realized. That may be traced to the 
fact that manufacturing steps in the production of 
clothing in the past could not be automated further. 
That is also why the manufacture of large runs was 
frequently shifted to low-wage countries. 
4. The analysis of priees 
The aim of this part of the study is twofold. On one hand 
we seek to evaluate the extent of residual trade barriers 
within the EC by observing the level of priees of sorne 
clothing articles all over the EC countries. On the ether 
hand we investigate the dynamics of clothing priee indices 
to elucidate the movement of relative priees of the clo-
thing industry over time in each EC country. We call the 
first horizontal analysis and the second time analysis. 
Horizontal analysis 
The analysis is based on net retail priees for selected 
clothing products which in sorne instances are not fully 
identical in the member countries. In both 1980 and 1985 
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for sorne clothing merchandises the priee differences reach 
even 200 %. Despite the fairly advanced stage achieved by 
the interna! market in this industry these apparent diver-
gences reveal at !east the existence of sorne peculiarities 
of national markets. 
The coefficients of variation presented show that there are 
priee differences in clothing (Table 3f. There is no clear 
trend towards a reduction over time. The interviews confirm 
Table 3 
Coefficients of variation of average net retail priees 
of clothing products for EUR-10 
Clothing product 1975*) 1980 1985 
Coat M. 0,06 0,06 0,06 
Coat w. 0,07 0,07 0,08 
Raincoat 0,08 0,07 0,06 
Jacket M. 0,05 0,06 0,07 
Jeans 0,05 0,06 0,05 
Trous ers w. 0,04 0,07 0,11 
Trou sers M. 0,05 0,07 0,06 
Trous ers c. 
-
0,10 0,10 
Wool Skirt 0,03 0,07 0,08 
Pull. M. 0,08 0,09 0,09 
Pull. w. 0,11 0,08 0,04 
Shirt 0,03 0,07 0,06 
Chemise 0,06 0,06 0,10 
Slip M. 0,03 0,09 0,10 
Slip w. 0,07 0,10 0,07 
*) Computed on gross priees. 
Source: Data from EUROSTAT calculations by PROMETEIA. 
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these findings. In all four major EC countries there are 
businessmen who said that they set priees in the EC within 
a discretionary range which represent on average 10 percent 
of the net final priee. We have reason to believe that they 
purposedly gave a lower figure because they feared legal 
consequences. Then if we add priee discrimination made by 
retailers we understand why such phenomenon is still so 
relevant. A detailed analysis on sorne standard textile 
products also shows priee differences. 
Priee differences look lower in textiles than in clothing. 
The reasons are: 
- Product differentiation in textiles is lower and hence 
priee differences cannet reflect differen~ consu~er 
tastes to a great extent. 
- More homogeneous goods in the textile industry make 
competition fiercer and priee differences less likely 
even if stronger competition is not accompanied by any 
decrease in concentration and economies of scale have 
still to be fully exploited. 
Textile production is more capital intensive, hence the 
slight differences in labour costs among the EC countries 
have less weight. 
- Textile goods are mostly sold directly by producers 
leaving less room to different commercial margins which 
are sometimes the cause of priee differences among goods 
of the same branch across countries. 
~y do we observe priee discrimination? Is it really the 
sign of a still lagging interna! market in the T-C sec tor? 
Will it persist after 1992? First of all priee discrimina-
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tion by firrns across different countries rnight just be a 
policy by firrns induced by different consurnption habits of 
consumera across the EC. Insofar priee discrimination is 
not the sign of residual non tariff barriers within the EC. 
Taking into account the pronounced priee differences it is 
clear that the bilateral agreements within the MFA play an 
important role. 
Tirne series analysis 
The analysis of priees tirne series shows a substantial 
stability of relative priees of clothing over the period 
1973-1986 in three major countries, i.e. Italy, Gerrnany and 
France. In Italy the priee of clothing bas gained over the 
period sorne five points, while in Gerrnany and France sorne 
two points which shows greater stability (figure 1). Quite 
Figure 1: Relative Priees Clothing-Footwear *) 
(1980 = 100) 
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a different behaviour is displayed by UK priees. Here the 
relative priee of clothing has lost sorne 40 points. This is 
primarily the signal of cheap imports from third countries 
{Commonwealth) and the switch of British consumers towards 
lower priee articles. 
5. Consumption patterns 
From branch data we can easily infer sorne features of the 
evolution of private expenditure in the four major EC coun-
tries. It appears that from 1973 to 1985 the share of pri-
vate consumption expenditure for clothing and footwear in 
total private consumption has slightly declined both in 
value and quantity terms in Italy, Germany and most in 
France. This is due to the inferior nature of clothing 
expenditures, that means demand for clothing is rather 
income-inelastic. A sharply different picture is provided 
by UK. In this country clothing expenditure has diminished 
its share over total consumption expenditure only in value 
terms, whereas it has increased its share in quantity 
terms. 
Demand for clothing can be divided into two parts. On the 
one hand there is a mass market primarily supplied by im-
ports from third countries. Demand for these products is 
relatively price-elastic. On the other hand there is a 
market for high quality products which is the very domain 
of most of the European producers. Demand for these goods 
is rather price-inelastic. This is the reason why the role 
of priee developments in the determination of clothing 
demand in the industrial countries is a controversial issue 
in the economie literature. Sorne studies indicate that 
priees are important, whereas other studies {mainly Euro-
pean) conclude that, according to the available data, pri-
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ces are rather insignificant in comparison with other fac-
tors in explaining clothing demand. (Cf. GATT, Textiles and 
Clothing in the World Economy, Geneva, July 1984, pg. 168). 
On the average the elasticity to priees of consumption 
expenditure for T-C is a little below o. We consider two 
different scenarios according to two different values of 
elasticity: -0,6 and -1,0. The lower figure (-0,6) is more 
realistic if we take into account the inferiority character 
of T-C goods. 
The effect of 1992 on concumption 
One effect of eliminating the trade barriers will be lower 
priees (see chapter II.6). To evaluate the impact of lower 
priees on the level of consumption of T-C products we 
assume that priees will decrease by 0,8-1 % in Italy, 
0,4-0,6 % in Germany and France and 0,6-0,8 % in the UK. 
The effects of the completion of the internal market will 
be a small increase of consumption in the range of 0,24-1 % 
in the period 1985-92. The total increase will be higher 
because aggregate consumption will have increased owing to 
a higher income in 1992. 
6. Barriers to trade 
Most of the firms in the sample did not complain about the 
existence of significant barriers to intra-community trade. 
An Italian firm even said that there are more troubles in · 
selling in Southern Italy than in Germany or France. The EC 
market is considered almost perfectly integrated • 
. 
Although there are no significant barriers intra-EC trade 
is still hampered by slight barriers. In accordance with 
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the Cornmission's 1985 White Paper, three categories of 
barriers may be distinguished: 
- Physical barriers: 
One of the most trade barriers within the EC are delays 
at the borders, primarly because of exaggerated border 
formalities or arbitrary and therefore discriminatory use 
of customs rules. In these conncection the surveyed firms 
mentioned above all the customs practice in France, but 
also in Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. To be sure, 
the frequency of border delays has declined recently, 
according to the firms. 
This category of physical barriers includes also the 
control of origin of goods in order to ensure that 
products from third countries, the imports of which to 
the EC has been restricted, have been set against the 
relevant Member States quotas. Moreover, Member States 
may be authorised by the Commission, on the basis of art. 
115 EC treaty, to exclude those imports from Community 
treatment. 
- Technical barriers: 
Of sorne importance are restrictions in cross-border capi-
tal flows, which affect merchandise trade as well as 
direct investment. Firms' complainte concern primarily 
practices in Italy and France. Frequently mentioned was 
the lack of a unique European currency; this was said to 
cause high hedging costs, especially for exports to the 
UK. 
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In the category of technical trade barriers mention was 
also made now and then of a restriction in the case of 
public procurement. In many cases, the firms didn•t even 
participate in the calls for tenders, as they were sure 
of not having a chance. 
- Fiscal barriers: 
Very frequently the firms mentioned the different value 
added tax rates in the member countries as being a trade 
barrier. Individual member countries, e.g. Italy, demand 
the value added tax at the time of import, which is dis-
criminatory in faveur of the domestic competitors. 
According to a special survey of German clothing manufac-
turers, the trade barriers mentioned above concern in par-
ticular small and medium size firms. The barriers have less 
grave effects on the large producers. 
The trade barriers mentioned did not, however, prevent the 
firms from exporting to ether Common Market countries. 
These experts might possibly have been even higher, al-
though there are many dynamic, Europe-oriented firms which 
stopped differentiating between domestic sales and experts 
a long time ago. Consequently the elimination of the still 
existing trade barriers will only have marginal effects on 
quantitative trade flows within the EC. This implies that 
economies of scale yet to be realized may also be minimal 
for production processes. 
Given that the trade barriers will be eliminated, the 
interviewed firms expect costs reductions for experts of 
sorne 1 to 3 percent. Because of the sharp competition in 
the textile and clothing markets one may assume that the 
cost reductions will also be passed on priees. 
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III. Results on the costs of Non-Europe 
Immediate direct effects 
1. Unit labour costs will drop as a result of the interna! 
market simply because the job of monitoring the custom 
formalities, filling the custom documents, checking the 
labelling requirements, etc., will be no longer necessary. 
Part of the staff working on these items can be moved to 
ether assignements or fired. Our estimate of the importance 
of these jobs in the employment structure of a firm with 
substantial export activity, is around 0,5 % to 2 % of the 
total number of employees. If these people were fired, the 
cost saving would be around 0,5-2 % of the wage bill. 
2. There are, however, two possible scenarios. The best 
one in terms of cost reduction, is that of lower employment 
with the same production level and efficiency, or the 
redeployment of the white collars formerly working on 
custom formalities to ether interna! jobs which increase 
the overall efficiency of the firm. The immediate firing is 
quite unlikely. Furthermore, if one of the possible effect 
of the interna! market is an increase of the export per-
formance of the firm, the marketing staff might need to be 
reinforced, so people formerly working on custom formali-
ties can still be valuable for the firm. 
3. The more likely scenario is that of no significant 
changes in the number of white collars, at least in the 
short term. So the unit labour cost reduction as a direct 
effect, will be accordingly negligible. 
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Deferred direct effects 
1. The completion ot the interna! market can have a psy-
chological effect in the sense of making firms more Europe 
minded and willing to increase their export and investment 
activity in the European community. Harmonization of VAT 
and a complete liberalization of movements of capitals and 
currenties could make sorne firms even more EC minded. In 
this scenario, the strategies of the firms are going to 
experience sorne changes even if they already have a Euro-
pean orientation, although, in this case, the impact will 
be correspondingly smaller. Firms will probably decide 
their market strategies at a European level, and not coun-
try by country as they usually do now. 
2. In any case, the most important expected effects of the 
completion of the interna! market come from the estimated 
net increase in competitiveness among European producers. 
We are talking about net effects because most of the chan-
ges that we would expect to occur in the next years will be 
mainly a reaction to forces that are in motion now and will 
affect the industry structure and performance for many 
years to come. According to the interviews• results the 
complete barriers-free European Community will affect these 
trends only marginally, not more than 10 % of the expected 
unit cost reductions. 
3. The expected increase in competition in the European 
markets will have sorne effects on the mark-up of the firm. 
It is very difficult to work out a single estimate of the 
expected reduction, because of the strong differences 
between the competitive systems of the various sub-sectors 
of the industry. Furthermore, the pressure on priees due to 
the competitiveness of low wage producers has already been 
forcing firms to adapt their strategies to a priee competi-
tive environment. 
- 504 -
- 24 -
4. The mark-up reduction depends also very much on the 
distributive structure of the countries and on the marke-
ting and distribution policies of the firms. The more the 
distributive structure of T-C goods is concentrated on 
independent large units (department stores, mail order 
houses etc.) the more priee competition is expected to 
reduce the mark-ups of the firms. In this case, however, 
nothing guarantees that reductions in the mark-ups will be 
passed on consumer priees: the expected mark-up reduction 
might simply mean more profits for the distributive sector. 
On the other hand, the more fragmented is the distribution 
structure, or the more important is the market power of 
single brands and labels, in other word, the more oligopo-
listic are the T-C sub-sectors, the less strong will be the 
effect on priees not only of increased competition but also 
of the estimated cost reduction. 
S. Countries like Great Britain and Germany, where the 
distribution of T-C goods is relatively more concentrated 
and the distributive sector is priee-competitive, might 
experience the strongest priee reductions. France, and 
above all Italy, on the other hand, where the distribution 
of T-C goods is very fragmented, are expected to experience 
a comparatively smaller priee reduction1 >. Firms which 
sell to the branded segments of the market, however, irres-
pective of the country, are going to develop strategies 
aimed at strengthening their market power, Franchising in 
the clothing industry is an example of such a policy. In 
this case, the pressure towards priee reductions is compar-
ably lower. 
1) A la longue in Italy and France there will be a restruc-
turing in the distribution sectors, consequently priee 
reductions also will be very strong. 
- sos -
- 25 -
6. A fall in productin costs due to economies of scale has 
been indicated as another plausible deferred direct effect. 
A scenario might be a tendency towards a homogeneity of 
tastes and demand across Europe, which could change the 
balance between static efficiency and product variety in 
favour of the former. In the United States demand is more 
homogeneous and plants are usually larger than in Europe. 
Volumes are relatively more important than variety. It 
seems very unlikely, however, that demand in Europe will 
follow the US pattern. Then flexibility will remain the 
main route to efficiency for the European firms. In any 
case, even assuming that most of the T-C industry is 
currently working at 2/3 of the optimal size of the plants, 
the cost reduction due to the full exploitation of static 
economies of scale would not exceed, on average, 1,5-2,5 
per cent of unit cost of production. The interna! market 
effect, at best, might account for only 10 % of this reduc-
tion. 
7. Marketing economies of scale on the other band, mainly 
due to advertising, brand image, and distribution factors, 
have still to be fully exploited for many sub-sectors of 
the T-C industry. A complete European market can help firms 
to reach a European dimension and save on marketing costs. 
Assuming that there is still on average a potential gain of 
2,5 per cent in the textile and 5 per cent of the unit cost 
in the clothing industry, and allowing the interna! market 
to account at best for 10 per cent of the expected chan-. 
ges1 >, the best scenario for the interna! market effect 
is an estimated cost reduction of not more than 0,20-0,30 
per cent of unit cost due to multi-plant marketing econo-
mies of scale. These figures, added to the static economies 
1) See paragraph 2 of this chapter. 
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of scale effect, give us an idea of the expected cost re-
duction due to the completion of the interna! market in the 
more favourable hypothesis: 0,3-0,6 percent of the total 
unit cost of production and marketing. The highest cost 
savings can be expected in France and Great Britain, cur-
rently the less efficient T-C industries. 
Indirect dynamic effects 
Generally speaking, a more larger use of international 
sub-contracting, de-centralization of production, and out-
ward processing practices with producers of low wage coun-
tries, are expected in the future. This will probably re-
present the most important structural changes in the next 
decade, particularly in the clothing indust~y. 
The cost saving due to the de-centralization of the assemb-
ly operation in low wage countries can be estimated around 
15-25 per cent of the total unit cost of production. The 
increased competition effect of the interna! market can 
force firms to increase their recourse to outward proces-
sing and direct investments in low wage countries. The more 
optimistic scenario is that, in the second half of the 
1990s, the share of imports of clothing from low-wage coun-
tries will be 2-5 percentage points higher of the estimated 
trend as a result of the internal market. The additional 
saving on unit labour cost can be estimated around -1 per 
cent for France, the country which is expected to expe-
rience the largest increase in outward processing and di-
rect investment in the next years, and roughly -0,2 to -0,5 
per cent for Germany, while for Italy and Great Britain the 
cost savings will be even less pronounced. 
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IV. Conclusions 
1. The internal market effect will be marginal in the T-C 
sector, because of the advanced state of integration 
achieved. This statement can be reinforced by observing 
that: 
1.1 Plant and technical economies of scale have already 
been exploited to a large extent. 
1.2 Commercial economies of scale have still to be 
exploited and their effect will be a further 
homogeneity of tastes and priees, with scanty 
relevance for the level of priees. 
1.3 The proportion of disposable income devoted to T-C is 
not going to increase, so the income effects of the 
internal market on consumption are rather low. 
2. The reduction of production priees due to direct and 
indirect effects should range between 0,5 and 1,5 %. How 
much of this reduction is going to be passed on to con-
sumera depends on the commercial structure which will 
prevail after 1992. Great Britain and Germany might 
experience the strongest priee reductions, but in all 
countries the effect on consumption will be insignifi-
cant. 
3. What is going to reshape dramatically the T-C sector in 
the EC in the years to come is not the internal market 
integration, but the fiercer competition from third 
countries. Priees, profits, employment will be set where 
third countries competition on one side and import pro-
tection on the other will compromise. Compared to the 
shocks produced by low wage countries import, the inter-
nal market effect looks like a grain of sand. 
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1.1 The nature of the European pharmacuetical market and industry 
1. In 1984 pharmaceutical sales within the Community, including Spain 
and Portuga 1 , were approxima te ly ECU25, 750m at manufacturers • pri ces 
(Table 1), forming 9.5 percent of health care costs and 0.79 percent 
of combined gross domestic product (GDP). Of this total, 88 percent 
of sales by value were obtained through a doctor•s prescription, 14 
per cent being consumed in hospitals and 74 per cent being dispensed 
through retai 1 pharmacies. Only 12 per cent were bought over the 
counter, 
2. There are large variations in the consumption of pharmaceuticals 
between the member states in the Community. Differences in incarne are 
only partly responsible. Equally important are differences in 
attitudes to drugs and in traditions of medical practice. These 
variations affect bath the levels of consumption and the types of 
product consumed. There are strong similarities between Belgium, 
France, I ta ly and Spain, on the one ha nd, and Denmark, Ire 1 and, the 
Netherlands and the UK on the ether. The FRG has elements in common 
with bath. 
3. The supply of pharmaceuticals within the Community is highly 
internationalised. Taking the Community as a whole, 43 per cent of 
sales are by indigenous companies to their own national market. In 
every country the locally owned industry has a disproportionately 
large share of the local market. Only in France and the FRG, however, 
does it amount to more than 50 per cent. Supplies from companies based 
in other Community countries make up a further 23 per cent of the 
total, while 34 percent come from firms based outside the Community, 
primarily in the USA and Switzerland. 
4. Foreign companies supply drugs either through trade or by local 
production. In the Community the latter is the more important, 
amounting to about 40 per cent of all pharmaceuticals supplied. US and 
Swiss firms depend overwhelmingly on local production to supply their 
markets, while British and German companies also have substantial 
foreign facilities. Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands are the only 
Community countries which are supplied mainly by imports from abroad. 
- 2 -
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TABLE 1 PHARMACEUTICAL CONSUMPTION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1984 
Country Total Per As % As % By type and outlet (%) Average Relative 
sales capita GDP hea lth priee 
ECU ECU ca re OTC Ethical (UK=lOO) 
{1) 
BELGIUM 880 90 0.81 
DENMARK 370 74 0.50 
FRANCE 5600 102 0.81 
FRG 7660 125 0.89 
GREE CE 449 45 0.95 
IRELAND 160 46 0.67 
ITAL Y 4440 78 0.91 
NETHER- 660 46 0.38 
LANDS 
PORTUGAL 350 35 1.08 
SPAIN 1830 48 0.81 
UK 3510 62 0.59 
TOTAL 25750 o. 78 
(1) at manufacturers' priees 
( 2) 1983 
(3) including dispensing doctors 
costs 
(2) 
8.6 
7.0 
8.8 
11.0 
20.2 
8.8 
12.4 
4.1 
18.9 
12.1 
9.6 
9.5 
12 
15 
9 
16 
through through 
retail hospitals 
pharmacies 
{3) 
76 12 
70 15 
78 13 
66 18 
.--83--+ 17 
5 80 15 
8 79 13 
.. n/a • 
+--93--+ 7 
+--Ba-. 12 
20 67 13 
12 74 14 
(4) using the 1983 indices of the EC statistieal office 
(5) per capita spending/average priee. 
( 4) 
103 
154 
76 
164 
73 
115 
57 
145 
low 
low 
100 
91 
volume 
Per 
eapita 
(UK=lOO) 
( 5) 
140 
77 
216 
122 
99 
65 
221 
51 
n/a 
n/a 
100 
152 
Source: Authors• estimates based on IMF and IMS data and OECD: Measuring Health Care 
1960-1983 
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5. Production of pharmaceuticals within the European Community 
amounted in 1984 to ECU39,300m (Table 2). The sector is dominated by 
large companies with the resources to develop new active substances 
(NAS). The cast of doing so is currently at least ECU75m per NAS to 
reach the market, and requires annual sales of ECU150m or more. There 
are 60 such firms operating in the Community, of which 33 are based 
there. Of the remainder, 20 are American, four are Swiss and three 
Swedish. 
6. These companies have a strong international orientation and operate 
on a world-wide basis. They are generally organised on multinational 
lines. Within the Community, marketing is always organised on a 
country-by-country basis. The manufacture of active ingredients is 
con fi ned to a 1 imited number of si tes, but conversion i nto dosage 
forms is extensively decentralised. Basic and commercially sensitive 
research is highly centralised most commonly in the country of origin. 
Clinical and formulation development work, however, is often 
dispersed. 
7. Many smaller companies operate in the Community. Most of them 
concentrate on generics or OTC products or exploit local markets with 
well-established remedies. Their innovative capacity is limited, and 
their focus national rather than international. Firms of this kind 
have 20-30 per cent of the market in France, the FRG, Italy and Spain, 
although they have largely disappeared in the UK. 
8. On the basis of shares of the world market and of success in 
innovation, the pharmaceutical industry of the USA leads. That of 
Switzerland, although much smaller, is also in the first class. Among 
the compani es based wi thin the European member nations tho se of the 
FRG and the UK are very strong. French firms are less well placed, 
being excessively dependent on sales in the home marke't and in the 
franc zone, and the same is true, mutatis mutandis, of those of Italy. 
The research-based companies of Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark 
have elements of competitive strength but are handicapped by their 
moderate size. The indigenous companies of the ether Community nations 
are uniformly weak. 
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TABLE 2 PHARMACEUTICAL OUTPUT IN EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1984 
COUNTRY PH ARMA 
COMPANIES 
NUMBŒ 
(1) 
BELGIUM 80 
DENMARK 39 
FRANCE 331 
FRG 308 
GREECE 90 
IR ELAND 153 
ITAL Y 365 
NETHER- 47 
LANDS 
PORTUGAL 96 
SPAIN 370 
UK 333 
TOTAL 2212 
(1) Manufacturers only 
(2} 1983 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTION 
TOTAL VALUE TRADING AS % 
ECUm ADDED PROFIT CHEMICAL 
% AS % SALES 
(2) SALES {2) 
(3) 
1290 49 20 9.4 
870 44 19 36.4 
8530 30 5 19.6 
10140 46 12 12.4 
405 20 
1040 69 52.4 
6300 41 11 21.0 
1050 
410 
2570 42 14 19.3 
6700 52 30 16.8 
34300 43 14 16.8 
(3} Authors' estimates based on 1983 Eurostat data. 
Source: IMS, Eurostat, National sources 
R&D 
EXPENDITURE 
TOTAL AS % 
$rn PHARMA 
SALES 
125 10 
65 7 
1090 13 
1430 14 
<1 
15 5 
380 6 
110 11 
<1 
.:40 2 
910 14 
4165 11 
EMPLOYMENT 
(000) 
10 
8 
66 
87 
3 
4 
64 
10 
3 
32 
66 
353 
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9. The pharmaceutical industry is subject to a very large degree of 
government regulation. The admission of new products to national 
markets is strictly controlled. Proof of safety, efficacy and quality 
is universally required. Regulation of this type is carried out on a 
national basis, although a considerable degree of uniformity within 
the Community has been attained through the various directives issued 
by the Commission since 1965. 
10. Pricing policies designed to limit pharmaceutical expenditure are 
also normal in the member countries. They result from the heavy 
involvement of European governments and national agencies in the 
provision of health care. Only in the FRG and the Netherlands are 
priees largely uncontrolled. Elsewhere, they are fixed by various 
forms of official action (paragraphs 27-32). Positive lists, which 
limit reimbursement to specified products, and negative lists, which 
exclude certain drugs or therapeutic categories, are widely used. 
Average priee levels vary very considerably within the Community. 
Differences of this kind have existed for many years. Priees are set 
on a national basis and little progress towards harmonisation has been 
made. 
11. Other barriers towards the unification of the European market and 
industry are relatively unimportant. Tariffs and direct import 
restrictions have been eliminated, except in the cases of Portugal and 
Spain, where they are being phased out. Patent protection has been 
unified. Direct assistance to the local pharmaceutical industry in the 
form of subsidies and tax concessions is only significant in the case 
of Ireland. The discriminatory use of registration procedures and 
priee controls is considered below. 
12. Government regulation of the industry means that it forms apart of 
. 
the political agenda. National administrations have divided aims. They 
wish to limit health care spending, of which pharmaceuticals form a 
minor but readily controlled part; at the same time they want to 
promote hign-technology industries, of which the pharmaceutical sector 
i s a success ful examp 1 e. The re i s therefore an inherent confl i ct of 
objectives. 
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13. In practice, Greece, Portugal and Spain, without a research-based 
industry, favour the interests of consumers unambiguously. Belgium and 
the Netherlands are inclined in the same direction; although they have 
such a sector, they appear to attach only a secondary importance to 
it. The FRG values its major companies, but is committed to a detached 
attitude to all types of industry. Denmark and the UK have a generally 
supportive attitude towards their own firms, which, however, make most 
of thei r sa 1 es abroad. The governments of France, and, to a 1 esser 
extent Italy, attach an equally strong importance to the interests of 
both consumers and producers, which have proved difficult to 
reconcile. 
1.2 Registration and its problems 
14. The abject of registration is to make sure that a drug is safe, 
effective and of adequate quality before it is put on sale. The onus 
is on the applicant to satisfy the authority; the role of the latter 
is to evaluate the evidence put before it. 
15. During the past 20 years the requirements of national regulatory 
authorities have converged as a result of action by the European 
Commission. There are now few differences in technical standards 
between them. All Community countries accept evidence obtained abroad 
and follow common guidelines. All provide abbreviated forms of 
registration for projects based on known ingredients. A uniform 
120-day decision period has been agreed, to which 90 days are added if 
the product is referred to an advisory committee. 
16. In practice, however, there are substantial differences between 
one country and another. Methods of evaluation vary, as do perceptions 
of the weight to be put on particular kinds of evidence. A large 
element of judgement is involved, which must be influenced by the 
local traditions of medical practice. Local clinical trials may not be 
officially required, but are often advisable to familiarise local 
opinion leaders with a new product. 
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17. There are also considerable delays in processing applications. 
Currently only France approaches the 120-day limit on occasion. The 
FRG and the UK take about two years, and Italy and Spain three or 
more. The Community average is currently 18-24 months. Such delays 
have tended to increase in recent years. They are attributed in the 
main to a lack of resources on the part of national registration 
authorities, aggravated in several nations by a large increase in the 
number of applications for generic products. 
18. The large research-based companies respond to this situation by 
preparing the necessary dossier centrally, usually with the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), the most demanding of authorities, in 
mind. The experimental work is organised so as to satisfy all 
requirements; thus, if local clinical testing is needed, it will be 
included in the overall programme. The dossier is then modified to 
suit the needs of each authority. They consider this to be a 
satisfactory if not ideal way to work. 
19. The direct costs of multiple registration within the Community are 
limited. Based on the extra staff employed by the major firms, a 
figure of ECU40-55m seems reasonable. Extra clinical testing is not 
considered to be serious burden; as already noted, the results 
contribute to the central dossier, while the testing itself may help 
towards a favourable decision by the licensing authority and towards a 
better reception when the product reaches the market. 
20. More important are the effects of delays in the registration 
process. Since it takes 9-12 years to develop an NAS, the opportunity 
costs of the money tied up in the process are considerable. A further 
delay increases the penalty correspondingly. Estimates based on data 
supplied by the FDA suggest that in 1984/5 the total costs imposed by 
the general failure to observe the 120-day limit were in the range of 
ECU30-200m, depending on the discount rate chosen, with a most 
probable range of ECU57-82m, corresponding to rates of eight and ten 
per cent respectively. 
21. Another serious problem arising from delays in approval is the 
loss of revenue while the product is in patent. As yet there is no 
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general patent term restoration in the Community, and effective patent 
lives, weighted by national sales, average nine years. Estimates 
derived from average sales of new active substances during the years 
following their introduction suggest that the failure to meet the 
120-day limit caused gross lasses of ECU360-640m to their originators. 
The net lasses are smaller, in part because costs of production must 
be deducted, and in part because of the continued sales of products 
which would otherwise be made obsolete. 
22. The penalties due to the differences between member nations are 
less serious. As has been noted, with the partial exception of France, 
all greatly exceed the 120-day limit. If the minimum practicable time 
for the approva 1 of an NAS under current candi ti ons i s ta ken to be 
one year, then the opportunity costs of delay drop to ECU20-28m and 
the net loss of sales to ECU100-175m. As far as registration is 
concerned, the total cast of the non-Europe i's therefore ECU160-260m 
or 0.5-0.6 per cent of industry costs within the Community (table 3). 
Effective unification of the market would most benefit US companies 
since they introduce the largest number of new active substances. 
23. Approaches to a more unified system of registration have focussed 
on two major al ternat ives 
pan-European registration 
cons ide rab 1 e prob 1 ems wi th 
- mu tua 1 recognition between states and 
agency. Research-based companies see 
bath the se approaches. The re a re doubts 
about the equality of the countries involved. There is sorne feeling 
that north European agencies carry more weight than south European 
ones. The differences of medical culture were thought to raise 
difficulties of mutual acceptability. Registration is not, however, 
thought to be used in a deliberately discriminatory way. 
24. A single European agency would have the advantages of impartiality 
and uniformity of approach. In principle it could provide rapid 
decisions. It might, however, be excessively rigid and bureaucratie; 
the precedent of the FDA, EAG found, was not thought to be 
encouraging. There was sorne anxiety about the standards to be used; 
these would have to be high, but many feared a combination of the most 
severe elements of all national agencies. There was also concern about 
the political acceptability to the individual nations of a central 
authority. 
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25. It does not appear that a central registration authority would be 
much cheaper to run than the present system. The national agencies 
employ the equivalent about 1500 staff at a cast of ECU55-70m to which 
accommodation and related overheads should be added. Allowing for the 
higher salaries prevailing in the USA, this sum is comparable with the 
cost of the drugs and biologies division of the FDA. The European 
national registration agencies are generally under-staffed and savings 
through the creation of a single authority would therefore be limited. 
26. From the standpoint of the pharmaceutical industry the key issue 
is the speed of the registration process. Any change which lengthened 
it would be opposed. Consumers would also benefit from the more rapid 
approval of new substances provided that safety standards were not 
lowered. 
27. The CPMP procedure in force between 1978 and 1985 was not widely 
used because of doubts among large innovative companies about its 
advantages. The current procedure has arised considerably more 
enthusiasm, especially as it is thought to be potentially faster than 
the normal route. 
1.3 Pricing systems, priees and priee competition 
28. As already noted, policies intended to control pharmaceutical 
expenditure are found in all member states of the Community. The 
methods used vary very widely as do average priee levels. The only 
common factors are that all systems incorporate an element of patient 
copayment and the over-the-counter ( OTC) products are exempt from 
regulation. 
29. At one extreme, the FRG leaves pharmaceutical firms free ta set 
priees as they wish. Total expenditure is limited by strong pressure 
on companies ta limit priee increases and on doctors ta economise and 
by a negative list which excludes certain categories of comfort drugs 
from the reimbursement system. The situation in the Netherlands is 
very similar. Priees are high in bath countries. 
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30. In the UK the profitability of pharmaceutical companies is 
controlled. A target level is set for the sector as a whole; the 
target for each fi rm depends on its research effort and on i ts 
contribution to the British economy. Subject to the se constrai nts 
companies are allowed to set the priees at which their products are 
introduced. Irish priees are in practice tied to those in the UK. In 
both countries they are in the middle range. 
31. In principle firms may set their own priees in France, but in 
practice admission to the national reimbursement system is strictly 
controlled. Products are dealt with on an individual basis. The priee 
agreed between the manufacturer and the reimbursement authority 
depends on those of competitive products and on the company' s local 
activities in France. Belgium has a similar system. Priees are low in 
both countries, and especially in France. 
32. Denmark, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain control the priees of 
individual drugs by the use of cost-plus methods, and maintain 
positive lists. Priees are high in Denmark, below average in Italy and 
very low in the other three countries. 
33. In every Community country except the FRG, the priee at which a 
product is introduced cannat subsequently be changed without official 
permission. Such permission is often delayed, refused or made 
contingent on the company expanding its local activities. 
34. As far as the adequacy of priee levels is concerned, the attitude 
of the research-based companies is that sales in the Community market 
should ideally make a substantial contribution to world overhead 
costs, and in particular to the cost of innovation, and to profits. 
Pri ces in Den mark, the FRG and the Nether 1 ands a re cons ide red to be 
. 
'satisfactory' form this point of view and those in the UK and Ireland 
'adequate'. 
35. Pri ces e 1 sewhere are cons ide red to be 1 ess th an adequate. Tho se 
prevailing in France are thought to be strikingly low as were those in 
Italy until recently. Priees in Portugal and Spain are even lower. 
Nevertheless, the major firms continue to sell their products in these 
countries. The reason for this behaviour is that production costs are 
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relatively law, especially at the margin, while most other costs are 
fixed in the short run. It is therefore worth selling in any market in 
which direct costs are covered and sorne contribution is made ta 
overheads. 
36. Official data suggests strongly that total costs vary considerably 
between member countries. In Italy, Portugal and Spain, law priees are 
offset to sorne extent by 1 ow costs and in the FRG hi gh pri ces are 
accompanied by high cast. The UK is unusual in combining above average 
priees with below-average costs, while the reverse is true of France. 
All measures suggest that priees in France are uncomfortably law from 
the standpoint of the French-based industry, which depends heavily on 
its local market. In contrast the UK industry is markedly profitable. 
37. Consumer advocates claim, in opposition ta the standpoint of the 
industry, that pharmaceutical priees are generally excessive and that 
the industry is inefficient in its use of resources. Central costs are 
inflated and conceal unnecessary activity, especially in marketing and 
administration. Priees would be more firmly controlled; alternatively, 
competition should be stimulated. 
38. In relation ta national incarne, total expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals is relatively law in Denmark and the Netherlands, and, 
to a lesser extent, in Ireland and the UK. It is high in France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. These variations result primarily 
from different attitudes to drugs rather than from differences in 
priees. For historical and cultural reasons the propensity to consume 
medicines is unusually high in southern Europe and law in northern 
Europe (paragraph 2). Such attitudes are difficult to change and must 
therefore influence national policies concerning the control of 
pharmaceutical expenditure. 
39. In relation to national priee levels, pharmaceutical products are 
unusually cheap in France, and were so, until recently, in Italy. This 
is not the case in Greece, Portugal and Spain. It is arguable that in 
the former countries priees are strictly controlled in arder to limit 
total expenditure because it is impossible to reduce the volume of 
consumption. In the latter nations, however, law priees correspond to 
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low incarnes. Priees in Denmark, the FRG and the Netherlands are high 
compared to other priees, perhaps because of the combination of free 
pricing, comprehensive health care services and a restrained attitude 
to medicines (table 1 and paragraph 38). 
40. In so far as comparison with other parts of the chemical industry 
is possible, the pharmaceutical industry of the Community appears to 
use its resources with equal efficiency. In most member countries, 
however - France is the principal exception - it appears to be 
appreciably more profitable. 
41. This is probably due to the ways in which priee competition is 
limited by the arrangements for getting drugs to those who need them. 
Most products are available only on prescription (paragraph 1) and 
doctors see their prime duty as well-being of the patient rather than 
economy. The majority of the bill is paid by the state or the 
insurance agency. In most countries the distribution system 
incorporates definite monopoly elements. There is therefore scope for 
higher than normal profits. 
42. To this extent consumer organisations have grounds for their 
criticisms. As presently constituted, the arrangements for 
discovering, making and distributing drugs are as a whole rather more 
expensive than is strictly necessary. The extra profits realised by 
the industry, however, do not appear large while the future benefits 
to be derived from its continued activities are very considerable. It 
is also arguable (paragraph 46) that priee competition is increasing 
in certain significant parts of the pharmaceutical market. Moreover, 
it is obvious that radical alterations to the system would require a 
major political effort. 
43. There is clear evidence that pricing systems may operate in a 
discriminatory way. As already mentioned (paragraphs 30-33}, 
individual priees and profit margins depend in several member 
countries on the scale and nature of a company•s local activities. 
This obviously discriminates in favour of indigenous firms; it also 
promotes the unnecessary decentralisation of particular functions, with 
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potential lasses in economies of production {paragraphs 53-54). 
44. Market distortions arise from the sharp differences in priee 
level. The most obvious sign is parallel importing from law-priee to 
high-price areas. It is seen in Denmark, the FRG, the Netherlands and 
the UK, the main sources of supply being France and Italy. The scale 
of this practice is quite small, however- it accounts for no more than 
0.5 per cent of total Community sales - and has not increased recently. 
It is seen by the industry as an irritant rather than as a major 
threat. 
45. Although priees do not play a major role in the competition 
between pharmaceutical products {paragraph 41), they nevertheless have 
an appreciable if subordinate part. In countries which permit free 
pricing, in-patent products are introduced at priees explicitly 
related to those charged by their competitors. Therapeutic advantages 
justify a premium priee of up to 25 per cent over other medicines in 
the same therapeutic class. 
46. A vigorous market in out-of-patent genric products has recently 
developed in those member countries where priees are high. Priees have 
been forced dawn and reductions in expenditure realised. Such products 
account for eight per cent by value of the UK market and ten per cent 
of that of the FRG and the Netherlands. It may be noted, however, that 
the market is highly imperfect and the originator is normally able to 
retain much of his sales even when charging a premium priee. Official 
action to encourage generic products has been a sine gua non for the 
development of a successful generic sector. 
47. The industry welcomes the transparency directive which it sees as 
a step to reduce and perhaps eliminate discriminatory practices and, 
in particular, pressures to enlarge local activities beyond what is 
commercially desirable. Progress towards convergence of national priee 
levels within the Community is widely anticipated. There is sorne 
anxiety about the basis on which this might take place. The directive 
has been less enthusiastically received by consumer advocates, who 
consider that it will do little to limit the profits of the industry. 
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1.4 The operation of the multinational system 
48. The major pharmaceutical companies operating 
organised on a multinational basis {paragraph 4). 
in Europe are 
This coul d be 
sub-optimal from an economie standpoint. The need to carry out 
operations in many locations could give to lasses in economies of 
scale. The coordination of such an organisation could prove 
excessively expensive. 
49. The research-oriented companies that there would be no worthwhile 
economies of scale in research from the unification of the Community 
market. There are indeed such economies in serious innovative 
research but they have already been realised. Such activity is 
normally concentrated in the firm's country of origin. Where a 
company has major research centres abroad, they have been placed there 
in arder to exploit local expertise. Within the Community such 
centres are placed in the UK or, less frequen'tly·, in France. In a 
unified market there would be no immediate change in this policy. 
50. Local development work is more decentralised. lt does not appear, 
however, that this activity would be much affected by unification. 
Formulation research for specifie markets is best carried out on the 
spot, where local advice and information is most effective and tests 
may be most readily arranged. As has already been seen (paragraphs 
16, 18), local clinical research has promotional and even political 
fu net ions as we 11 as sei en ti fic ones, and may therefore be 
indispensable in practice. 
51. The scope for economies in marketing are also very limited. 
Traditions of medical practice and patterns of consumptions vary 
markedly between member countries {paragraphs 1, 2) and different 
approaches are necessary for each market. Even more to the point, the 
key persan in marketing is the salesman who calls on doctors to 
promote his company•s products. If he is suitably persuasive, he must 
by definition be a native of the country in which he works. In 
practice marketing is always organised on a national basis, and no 
firm interviewed could see any alternative. 
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The 
- 15 -
The possibility of economies in production are more considerable. 
manufacture of pharmaceuticals involves two stages: the 
production of the active materials by extraction, synthesis or 
fermentation, and the conversion of these substances into dosage forms. 
The first of these steps is normally confined to a few sometimes a 
single site in Europe, but the second is often decentralised. A 
common reason is reported to be pressure from host governments, often 
expressed in the course of priee negotiations (paragraphs 30-33, 42). 
Multinational companies agree that to meet these demands is often to 
sacrifice economies of production. 
53. The equipment used for the formulation of active ingredients is 
relatively cheap but the building in which it is put, which requires 
elaborate air-conditioning and ultra-clean facilities is not. The 
total cost of a formulation plant depends not so much on the volume 
of output as on the product mix and on the technology used. Over a 
wide range of output, therefore, it may be taken as fixed. The number 
of such installations within the Community much exceeds need. 
American multinationals report that their European formulation plants 
were often working at between one third and one-half their capacity. 
54. Assumi ng this to be genera lly true, th en between one-ha 1f and 
two-thirds of all formulation plants belonging to the multinational 
companies are surplus to requirements. There are approximately 250 
such plants within the Community. If they are conservatively valued 
at either ECU 10 or 20m each then the extra capital employed is in the 
range ECU 1250-3333m. If they were eliminated then, assuming a 
10-year lifetime for this kind of installation, the annual saving 
would be ECU 125-333m. 
55. If it is further assumed that the extra production could be 
provided by existing plants with no further labour then the reduction 
in employment may be tentatively estimated at a maximum of between 
12,500 and 16,500 persans. Labour costs would drop by ECU 225-295m. 
The total saving in production costs \'IOuld then be ECU350-630m, or 
1.0-1.9 per cent of unit costs. If priees remained unchanged this 
would increase the trading profits of the Community industry as a 
whole by 7-14 per cent; alternatively spending on R & 0 might be 
raised by 8 - 15 per cent. 
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56. It should, however, be emphasised that these gains are markedly 
hypothetical. Multinational companies commented that in many cases 
their local activities were beneficial to them. In sorne countries, 
notably France, they are a condition of receiving an adequate priee. 
In Germany, although pressures of this kind were absent, the free 
market permits relatively high priees which are advantageous in those 
export markets in which they are linked to those in the country of 
origin. More generally, firms feel an obligation to behave as 
corporate citizens of their host countries. Their local plants 
already exist, and it would be politically unacceptable and 
commercially damaging to shut them dawn. 
57. Multinational companies do not think that there are appreciable 
direct costs in running Europe-wide networks of subsidiaries. Most of 
them remarked that the extra staff required to coordinate their 
operations were few. 
58. The unification of the European market would therefore not be 
followed by large changes in the location of facilities. Sorne degree 
of concentration is seen as desirable but would happen slowly. 
Extensive action would have to await changes in pricing systems. Most 
companies indicated that they would continue to maintain production 
facilities in the five major countries of the Community. 
1.5 The results of unification 
59. The savings which might be expected from unification of the 
Community pharmaceutical market have been estimated in a variety of 
more or less plausible scenarios on an exploration of company 
attitudes. They are shawn in table 3. In the first, no concentration 
of facilities takes place but economies due to unified ànd more rapid 
registration are realised (paragraph 22). In the second, 
multinational companies also withdraw all production facilities from 
Greece and Portugal. In the third, they further reduce the number of 
formulation plants which they operate by 50 per cent in France and by 
25 per cent each in Italy and Spain. The production lost by these 
countries is transferred to the FRG and the UK. 
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TABLE 3 SAVINGS IN DIRECT COSTS OF OPERATION TO COMPANIES AND COUNTRIES THROUGH THE 
UNIFICATION OF THE COMMUNITY MARKET ON A 1984 BASIS 
(For the three scenarios see para 59) 
Origin of firrns FRANCE FRG UK USA SWITZ OTHER TOTAL 
SCENARIO 1 
Savings to firrns 
- rn ECU: lower value 10.7 23.4 17.6 65.6 28.6 14.1 160 
upper value 17.2 37.7 28.3 105.6 46.6 25.3 260 
-
As % unit costs 
lower value 0.19 0.26 0.51 0.91 1.34 0.22 0.48 
upper value 0.30 0.40 0.82 1.47 2.10 0.39 0.77 
SCENARIO 2 
Absolute saving rn ECU 
Law value 18.5 29.6 23.8 84.3 31.7 15.7 204 
High value 28.9 47.0 37.6 133.6 50.7 27.6 325 
Reduction in unit 
Costs % 
Law value 0.32 0.34 0.70 1.17 1.43 0.24 0.61 
High value 0.50 0.53 1.09 1.86 2.15 0.43 0.96 
SCENARIO 3 
Absolute saving rn ECU 
Law value 22.8 39.3 34.4 116.4 35.8 19.8 269 
High value 46.2 88.6 61.9 227.7 65.8 42.7 533 
Reduction in unit 
costs % 
Law value 0.40 0.44 1.00 1.62 1.68 0.30 0.79 
High value 0.81 1.00 1.81 3.17 3.08 0.66 1.57 
Source: Authors' estirnates 
- 532 - - 18 -
60. The savings realised range from a minimum of 0.5-0.8 per cent of 
European unit costs ta a maximum of 0.8-1.6 per cent. These savings 
would accrue primarily ta companies operating on a multinational basis 
in a large number of member nations. They are proportionately 
greatest for US firms followed by those based in Switzerland and, at 
sorne distance, by the UK. Because these estimates relate ta all 
companies of a particular nationality it shculd be remembered that 
this reduction in unit costs might be considerably higher or lower for 
individual firms, depending on their circumstances. 
61. The funds sa liberated might be used ta increase investment in R & 
D, with a positive effect on competitive strength. For the Community 
as a whole research budgets could rise by between five and 18 per 
cent. However, as noted a bave, the main bene fi ts wou 1 d be fe 1 t by 
companies based outside the Community. 
62. The effects of maves towards common pricing have been explored. 
Cou nt ri es in whi ch this entai 1 ed genera 1 i ncreases in the pri ce of 
pharmaceuticals would have ta spend more on consumption but would 
simultaneously become more attractive as centres for production, since 
local production is always a major source of supply for the local 
market in the larger member countries of the Community. Countries in 
which priees fell would experience the reverse. Harmonisation on a 
basis which maintained total Community expenditure would benefit 
French and Italian firms and would have adverse effects on those of 
the FRG. UK, US and Swiss firms would break even. Harmonisation on a 
basis which reduced expenditure would be unambiguously unfavourable 
for all. 
63. In the longer term the effect of unifying the European market will 
be to make the strong stronger and the weak weaker. Firms which have 
depended on the favour of their governments will suffer, while those 
who are already highly competitive will flourish even more. The 
elimination of marginal companies should concentrate resources on the 
more efficient and enable them ta exploit the opportunities of the 
future the more profitably. Accelerated progress towards a two-tier 
pharmaceutical industry, in which companies are either very large or 
relatively small, seems probable. 
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PREFACE 
The Commission of the EC, strongly supported by the European Parliament, bas 
initiated a project on 'The costs of non-Europe', and the benefits of 
"completing" the Community' s Interna! Market by the end of 1992. The 
steering committee, chaired by Mr Paolo Cecchini, decided that the work 
could benefit from an exploratory study of the Internai Markets of the US 
and Canada, in particular, their remaining 'incompleteness' as well as the 
costs and benefits. 
The present paper aims to analyze the nature of the Interna! Market of the 
USA, with special attention for its remaining fragmentation, and that of 
Canada, with its fragmentation too, as well as the nature and scope of 
non-tariff barriers and other distortions discussed in the Canada-US free 
trade area talks. A second objective is to come to an assessment of costs 
and benefits of the barriers inside the two Internal Markets of the USA and 
Canada, respectively, as well as the costs and benefits of the l.anada-US 
free trade area for the Canadian economy. 
The assignment is to provide an exploratory study, not a fully-f ledged 
research product nor a very detailed and minute comparison. A major 
limitation of the paper is that no original research was conducted. The 
basis of the following is literature, interviews and discussion. 
The author is endebted to numerous Canadian and US civil servants, academie 
experts and specialists, who generously helped to gather material and to 
improve the understanding of the many intricate aspects of market 
integration in their countries. Special thanks are due to Mark Vanheukelen 
(DG II, EC Commission}. His painstaking efforts to clarify lots of detailed 
pieces of economie regulation have been indispensable. His insightful 
analytical survey of the empirical economie studies on the impact of the 
US-Canada free trade area on the Canadian economy bas greatly increased the 
quality of this report. Needless to emphasize, however, that only the author 
is responsible for any errors or omissions. 
- 538 -
2 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. In the framework of the research project 'The costs of non-Europe' it 
was considered useful to dispose of a study of the Interna! Market 
arrangements in the US and in Canada as well as the recent endeavour 
of the two countries to establish one North American market. A second 
objective is to provide, whenever possible, a cost/benefit assessment 
of still existing 'barriers' in the two countries and of the removal 
of 'barriers' between the two neighbours. Since the free trade area 
agreement implies an enormous market enlargement for Canada, the 
latter cost/benefit analysis will concentrate on the Canadian case. 
2. The assignment is to provide an exploratory study. The report 
summarized below is not a fully-fledged research product, as no 
original research was conducted and sourcing, interviews and the 
processing of literature and material were limited by time 
constraints. 
3. The main features of the report are four: 
o the context of market integration in the US and in Canada 
o a comparative description of seven 'barriers' within the two 
Interna! Markets 
o an assessment of the market fragmentation caused by each 
'barrier', and its costs, where possible 
o an assessment of the (net) economie benefits of North American 
market integration, especially for Canada. 
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4. The context of market integration in the two countries studied 
differs considerably from that of the European Community today, or 
even from the EC in 1993. It is also important to appreciate 
essential contextual differences between the US and Canada. The 
report highlights a number of non-economie factors, such as 
demographie and geographie determinants of market size, some 
essential historical, constitutional and legal characteristics, and 
key political values. Although the factors are not elaborated, it is 
crucial to take them into account before any possible lesson is 
drawn from the assessments. 
5. The Interna! Markets must also be placed in a wider economie context 
before a proper evaluation of the nature and degree of market 
integration and fragmentation cao be made. The allocative function 
of government - exercized by the choice between the market mechanism 
on the one ha nd and the options of regulation and intervention in 
markets on the other ha nd - is not full y centralized in the two 
federations. However, the degree of delegation of allocative 
functions to the market and the degree of decentralization of 
regulation/intervention interact with two other economie functions 
of government: redistribution and macro-economie stabilization. The 
nature and degree of market integration depend on this interaction, 
and not solely on allocative decisions. 
6. Both Canada and the US have centralized their macro-economie 
stabilization policies. They each have one money and the federal 
government's budget carries a large weight in the national economy. 
There are no interna! exchange controls and the money and capital 
markets are fairly well-integrated. Nevertheless, fiscal policy is 
not fully centralized and this gives rise to both macro-economie and 
allocative issues. The federal governments also assume certain 
general redistributive functions both directly and via 
(co-)financing welfare programmes at subcentral leve!. In both 
countries this central function is closely linked to labour mobility 
as citizens anywhere in the nation are always entitled to equal and 
free access to social security and related benefits. 
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7. The seven categories of 1 barriers 1 were selected in prior 
consultation with the Commission in view of their prominence in the 
White Paper and their expected importance in the two countries. 
1 Barriers 1 are defined as impediments to or artificial 
encouragements of economie mobility between States or Provinces. For 
a discussion of the concept used, the reader is referred to section 
4.1. The seven categories of barriers selected are: (in) taxation, 
public aid, discriminatory public procurement, (in) financial 
services, technical barriers, (in) labour mobility and (in) 
transport. 
8. An elaboration of these barriers for both countries is not possible 
in the executive summary. Nonetheless, without some basic 
description, the assessment cannat be explained at all. A compromise 
is presented in Table EX-1, providing a highly condensed 
presentation of the comparative analysis in the chapters 5 and 6 of 
the report. The reader is warned that this material does not lend 
itself very well to such compression; for a proper understanding it 
remains indispensable to consult the main text. 
9. Very little research on the quantitative economie costs (and 
benefits, if any) has been conducted on the intra-US 1 barriers 1 • For 
Canada some simple static estima tes exist. Therefore, the report 
discusses internai 1 barriers 1 in the two countries almost entirely 
in qualitative terms. Hence a 1 ranking 1 of barriers in terms of 
costs is not possible and the following impressions are inevitably 
partly subjective. 
10. In Canada, the most costly 1 barriers 1 are likely to be excises on 
alcoholic beverages (including the restrictions of provincial liquor 
boards); the administrative burden on road haulage flowing from the 
enforcement of the destination principle in fuel taxes; provincial 
subsidy competition; and the administrative burden on road haulage 
flowing from provincial entry regulation and registration fees. It 
is uncertain whether discriminatory public procurement is so costly 
to the economy. Interprovincial tax competition in Canada is 
unimportant in the retail sales tax and persona! income tax and more 
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'barriers' or 
sec tor 
1. taxation 
- sales 
- excises 
5 
TABLE EX-1 
THE INTERNAL BARRIERS IN CANADA AND THE US: 
a summary of facts and costs 
CANADA 
provinces levy retail 
sales tax; rates vary from 
0% to 12%; Ontario 7%; 
Quebec 9%, distances 
prevent major distortions; 
fiscal cross-border 
shopping is exceptional. 
excises differ among pro-
vinces but the main issues 
are with alcoholic 
beverages and motor fuel; 
local preferences through 
liquor boards' rules are 
combined with restrictions 
to m1n1m1ze cross-border 
shopping; wine and spirits 
excises can be much higher 
than in the US; fuel 
excises differ also but 
the major concern of 
provinces is that miles 
travelled by trucks in a 
province are roughly 
proportional to fuel 
bought locally (via extra 
administrative controls). 
USA 
states and local 
authorities levy retail 
sales tax; rates (incl. 
local) vary from 0% to 9%; 
many states exempt various 
basic needs, but often in 
different ways; certain 
states tax services, 
others don' t; geographical 
distribution and distances 
prevent major distortions; 
only few identifiable 
cases of fiscal 
cross-border shopping. 
states levy excises espe-
cially on cigarettes, 
alcoholic beverages and 
motor fuel; state 
cigarettes excises vary 
from 2 cents a pack up to 
29 cents; large scale 
cigarette bootlegging is a 
federal crime; individual 
cross-border shopping is 
accepted and can be sub-
stantial; spirits excises 
differ enormously from 
$1.50 to $6.50 (often 
combined with state mono-
poly systems); random 
checks on cross-border 
shopping of all alcoholic 
beverages; state motor 
fuel excises vary from 8 
cents to 19 cents a 
gallon, with cumbersome 
fuel use administration 
for trucks (per state). 
- 542 -
- corporate 
- personal 
income 
2. public aid 
- subsidies 
- tax breaks 
6 
provincial rates vary from 
10% to 16%; federal tax 
collection agreement for 7 
smaller provinces (i.e. 
identical base); there is 
uniformity for multi-
provincial firms in 
apportioning tax revenue 
among provinces. 
rates vary somewhat among 
provinces; base is 
harmonized through federal 
tax collection agreement 
(exc. Québec); 
progressivity structure is 
similar; provincial tax 
credits may differ but not 
much. 
vigorous subsidy competi-
tion among provinces; no 
federal supervision via 
Ottawa or the Supreme 
Court; great variety of 
instruments, frequently 
'off-budget' (via 'crown' 
corporations or special 
funds); subsidy compe-
tition is reduced via 
federal regional 
programmes. 
numerous; limits (for 
corporate tax breaks) are 
set by the federal 
state (marginal) rates 
vary from 0% to 11,5%, 
ignoring all kinds of 
special cases; however, 
states compete via 
exemptions, too; 5 states 
have no corporate tax; 
unitary taxation is not 
forbidden, though strong 
pressures discourage it 
somewhat; altogether, 
interstate corporate tax 
competition has reduced 
average state corporate 
tax revenue below 5% of 
all state revenues. 
rates vary considerably 
among states, the highest 
marginal rates ranging 
from 10% to 13,5% in nine 
states and lower in other 
(bef ore the recent tax 
ref orms; t o be reduced t o 
four) states; seven states 
have no personal income 
tax and three levy only a 
tax on interest & 
dividends; state/local 
income tax is deductible 
for federal income tax 
purposes (reducing the 
impact of interstate tax 
competi- tion); federal 
and states' tax base not 
harmonized. 
all states have inward-
investment promotion 
activities, but direct 
state aids are very 
modest, major instruments 
are infrastructural, 
easier access to capital 
and various tax exemp-
tions; many states' laws 
forbid production sub-
sidies; commerce clause 
enforcement is another 
major constraint. 
numerous; especially on 
construction, initial 
outlays for plant and 
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3. procurement 
- forma! 
- informa! 
4. financial 
services 
- banking 
7 
collection agreement for 
the 7 smaller provinces, 
but not for the three 
bigger ones (as they opted 
out) 
complete constitutional 
freedom for provinces to 
purchase preferentially; 
provincial laws usuallyset 
maximum priee diffe-
rences for tendering 
procedures. 
the forma! leeway is 
materially reduced by 
interprovincial sensi-
tivities and tax payers' 
consciousness; neverthe-
less, numerous informa! 
local content requirements 
or 'understandings' are 
reported. (Note: the 
provincial purchases are 
small compared to EC 
Member States, as major 
purchase categories are 
private in Canada or 
federal). 
nation-wide operations 
with, however, quite sorne 
provincial regulation; no 
nation-wide freedom to 
supply cross-border 
banking services; 
efficient national 
clearing; different 
banking functions were 
regulated at federal leve! 
(banks) and provincial 
(near-banks and 
securities); recent 
deregulation upset this 
system somewhat; the 
capital market is truly 
nation-wide and open to 
the world; there are 4 
stock exchanges in the 
country; the banks are few 
physical capital; also 
excise and income tax (for 
immigra ting business 
executives) exemptions are 
used. 
around 20 states have 
preference laws (up to 5% 
priee differentiai in 
bids); states as pur-
chasers are normally not 
constrained by the 
commerce clause. 
there are many anecdotes 
about informa! pressures; 
tax payers' consciousness 
in the US is very nigh, 
however, and blatant 
discrimination (if costly) 
can be politically 
damaging (Note: state 
purchases are small 
compared to EC Member 
States as major purchase 
categories are priva te in 
the US or federal). 
banks can be chartered at 
federal or at state level; 
most supervision is 
federal, but assigned to a 
handful of institutions in 
a complex setting (savings 
and loans as well); frag-
mentation arises out of 
crippling branching 
restrictions: there are 
many thousands of 'unit' 
banks with no branches at 
all; interstate branching 
is forbidden, with groups 
of states sometimes 
allowing exceptions; 
intra-state branching 
prohibitions still exist 
in a number of states. For 
the many complexities this 
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- insurance 
5. technical 
barriers 
8 
in number (5 big ones gives rise to, see section 
attract most business) but 6.2.2. Pressures to reduce 
competition is fierce. this fragmentation are 
most regulation at 
provincial leve!; some at 
federal level; 
far-reaching harmonization 
between provinces has been 
achieved via uniform laws 
proposed by the Asso-
ciation of (provincial) 
Super-intendents of Insu-
rance, close collaboration 
between industry and 
regulators at federal 
leve!, and delegation of 
the control of the finan-
cial integrity of insurers 
to the federal Dept. of 
Insurance; in this way, 
formal provincial powers 
have nevertheless enabled 
effective market 
integration in insurance, 
with considerable 
standardization and mutual 
recognition and 'home 
province control' where 
necessary. 
formally, provinces have 
substantive regula tory 
powers; yet, apart from 
road haulage and a few 
instances in agriculture, 
the re appear to be few 
problems in technical 
regulations. Standards are 
mostly nation-wide; so is 
certification. 
strong: they originate from 
financial stability 
concerns, technology, 
business strategies and 
consumer sources. The costs 
of fragmentation have 
probably decreased for 
consumers due to 
technology, but financial 
instability costs are still 
high. 
regulated at state leve! 
since Congress has 
explicitly allowed for 
this. Licensing of 
insurers and brokers per 
state and divergent state 
regulations lead to 
serious fragmen- tation, 
although formally the 
freedom of services is 
nation-wide. States refuse 
'home state control', so 
super-vision is expensive 
and duplicative. 
Regulation extends to 
rates (at times very 
strict), solvency, 
insurance products, taxes 
and fees, and licensing -
there is reciprocity for 
licensing agents and 
brokers. Costs are further 
increased by almost 
permanent legislative 
drift in many states 
(recently again in 
response to the problems 
in product liability 
insurance). 
although standard writing 
is (privately) organized 
in an extreme·ly 
complicated way, the 
issues arizing are in the 
antitrust area, not so 
much in differences among 
states regulations 
themselves, or the 
standards they refer to. 
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6. labour 
mobility 
- general constitutional rights to 
access travel and to migrate; 
to labour recourse to provincial 
markets social security/services; 
- professions 
nation-wide public 
pension; incomplete 
portability of private 
pensions; some cases of 
preferential provincial 
hiring of labour. 
extensive regulation of 
professional licensing at 
provincial leve!; 
sometimes the local 
professional organizations 
decide on admission; 
minimum residence 
requirements are rarely 
costly (but some are); 
barriers are serious for 
lawyers, pharmacists and 
surveyors, as well as for 
certain skilled craftsmen; 
university education is to 
federal standards in many 
cases (although 
restrictions exist in the 
medical field). 
Standards are nation-wide. 
The major exception is in 
the building codes. 
Nevertheless, the commerce 
clause should not be 
considered as preventing 
differences in technical 
regulations from arising at 
all, and this cao be costly 
in individual cases. 
constitutional rights to 
travel and to migrate; 
recourse to state social 
security/services; fairly 
strict case law to prevent 
preferential hiring. 
extensive regulation of 
professional licensing at 
state leve!; dependent on 
state and professions, 
restrictions cao vary from 
trivial to very serious; 
however, higher education 
in many cases is federally 
oriented or to federal 
(university) standards 
(yet, some states require 
local exams in some 
professions); 
mutual recognition exists 
in some cases, not in 
other there is no 
general rule. 
(Note: mobility is (Note: mobility is 
7. transport 
- registra-
tien 
actually substantial). 
At provincial leve!; until 
'82 license plates for 
every province; now the re 
is 'home-province control' 
with mutual provincial 
recognition of the home 
plate, with an inter-
actually substantial). 
At state level; 
registration reciprocity 
is widespread; 
registration 'fees' 
competition is reduced in 
'compacts' (more than 30 
states), with fees shared 
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- fuel 
- other 
10 
provincial clearing based 
on miles travelled per 
province (i.e. an 
administrative burden). 
fuel taxes differ among 
provinces; the real 
problem is the destination 
principle; fuel tax 
revenues are shared out 
among provinces according 
to miles travelled in the 
province( s), which imposes 
cumbersome administrative 
requirements for road 
haulage. 
licensing before entering 
the road haulage sector 
takes place at provincial 
level (stricter 
regulations for out-of-
province 
sometimes 
Supreme 
reduces 
right). 
truckers are 
validated by the 
Court, which 
the cabotage 
ace. to miles travelled 
(i.e. an administrative 
burden). 
as in Canada, the 
destination of the fuel 
tax revenue is the key 
issue; truckers are held 
to fill tanks proportional 
to miles travelled in the 
various states (or pay the 
excise anyway), and file 
f orms and accounts proving 
this; random checks are 
regularly held. 
43 states have not 
deregulated on intra-state 
transport incl. entry 
barriers and 'fair 
competition' rules which 
can be peculiar;' they can 
create some costs for 
firms operating 
nationwide; property taxes 
and sales taxes on trucks 
differ; on axle/distance 
taxes, there is even tax 
retaliation among certain 
states. 
NOTE: For a proper evaluation, this list of barriers should be read 
together with the assessment in the text. The economie context, the 
benefits and minor costs are not indicated in this summary. Details are 
ignored. 
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pronounced for corporate taxes. 
complications but in reality, 
Financial services present sorne 
fragmentation has been largely 
prevented. The costs of having formai provincial powers in insurance 
are negligeable as harmonization is almost complete. There are hardly 
any problems with securities, but near-banks cause regulatory and 
supervisory costs. Technical barriers are exceptional in Canada. 
Migration for the professions can be onerous in sorne cases; 
uncertainty exists because of local admission procedures. 
11. In the US, the most costly 'barriers' include interstate tax 
competition in general, interstate branching prohibitions in banking, 
state regulation in direct insurance and administrative burdens 
connected to interstate road transport arrangements. 
Interstate tax competition is so fierce in the US that it covers 
almost any conceivable tax, including death taxes and gambling taxes. 
In sales taxes there is only a moderate spread of rates, but this is 
likely to be related to transaction costs for non-marginal cross 
border shopping, given the absence of fiscal frontiers (so, one could 
argue that sales tax competition is also fierce but restrained by 
open borders). In excises, competition is stronger, and complemented 
by non-fiscal (f. i. administrative) measures to secure tax revenues 
for the state of consumption. These measures even lead to cooperation 
among the States and, in cigarettes, to federal law enforcement for 
the States' purposes! In corporate and persona! income matters, tax 
competition is strong; in corporate taxes, exemption policy and other 
tax breaks play a role as near-subsidies. State subsidies are of 
trivial importance and public procurement discrimination seems only 
marginally more costly. Technical barriers in interstate commerce are 
effectively minimized (if not removed) by commerce clause case-law 
but, to sorne extent, state technical regulation and their differences 
may still lead to higher costs for multi-state business; standards 
and certification present few problems, however. Interstate mobility 
of the professions sometimes seems to be hampered by overly strict 
regulation, including licensing and supervision. Since national 
standards for professions and university education are well-accepted, 
mobility costs are generally not increased more than marginally. 
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12. Finally, in both countries incident al 'barriers' can be identified 
outside the selected group of seven categories. They remain outside 
the scope of this report (for an impression of this problem, see 
sections 5.1 and 6.1). 
13. A cost/benefit perspective of the fragmentation and integration of 
the interna! markets of the US and of Canada requires, t10wever, a 
broader set of criteria. Looking strictly to 'barriers' as 
impedimenta to access to state/provincial markets or as artificial 
encouragement of inward economie mobilities might provide a singular 
emphasis on 'costs'. From this angle, 'benefits' would be identified 
only for sectoral or regional interests, with the national economy 
presumably suffering an overall welfare loss. Given the nature of the 
Commission's research project 'The costs of Non-Europe', this report 
does not address the benefits of sectoral groups. 
14. The problem is quite different with regional interests. Of course, at 
regional leve! sectoral lobbies will attempt to present their case in 
terms of 'regional' benefits. If and only if this is all there is to 
the political economy of 'barriers', the mere concentration on costs 
to the national economy would be proper. But in federal countries, 
this cannot always be correct. It is conceivable to design a mode! 
federal country where market integration is complete, and where 
subcentral governments are only involved in purely regional 
expenditure and regulation (with no spill-over effects to other 
subcentral economies). Neither the US nor Canada fully respond to 
this mode!. Since they do not, 'barriers' must be presumed to 
generate certain 'benefits', as elements of political support to the 
federalist structure of government. 
15. If there are 'benefits' of plurality, variety or diversity, two 
questions emerge in the context of this report: 
(a) given the constitutionally assigned powers and politically agreed 
division of labour between the central and the subcentral 
governments - i.e. the 'benefits' - are these powers utilized in 
such a way as to achieve the highest degree of market integration? 
In other words, given the 'benefits' of a federal structure, are 
the 'costs' of fragmentation minimized? 
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(b) The 'benefits' of diversity may include more than the 
satisfaction of having one' s own regional government with some 
powers to satisfy local preferences. To what extent, then, do 
regional regulation and intervention (in the US and Canada) yield 
benefits to the national economy, that are not captured by the 
focus on their distortive nature as 'barriers'? 
16. If the immaterial, but genuine, 'benefits' of a federal structure are 
expressed in regional competences with a market-fragmenting 
potential, the issue is one of cast minimization. A variety of 
approaches are used in the two countries. 
o federal judicial review on the kind of measures, allowed to 
affect market integration; in the US the commerce clause case-law 
goes very far in protecting interstate commerce from state 
measures; in Canada, the interprovincial economie mobilities are 
also protected but there is more attention to preserve the 
effective economie powers of the provinces (the 'benefits'). 
o a complementary factor in bath countries is the threat of federal 
preemption, possible under the constitution but not utilized so 
as to increase the 'benefits' of decentralization. The threat 
tends to become more credible as the costs of fragmenting 
subcentral measures increases, thereby having the effect of 
curbing local protectionist pressures. In the insurance market in 
the US, states can only retain current powers if they find 
mechanisms keeping the costs of fragmentation acceptable, so that 
federal pressure to preempt does not build up. In the US banking 
market, inters tate branching prohibitions in federal laws have 
been threatened a number of times; in the distant past, new 
measures bordering on the problem have been used as palliatives 
(federal deposit insurance being one); during the last few 
decades more and more routes of evasion have been agreed or 
condoned at federal leve!, leading at state leve! to a measured 
relaxation of the prohibition as a response since 1985. In 
Canada, the federal government delegated raad transport 
regulation to the provinces in the early 1950's and the mounting 
irritation about the costs of fragmentation (against the backdrop 
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of a constitutions! debate on an 'economie bill of rights' 
guaranteeing market integration) forced the provinces to reduce 
these costs in the early 1980's. 
o cooperation among the States or Provinces. For subcentral 
governments this has the advantage of retaining powers (and, 
whenever relevant, tax revenues), while reducing fragmentation, 
duplication or harmful competition. Both countries have developed 
legal techniques that greatly reduce costly differences in 
regional laws and procedures: the major instrument is Uniform Law 
Codes, but sometimes unif orm insurance policies exist or 
identical procedures. Cooperation may extend to 'mutual 
recognition' (e.g. licensing insurance brokers in US States) but 
not frequently (e.g. rarely in licensing insurers). Mutual 
recognition is approximated, however, in cases where national 
standards (technical; diploma's) are used as references in 
regional laws; some costs remain in such cases, as licensing 
procedures may still be required. Cooperation is also developing 
in joint institutions (cf. solvency investigation of non-US 
insurers by the NAIC, seeking licenses in a State), in interstate 
compacts (sharing truck registration fees, for instance, or, 
allowing limited reciprocal interstate bankbranching) and in 
joint lobbying organisations (promoting federal-subcentral 
cooperation so 
'harmonization'). 
as to reduce 
Cooperation can 
fragmentation or enhance 
go as far as delegating 
administrative execution (tax collection agreements in Canada; 
some insurance controls in Canada) or enforcement power (checks 
on cigarette bootlegging in the US) to the federal government. In 
the case of administrative execution this increases uniformity as 
a condition to the federal task (e.g. a uniform tax base). In the 
case of cigarette bootlegging, however, it has reduced the 
constraint of (illegal) cross-border trade, thereby increasing 
the freedom of the States to raise excises. 
17. Are there other benefits of regional powers to the national economy, 
that are not captured by the focus on their distortive nature as 
'barriers'? If so, they would have to be weighed against the 'costs' 
of barriers. The report does not discuss this question in any detail. 
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For a good understanding of how Canadians and Americans perceive the 
côst/benefit issue, it is nevertheless valuable to identify briefly 
these other benefits. This may well have some relevance to the 
Community 1 s own assessment of costs and benefits of the 1 remaining 1 
fragmentation of its Interna! Market. 
o under appropriate conditions, the combination of a high degree of 
market integration with some remaining subcentral powers 
generates the benefits of 1 competitive federalism 1 • The idea is 
that citizens and firms can signal dissatisfaction with taxes, 
public goods and services and regulation by interstate/provincial 
migration. Subcentral governments may also compete with respect 
to the nature and intensity of interventions in the goods and 
services markets, set ting different objectives or imposing 
different costs for given targets. More generally, subcentral 
government performance is subject to competitive challenges from 
other subcentral governments, and this may prompt policies to be 
more responsive. In the Padoa- Schioppa report this idea is 
echoed as 1 competition-among-rules 1 • The benefits flowing from 
such competition cannot be available when central powers are the 
alternative. On the other hand, for the benefits to materialize, 
a fairly high degree of market integration must be achieved 
(especially for factors of production) for migation to serve as a 
disciplining factor. This applies, mutatis mutandis, to product 
and services market integration. In other words, in the EC 
context, the complet ion of the White Paper is essential bef ore 
this benefit could be enjoyed. Note that neither in the US nor in 
Canada competition among rules, among tax regimes and public 
goods has led to a removal of diversity, or to overall 1 low 
standards 1 of whatever activity. For instance, tax competition 
accentuates diversity while at the same time finding a minimum 
standard in the desired ability everywhere to provide good 
infrastructure, certain merit goods and certain public goods. 
o decentralization fosters innovation, which may or may not spread 
according to its attractiveness. This is a longstanding argument 
against coordination or centralization. The argument is used to 
rationalize powers which currently carry some costs in terms of 
fragmentation. However, it cuts two ways. The mobility of the 
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professions in the US regulated is strie ter than necessary, due 
to rapid inters tate imitation of 'innovations', thereby having 
made inters tate mobility more costly. On the other hand, where 
deregulation is proving successful, a possibly benef~cial 
side-product of spreading regional deregulation is improved 
market integration (cf. banking in Canada, led by Québec; road 
transport deregulation in the US). 
o finally, and not surprising for federalist countries, in a number 
of policy areas, the mere avoidance of central policies or 
regulation is perceived as a benefit, worth some costs of 
fragmentation. In Canada this point is related to the peculiar 
economie geography of the country (chapter 2 and section .).1), 
which causes federal sectoral policies to benefit certain clearly 
identifiable provinces at the expense of other equally clearly 
identifiable ones. However, in both countries, there are also 
political objections which fall outside the scope of this report. 
18. The recently signed but still not ratified US-Canadian free trade 
agreement is discussed in the last two chapters. 
Three questions are addressed. First, was the expectation borne out 
that the negotiating parties would move beyond mere free trade to a 
kind of common market, possibly the only case comparable to the White 
Paper? The answer is clearly no. Although from a GATT perspective, 
the agreement is ambitious and may be a helpful exercise for the 
Uruguay Round, it falls far short of virtually all the major dossiers 
of the White Paper. Trade in services is not tackled, merely the 
'right of establishment' combined with 'national treatment'. The 
direct investment regime, especially on the Canadian part, is 
conditional and has significant exceptions. What exactly will happen 
to the mobility of the profession is unclear. Even in product trade 
certain restrictions have been 'grandfathered' (i.e. accepted), 
notably for beer, and others have been relaxed only conditionally and 
incompletely. On subsidies, no agreement was reached but new rules 
are nevertheless announced as a basis for 'binding' dispute 
settlement; however, all this has to be agreed in the next five to 
seven years. In other words, there are reasons to be sceptical about 
Congress's willingness to give up its power of countervailing duties 
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bef ore March 3, 1988 (the deadline of the 'fast track' procedure) 
without having the slightest idea about the principles and the rules 
on subsidies. 
19. Second, the North American free trade area (NAFTA) negotiations 
called forth the question whether states and provinces would give up 
regulatory and subsidy powers for the sake of bilateral economie 
intercourse, although these powers are on the whole seen as essential 
to federalism. The short answer is that subcentral governments, 
especially in Canada, have informally influenced the negotiations in 
such a way that competences have hardly or not been undermined. 
Possibly, NAFTA may force provinces and states to exercise their 
economie powers in a less costly fashion. Thus, it is conceivable 
that the cost minimlzation, discussed in para. 16 tinfra), is 
facilitated by bilateral or multilateral liberallzation, if only it 
is stringent enough. However, it does not imply that the assignment 
of economie competences to the two levels ot government in both 
federations is called into question. 
20. The third reason to study NAFTA is the rich Canadian economie debate 
on the impact of the enormous market enlargement it implies for 
Canada. The economie methodology as well as the orders of magnitude 
found are of obvious interest to the 'cost of non-Europe' project. 
Methodological issues are especially important as Canadian economists 
have published path-breaking work on NAFTA, using general equilibrium 
models with economies of scale and imperfect competition (here: priee 
collusion behind protection). This also enables to break out of the 
narrow confines of traditional partial-equilibrium estimates (based 
on 'welfare triangles'), which are known to yield too low estimates 
of welfare effects of trade liberalization, given their assumptions. 
21. Chapter 8 discusses in some detail (adapted) partial equilibrium 
estimates, general equilibrium model estimates and those from large 
macro-econometrie models, including some methodological issues. For 
the purpose of this study it is important that these different 
approaches produce empirical estimates much larger than the simple 
traditional approaches. Nevertheless, the empirical problems are 
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considerable: general equilibrium model estimates vary but go up to a 
high of 9% GDP increase, whereas the macro-econometrie estimates 
(after 10 years) move between 1.9% and 3.3% GNP increase (as well as 
different. employment increases). Amongst a number of empirical 
puzzles one has to solve when using these models, the proper 
calculation of the 1 height 1 of 1 non-tariff barriers 1 in the product 
market - not to spreak of services or factors - and the assumed 
reactions on their removal stand out as particularly difficult. All 
in all, the work on the economie impact of NAFTA on Canada supports 
the methodological direction of the 1 Costs of Non-Europe 1 project 
with respect to the goods markets and the empirical results for 
Canada lend plausibility to the range of estimates on the EC of 1992. 
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Criticism is expected and welcome. Such an enterprise cannot be 
immune to imperfection and even perhaps error. However the. 
overall outcome of the research, which points to very 
significant gains to be derived from European market 
integration, seem to be both, accurate and reasonable. It is 
highly unlikely that the intellectual input of so many leading 
consultants, academies, officials and independent experts would 
be unanimously pointing in the wrong direction. 
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